Leanna Resetich and Ross Resetich v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1762
Filed September 10, 2015
LEANNA RESETICH and ROSS RESETICH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Paul L. Macek,
Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal a district court order denying a new trial based upon
alleged juror misconduct. AFFIRMED.
William J. Bribriesco and Anthony J. Bribriesco of William J. Bribriesco
& Associates, Bettendorf, for appellants.
Eric M. Knoernschild and Amber J. Freyermuth of Stanley, Lande
& Hunter, P.C., Muscatine, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, J.
We must decide whether the district court erred in excluding a juror
affidavit proffered to support a claim of irregularity and misconduct in connection
with a jury’s damage award.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Leanna Resetich was involved in a car accident with another vehicle. She
and her husband sued Leanna’s automobile insurance carrier for underinsured
motorist coverage and loss of consortium. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the Resetichs for $48,000, but found Leanna 45% at fault. Accordingly, the
district court reduced the judgment to $26,400.
The Resetichs filed a motion for new trial. In part, they alleged irregularity
in the proceedings and misconduct. In support of these allegations, they
attached a juror affidavit attesting that the jurors considered Leanna’s fault in
calculating damages, in contravention of an instruction “not [to] take into
consideration any reduction of damages due to Leanna Resetich’s fault.”
The district court concluded “the affidavit [was] not admissible as
evidence” but, even if it was, “the affidavit [did] not bring into play any outside
influence or extraneous prejudicial information.” The court denied the irregularity
and misconduct grounds of the motion because the affidavit “relate[d] directly to
the jury’s internal deliberations.” The Resetichs appealed.
II. Juror Affidavit
The Resetichs argue the district court “erred in ruling that the [] affidavit
was not admissible to support [their] [m]otion for a [n]ew [t]rial.” State Farm
responds with error preservation concerns. On our review of the trial record, we
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are convinced the Resetichs preserved error. Accordingly, we proceed to the
merits. Because the Resetichs’ claims of irregularity and misconduct relate to
the substance of the verdict, our review is for errors of law. See Lund v.
McEnerney, 495 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Iowa 1993); see also Weatherwax v. Koontz,
545 N.W.2d 522, 524 (Iowa 1996) (“The appropriateness of any inquiry into jury
deliberations is a legal question which we review on error.”).
Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.606(b) governs the admissibility of the affidavit.
The rule states:
[A] juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of
anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection
therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly
brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror’s affidavit or
evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about
which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for
these purposes.
(Emphasis added.) The official comment to the rule states: “Rule 606(b) [now
Rule 5.606(b)], like Iowa common law, protects the sanctity of the jury room
regarding matters that inured in the verdict, while allowing disclosure of
extraneous misconduct.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.606 cmt.
The matter the Resetichs complained of—failure to follow the instruction
on the verdict form—inhered in the verdict. See Dudley v. GMT Corp., 541
N.W.2d 259, 261 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (“Any juror testimony regarding the jury’s
misunderstanding of the instruction is inadmissible.”). Accordingly, the district
court did not err in concluding the juror affidavit delving into this topic was
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inadmissible. See Scwennen v. Abell, 471 N.W.2d 880, 888 (Iowa 1991)
(concluding juror affidavits attesting to consideration of one of the defendant’s
fault were “clearly part of the internal workings of the jury and so inhere in the
verdict” and “the statements may not be relied on to challenge the jury’s verdict”);
Ryan v. Arneson, 422 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 1988) (concluding “[t]he district
court was correct to disregard affidavits of jurors concerning a quotient verdict”);
Abbot v. RJS Elec., No. 05-1959, 2006 WL 2872632, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct.
11, 2006) (concluding jurors’ statements as to how they reached an award
including “what parts of the record the jurors considered, which instructions they
followed, and how they mentally and emotionally reacted” could not be received
“[b]ecause those thought processes inhere[d] in the verdict”); see also
Weatherwax, 545 N.W.2d at 525 (expressing “grave doubts concerning the
admissibility of the juror affidavits or testimony as impeachment of [a] verdict” but
finding it unnecessary to decide admissibility of juror affidavits or statements).
Prendergast v. Smith Laboratories, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 880 (Iowa 1989),
cited by the Resetichs, does not alter our conclusion. We acknowledge the court
concluded “juror testimony is competent to reveal a mistake in the rendition of an
otherwise unanimous verdict.” Prendergast, 440 N.W.2d at 884. But the court
went on to state, “If the issue were whether a verdict may be overturned because
it was induced by the jury’s misunderstanding of the court’s instructions, rule
606(b) would render juror testimony inadmissible for purposes of achieving that
result.” Id.; see also Weatherwax, 545 N.W.2d 522 (“Our Prendergast . . .
holding[] mark[s] the outer limits of acceptable inquiry.”). Misunderstanding of
the instructions is precisely the issue raised by the Resetichs.
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The Resetichs’ claims of irregularity and misconduct are premised on the
juror’s affidavit. Having concluded the district court did not err in finding the
affidavit inadmissible, we further conclude the irregularity and misconduct claims
necessarily fail and the court did not err in denying their new trial motion on these
grounds.
AFFIRMED.
Danilson, C.J., concurs; Doyle, J., dissents.
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DOYLE, J. (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. A new trial on the issue of damages is warranted.
A special interrogatory on the verdict form asked the jury to “[s]tate the
amount of damages sustained by Leanna Resetich by [the fault of the driver of
the other vehicle, Steve Stumpff].” In response, the jury entered $12,000 for past
loss of use of body, $12,000 for present value of future loss of use of body,
$12,000 for past pain and suffering, $12,000 for present value of future pain and
suffering, and $0 for loss of spousal consortium. The jury totaled the damages at
$48,000. In calculating the amount of damages, the juror’s affidavit states:
The jury subtracted . . . Leanna Resetich’s percentage of fault from
[Stumpff’s] percentage of fault in arriving at a net percentage.
Specifically, the jury did the following: 55% fault of [Stumpff] minus
45% fault of Leanna Resetich is equal to 10%. The jury then
multiplied the net percentage of 10% by $480,000.00 ( . . . Leanna
Resetich’s total damages) to arrive at $48,000.00. The $48,000.00,
10% of [the Resetichs’] total damages, was then divided by 4
arriving at $12,000.00. The $12,000.00 was then placed into each
category of damages of Past loss of use of body, Present value of
future loss of body, Past pain and suffering and Present value of
future pain and suffering.
In considering the Resetichs’ motion for new trial on the issue of jury irregularity,
the district court ruled:
The [Resetichs] first argue that the motion for a new trial
should be granted on the basis of irregularity by the jury. This
irregularity is supported by an affidavit signed by a juror. The
affidavit is not admissible as evidence. See Iowa R. Evid.5.606(b);
Ryan v. Arneson, 442 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 1988); Horn v.
Chicoine, 772 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). . . .
Even if the affidavit was considered, the affidavit does not
bring into play any outside influence or extraneous prejudicial
information. Instead, the affidavit relates directly to the jury’s
internal deliberations. For this reason, the [Resetichs’] first two
grounds for a new trial are denied.
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The majority concludes the district court did not err in finding the affidavit
inadmissible. I disagree.
Although one may reasonably view the juror affidavit as evidence of the
jury either ignoring or misunderstanding the instructions—evidence verboten
under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.606(b)—I see it a little differently. I believe the
affidavit shows a mistake in the completion of the verdict form by the jury. My
reading of the affidavit is that the jury unanimously concluded Leanna Resetich’s
damages totaled $480,000, for that figure was the basis upon which the jury
made all its calculations.1 That figure was not entered on the line of the verdict
form reserved for total damages. Consequently, the verdict form does not reflect
the actual agreement reached by the jury.
Rule 5.606(b) “does not suggest that juror testimony which aids in
establishing that which was agreed upon by the jury is prohibited.” Prendergast
v. Smith Labs., Inc., 440 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Iowa 1989). In other words, the rule
rendering juror testimony incompetent to impeach a verdict does not apply to
exclude evidence that the jury made an error in recording an otherwise
unanimous verdict. Id. Here, the jury unanimously agreed the total damages
were $480,000, but it erroneously recorded the total damages as $48,000 on the
verdict form. Insofar as the affidavit indicates the jury agreed to total damages of
1
State Farm submitted five juror affidavits in support of its resistance to the motion for
new trial. The affidavits, all identical in language, do not dispute that the jury agreed
Leanna Resetich’s damages totaled $480,000. Instead, they all stated: “In determining
damages we concluded that [Leanna Resetich] had failed to prove that all of her injuries
resulted from the motor vehicle accident as opposed to existing before the accident or
being caused by other factors.”
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$480,000, I conclude the juror affidavit is admissible to reveal a mistake in the
rendition of the verdict.
For the above reasons, the district court should have granted a new trial
on the issue of damages.2
2
Reformation of the verdict would have also been an appropriate remedy had it been
requested. “We have allowed reformation of a jury verdict based on juror testimony that
it was inaccurately rendered even where the verdict form returned was facially consistent
and logical.” Prendergast, 440 N.W.2d at 883. Had the Pendergast jury made a finding
of total damages “and then gratuitously assumed the task of reducing the award by
eighty-five percent prior to entering it on the verdict form, we believe reformation of the
verdict, based on juror testimony, would have been proper.” Id.