In the Interest of Q.E., C.E., and K.E., Minor Children, A v. Mother

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0783
Filed August 13, 2014
IN THE INTEREST OF Q.E., C.E., and K.E.,
Minor Children,
A.V., Mother,
Appellant,
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine Dalton,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Brenda Drew-Peeples of Drew-Peeples Law Firm, Davenport, for
appellant mother.
Timothy Tupper, Davenport, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Julie A. Walton,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Lauren Phelps, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
children.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
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DOYLE, J.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental
rights to three of her children.1 We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human
Services (DHS) in January 2013, when the mother contacted DHS because she
did not feel she could parent her children safely. The mother has six children:
K.E., born in 2005; Q.E., born in 2007; C.E., born in 2009; A.E., born in 2010;
A.E., born in 2011; and S.E., born in 2013. The youngest three children have
since been placed in the care of their father. The mother’s parental rights to her
oldest three children, who have a different father than her younger children, are
at issue in this proceeding.
When the mother contacted DHS, she indicated she was having violent
thoughts toward other people (not her children), and that she was depressed and
suicidal. The mother was also homeless and she was concerned about the
welfare of the children. The mother was solely responsible for all her children,
did not receive financial or emotional support from the fathers, and was unable to
maintain a job for more than a few weeks. Prior to the mother’s contact with
DHS, the children had been in and out of the mother’s care, shelters, and “Safe
Families” placements since 2012.
The children were adjudicated in need of assistance in May 2013. K.E.
and Q.E. remained placed with the same foster family they had been placed with
1
Per order filed July 14, 2014, the Iowa Supreme Court denied the father’s motion to join
the mother’s appeal and dismissed his appeal as untimely.
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in December 2012, which was a pre-adoptive placement. C.E. was placed with a
different foster family that was not a pre-adoptive placement. The children’s
father did not participate in services or communicate with caseworkers and did
not have any regular or meaningful contact with the children. Services were
provided to the family to eliminate the need for removal of the children from the
mother’s care, and supervised visitations were scheduled. Specifically, the
mother was directed to attend therapy and take medication for her outstanding
mental health issues, including her “severe depression.”
The juvenile court entered a permanency order in October 2013. The
court observed the mother struggled to attend all visitations, and when she did,
had difficulty managing more than a few of the children at a time. The court
found visitation was disruptive for the children due to the mother’s displays of
anger toward caseworkers and inappropriate behavior toward the children. For
example, the mother advised K.E. and Q.E. they could return to her care if they
misbehaved. She also taught the children that cutting themselves was a way to
deal with anger and pain. K.E. and Q.E.’s behavior, which was problematic to
begin with, regressed after visits with the mother. C.E. had significant cognitive
delays such that the mother had difficulty interacting with him let alone meeting
his needs. The mother refused to sign the necessary releases to allow the
children to be seen by a child psychologist, and refused to meet with the
children’s therapists. As the court accurately summarized, the mother
“repeatedly allowed her anger to override what [was] best for the children.”
The court observed the mother was “extremely slow” in working toward
addressing case plan goals. The mother had begun attending therapy, albeit
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irregularly and was not taking her prescribed medication consistently. She was
unable to maintain employment and had not secured a stable living arrangement.
The court observed the mother made no request for services that were not
provided. In light of the mother’s overall lack of progress toward any case plan
goals and the detrimental impact that contact with the mother had on the
children, the court waived reasonable efforts in regard to the mother and
changed the permanency goal from reunification to termination and adoption for
K.E., Q.E., and C.E. The mother’s visitations with the children were discontinued
in October 2013.
The State filed a petition to terminate parental rights in January 2014. The
termination hearing was held in April 2014. The juvenile court observed the
children’s behavioral and cognitive issues were markedly improved by remedial
services once the children received them, and the children had a “huge
reduction” in anger outbursts and destructive behavior after visitation with the
mother was stopped. At the time of the termination hearing, K.E. and Q.E.
remained with the same family in which they had been placed in December
2012—a family that expressed its willingness and ability to adopt the children.
The court observed that although C.E.’s placement was not pre-adoptive, the
child had demonstrated “great progress since being removed from his mother,”
and was a young and “now adoptable” child.
The court acknowledged the mother’s recent participation in services. The
mother testified she had attended therapy regularly for the past few months and
had experienced “a lot of breakthroughs in therapy.” She further testified she
had switched medication a few weeks before the termination hearing and was
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taking that medication consistently. The mother testified she was now living with
her boyfriend of several months in his mother’s home, and that for several weeks
she had been employed in a job she enjoyed. The mother testified she believed
she could take care of and provide for her children if they were returned to her
care. Her boyfriend’s mother also testified, stating she would be a “support
system” to help the mother’s reunification with her children, including allowing the
children to live in her home along with the mother. Neither the mother’s
boyfriend nor his mother had met the children, and they had only known the
mother for approximately four months. The guardian ad litem recommended
termination of the mother’s parental rights.
Following the termination hearing, the juvenile court entered its order
terminating the mother’s parental rights to pursuant to Iowa Code sections
232.116(1)(d) and (f) (2013), and additionally pursuant to section 232.116(1)(i) as
to K.E. and Q.E. The mother appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
We review proceedings to terminate parental rights de novo. In re A.B.,
815 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012). We give weight to the juvenile court’s factual
findings, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not
bound by them. Id. We will uphold an order terminating parental rights if there is
clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination under Iowa Code
section 232.116. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). Evidence is
clear and convincing when there are no serious or substantial doubts as to the
correctness of conclusions of law drawn from the evidence. Id.
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III. Discussion
A. Grounds for Termination
We must first determine whether a ground for termination under section
232.116(1) is established. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). The
mother disputes the grounds to terminate her parental rights under each ground
found by the juvenile court. “We only need to find grounds to terminate parental
rights under one of the sections cited by the district court in order to affirm its
ruling,” see In re R.K., 649 N.W.2d 18, 19 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000), and we elect to
address the mother’s contention that statutory grounds under section
232.116(1)(f) have not been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Under that section, the State must show the children are four years old or
older, have been adjudicated in need of assistance, have been removed from the
home for a requisite period of time, and the juvenile court could not return the
children to the parent’s custody pursuant to section 232.102. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)(f) (setting forth the statutory requirements for termination). The
mother challenges the court’s finding that the children could not be returned to
her care “at the time of the termination hearing” or “in [a] reasonable period of
time.” Therefore, at issue is whether the State presented clear and convincing
evidence the children could not be returned to the mother’s care pursuant to
section 232.102. See id. § 232.116(1)(f)(4). The State meets its burden to prove
this element if it presents clear and convincing evidence the children have
suffered or are imminently likely to suffer an adjudicatory harm upon their return.
See id. §§ 232.116(1)(f)(4), .102(5)(a)(2), and .2(6)(c); In re A.M.S., 419 N.W.2d
723, 725 (Iowa 1988).
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This case first came to DHS’s attention in January 2013 when the mother
contacted DHS because she did not feel she could parent her children safely.
Throughout 2012, the children had been in and out of the mother’s care as she
struggled with unaddressed mental health issues and providing the children a
stable home. We commend the mother for realizing her children were suffering
and for reaching out to DHS. Unfortunately the mother’s actions thereafter to
correct these circumstances were not as proactive.
For nearly one year, the mother did little to address her mental health
issues. She did not attend therapy regularly or take her prescription medications
consistently. Her unaddressed mental health issues detrimentally affected her
cooperation with caseworkers and her relationship with her children. Indeed, the
mother was so disruptive during supervised visitations, and the children were
affected so adversely from her behavior, that visitations were discontinued in
October 2013. It was not until January 2014 that the mother began to show
some initiative and begin to follow through with the case plan requirements.
Coincidentally, this was also around the time the State filed a termination petition.
Meanwhile, the children were adjusting to placement outside the mother’s care,
K.E. and Q.E.’s behavior problems nearly ceased, and C.E.’s cognitive delays
markedly improved.
In light of the mother’s testimony concerning her recently-acquired
employment, supportive relationships, housing, and dedication to mental health
treatment, we are truly hopeful the mother will find sustained stability and
improvement of her mental health issues. But, her current efforts are simply too
little, too late for these children. “A parent cannot wait until the eve of
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termination, after the statutory time periods for reunification have passed, to
begin to express an interest in parenting.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa
2000). Under these circumstances, the mother’s short-term attention to her
mental health needs do not rectify concerns about her longstanding stability and
inability to parent her children safely, and the children cannot be returned to her
care without an imminent risk of suffering an adjudicatory harm.
We further conclude an additional period of rehabilitation in this case
would not correct the situation. “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a
child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under
section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be
able to provide a stable home for the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 41; see A.B.,
815 N.W.2d at 778 (noting the parent’s past conduct is instructive in determining
the parent’s future behavior). Children are not equipped with pause buttons.
“The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment
with ways to face up to their own problems.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613
(Iowa 1987). At some point, as is the case here, the rights and needs of the
children rise above the rights and needs of the parent. There is no reason to
delay the children the permanency they need and deserve. We therefore affirm
the juvenile court’s determination that termination of the mother’s parental rights
was proper under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f).
B. Factors in Termination
Even if a statutory ground for termination is met, a decision to terminate
must still be in the best interests of a child after a review of section 232.116(2).
P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 37. In determining the best interests, this court’s primary
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considerations are “the child’s safety, the best placement for furthering the long-
term nurturing and growth of the child, and the physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs of the child.” Id.
The mother contends termination of her parental rights is not in the best
interests of the children because it would sever “the sibling group [and] the
sibling relationship between these children and their half sibling group [of which]
the mother retains parental rights.”2 Indeed, we prefer to keep siblings together
when possible. See In re T.J.O., 527 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
But the paramount concern is the children’s best interests. See id. Here, K.E.
and Q.E. have lived together in a foster home since December 2012 with a family
that wishes to adopt them. C.E. is young, adoptable, and has responded well to
placement in foster care. None of the mother’s other children (who were very
young when they were last living with K.E., Q.E., and C.E.) reside with her.
Because we agree with the juvenile court’s finding that termination of the
mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children and would best
provide for the children’s long-term nurturing and growth, we decline to reverse
the termination on this ground.
C. Factors Against Termination
Finally, we give consideration to whether any exception or factor in section
232.116(3) applies to make termination unnecessary. We have discretion, based
2
There is no indication this issue was raised in the juvenile court, and accordingly, the
mother’s claim is not preserved for our review. State ex rel. Miller v. Vertrue, Inc., 834
N.W.2d 12, 20-21 (Iowa 2013) (“Our error preservation rules provide that error is
preserved for appellate review when a party raises an issue and the district court rules
on it.”). On our de novo review, we elect to bypass this error preservation concern and
proceed to the merits. See State v. Taylor, 596 N.W.2d 55, 56 (Iowa 1999) (bypassing
error preservation problem and proceeding to the merits of the issue raised on appeal).
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on the unique circumstances of each case and the best interests of the children,
whether to apply the factors in this section to save the parent-child relationships.
In re C.L.H., 500 N.W.2d 449, 454 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). No exception or factor
contained in section 232.116(3) applies to make termination of the mother’s
parental rights unnecessary in this case.
IV. Conclusion
There is clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination exist,
nothing in the record suggests additional time would correct the circumstances
leading to the children’s adjudication and removal, termination of parental rights
is in the children’s best interests, and no consequential factor weighing against
termination requires a different conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm termination of
the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.