State of Iowa v. Daniel Lee Dierks

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0399
Filed June 15, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DANIEL LEE DIERKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, Ian K. Thornhill
(Motion to Suppress), Sean W. McPartland (Verdict), and Kevin McKeever
(Judgment and Sentence), Judges.
Daniel Dierks appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated, first
offense. AFFIRMED.
R.A. Bartolomei of Bartolomei & Lange, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., Greer, J., and Vogel, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2022).
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VOGEL, Senior Judge.
Shortly after 5:00 p.m. on December 26, 2019, Deputy Neil Frizzell with the
Tama County Sheriff’s Office responded to a single-car (“car-deer”) accident. The
accident occurred less than one-half mile outside Traer along a two-lane highway
where the speed limit was fifty-five miles per hour. Deputy Frizzell stopped his
marked patrol vehicle along the right shoulder behind the car-deer vehicle and
activated his rear flashing red and blue lights. Deputy Frizzell acknowledged he
parked “very close to the shoulder line” but “completely on the shoulder.” When
Deputy Frizzell exited his patrol vehicle on the driver’s side, another vehicle
approaching from behind narrowly missed hitting him. Deputy Frizzell later
testified the vehicle “came within a foot of hitting me.” The deputy reentered his
patrol vehicle to pursue and stop the other vehicle.
After stopping the vehicle, Deputy Frizzell noticed the driver—identified as
Daniel Dierks—had bloodshot, watery eyes; an odor of alcohol was coming from
the vehicle; and beer cans were visible in the center console and passenger seat.
Dierks failed or was unable to complete field sobriety testing, and Deputy Frizzell
arrested him for operating while intoxicated.
Dierks filed a motion to suppress evidence from the stop, arguing Deputy
Frizzell lacked probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. The district court denied
the motion to suppress. After a trial on the minutes, the court found Dierks guilty
of operating while intoxicated, first offense. Dierks appeals the denial of his motion
to suppress and resulting conviction, asserting Deputy Frizzell lacked probable
cause or reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle in violation of the United States
and Iowa constitutions.
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We review the denial of a motion to suppress on constitutional grounds de
novo. In re Pardee, 872 N.W.2d 384, 390 (Iowa 2015). We place weight on the
fact findings of the district court, but we are not bound by those findings. Id.A law enforcement officer may lawfully stop a vehicle under the United
States and Iowa Constitutions if the officer has probable cause or reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Iowa 2013).
Because Dierks argued a probable-cause standard before the district court, we will
analyze the facts under the same standard. “[W]hen a peace officer observes a
violation of our traffic laws, however minor, the officer has probable cause to stop
a motorist.” Id. at 293. “Probable cause may exist even if the officer’s perception
of the traffic violation was inaccurate. The existence of probable cause for a traffic
stop is evaluated ‘from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.’”
Id. at 293–94 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). “[T]he
State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
officer had probable cause to stop the motorist.” Id. at 293.
The State argues Deputy Frizzell had probable cause to believe Dierks
violated Iowa Code section 321.323A(1) (2019) when the deputy witnessed Dierks
almost strike him after exiting his patrol vehicle. See United States v. Luna, 368
F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding an Iowa State trooper, who was conducting
another traffic stop, had probable cause to stop the defendant for a violation of
section 321.323A(1) after the defendant’s vehicle “fail[ed] to slow down or to move
into the open passing lane when it passed the trooper’s vehicle”). Under section
321.323A(1):
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The operator of a motor vehicle approaching a stationary
authorized emergency vehicle that is displaying flashing lights, as
permitted under section 321.423, shall approach the authorized
emergency vehicle with due caution and shall proceed in one of the
following manners, absent any other direction by a peace officer:
a. Make a lane change into a lane not adjacent to the
authorized emergency vehicle if possible in the existing safety and
traffic conditions.
b. If a lane change under paragraph “a” would be impossible,
prohibited by law, or unsafe, reduce the speed of the motor vehicle
to a reasonable and proper speed for the existing road and traffic
conditions, which speed shall be less than the posted speed limit,
and be prepared to stop.
Deputy Frizzell testified his marked patrol vehicle was displaying its rear
flashing lights. Because the dash-camera in the deputy’s car is directed in a
forward position, it does not capture the exact position of the passing vehicles
when parallel to the deputy’s driver’s side door. It does however capture the
position of vehicles just as they parallel the front of the deputy’s vehicle. The
deputy testified, and the video shows, that one vehicle passed the deputy seconds
before Dierks, and this first vehicle slowed down considerably and moved very
close to the centerline of the road. The deputy further testified he believed Dierks
was not pulled over as far to the left—toward the centerline—and was driving near
the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit as he passed the deputy. While the video is
inconclusive on some points due to its position, it clearly depicts Dierks driving
noticeably faster than the first vehicle and farther right of the centerline. On our de
novo review, we agree with the State this evidence establishes probable cause for
the deputy to believe he had just witnessed Dierks violate section 321.323A(1),
thus justifying the resulting traffic stop.
Dierks also argues Deputy Frizzell committed mistakes of both fact and law
in stopping him. A traffic stop may be justified despite a mistake of fact if the
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mistake was “objectively reasonable.” Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 294 (quoting State v.
Lloyd, 701 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 2005)). Dierks asserts the deputy mistakenly
perceived the situation because, at the time Dierks passed the deputy, he could
not legally or safely move over and he was driving near the speed limit and possibly
slowing. Dierks also repeatedly accuses Deputy Frizzell of conduct such as
“blithely wad[ing] into highway traffic,” apparently asserting the deputy contributed
to or outright caused the narrow miss. As stated above, Deputy Frizzell testified
Dierks narrowly missed him, and the video confirms Dierks was near the center of
his lane and driving much faster than the prior passing vehicle when he passed
the deputy.1 The driver of the car-deer vehicle corroborated that the deputy was
nearly hit by Dierks’s vehicle. But even if Deputy Frizzell committed a mistake of
fact and Dierks did not have an opportunity to move over or slow down before
passing, the deputy’s mistake was objectively reasonable.
Dierks also argues Deputy Frizzell was agitated by the narrow miss, which
the deputy acknowledged may have partly motivated him to stop Dierks. However,
“[t]he legality of the stop does not depend on the actual motivations of the officer
involved in the stop.” State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004). The
officer’s subjective motivations are relevant in evaluating the officer’s credibility.
State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 849–50 (Iowa 2019) (“The more evidence that a
detention was motivated by police suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense, the
less credible the officer’s assertion that the traffic offense occurred.” (quoting State
1 Deputy Frizzell’s dash-camera video shows the deputy returned to talk to the
occupants of the car-deer vehicle after arresting Dierks. The deputy tells the other
driver Dierks “almost hit me,” and the other driver responds, “yeah, we saw.”
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v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1138–39 (Utah 1994))). Even considering the deputy’s
agitation, we again find any mistake of fact to be objectively reasonable.
Finally, Dierks asserts Deputy Frizzell committed a mistake of law, thereby
lacking probable cause to justify the stop. See Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 294. Dierks
points to the deputy’s comments during the hearing that Dierks should have
stopped rather than pass the deputy. Dierks correctly notes section 321.323A(1)
does not require all motorists to stop for flashing emergency lights, but it does
require motorists to approach “with due caution” and “be prepared to stop.” The
deputy’s misstatement on cross-examination does not undermine his
determination of probable cause for stopping Dierks, based on his observations
that Dierks had driven too fast and too close to the deputy’s law enforcement
vehicle that was illuminated by flashing rear lights. The deputy’s testimony was
clear that Dierks did not follow the statutory requirement of approaching an
emergency vehicle “with due caution” and slowing down “to a reasonable and
proper speed.” See Iowa Code § 321.323A(1). Therefore the deputy’s full
description of the situation and general knowledge of a driver’s responsibilities
convince us there was no mistake of law that would undermine the probable cause
to stop Dierks’s vehicle.
Deputy Frizzell had probable cause to believe Dierks committed a traffic
violation when Dierks narrowly missed striking the deputy as he passed.
Therefore, we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.