Brian Sydnes v. Iowa Department of Human Services

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1862
Filed November 9, 2016
BRIAN SYDNES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A. Romano,
Judge.
A father appeals a founded assessment of child abuse by mental injury by
the Department of Human Services and his placement on the central registry.
AFFIRMED.
Tammy M. Westhoff Gentry of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble
Gentry, Brown & Bergmann, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and David Van Compernolle and
Teresa M. Baustian, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
2
TABOR, Judge.
Brian Sydnes appeals the district court’s ruling on judicial review
upholding the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) founded assessment
of child abuse by mental injury involving his daughter, J.S., and his placement on
the central registry. He raises three claims: (1) the DHS violated his right to due
process, (2) the DHS ruling is not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) the
DHS gave “undue credence” to the prior child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA)
adjudication.
Like the district court, we reject all three challenges to the DHS actions.
First, although the DHS did not provide Brian with statutory notice in a timely
manner, this failure did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because
Brian received actual notice he was the target of the DHS investigation in time to
provide a meaningful response. Second, substantial evidence supports the DHS
ruling. Third, because our legislature has determined a CINA adjudication “may
be determinative” in a contested case proceeding, the DHS gave the adjudication
proper deference and weight.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
The child at issue in this case is J.S., the teenage daughter of Brian and
O.S. J.S. and her two younger siblings experienced emotional distress related to
the contentious divorce of their parents. The most serious manifestation of that
distress occurred in July 2013, when J.S. attempted suicide by taking an
overdose of ibuprofen. She was admitted to the adolescent psychiatric unit at
the University of Iowa Hospitals. Her treating physician, Dr. Eric Boyum,
contacted the DHS and alleged a mental injury to J.S. caused by both parents.
3
After an investigation by child protection worker (CPW) Theresa Hirst, the
DHS initial assessment, issued on August 9, 2013, determined the allegations of
“mental injury” were unfounded. But after receiving Dr. Boyum’s written report,
the DHS issued a founded assessment as to both parents in an August 16
“mental injury” addendum. The DHS offered services to the family. In early
November 2013, the DHS asked the county attorney to file a CINA petition
alleging negative behavior by Brian and O.S. and expressed “concerns about
whether [J.S.’s] emotional needs are being met in either parent’s home.”
On November 25, 2013, the county attorney filed a CINA petition. The
juvenile court held a contested hearing, and its February 28, 2014 ruling noted
the guardian ad litem and J.S. herself favored the CINA adjudication. The only
party contesting the determination was Brian. The court noted Brian was
“concerned how this ruling may affect his ability to obtain future employment with
government contracts.” The court adjudicated J.S. as CINA under Iowa Code
section 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2013) (regarding parent’s failure to supervise). The court
found, based on clear and convincing evidence, J.S. had suffered emotional
distress and was likely to suffer additional harm due to the argumentative and
unhealthy relationship between her parents. The court ordered J.S. to be placed
in foster care.
Brian filed a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). On
June 10, 2014, the court reaffirmed its ruling on Brian’s failure to supervise and
made an additional finding relevant to this appeal—based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence
4
the parents’ behavior led to adjudication of J.S. as CINA under
section 232.2(6)(c)(1) (mental injury caused by the acts of the child’s parents).
Brian appealed the CINA adjudication to this court, alleging he was “being
blamed for the mother’s infliction of mental injury” on J.S. See In re J.S., No. 14-
1014, 2014 WL 4938012, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2014). Upholding the
juvenile court’s ruling, we noted Brian’s focus was misdirected because the
question was not which parent was “more blameworthy” but whether continued
DHS supervision was necessary to ensure the psychological harm to J.S. did not
worsen.1 Id.Meanwhile, Brian challenged the founded assessment and his placement
on the central registry—the basis for this appeal. A contested hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ) occurred on October 7, 2014.2 Two months later,
on December 5, the ALJ issued his proposed decision. The ALJ sustained the
founded child abuse assessment and Brian’s placement on the central abuse
registry under Iowa Code section 232.71D. Brian appealed, and the DHS
director’s December 24 final decision adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision,
stating: “A reasonable and prudent person would not put their own conflicts with
another adult before the medical needs of their own child.”
1
Noting the parents’ emotional battle was not new, this court observed:
An Iowa DHS social worker testified, “All three kids expressed to the
Department that the relationship between the parents is very contentious
and conflictual and that’s causing them emotional distress.” The worker
explained the mother lacks boundaries as to the information she shares
with the children about her critical feelings toward the father and their
ongoing custody issues. The father, while less blatant, also
communicates his negative feelings toward the mother to others, and the
children are aware of those communications. The children are hesitant to
talk to the DHS workers while in the company of their father.
2
An earlier hearing date was continued at Brian’s request.
5
Brian sought judicial review, and after hearing arguments, the district court
affirmed the agency on October 13, 2015. Brian now appeals.
II. Scope and Standards of Review
The DHS is vested with discretion in the area of child abuse and
placement of those who perpetrate abuse on the offender registry. See Grant v.
Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 722 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 2006). “We apply the
standards of judicial review set forth in the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act,
Iowa Code chapter 17A, in our review of the agency’s findings concerning child
abuse reports.” Taylor v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 870 N.W.2d 262, 266
(Iowa Ct. App. 2015). “We review the district court’s decision to see if we reach
the same conclusions.” Id.On judicial review, we are bound by the agency’s findings of fact “if
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Meyer v. IBP, Inc.,
710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006). “In our fairly intensive review,” we consider
“evidence supporting the challenged finding as well as evidence detracting from
it.” Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 814 N.W.2d 512, 525 (Iowa 2012). But “courts
should broadly and liberally apply” the agency’s findings of fact “to uphold rather
than defeat the agency’s decision.” Taylor, 870 N.W.2d at 266 (citation omitted)
(“It is the agency’s duty as the trier of fact, not the reviewing court, to determine
the credibility of the witnesses, to weigh the evidence, and to decide the facts in
issue.”). Record evidence “is not insubstantial merely because it would have
supported contrary inferences.” Id. (citation omitted).
Our review of agency action involving constitutional issues is de novo.
Chiodo v. Section 43.23 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Iowa 2014).
6
III. Due Process
Brian contends the district court erred in upholding the DHS determination
because he was not afforded procedural due process. Brian faults the DHS for
failing to provide a timely notification letter as required by statute. He asks us to
reverse the district court and vacate the founded child abuse assessment against
him.
Brian is entitled to procedural due process in this administrative
proceeding. See Koelling v. Bd. of Trs., 146 N.W.2d 284, 291 (Iowa 1966). But
“all the formalities of judicial proceedings are not essential to constitute due
process of law in an administrative proceeding.” Id. In the context of
administrative agencies, “due process of law is not a term of fixed and invariable
content.” Id. We agree with Brian’s formulation of his right to due process—he
must be provided “notice of the allegations against him in time to provide a
meaningful opportunity to respond.”
We turn to the assessment process utilized here. See Iowa Code
§ 232.71B(1)(a) (requiring the DHS to promptly commence an assessment if it
finds a report is an allegation of child abuse). The DHS, “within five working days
of commencing the assessment, shall provide written notification of the
assessment to the child’s parents.” Id. § 232.71B(2). “If a parent is alleged to
have committed the child abuse, the notice shall inform the parents regarding the
complaint or allegation made regarding the parent.” Id.
UI Hospitals admitted J.S. on July 5, 2013. According to Brian, he then
called the DHS hotline and reported his daughter’s suicide attempt, the emotional
harm inflicted on J.S. by O.S., the physical fighting between O.S. and J.S., and
7
O.S.’s defiance of the court orders. Brian stated the DHS did not accept his
report, finding his allegations did not “rise to the level of neglect or abuse
necessary for assessment.”
The assessment at issue commenced on July 12, 2013, when the DHS
accepted a referral alleging “the mother [O.S.] and father [Brian] have caused a
mental injury to the child [J.S.] by the manner in which they have treated and
spoken to the child. Child is currently a patient at U of I Hospitals.”
On July 15, CPW Hirst spoke to the hospital social worker and learned
J.S., upon admission, was “in a state of depression, anxious, restless, somewhat
oppositional, [and] regretful that her overdose wasn’t successful in killing her.”
The social worker expressed concerns about both parents, telling Hirst each
noted the other’s behavior as the cause of J.S.’s suicidal thoughts.
A different child protection worker interviewed J.S. on July 16; the child’s
condition had improved and she was agreeable to being discharged to her
mother’s care but did not want to go to her father’s home. J.S. told the worker
that in March, when her father was mad about the amount of time she spent on
her iPod, he grabbed her by her arm, “drug her up the stairs,” and later smashed
the device with a hammer. J.S. ran away to a friend’s house and later that
evening went to her mother’s home. J.S. stated she did not live with Brian after
the March 2013 incident.
Four days after the assessment commenced, on July 16, Hirst called Brian
and left a message asking him to call her about “an open child abuse
assessment.” Brian did not return her call. On July 17, Hirst noted “historically,
8
any communication the father has had with the [DHS] has been through email.”
Hirst planned to make further “attempts to interview the child’s father.”
The hospital called Brian on July 18 to inform him J.S. was being released
to her mother. On July 23, Hirst spoke to J.S. for the first time. J.S. said her
father tries to communicate with her but “she just doesn’t want to talk to him.” On
July 24, Hirst noted she still had not received any response from Brian.
Hirst was able to speak with Dr. Boyum by phone on July 29. Dr. Boyum
stated his belief that “both parents are causing mental injury” to J.S. and agreed
to send Hirst a letter stating this opinion. Also on July 29, Hirst sent Brian a letter
again informing him of the open assessment regarding J.S. and requesting Brian
call Hirst to discuss the assessment and “any concerns you may have.” Neither
Hirst’s initial phone message nor this letter informed Brian the assessment
included allegations against him.
Brian drafted a lengthy letter on August 2, stating he was concerned about
the safety of J.S. and the two younger children, “especially in the care of their
mother.” He stated the hospital personnel had attempted to intimidate him by
saying “they were going to report to DHS emotional injury against both parents.”
Brian concluded by stating he had retained an attorney to help him reinstate
supervised visitation with the mother because, otherwise, he feared the mother’s
“emotional and psychological abuse” of the children would only worsen. The
DHS included the entirety of Brian’s letter in its assessment.
9
On August 4, 2013, Hirst sent another letter to Brian, provided him with
two phone numbers, and stated:
I have received your letter on August 2, 2013, regarding your
concerns of the mental health status of [O.S.]. I need to further
speak with you regarding how your actions and behaviors [m]ay
have negatively impacted [J.S.], as the concerns received by DHS
allege[ ] that both yourself and [O.S.] . . . have caused mental injury
to [J.S.].
I would like to schedule an appointment and meet with you
to further discuss and assess the information that I have gathered
thus far during the course of my assessment to gather additional
information, clarification, and to provide you an opportunity to
respond to the concerns as it involves yourself and your family.
Thus, Brian learned on August 4 that the DHS assessment included allegations
against him. This actual notice was more than five days after the assessment
commenced on July 12, so the DHS did not meet the statutory timeframe.
Brian replied in an August 7 letter, received by the DHS on August 9.
Brian claimed he was misled by Hirst’s July 29 letter because she did not identify
him “as the subject responsible for alleged child abuse.” Brian also objected to
the lack of statutory notice.3 Brian requested “an opportunity to respond to the
allegations of child abuse.” He asked for “a written response of all allegations
from all sources which you have gathered in your assessment.” He stated “once
this information has been provided, I will consider making an appointment to
meet with you.” Brian also provided a timeline, e-mails, text messages, letters,
Facebook conversations, and stated: “Prior to this I had little to no contact with
[J.S.] since March 15, as [O.S.] has openly defied the court order regarding
3
The district court found: “As soon as Hirst was informed that Brian did not receive the
parental notification, it was reissued.”
10
custody and visitation and refused to allow any direct contact. I have retained an
attorney and will be filing Contempt of Court action.”
Brian knew J.S. had attempted suicide on July 4 and was refusing to
speak with him; knew from his conversations with hospital personnel that they
were planning to report emotional injury against both parents; and knew from a
July 16 phone message that the DHS wished to speak to him about an
assessment involving J.S. Although the DHS did not provide timely statutory
notice, Brian had actual notice from the DHS on August 4 that allegations had
been made against him. The DHS issued its initial assessment of unfounded
child abuse on August 9. Thus, Brian had several days after receiving actual
notice to respond to the DHS. Brian responded in an August 7 letter. Under
these circumstances, we cannot conclude the lack of statutory notice rose to the
level of a constitutional violation of Brian’s right to procedural due process. Brian
had a meaningful opportunity to present his viewpoint after he had actual notice
of the allegations against him, and he chose to do so in writing.4
IV. Substantial Evidence
At the administrative hearing, Brian’s testimony, his exhibits, and the
testimony of his witnesses pointed to the mother’s acts and omissions as causing
4
Brian raises a second due process challenge, claiming his rights were violated because
he was not interviewed by the DHS. The relevant statute provides:
The offer of an interview shall be made to the person prior to any
consideration or determination being made that the person committed the
alleged abuse . . . . The person offered an interview, or the person’s
attorney on the person’s behalf, may decline the offer of an interview of
the person.
Iowa Code § 232.71B(4)(e). After our review of the record, we adopt the district court’s
resolution: “This assessment did not include an interview with Brian because he chose to
communicate in writing and did not take advantage of the opportunity to speak with
Hirst.” Brian’s constitutional rights were not violated in this regard.
11
harm to J.S. On appeal, Brian claims there was not substantial evidence that his
acts or omissions caused J.S.’s mental injury. During oral arguments, Brian’s
counsel asserted the DHS twisted the sentiments in his August 2 letter to support
its claim Brian was not concerned about his daughter and emphasized Brian
composed the letter before receiving notice he was the target of the DHS child
abuse investigation.
Because we appreciate counsel’s point regarding the unfairness of the
DHS using Brian’s August 2 letter to paint him in a negative light, we exclude any
consideration of that letter when deciding if the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence to support the agency’s determination. Even excluding that
piece of evidence, we conclude the State met its burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Brian’s acts or omissions caused J.S.’s
mental injury. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 441-175.21.
Iowa Code section 232.68(2)(a)(2) defines child abuse involving mental
injury as follows:
Any mental injury to a child’s intellectual or psychological
capacity as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment
in the child’s ability to function within the child’s normal range of
performance and behavior as the result of the acts or omissions of
a person responsible for the care of the child, if the impairment is
diagnosed and confirmed by a licensed physician or qualified
mental health professional.
“That section reveals a clear intention by the legislature that a finding of child
abuse based on a mental injury to a child’s intellectual or psychological capacity
may be proven if diagnosed and confirmed by a physician or mental health
professional.” Taylor, 870 N.W.2d at 272.
12
In our review of the voluminous administrative record and the hearing
transcript, we find the following information sufficiently undergirds the agency’s
conclusion that Brian’s conduct toward J.S. constituted child abuse causing
mental injury. The connection between Brian’s conduct and J.S.’s mental injury
was suggested by J.S. in her suicide note. In the note, the teenager was critical
of how Brian treated her and her siblings. J.S. begged Brian to change his
behavior to be a better parent to her younger sister and brother. She told the
hospital staff her father was ineffective in communicating with his children and
“repeatedly threatened or destroyed his children’s electronic equipment.”
Dr. Boyum, who treated J.S., named both parents in a report of mental
injury filed with the DHS. During her treatment, J.S. told Dr. Boyum she was
afraid of Brian after an incident in March 2013 when he reportedly dragged her
upstairs to her room and threw her on the bed.5 J.S. told the doctor she then
moved into her mother’s home, where she was subjected to verbal abuse and
demoralizing criticisms. Finding a correlation between the behavior of both O.S.
and Brian and J.S.’s mood and impairment, the doctor filed the report for mental
injury and diagnosed J.S. with major depressive disorder and adjustment
disorder with anxiety. The hospital discharge notes state:
As the hospitalization progressed, [J.S.] remained rather
easily tearful about her social situation, feeling that she did not see
much hope in living with either parent. She said that “she would
run away,” and “would be better off dead” [than] living with her
5
Twice during March 2013, J.S. told this version of the events to the police. But when
the DHS investigated the incident, she changed her story, and the DHS labelled the
incident “unfounded.” Thus, during her hospitalization, J.S. told Dr. Boyum the original
version of the interaction with her father.
13
father,[6] and remained hopeless that her mother would change in
how she publically shamed [J.S.] and focused on negative
behavior, which hurt [J.S.’s] self-esteem.
A hospital social worker told CPW Hirst that the conduct of J.S.’s parents
led to the girl’s depressive symptoms and each parent blamed the other for J.S.’s
suicide attempt and mental health issues. According to the social worker, the
parents saw no need for treating J.S. with medication recommended by the
doctor, instead each parent asserted that placing sole custody with him or her
would serve as a “cure” for J.S.’s diagnosed mental illness.
In a July 29, 2013 phone call with Hirst, Dr. Boyum stated his belief “the
parents’ behaviors and actions have led to [J.S.’s] depressive symptoms, poor
school performance, and [J.S.] attempting suicide.” Dr. Boyum discussed his
interactions with O.S. and Brian, stating each parent’s “main motivation is the
external issues, the ongoing court battle regarding custody of the children,
instead of meeting the emotional needs of the child.”
CPW Hirst’s November 5, 2013 letter to the county attorney seeking a
CINA petition discussed Brian’s behavior after the founded assessment and
when the DHS was offering of services to the family:
A family team meeting [FTM] was held on October 14, 2013 . . . .
The father refused to answer many of the questions aimed at
creating case plan goals and/or general questions about the family.
He made statements to the effect that since he does not believe the
[DHS] should be involved; there is no need for case plan goals. He
was unwilling to discuss how to better communicate with [J.S.] and
how to address her emotional needs, because he does not believe
he has a poor relationship with his daughter. The father left the
6
Three days after her suicide attempt, J.S. attended an individual therapy session and
stated she “does not want to go to her father’s house due to physical abuse problems in
the past.” But she stated a willingness to work with a hospital program “to learn about
healthy ways to manage her difficult emotions.”
14
FTM prior to its completion because he said there was nothing
further to discuss . . . . In short, both parents seem oblivious to the
impact their unhealthy actions and communications may have on all
their children.
. . . . The father . . . blame[s] the DHS, the provider, the
mother, the mental health professionals, and the police for the
current situation.
. . . . [The] DHS does have concerns about whether the
children’s emotional needs are being met in either parent’s home.
(Emphasis added.)
After her hospitalization, J.S. “basically refused to have any contact with
her father. She did agree to see him on one occasion; the contact did not go
well,” according to a February 2, 2014 DHS report. The DHS report recounted
feelings expressed by J.S. that her father was “mean to her.” The DHS asked
Brian to engage in anger management sessions; Brian said he needed additional
information before he would do so. The report also noted J.S. agreed to therapy
only “if her parents do not choose the therapist and if her parents do not go with
her.” The report continued: “All three children report the conflict between their
parents is a constant stressor and they often feel stuck in the middle. They all
report that each parent blames the other for the divorce and for all of the
children’s emotional issues.” Finally, the report concluded:
In short, . . . there has been little progress in regard to the
parents being able to set aside their own anger, feelings, and
needs to adequately address the emotional needs of all three
children. The parents’ relationship has remained contentious . . . .
In some regard, the father is more discreet and covert [concerning]
his disapproval of the mother, he [is] not continually say[ing]
disparaging remarks about the mother directly to the children, but
he does to others, and the children are aware of this . . . . [H]e
exhibits extremely controlling behavior toward the mother, the
children, the DHS, and the provider.[7]
7
The report addressed Brian’s interactions with the DHS and the provider:
15
....
The parents continue to blame each other for the children’s
emotional issues, and although the parents are willing to allow the
children to access therapy services, unless their behavior changes
in regard to each other and toward their children, it would appear
the emotional harm caused to the children will simply worsen.
In late April 2014, J.S. completed a psychological evaluation. During the
evaluation J.S. reported “her father does not tell her things about her mother, but
will still attempt to portray her mother in a negative light.” She described her
father as “manipulative and controlling.” The testing suggested J.S. “likely feels
overwhelmed by anxiety, tension, and depression” and also “suggests she is
likely functioning at a very low efficiency level and minor stressors can lead to
emotional deterioration.” The clinician noted a diagnostic impression of major
depressive disorder and adjustment disorder with anxiety. The clinician
suggested continuing therapy, “but she would also likely benefit from anti-
depressant medication.” The clinician opined J.S. has “a vast amount of
potential” and is experiencing “significant home stress.” The clinician hoped her
parents “will begin to focus on all the positives she offers.”
The ALJ’s lengthy decision accurately set out the contested hearing’s
evidence in detail. The ALJ found the case “difficult and close,” believed the
mother “was largely responsible for the conflict” in the family over the past
Throughout the course of the family’s involvement with the DHS,
the father has insisted that the DHS enforce [the Colorado order granting
him physical care]. The DHS has consistently explained to the father,
that unless the children are adjudicated by the juvenile court, and/or the
DHS can prove an imminent risk of harm to any of the children in either
parental home, the DHS cannot intervene in the custody issue. Even
though this has been explained to the father on numerous occasions, he
has continued to insist that the DHS is not enforcing the order and is
allowing the mother to keep his daughter from him.
16
several years, and also believed the mother “has been in large part responsible
for the mental injury that J.S. clearly suffers from.” Nevertheless, the ALJ found
Brian contributed to J.S.’s condition by (1) his initial reluctance to seek therapy or
other services for J.S., (2) his initial unwilling to discuss ways to communicate
with J.S. and how to address her emotional needs, and (3) not aiming his
communications with the DHS at “solutions and treatment, but rather on laying
blame,” which “cannot be a parent’s focus.” The ALJ findings are supported by
the record.
Continuing, the ALJ found “two other important factors”—Dr. Boyum’s
July 29, 2013 letter and J.S.’s CINA adjudication—support the DHS child abuse
assessment against Brian. We discuss the CINA adjudication below. As to Dr.
Boyum’s letter, like the district court, we conclude the letter provides support for
the founded assessment and registry placement. The district court decided
substantial evidence supported the agency’s findings, pointing to information in
the record showing Brian’s inability or unwillingness to accept “the past turmoil
has continued to adversely impact J.S. as she enters her teen years to the point
she attempted suicide.” The court also noted evidence that after J.S. left the
hospital, Brian continued to focus on his “toxic relationship” with O.S. and not on
J.S.’s needs. We reach the same conclusion as the district court.
V. CINA Adjudication
Brian argues the ALJ’s deference to the CINA adjudication constituted an
application of the doctrine of issue preclusion “in all but name.” Brian claims
consideration of the CINA adjudication “essentially swung” the case against him
and an “overbroad reliance on the CINA proceeding moots the point of the
17
separate contested case proceeding,” constituting error by the agency and the
district court. Brian relies upon Grant, 722 N.W.2d at 173-75, to support his
issue-preclusion argument.
In response, the State notes the legislature amended the code to
“specifically authorize issue preclusion in appropriate cases.” See 2012 Iowa
Acts ch. 1082, § 5 (amending Iowa Code § 235A.19(3)(d)). Under the amended
statute, the department may defer the contested hearing until the conclusion of
the adjudicatory phase of a pending CINA proceeding either on its own initiative
or at the request of “any party to the contested case proceeding.” Iowa Code
§ 235A.19(3)(d). Thereafter, a CINA adjudication “in a district court case relating
to the child abuse data or findings may be determinative in a contested case
proceeding.” Id. Accordingly, under the plain language of the statute, the
agency is authorized to give weight to a prior CINA adjudication of the same
issue. See id.
In resolving this challenge, the district court stated the ALJ had “noted the
higher burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence required to adjudicate a
child on the grounds of ‘mental injury caused by the acts of the child’s parent.’”
The district court then found the CINA proceeding was fully contested, with Brian
represented by an attorney who “was able to call witnesses and cross-examine
witnesses.” Noting the ALJ “appears to have placed great weight on the CINA
adjudication in his final determination,” the court concluded “the deference and
weight given to the CINA adjudication by the agency was proper.” We agree.
AFFIRMED.