State of Iowa v. Sonya L. Stark

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1962
Filed December 19, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SONYA L. STARK,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Timothy T.
Jarman, District Associate Judge.
Defendant appeals her conviction and sentence for theft in the third-degree.
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Brenda J. Gohr, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
2
VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
Sonya Stark appeals her conviction and sentence for the crime of theft in
the third degree. Stark argues the district court applied the wrong standard when
ruling on her motion for a new trial. Also, she argues there was insufficient
evidence in the record to support a conviction of theft in the third degree. Because
the district court did not apply the wrong standard when denying the motion for a
new trial and there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On May 9, 2017, Stark and Brandon Grimes went to a Wal-Mart store at
approximately 4:15 in the morning with the intent to steal merchandise and later
sell the merchandise to make “quick money.” The pair entered the store with two
backpacks; each took a cart and then parted ways. The two proceeded to walk
around the store, select various items, and place them in their carts but switched
carts several times. Stark attempted to leave the store with two car batteries in
her cart and was stopped by Wal-Mart employees, who asked to see a receipt.
One battery had been placed in a garbage bag; another in a Walmart bag. At this
point, Stark called Grimes, who abandoned his cart, grabbed the two backpacks,
and met up with Stark. The two quickly left the store; Stark pushed out the cart
with the two batteries, and Grimes left with the two backpacks. An asset protection
employee followed them out to the parking lot to gather license plate information.
Later, Wal-Mart’s management and asset protection generated a list of
merchandise believed to have been stolen. The merchandise was valued at
$776.37, excluding tax.
3
Stark was charged with theft in the third degree, in violation of Iowa Code
sections 714.1(1) and 714.2(3) (2017).1 A jury trial was held on November 7 and
8. At trial, Grimes2 testified the two entered Wal-Mart with the intention to steal
items and that the two did in fact leave with items that neither of them paid for.3
After the first day of trial, defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal.
Defense counsel argued the evidence did not prove the value necessary for theft
in the third degree. Defense counsel renewed the motion at the start of the second
day of trial. The jury entered a guilty verdict for theft in the third degree. Stark filed
a motion for new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment. The State filed a
resistance to both motions and the court denied the same. Stark was convicted
and sentenced to 180 days in jail, 165 days of which were suspended; placed on
probation; and ordered to pay fines and surcharges. Stark appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“Trial courts have wide discretion in deciding motions for new trial.” State
v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998). Claims that the district court failed to
apply the proper standard when ruling on a motion for new trial are reviewed for
1
Iowa Code section 714.1(1) states “[a] person commits theft when the person . . . [t]akes
possession or control of the property of another, or property in the possession of another,
with the intent to deprive the other thereof.” Theft in the third degree is defined as “[t]he
theft of property exceeding five hundred dollars but not exceeding one thousand dollars in
value,” and it is an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 714.2(3).
2
Grimes was also charged with theft in the third degree for this matter. He testified at
Stark’s trial that he pled guilty to the charge.
3
However, at the sentencing hearing on December 4, 2017, Grimes recanted some of his
testimony and claimed he and Stark did not steal the batteries. Instead, he stated Stark
brought the batteries into Wal-Mart, and he claimed he did not remember actually stealing
any items. He further stated he only testified about stealing the batteries because he “was
scared and nervous and that [he] was forced to testify. If [he] didn’t, [he] would spend time
in jail.”
4
correction of errors at law. State v. Wells, 738 N.W.2d 214, 218 (Iowa 2007); see
also Iowa R. App. P. 6.907.
“We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law.”
State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 2000); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.907.
“We will uphold a finding of guilt if ‘substantial evidence’ supports the verdict.
‘Substantial evidence’ is that upon which a rational trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [W]e view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State.” State v. Pace, 602 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Iowa 1999)
(citations omitted).
III. Motion for New Trial Standard
Stark asserts the district court applied the wrong standard when ruling on
her motion for a new trial. Stark claims the district court did not use the weight-of-
the-evidence standard, required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(6).
Defense counsel moved for a new trial during the sentencing hearing, and the
district court made the following ruling:
Well, with respect to the Motion for New Trial, I find that the
weight of the evidence supports the verdict. I was troubled by the
fact that the folks at Wal-Mart didn’t go and itemize the particular
products that were left in the shopping cart inside the store, but I
believe that the total value of the property gathered together by the
defendant and her accomplice was far in excess of the minimum
necessary for Third Degree Theft. Of course, much of it was left
behind so it creates a problem for restitution purposes, but for
purposes of deciding that, the value of the property intended to have
been stolen by the defendant and her accomplice was more than
enough to support the verdict of guilty on the charged offense, that
being Theft in the Third Degree. As a result, the Motion for New Trial
is overruled and denied.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(6) states a court may grant a
new trial “[w]hen the verdict is contrary to law or evidence.” In State v. Ellis, our
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supreme court held “contrary to the evidence” in Rule 2.24(2)(b)(6) must be
interpreted to mean “contrary to the weight of the evidence.” 578 N.W.2d 655, 657
(Iowa 1998).4
The weight-of-the-evidence standard requires the district
court to consider whether more “credible evidence” supports the
verdict rendered than supports the alternative verdict. It is broader
than the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard in that it permits the
court to consider the credibility of witnesses. Nonetheless, it is also
more stringent than the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard in that
it allows the court to grant a motion for new trial only if more evidence
supports the alternative verdict as opposed to the verdict rendered.
The question for the court is not whether there was sufficient credible
evidence to support the verdict rendered or an alternative verdict, but
whether “a greater amount of credible evidence” suggests the verdict
rendered was a miscarriage of justice.
In contrast to a motion for a new trial brought under the
sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, a motion for new trial brought
under the weight-of-the-evidence standard essentially concedes the
evidence adequately supports the jury verdict. Consequently, a
district court may invoke its power to grant a new trial on the ground
the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence only in the
extraordinary case in which the evidence preponderates heavily
against the verdict rendered.
State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016) (citations omitted).
While the district court did not use the precise terminology, the district court
did engage in a weighing of “credible evidence” and found the “weight of the
evidence supports the verdict.” See id. The district court evaluated the testimony
from Wal-Mart employees in determining whether such testimony was credible and
found the items Stark and Grimes intended to steal were valued “in excess of the
minimum necessary for Third Degree Theft.” While the district court did not use
the words “contrary to the weight of the evidence,” we find it did apply the correct
4
The supreme court in Ellis cites to rule 23(2)(b)(6), however this rule has been
renumbered and is now cited as Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(6).
6
standard by weighing the credible evidence to determine “whether ‘a greater
amount of credible evidence’ suggests the verdict rendered was a miscarriage of
justice.” See id.IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Stark argues there was insufficient evidence to prove she committed third-
degree theft. Additionally, she argues, based on the insufficient evidence, the
district court inappropriately denied her motion for judgment of acquittal. Theft in
the third degree requires the stolen items to be valued between $500 and $1000.
Iowa Code § 714.2(3). Stark claims the only merchandise she intended to deprive
Wal-Mart of was two car batteries that she took out of the store, which are valued
at just over $200 in total.
According to the record, Stark and Grimes entered Wal-Mart with the
intention of stealing merchandise and selling it for money. In addition to the two
car batteries, surveillance video depicted Grimes putting merchandise in his
backpacks and walking out of the store with the backpacks. Grimes testified that
“four or five DVD complete sets” were also stolen from the store. After the two left,
Wal-Mart employees itemized the merchandise they believed the two either took
or intended to take based on the surveillance video. The total value of all the
merchandise was $776.37. At trial, Wal-Mart employees testified about the value
of the merchandise the two gathered, and the surveillance video was shown to the
jury. Since the jury was able to hear this testimony as well as view the surveillance
video, it is reasonable that “a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Pace, 602 N.W.2d at 768. Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient evidence to find Stark
7
guilty of theft in the third degree, and therefore, the district court’s denial of the
motion for judgment of acquittal was appropriate because substantial evidence
supports the conviction. See State v. Hernandez, 538 N.W.2d 884, 887–88 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1995) (“We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based
on insufficient evidence under a substantial evidence standard.”).
V. Conclusion
We find the district court did not apply the wrong standard when ruling on
the motion for a new trial. In addition, we find there was sufficient evidence to
support a finding of theft in the third degree.
AFFIRMED.