Willie James Jeffries, Jr., Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0737
Filed March 23, 2016
WILLIE JAMES JEFFRIES, JR.,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J. Ovrom,
Judge.
Willie Jeffries appeals the district court’s summary disposition of his sixth
postconviction-relief action on the ground the application was untimely.
AFFIRMED.
Eric W. Manning of Manning Law Office, P.L.L.C., Urbandale, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.
Applicant Willie Jeffries appeals the district court’s summary disposition of
his sixth postconviction-relief (PCR) application. The district court concluded
Jeffries’s claims were time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of
limitations, set forth in Iowa Code section 822.3 (2013), and it dismissed his
application. We affirm.
After a jury trial in 1985, Jeffries was convicted of first-degree sexual
abuse and sentenced to life without parole. This court affirmed his conviction.
See State v. Jeffries, 417 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987). Procedendo
issued on January 11, 1988. Jeffries then filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in federal court, which was subsequently dismissed, and the dismissal
was affirmed on appeal. See Jeffries v. Nix, 912 F.2d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 930 (1991). His second petition for writ of habeas corpus
met the same fate. See Jeffries v. Nix, No. 91-3782SI, 1992 WL 323471, at *1
(8th Cir. 1992).
Jeffries filed two PCR applications in 1995. They were consolidated and
subsequently dismissed as being time-barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. His appeal from the dismissal was dismissed, and procedendo was
issued February 25, 2000. Jeffries filed his third PCR application in 2000, and
while that application was pending, he filed a fourth PCR application. These
applications were dismissed in 2004 as being time-barred. In 2007, Jeffries filed
his fifth PCR application. That application was dismissed as being time-barred
after the PCR court found the application was an attempt to relitigate issues
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previously addressed in Jeffries’s previous PCR actions. His appeal from this
dismissal was dismissed, and procedendo issued on December 18, 2012.
Jeffries’s present PCR application—his sixth—was filed September 26,
2013. He raised the following grounds for relief: (1) a sentence of life in prison is
cruel and unusual punishment where the defendant received ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal and in prior PCR matters; (2) he had a
“substantial amount of equity on his side,” as the victim had just run off from a
residential-treatment program and had a history of trading sex for drugs and
suffered from delusions of sexual abuse—the fighting issue was consent; (3) the
trial court refused to allow Jeffries to present evidence of a State witness who
would testify the victim suffered from delusions of sexual abuse; (4) Jeffries was
acting in self-defense when he struck the victim in the face; (5) counsel was
ineffective for filing a federal-habeas-corpus action instead of filing for PCR in
state court; (6) PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to advance claims that
(a) the victim admitted having delusions before leaving the hospital, (b) no blood
from Jeffries was found in the victim’s vagina or anus, and (c) counsel should
have investigated Dr. Edison’s testimony that the victim suffered delusions of sex
abuse; (7) subsequent PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the above
claims; (8) he was entitled to a private investigator; (9) there was newly
discovered evidence; (10) the State failed to timely disclose a medical report
from Dr. Edison that the victim suffered delusions of sexual abuse; (11) the trial
court refused to allow said evidence under the state Rape Shield Law; and (12)
“the correctness of the jury’s verdict. [Jeffries] should have a chance to be heard
and cross-examine witness.” The State responded with a motion for summary
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disposition and dismissal, arguing “Jeffries has essentially made the same
arguments in the above-captioned case, as he has made in his numerous prior
pleadings. These arguments are barred by the statute of limitations and there is
no exception to that limitation that is applicable.” Jeffries resisted, and after a
hearing, the PCR court concluded:
Like the courts that have considered this matter before, this
court finds that all issues raised here have either been raised and
addressed in prior actions or are time-barred by Iowa Code section
822.3. That section states that [PCR] actions must be filed within
three years of conviction or procedendo issues, unless there is a
ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the
applicable time period. Iowa Code § 822.3. All of [Jeffries’s] claims
are barred under this statute.
On appeal, Jeffries makes several complaints. We review a district court’s
ruling finding a PCR application was untimely for correction of errors at law.
Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519-20 (Iowa 2003). “[W]e will affirm if the
[PCR] court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and the law
was correctly applied.” Id. at 520.
Section 822.3 provides an application for PCR “must be filed within three
years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an
appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.” Procedendo was issued
in Jeffries’s direct appeal on January 11, 1988, and his sixth PCR application
was filed on September 26, 2013. The application is thus untimely unless it
comes within the exception for “a ground of fact or law that could not have been
raised within the applicable time period.” See Iowa Code § 822.3. Although
Jeffries relies on this exception for his “self-defense” and “cruel and unusual
punishment sentence” claims, we find his arguments to be so incredible we do
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not repeat them here. His self-defense claim could have been raised within the
applicable limitations period. It was not. It is therefore time-barred. The same
can be said for his cruel-and-unusual-punishment-sentence claim. Furthermore,
alleging his counsel were ineffective regarding the issue does not trigger the
exception. See Whitsel v. State, 525 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Iowa 1994) (“Ineffective
assistance of counsel may constitute ‘sufficient reason’ for failure to raise an
issue in an earlier trial or direct appeal. It does not, however, constitute a claim
that ‘could not have been raised within the applicable time period’ under section
822.3.” (internal citation omitted)). His remaining PCR claims have been raised
and rejected in previous actions. Therefore, we find no error in the district court’s
conclusion, “that all issues raised here have either been raised and addressed in
prior actions or are time-barred by Iowa Code section 822.3.” Jeffries’s other
arguments on appeal are without merit, and we need not address them here,
though we note they too are time-barred. See id. at 864-85.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court summarily
dismissing Jeffries’s PCR application on the ground the application was untimely
under section 822.3.
AFFIRMED.