In the Interest of D.R., Minor Child, D.R., Father

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0646
Filed October 28, 2015
IN THE INTEREST OF D.R.,
Minor Child,
D.R., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rachel Seymour,
District Associate Judge.
A father appeals from the order terminating his parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Jane M. White of Jane M. White Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant
father.
Alexandra Nelissen of Nelissen Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Amanda Johnson,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Jessica Millage of Millage Law Firm, Des Moines, for minor child.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Tabor, JJ.
2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
The father appeals the termination of his parental rights contending,
among other things, that his due process rights were violated by the failure of the
juvenile court to appoint him a guardian ad litem in the underlying child-in-need-
of-assistance proceedings and the court erred in not allowing him an additional
six months to seek reunification. We are not persuaded by the father’s
contentions and affirm the termination of his parental rights.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The child, born in May 2006, came to the attention of the department of
human services (DHS) in September 2012 when the mother attempted suicide
and admitted using methamphetamine. The child and three half-siblings were
removed from the mother’s care.1 D.R. and two siblings were placed in the care
of their maternal grandmother; one sibling was placed with a paternal
grandmother.
At the removal hearing, the mother informed the juvenile court that D.R.’s
father was a federal inmate at a correctional facility in California. Notice of the
child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) proceedings was mailed to the father on
October 5, 2012. Notice included the removal order, the CINA petition, an order
setting hearing, an order appointing attorney and guardian ad litem (GAL) for the
child, an order appointing an attorney from mother, an affidavit in support of
placement with maternal grandmother, the application for temporary removal, an
Indian Child Welfare Act affidavit, and an application for court-appointed counsel
1
The parental rights of the mother as to this child and her siblings, as well as the
parental rights of the fathers of the siblings were terminated by consent in a previous
order. Their rights are not issue in this appeal.
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for the father to complete and return to the court. The father did complete and
return the financial affidavit to obtain an attorney; however, the juvenile court
later observed that document was not brought to the attention of the juvenile
court. The father also included a letter, which stated, “I do understand what is
going on and if my Baby is at peace with her grandmother she is with and if
[grandmother] would keep her safe and way from drama I would like for her to
take care of my Baby until I can get out . . . .”
The child was adjudicated to be a CINA on November 1, 2012, pursuant to
Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2) and (n) (2011). The court found the
mother had admitted to using illegal substances while caring for the children.
Further, D.R. tested positive for opiates, without a legal prescription, and a sibling
tested positive for methamphetamine.
On January 30, 2013, an uncontested dispositional hearing was held. The
court found the mother needed to continue to address her substance abuse
issues, confirmed prior orders regarding custody of the children, and ordered
services continue to be provided to the mother.
The juvenile court granted a June 7, 2013 motion to modify custody, which
returned the children to mother’s custody, based on her compliance with
services. That placement was confirmed during a July 2013 review hearing upon
the court’s finding that the mother had completed recommended drug treatment,
provided clean drug screens, and attended domestic violence classes.
Unfortunately, the children were again removed from the mother in
January 2014 upon the children’s GAL’s motion and the court’s findings that the
mother was not complying with court ordered services. All of the children’s
4
behaviors had significantly deteriorated since their return to the mother’s custody.
The children were placed in the custody of DHS for the purposes of foster care
as the prior custodians indicated they were unable to make a permanent
commitment to the children if that became necessary.
On July 17, 2014, a permanency hearing commenced with numerous
exhibits admitted. The maternal grandmother had filed a motion to intervene to
request placement D.R. The motion to intervene was not resisted by any party
present and was subsequently granted. The DHS worker had recommended a
termination petition be filed. The mother and the fathers of D.R.’s siblings
resisted that recommendation. The mother had been arrested on felony drug
charges in April 2014 and remained in jail since that time. On agreement of the
parties present, the permanency hearing was continued and would coincide with
the termination hearing.
A termination petition was filed on July 17, 2014, and a hearing was
scheduled for September 16 and 17, 2014. D.R.’s father was appointed counsel
at this time. At the September 2014 hearing, it was determined notice had still
not been served on the father of D.R. as he had been transferred to a different
federal correctional facility. The juvenile court continued the termination
proceeding as to this father. The termination trial as to the other parents went
forward however.
On November 30, 2014, the court entered an order terminating the
mother’s parental rights based on her consent. The maternal grandmother had
requested placement of D.R. only, which was resisted by DHS, the State, the
child’s attorney, and the GAL. The court found the grandmother could not care
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for all the children; D.R. remained placed with a younger sibling and a
modification would require separating those two siblings, which was not
recommended by their therapists. The juvenile court confirmed placement of
D.R. in foster care.
The termination hearing as to the father of D.R. was rescheduled and held
on October 21, 2014, and January 20, 2015. The father testified by telephone
both days of the hearing. He had been serving a sentence for a conviction of
being a felon in possession of a firearm since December 2008. For the first four
years of his sentence he was placed at a correctional facility in California. He
was then transferred to North Carolina for eleven months, and then to a
correctional facility in Illinois, where he had been for two months and would
remain until his discharge. The father has prior convictions for possession with
intent to distribute crack cocaine and reckless discharge of a firearm causing
injury. He had served about three years in a correctional facility in Iowa on
conviction for reckless discharge of a firearm.
The father stated the last time he had physical contact with D.R. was in
November 2008. However, he stated he was in contact with the child while the
child was in the care of the maternal grandmother and during the time that the
mother had custody of the children (June 2013 to January 2014). He testified he
would write the child and talk to her on the telephone. The mother told the father
when the children were removed from her care again.
The father stated that he had gotten notice of the CINA proceedings.
When asked if he attempted to contact DHS after getting notice, he testified, “No.
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ma’am. Because at the time I felt like my family . . . was in good hands with
[maternal grandmother]. I told her whatever she needed me to do, I would do it.”
In early 2014, the father asked his sister and his fiancé to contact DHS.
The father’s sister was the only family identified by the father to DHS. When the
father received the termination paperwork in July 2014, he asked his sister to go
to Des Moines and let people know there was family for D.R. The father believed
that he would be released on January 30, 2015, to a halfway house in Minnesota
where he could remain until July 28, 2015. He stated he would be completely off
of supervision in 2018. He proposed D.R. be placed with his sister in Minnesota
until his eventual release. D.R. had not seen the father’s sister since she was
about three years old, an approximate period of five years.
On the second day of the termination hearing in January 2015, the father
testified that he had not had any contact with D.R. since her placement in family
foster care. However, he had contacted his family about the placement. The
father had learned since the last hearing that the home study for his sister had
been denied. He stated he wanted additional time to “get [him]self together” so
that he could care for his daughter. The father acknowledged he was able in the
course of this case to identify relatives that could be a potential placement for his
daughter and he had identified his sister, but her home study was denied.
The DHS worker testified that the father had not contacted her since he
had received court-appointed counsel. However, his sister did contact the DHS
worker in the summer of 2014 to discuss placement of D.R. The DHS worker did
not send the father any updates or information, and she did not talk with him on
the telephone. The father had not requested any information. He did not advise
7
the DHS worker when he changed institutions. The DHS worker did not facilitate
any contact between the father and child. The father did not ask for any
assistance in making such contact. The DHS worker was aware the mother and
the maternal grandmother were facilitating contact with the father and both of
these women knew how to contact the DHS worker.
The DHS worker also testified that D.R. had been informed of the
placement option with her paternal aunt and had become emotionally upset. The
child indicated she did not want to be placed with her. The child was also scared
of her father, and she only wanted to be placed with her siblings. She was very
happy in her current home. The DHS worker believed it would be in the child’s
best interests for permanency to be established.
On March 31, 2015, the juvenile court terminated the father’s parental
rights, finding clear and convincing evidence to support termination pursuant to
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b), (d), (e), and (f) (2013).2 The court also
2
The relevant code provisions allow the juvenile court to terminate parental rights if:
(b) The court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that the
child has been abandoned or deserted.
....
(d) The court finds that both of the following have occurred:
(1) The court has previously adjudicated the child to be a child in
need of assistance after finding the child to have been physically or
sexually abused or neglected as the result of the acts or omissions of one
or both parents, or the court has previously adjudicated a child who is a
member of the same family to be a child in need of assistance after such
a finding.
(2) Subsequent to the child in need of assistance adjudication, the
parents were offered or received services to correct the circumstance
which led to the adjudication, and the circumstance continues to exist
despite the offer or receipt of services.
(e) The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.
(2) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the
child’s parents for a period of at least six consecutive months.
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determined termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best
interests, stating:
The child’s safety is a primary consideration. This child cannot be
returned to [the father’s] home now or any time in the near future.
[The child] has a limited relationship with him that includes her
being fearful of him. The child’s primary concern is maintaining her
relationship with her younger sibling. [The father’s] own actions
have prevented him from being in a role to parent this child. He
has not demonstrated any ability to maintain a safe and sober
lifestyle outside the confines of a correctional facility. This child has
already waited too long for a parent to step up and function in that
role and should not be made to wait any longer while Father
creates a relationship with her. This child needs a long-term
commitment from a parent to be appropriately nurturing, supportive
of their growth and development, and who can meet her physical,
mental, emotional and safety needs today, not six months from
now. [The father] cannot do that today and cannot guarantee that
any time in the foreseeable future. Since termination and adoption
are the preferred methods of obtaining permanency for a child who
cannot be returned to a parental home, the court finds termination
is in the child’s best interest. In re R.L., 541 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1995). Further, the court finds there are no longer any
legal exceptions in Iowa Code section 232.116(3) which would
argue against termination.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We conduct a de novo review of termination of parental rights
proceedings. In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 745 (Iowa 2011). Although we are not
(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parents have
not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child during the
previous six consecutive months and have made no reasonable efforts to
resume care of the child despite being given the opportunity to do so. . . .
(f) The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the
child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the
last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been
less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time
the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as
provided in section 232.102.
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bound by the juvenile court’s findings of fact, we do give them weight, especially
in assessing the credibility of witnesses. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa
2010). An order terminating parental rights will be upheld if there is clear and
convincing evidence of grounds for termination under section 232.116. Id.Evidence is considered “clear and convincing” when there are no serious or
substantial doubts as to the correctness of conclusions drawn from it. See id.III. Analysis.
Iowa Code chapter 232 termination of parental rights follows a three-step
analysis. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). The court must initially
determine whether a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) is
established. Id. If a ground for termination is established, the court must next
apply the best-interest framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide if the
grounds for termination should result in a termination of parental rights. Id. If the
statutory best-interest framework supports termination of parental rights, the
court must finally consider if any statutory exceptions or factors set out in
section 232.116(3) weigh against termination of parental rights. Id.The father does not contest the grounds for termination. Rather, he
argues the failure to appoint him a GAL during the CINA proceedings violated his
due process rights, and that had he been appointed a GAL, the outcome of those
proceedings might have been different. He also asks us to rule that the juvenile
court’s taking of judicial notice of files in the underlying CINA proceedings
violated his due process rights. The father asserts the juvenile court erred in
denying his request for an additional six months to access services. He asks us
10
to reverse the CINA adjudication and termination. Under the circumstances
presented in this case, we will not do so.
In In re T.C., 492 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Iowa 1992),—a case with facts
analogous to those before us—our supreme court held the failure to appoint a
GAL during CINA proceedings did not void the subsequent termination. The
court stated,
Even if Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure [1.211] applied,[3] however, we
do not believe that a failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for J.C.
in the CINA proceeding voids the legal effect of the termination
proceeding. At the CINA proceeding, W.C., the children’s mother,
and her attorney stipulated that the children were in need of
assistance. J.C. was obviously not able to provide the help that the
children then needed. Had he been present, it is completely
unlikely that the court would have entered any order different from
what it did. Moreover, the element of the children having been
adjudicated in need of assistance had to be proved at the
termination proceeding. J.C. was present with counsel at that
proceeding and had the opportunity to litigate any errors of fact
giving rise to the children being deemed in need of assistance.
T.C., 492 N.W.2d at 429. Here too, the mother did not contest the children were
CINA and the father “was obviously not able to provide the help that the child[]
then needed.” See id. As was the case in T.C., had the father been present by
GAL or counsel in the CINA proceedings, it is unlikely the juvenile court would
3
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.211 provides:
No judgment without a defense shall be entered against a party
then . . . confined in a penitentiary, reformatory or any state hospital for
the mentally ill, or one adjudged incompetent, or whose physician certifies
to the court that the party appears to be mentally incapable of conducting
a defense. Such defense shall be by guardian ad litem[.]
The State argues the father’s claim of a violation of rule 1.211 was not properly
preserved below because it was not raised until closing arguments in the termination
hearing. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012) (“[T]he general rule that
appellate arguments must first be raised [at the earliest opportunity] in the trial court
applies to CINA and termination of parental rights cases.”). As in T.C., we find that even
if the rule is at play, we find no violation of the father’s due process rights. 492 N.W.2d
at 429.
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have entered any order different than it did; in fact, the father was satisfied with
the child’s placement with the maternal grandmother. The father does not assert
the child was not a CINA. We conclude that even if the matter were adequately
preserved, the father’s due process rights were not violated here by the failure to
appoint the father a GAL during the CINA proceedings.
The father’s claim on appeal—that his due process rights were violated by
the juvenile court’s “taking judicial notice of prior Child in Need of Assistance
legal and exhibit files” “since he was not present to dispute the factual
documentation contained in those files”—is not properly before us because this
objection was not made to the juvenile court.4 See A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 773.
Similarly, the father’s complaint of lack of notice to relatives under Iowa Code
section 232.84 was not made below and is not properly before us. See id.
There is clear and convincing evidence that the child is four years or older,
has been adjudicated a CINA, has been removed from the parent’s custody for
the requisite statutory period, and could not be returned to the incarcerated father
at the time of the termination hearing in October 2014 or January 2015. Thus,
clear and convincing evidence supports termination of the father’s parental rights
pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f).
In order to continue placement for an additional six months as requested,
Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b) requires the juvenile court to make a
determination the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the
4
The father objected to the court taking judicial notice of the siblings’ CINA and
termination files “without having those files here properly identified and marked and
being submitted to the Court since they are not underlying files related to this child but
are files related to siblings.”
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extension. Even if the father were willing and able, he had not seen the child for
five years or more. The juvenile court did not err in rejecting the father’s request
for an extension of time here. We affirm the termination of the father’s parental
rights.
AFFIRMED.