State of Iowa v. Roger Allen McDaniel

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1458
Filed May 14, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ROGER ALLEN MCDANIEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, Myron L.
Gookin, Judge.
A defendant who pled guilty to lascivious acts with a child contends the
district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to prison. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Heather Quick, Assistant Attorney
General, and Richard Scott, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
Roger McDaniel appeals his judgment and sentence for lascivious acts.
He contends the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to prison.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Forty-year-old McDaniel pled guilty to lascivious acts with a ten-year-old
child. See Iowa Code § 709.8(3) (2011). Under the plea agreement, the State
agreed to dismiss a second-degree sexual abuse charge and recommend a
suspended sentence on the lascivious acts count, with defense counsel free to
argue for a deferred judgment. The district court judge informed McDaniel he
could not guarantee what the sentence would be. The court ordered a
presentence investigation report and scheduled the matter for sentencing.
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor recommended “that the
defendant receive a suspended prison sentence.” The State cited McDaniel’s
“lack of criminal history” and subsequent decision to take “responsibility for this
action” by voluntarily obtaining counseling. The district court declined to adopt
the prosecutor’s recommendation and sentenced McDaniel to a prison term not
exceeding five years.
II. Analysis
On appeal, McDaniel contends the district court considered the nature of
the crime to the exclusion of other relevant factors and, accordingly, abused its
discretion in imposing sentence. See State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 10 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1995) (“In exercising . . . discretion, the court may consider a variety of
circumstances, including the nature of the offense and attending circumstances,
as well as the defendant’s age, character, propensities and chances of reform.”).
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There is no question the court was deeply troubled by the nature of the crime.
For example, the court stated, “[U]nder no circumstances can the sexual abuse
of a young child be justified or acceptable.” The court continued,
As I review all of this information and as I consider the very,
very serious, serious nature of the crime that’s been committed, I
have no choice in my own mind, I believe, but to require you to
suffer the consequences of the actions that you’ve taken, which is
the sexual abuse of [this child].
Later, the court stated, “[W]hat you did to [this child] is completely inexcusable.
She will suffer for it for the rest of her life, as will you, and there has to be
consequences.”
But the court did not limit the discussion to the nature of the offense. The
court emphasized that this was “a very, very difficult choice” because McDaniel
did not “have much of any kind of a criminal record, other than somewhat of a
lengthy traffic violation record.” The court also noted McDaniel had “done good
things” since the incidents by “undertaking counseling” and by stating he
“benefited from that counseling.” The court also considered “that which would
provide maximum benefit for . . . rehabilitation and at the same time protect the
community from further offenses.” See Iowa Code § 901.5. Finally the court
stated:
Mr. McDaniel, I’ve selected this particular sentence for you after
considering many things; after considering the Presentence
Investigation Report by the Department of Corrections, their
recommendation that you be imprisoned. I’ve considered, quite
frankly, not only your lack of a prior criminal record but also the
serious nature of the crime that has been committed, your
employment and family circumstances, whether force was used in
the commission of the offense, your need for rehabilitation and your
potential for rehabilitation, and the necessity to protect the
community from further offenses by you and by others.
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Based on these statements, we conclude the district court did not consider the
nature of the offense to the exclusion of other pertinent factors and did not abuse
its discretion in sentencing McDaniel to prison.
AFFIRMED.