In Re the Marriage of Larry C. Harrah and Angela Sue Harrah Upon the Petition of Larry C. Harrah, and Concerning Angela Sue Harrah

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 4-061 / 13-1131
Filed March 26, 2014
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF LARRY C. HARRAH
AND ANGELA SUE HARRAH
Upon the Petition of
LARRY C. HARRAH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
And Concerning
ANGELA SUE HARRAH,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wright County, Colleen D. Weiland,
Judge.
Larry C. Harrah appeals the district court ruling dissolving his marriage to
Angela Sue Harrah. AFFIRMED.
Megan Rosenberg, of Hobson, Cody & Cody,Hampton, for appellant.
Dani Eisentrager, of Eisentrager Law Office, Eagle Grove, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Bower, J., and Miller, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2013).
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BOWER, J.
Larry C. Harrah appeals the district court ruling dissolving his marriage to
Angela Sue Harrah. Larry contends the district court erred in valuing the parties’
property on the date of the dissolution trial, rather than the date of separation.
He also claims the district court failed to award him sufficient credits for property
brought into the marriage and for paying off Angela’s premarital debt. Finally, he
claims the court erred in ordering him to pay a portion of Angela’s attorney fees.
We find the district court correctly valued the parties’ property as of the date of
the dissolution trial. We also find the district court gave proper credit for assets
and liabilities brought into and paid off during the marriage, and the award of
attorney fees was appropriate. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Larry filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on May 3, 2012. Larry and
Angela had been married for less than three years. Following a trial in February
2013, the district court entered a decree of dissolution in May 2013. Larry then
filed a motion to enlarge and amend. The district court ruled on the motion,
agreeing with Larry in two respects. First, the district court recognized it had
failed to credit Larry with $21,000 for premarital equity in real estate. Second,
the district court corrected an error in the itemization of assets. As a result of
these corrections, Larry’s equalization payment to Angela was reduced from
$63,400 to $51,000.
As the district court recognized, while the parties were married for a short
period of time, they engaged in a large number of important financial transactions
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regarding the marital home, including refinancing and taking out home equity
loans. These transactions allowed the parties to make improvements to the
property, which Larry owned prior to the marriage. The parties also purchased a
timeshare in Hawaii and bought and sold a number of motor vehicles.
Larry is the owner of an agricultural business currently known as Wright
County Ag, L.L.C. At the time the parties married, Larry owned a nearly identical
business known as Harrah Agriculture. For much of the marriage, Angela was
employed by the business, though she later obtained other employment, at
Larry’s request, to improve their finances. Due to financial troubles, the parties
decided to start Wright County Ag and dissolve Harrah Agriculture. As a result,
Angela was given a 10% share in Wright County Ag.
In the decree, the district court awarded Larry the marital home and the
timeshare.1 Angela was awarded a home she purchased subsequent to the
separation and one vehicle, while Larry was awarded several other vehicles. The
parties were each awarded their individual bank and retirement accounts. Each
party was ordered to assume all debts incurred in their name, with the exception
of two credit card accounts and a charitable pledge, which were assigned to
Larry. Due to the disparity of the distribution of property, Larry was ordered to
make an equalization payment that included $5,000 for Angela’s share of Wright
County Ag. All assets and debts were evaluated as of the date of trial. Finally,
Larry was ordered to pay $2,000 in Angela’s attorney fees.
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Larry was ordered to make all reasonable efforts to refinance the mortgage and note
on the marital home within six months in order to release Angela from the debt.
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II. Standard of Review
As an equitable proceeding, we review the decree of dissolution de novo.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. We give weight to the findings of the trial court but are
not bound by them. In re Marriage of Sjulin, 431 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Iowa 1988).
III. Discussion
Larry raises four issues on appeal. First, he contends the district court
should have valued the parties’ property at the time of the separation not the date
of the dissolution trial. Next, he claims he should have been given greater credit
for his premarital assets and for helping pay off Angela’s premarital debts.
Finally, he asks us to vacate the award of attorney fees. Angela requests
appellate attorney fees.
A. Date of Evaluation
When dissolving a marriage, the district court is to divide equitably all
property, with the exception of inherited property or gifts, between the parties.
Iowa Code § 598.21(5) (2013). Dividing the property equitably requires an
examination of the tangible contributions of each party. In re Marriage of
Bulanda, 451 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989). Normally, the value of the
property is determined as of the date of the trial. See Locke v. Locke, 246
N.W.2d 246, 252 (Iowa 1976). Though this court has recognized there may be
occasions where a date other than the trial date may be the proper time to
determine values, the applicability of that policy has since been called into
question. See In re Marriage of Oakes, 462 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Iowa Ct. App.
1990) (allowing for possibility of separation date valuation); In re Marriage of
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Campbell, 623 N.W.2d 585, 587–88 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001) (expressly overruling
Oakes allowing for valuation based upon the date of separation when one party
does not contribute to post-separation growth of an asset).
We find the district court was correct in valuing the parties’ property as of
the date of the dissolution trial. This is not a case where the parties separated
and years passed before the decree was entered. Like the marriage itself, the
time between the separation and the entry of the decree was short. Although
Larry presented some evidence regarding the post-separation improvement in
the parties’ financial standing, we see no unusual facts giving us reason to depart
from the trial date valuation.
B. Premarital Assets and Debts
Larry contends he should have been given greater credit for the premarital
assets he brought to the marriage. Property brought to the marriage by each
party is a factor to be considered when crafting the final division of property.
Iowa Code § 598.21(5)(b). Premarital property is not, however, included in
inherited or gifted property that is specifically excluded from an equitable
distribution. Iowa Code § 598.21(6). “The district court may assign varying
weight to premarital property, but should not automatically award it to the spouse
who owned the property prior to the marriage.” In re Marriage of McDermott, 827
N.W.2d 671, 678 (Iowa 2013).
Following entry of the decree, Larry successfully sought modification along
identical grounds. The record is clear Larry entered the marriage in better
financial condition than Angela, bringing with him a business, the marital home,
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and a greater net worth. He contends he should be given greater credit for his
premarital standing because his net worth decreased during the marriage while
Angela’s improved. We disagree. The district court considered both Larry and
Angela’s premarital financial condition and properly weighed the differences
when distributing their assets and liabilities. The parties each contributed to
numerous financial transactions concerning the home during the marriage, and
Angela took active roles in both agriculture businesses during the marriage. We
find the district court’s decision concerning Larry’s premarital contributions and
retirement of Angela’s premarital debt was equitable.
C. Attorney Fees
Angela was awarded $2,000 in attorney fees, and requests additional fees
on appeal. Attorney fees are not allowable as a matter of right and depend upon
the parties’ financial condition and relative ability to pay. See In re Marriage of
Willcoxson, 250 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Iowa 1977). When considering whether to
award appellate attorney fees, we add the additional consideration of whether the
requesting party has been required to defend the decree. See In re Marriage of
Erickson, 228 N.W.2d 59 (Iowa 1975). Because of the closer perspective and
expertise of the district courts, they have considerable discretion in awarding
attorney fees. Id. Considering the relative financial standing of the parties, we
find the district court’s award to be equitable. We decline to award appellate
attorney fees.
AFFIRMED.