State of Iowa v. Eric Scott Olsen

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 3-1196 / 12-1490
Filed February 5, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ERIC SCOTT OLSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Gary D. McKenrick,
Judge.
Eric Olsen appeals his convictions for homicide by vehicle and leaving the
scene of an accident. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant Attorney
General, Michael H. Walton, County Attorney, and Kim Shepherd, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
2
DOYLE, P.J.
Eric Olsen appeals his convictions for homicide by vehicle-recklessness,
in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(2)(a) (2011), and leaving the scene of a
fatality accident, in violation of sections 321.261 and 321.263. Olsen claims the
evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s findings of guilt. Olsen also takes
issue with several evidentiary rulings by the district court. We affirm.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The jury was instructed that the State would have to prove the following
elements of homicide by vehicle:
1. On or about the 17th day of January, 2011, the defendant
operated a motor vehicle in a reckless manner.
2. The defendant’s recklessness unintentionally caused the
death of Wanda Weldy.
The jury was instructed that the State would have to prove the following elements
of leaving the scene of a fatality accident:
1. On or about the 17th day of January, 2011, the defendant
was the driver of motor vehicle which was involved in an incident
which resulted in the death of another person.
2. The defendant knew that the other person suffered
serious injury or death.
3. The defendant left the scene of the incident.
4. The defendant:
a. Did not leave his driver’s license, automobile
registration receipt, or other identification information at
the scene of the incident; or,
b. Did not report the incident promptly to law
enforcement authorities and:
i. Did not return to the scene immediately; or
ii. Did not inform law enforcement authorities
where he could be located.
The jury was further instructed on the meaning of the terms “reckless” and
“serious injury”:
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A person is “reckless” or acts “recklessly” when he willfully
disregards the safety of persons or property. It is more than a lack
of reasonable care which may cause unintentional injury.
Recklessness is conduct which consciously is done with willful
disregard of the consequences. For recklessness to exist, the act
must be highly dangerous. In addition, the danger must be so
obvious that the actor knows or reasonably should foresee that
harm more likely than not will result from the act. Though
recklessness is willful, it is not intentional in the sense that harm is
intended to result.
A “serious injury” is a bodily injury which creates a
substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement or extended loss or impairment in the function of any
bodily part or organ. “Serious injury” includes death. The term
“bodily injury” means physical pain, illness or any impairment of
physical condition.
For the defendant to know or have knowledge of something
means he had a conscious awareness that Wanda Weldy suffered
bodily injury, serious injury, or death.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to its verdict, see State v.
Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Iowa 2013), the jury could have found the
following. Olsen was drinking at the Pour House bar in Davenport with his “on
and off” girlfriend, Wanda Weldy on January 17, 2011. A surveillance video
depicted Olsen and Weldy leaving the bar at 1:37 a.m. Nearby, at approximately
1:50 a.m., Mark Burns was awakened by loud engine noises in his front yard at
2806 North Fairmount Street. Burns looked out the window and saw Olsen’s
blue pickup truck in the yard. The truck was stuck, and the driver was revving
the engine and spinning the wheels trying to get free. After about one minute,
the truck got out of the yard and squealed its tires as it left, driving northbound on
Fairmount Street. Burns saw the truck turn right onto West 29th Street.
Within one minute, Burns—still looking out his window—noticed another
pickup truck driving north on Fairmount Street. The truck stopped in front of his
parents’ house, a few doors south of Burns’s house, on Fairmount Street. At that
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point, Burns woke up his wife, told her “something is going on around here,” and
ran outside.
The driver of the second truck, Ryan Uhle, was driving home on Fairmount
Street when he spotted what he thought was a garbage bag in the road. As he
got closer, Uhle realized it was a body (Wanda Weldy) and a shoe lying in the
road. Uhle stopped his truck and tried to rouse Weldy before running to a nearby
house (Burns’s parents) to call police. By that time, Burns had run over from his
house. Burns asked Uhle what happened, and checked Weldy’s condition.
Weldy had no pulse, was not breathing, and was covered in blood. An
ambulance arrived and rushed her to the hospital.
An autopsy performed on Weldy’s body indicated a black, smudgy
substance on her chest and head in a grid-like pattern. A doctor opined that with
her injuries, Weldy would have died relatively rapidly, within minutes. Her cause
of death was determined to blunt force trauma. The doctor confirmed Weldy’s
injuries were consistent with her being run over by a motor vehicle, noting the
black grid-like pattern on her body appeared to be tire tread. The injuries aligned
on one side of her body, consistent with one continuous process of injury.
At the scene, police found and diagrammed fresh tire marks on the road
and in the plowed snow indicating a vehicle had made a U-turn from northbound
to southbound on Fairmount Street, accelerated at the intersection of Fairmount
Street and West 29th Street, and then changed direction again in Burns’s yard at
2806 Fairmount Street. Police also diagrammed a blood spot and a shoe lying in
the road near Burns’s parents’ house at 2715 Fairmount Street. An evidence
technician took a cast of the tire tracks in the snow. Weldy’s clothing did not
5
have tearing or scraping to be expected if she had slid or rolled on the pavement.
Her jeans had a black substance in a pattern that ran up the leg. Marks on her
body were consistent with being caused by a tire. Police opined the evidence did
not support a theory that Weldy had “alighted” from a moving vehicle, but rather
that she was lying on the ground when she was run over.
Meanwhile, at 2:01 a.m., a security guard at a local hospital saw a person
park a blue pickup truck and “power walk” away from the hospital. The truck was
determined to be registered to Olsen; it matched the description of the truck
Burns had seen in his yard; its tire treads were consistent with the tire tracks on
Fairmount Street and Weldy’s body. Shoeprints on the inside of the windshield
and passenger window were consistent with the sole pattern of Weldy’s shoes.
Later that morning, police found Olsen in a home near the hospital where
his truck was parked. Olsen never reported an accident to police. In an
interview with police, Olsen lacked emotion considering he claimed he had just
learned about his girlfriend’s death. Olsen claimed he was driving Weldy to Wal-
Mart when she jumped out of his moving truck. He said he turned around, but
she did not want to get back in the truck. Olsen said, “[I]f somebody jumps out of
a truck at 35, 40 miles per hour they can break their leg, they can break their
neck, anything can happen to them.” He said Weldy had also jumped out of the
truck the previous Thursday. Police noted several discrepancies in that story
compared to statements he made during various jail phone conversations,
including that he did not see Weldy when he backed out of the yard and he
thought he might have run her over and that Weldy might have gotten caught in
the seatbelt and hit her head. Olsen did not testify at trial. His defense theory
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was that Weldy got angry and jumped out his truck; when he turned around he
did not see her so he assumed she ran away.
On appeal, Olsen contends “[o]ne has to speculate about whether Olsen
was reckless in the operation of his vehicle and, even if he were, if his actions
were the cause of Weldy’s death” where
other cars were driving on the road, the body was not located by
where Olsen drove into the yard, there was the possibility Weldy
was mobile after she left the vehicle, there was no evidence of
damage to Olsen’s vehicle, and any evidence tying Olsen’s truck
tires to Weldy’s injuries was inconclusive.
He further claims “one has to speculate about whether Olsen even hit Weldy and,
more importantly, if he knew how badly she was injured.”
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we are
persuaded that a reasonable juror could have found Olsen’s reckless driving
caused Weldy’s death, and that Olsen knew he had been in an accident capable
of causing Weldy’s death. See State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 197 (Iowa
2002) (setting forth standard of review in challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a guilty verdict). We affirm, finding substantial evidence
supports the jury’s finding of guilt.
Olsen also claims the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for new trial. At trial, the State and Olsen presented conflicting evidence
as to the circumstances of the incident and the cause of Weldy’s death; the jury
chose to believe the State’s evidence. Olsen requested a new trial on the basis
of insufficiency of evidence, claiming “the credible evidence is the evidence
presented by the defense.” The district court rejected the claim, stating:
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With respect to the issue of whether the verdicts were
contrary to the weight of the evidence, the Court starts with the rule
that the jury may believe all, part or none of any witness’s
testimony. Looking at the evidence in its entirety, and with the view
towards the evidence supporting the verdicts, the Court does
conclude that the weight of the credible evidence does, in fact,
support the verdicts rendered by the jury in this matter, and
therefore, the Motion for New Trial with respect to that issue will be
overruled . . . .
We conclude the court properly exercised its discretion in its ruling. See State v.
Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 2003) (“The district court has broad discretion in
ruling on a motion for new trial.”); State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658-59 (Iowa
1998) (stating the district court may grant a motion for new trial “[i]f the court
reaches the conclusion that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence”).
II. Evidentiary Rulings
Olsen takes issue with several evidentiary rulings by the district court,
claiming the court abused its discretion in (1) excluding evidence of a prior act by
the victim, (2) admitting evidence of Olsen’s prior domestic abuse of the victim,
and (3) denying access to the victim’s mental health records.
A. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding the Victim’s Character
Olsen appeals the district court’s refusal to admit evidence of a specific
instance he claims would have supported the theory that Weldy jumped out of his
truck by “her own free will.” He presented an offer of proof of a February 2010
incident during which he and Weldy were arguing in the backseat of his friend’s
car when Olsen told the friend to stop the car because Weldy had “hopped out”
while the car was moving. Olsen’s friend acknowledged he did not see what
happened before Weldy went out the car door, who opened the door, and what
Olsen was doing at the time Weldy went out the door.
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The district court excluded the proffered evidence, determining it was
improper character evidence. See Iowa Rs. Evid. 5.404(a)(2)(A) (“Evidence of a
person’s character or a trait of the person’s character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except . . . evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same . . . .”),
5.405(b) (“In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of
specific instances of the person’s conduct.” (emphasis added)); State v. Jacoby,
260 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Iowa 1977) (“[W]here the accused denies the killing or
asserts it was unintentional, evidence of the deceased’s character is
inadmissible”). We conclude the evidence was properly excluded.
B. Admission of Evidence Regarding Olsen’s Prior Abuse of the Victim
Olsen appeals the district court’s admission of evidence of his prior acts of
violence toward Weldy, claiming none of the charges submitted to the jury
required the State to prove Olsen’s specific intent, and even if the evidence was
relevant, the danger of unfair prejudice “far outweighed” its probative value.
Olsen takes issue with the following evidence: testimony from the paramedic who
responded to the scene on January 17, 2011, that he recognized Weldy from a
different incident on January 13, 2011, when he had responded to a domestic
assault call and Weldy had told him she had been “pushed out of a truck”;
testimony from police who responded to a domestic assault call at Olsen’s house
on January 12, 2011, after Olsen threw Weldy to the ground when she came to
retrieve her belongings; and testimony from police who responded to a report of
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domestic assault involving Olsen and Weldy in November 2010 and saw Weldy
with scratches and blood on her face.
The district court allowed the testimony, with a cautionary instruction,
determining it was admissible evidence of other bad acts. The court stated “the
incidents are relevant to establish the volatile and violent nature of the
relationship between the defendant and the alleged victim,” “would tend to help
establish motive, intent, or absence of mistake or accident,” and “occurred within
approximately two months of the alleged victim’s death.” The court concluded
“the highly probative nature of the three incidents . . . substantially outweighs any
danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, particularly when coupled with an
admonishment to the jury concerning the purpose for which such evidence may
be offered along with an instruction setting forth its limited utility.” 1 See Iowa R.
Evid. 5.403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”), 5.404
(“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.”); State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 242 (Iowa 2001)
1
The jury received the following limiting instruction in regard to the evidence at issue:
Each of the new three witnesses that are being called by the state are
going to offer testimony concerning incidents which occurred prior to
January 17th, 2011. Evidence concerning those incidents is not
admissible to prove the character of Mr. Olsen or that Mr. Olsen acted in
conformity with the actions that are alleged to have occurred in
connection with those incidents. That evidence is being offered merely
for the purpose of showing that what occurred on January 17th was not a
mistake or accident.
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(allowing evidence of prior assaults against same victim where the defendant
claimed the injuries he inflicted on the victim that day were “unintended” and his
prior bad acts made it “more probable” that his actions constituted an element of
the crime at issue). Here, Olsen’s defense was that Weldy voluntarily jumped
from his moving vehicle and was accidentally or mistakenly run over. We
conclude the district court properly exercised its discretion to permit evidence of
prior domestic abuse of Weldy by Olsen.
C. Denial of Access to Victim’s Mental Health Records
Olsen appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to compel production
of Weldy’s mental health records, claiming the records would have supported a
finding that Weldy “had a history of jumping out of vehicles” and “would make it
more likely that Weldy voluntarily jumped out of Olsen’s vehicle on the night in
question.” Prior to trial, the district court conducted an in camera review of
Weldy’s medical records from Genesis Medical Center from March 8, 2000,
through January 17, 2011, and from Vera French Community Mental Health
Center from September 27, 2005, through December 1, 2010.2 The court
determined the records did not contain exculpatory information, and that to the
extent any information was exculpatory, Weldy’s privacy interests outweighed
Olsen’s need for disclosure.
2
In April 2013, the Iowa Supreme Court entered an order allowing appellate counsel
access to Olsen’s January 2012 motion to compel and the State’s February 2012
resistance to that motion. Those filings, along with the district court’s order denying
Olsen’s motion to compel, are included in a sealed appendix before this court for
purposes of this appeal, which we have reviewed and considered in reaching our
conclusion on this issue.
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Olsen claims the court’s ruling makes it “impossible for an appellate court
to . . . know whether the court determined there was no exculpatory evidence at
all, or whether there was some exculpatory evidence that did not warrant limited
disclosure.” Our supreme court, however, has not interpreted Iowa Code section
622.10(4), which sets forth the protocol for criminal defendants’ access to
potentially exculpatory mental health records of their alleged victims, to require
the district court to make the written findings Olsen claims were necessary here.
Indeed, section 622.10(4)(a)(2)(d) provides:
Upon the court’s determination, in writing, that the privileged
information sought is exculpatory and that there is a compelling
need for such information that outweighs the privacy interests of the
privilege holder, the court shall issue an order allowing the
disclosure of only those portions of the records that contain the
exculpatory information.
(Emphasis added); see Thompson, 836 N.W.2d at 490 (holding section
622.10(4) “is constitutional on its face”). Here, the district court determined
Weldy’s privacy interests outweighed Olsen’s need for any exculpatory
information, and issued its ruling denying access to the records. We conclude
the court properly applied section 622.10(4) in determining whether to allow
access to the confidential medical records at issue.
Alternatively, Olsen asks this court to conduct an in camera review of the
medical records at issue. Our appellate courts have routinely conducted in
camera reviews of confidential materials in addressing claims on appeal
concerning the district court’s discovery rulings. See, e.g., Otteson v. Iowa Dist.
Court for Linn Cnty., 443 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Iowa 1989); Pathology Consultants v.
Gratton, 343 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Iowa 1984). We have thoroughly examined the
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sealed documents as a part of our review and agree with the district court’s
determination that no exculpatory information is contained therein. Therefore, we
find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling . See Thompson, 836
N.W.2d at 476 (“Nonconstitutional challenges to discovery rulings are reviewed
for abuse of discretion.”).
To the extent Olsen claims violations involving the right to present a
defense based on the denial of access to Weldy’s medical records to his trial or
appellate counsel, we review those claims de novo. Id. at 476. We find these
claims unpersuasive under our supreme court’s recent ruling in Thompson, 836
N.W.2d at 476, 486 (holding the criminal defendant does not have state or
federal due process right “to an in camera inspection by his own lawyer”).3
Having considered the issues raised on appeal, we affirm Olsen’s
judgment and sentence for homicide by vehicle and leaving the scene of a fatality
accident.
AFFIRMED.
3
Insofar as Olsen claims his counsel was ineffective in failing to gain access to Weldy’s
medical records, we conclude Olsen is unable to prove this claim where trial counsel
sought—albeit unsuccessfully—access to those records.