Kelli Jo Schroeder v. City of Cedar Falls, Cedar Falls Police Department and Jeffrey Sitzmann, in His Individual and Official Capacities

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1698
Filed September 17, 2014
KELLI JO SCHROEDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CITY OF CEDAR FALLS, CEDAR
FALLS POLICE DEPARTMENT and
JEFFREY SITZMANN, in his Individual
and Official Capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Thomas N.
Bower (first summary judgment ruling), David F. Staudt (second summary
judgment ruling), and Bradley J. Harris (motion in limine ruling, third summary
judgment ruling, and trial), Judges.
The plaintiff appeals the evidentiary ruling of the district court precluding
the introduction of certain evidence at trial on her petition for the false arrest.
AFFIRMED.
Edward M. Blando and Desiree A. Kilberg of Elderkin & Pirnie, P.L.C.,
Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Bruce L. Gettman Jr. and Brandon J. Gray of Redfern, Mason, Larsen &
Moore, P.L.C., Cedar Falls, for appellees.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ. Bower, J.,
takes no part.
2
MULLINS, J.
Kelli Jo Schroeder appeals the district court’s rulings regarding the
admissibility of certain evidence she sought to introduce in her false arrest action
against the City of Cedar Falls, the Cedar Falls Police Department, and Officer
Jeffrey Sitzmann (the defendants). She claims the court erred in refusing to
allow her to offer evidence that an eye witness’s identification of her was not
reliable. She also claims the court erred in permitting the prosecuting attorney to
testify as an expert witness to matters that occurred after the arrest. Because we
find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, we affirm the
jury’s verdict.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Schroeder’s claim of false arrest stems from her arrest in August of 2007
for criminal mischief in the second degree for damage inflicted on the vehicle of
Nathan Curran. Curran discovered the scratches on his vehicle on the morning
of July 24, 2007, while his vehicle was parked outside his apartment in Cedar
Falls. Curran was approached by a neighbor, Maurice Allen, who told Curran he
had witnessed a white female with shorter blonde hair walk around his car with
her arm extended, “keying” the car. The woman was also accompanied by a
white male, and it appeared to Allen the two were dating. Curran and Allen were
not previously acquainted, and Allen did not know the female that had done the
damage. However, he had watched her do it and had spoken with her, coming
within an arm’s reach of her.
3
Curran showed Allen photographs from Facebook of women he knew that
matched Allen’s description. Allen identified the picture of Schroeder as the
female he saw and identified Schroeder’s then boyfriend as the male he saw with
her that night. Curran provided this information to Officer Sitzmann of the Cedar
Falls Police Department.
Sitzmann contacted Allen, who later provided Sitzmann with a written
statement of what he saw that night and indicated Curran had shown him a
picture of the female who did the damage. Sitzmann followed up with Allen again
showing him a photo lineup of six women. Allen identified a picture of Schroeder
from this lineup.
Sitzmann interviewed Schroeder at the police station. She denied being
involved in damaging Curran’s vehicle and stated she did not even know what
Curran’s vehicle looked like. Sitzmann informed Schroeder he would be filing
charges against her, and they arranged for Schroeder to turn herself in at a later
date. Schroeder’s case proceeded to trial where she was found not guilty.
She then filed this lawsuit against the defendants for false arrest, asserting
Sitzmann’s warrantless arrest lacked probable cause and caused her damages.
The defendants filed a series of summary judgment motions, all of which were
denied by the district court as the court concluded factual issues prevented a
finding for the defendants as a matter of law.
The defendants filed motions in limine where they sought to exclude,
among other pieces of evidence, “evidence acquired after [Schroeder’s] arrest on
August 24, 2007” because such evidence was “immaterial and inadmissible to
4
any issue involved in the suit and irrelevant to any issue raised by the Plaintiff’s
Petition or the Answer of Defendants as the only liability issue for the jury to
decide is whether Defendant Sitzmann had probable cause at the time of the
Plaintiff’s arrest.” The defendants asked that Schroeder be prevented from
introducing into evidence “any criticism of the investigation of Lt. Sitzmann
including any evidence or testimony as to what Lt. Sitzmann should or should not
have done during the course of his investigation.” In addition, the defendants
asked that Schroeder be prevented from introducing any of Allen’s deposition or
trial testimony from the criminal trial. Schroeder resisted these requests claiming
evidence acquired after Schroeder’s arrest “demonstrates Officer Sitzmann’s
total lack of any investigation into whether he had probable cause to believe Ms.
Schroeder committed a crime.” In order to prove her false arrest claim,
Schroeder asserted she must be able to “identify the inadequacies and criticisms
of the officer’s so-called investigation.” Finally, she claimed that Allen’s
testimony “is directly relevant to the issue of probable cause because it
demonstrates the inherent unreliability of his identification.”
After an unreported hearing, the court issued a ruling on the various
motions, concluding, “Evidence obtained following the arrest of the plaintiff by
defendant is not relevant to any issue herein.” Thus, court granted the motion
regarding evidence acquired after Schroeder’s arrest. But evidence regarding
criticism of the investigation Sitzmann conducted was “relevant insofar as it tends
to establish the reasonableness of defendant’s belief that plaintiff had committed
the crime in question.” The court denied the motion related to criticism of the
5
investigation “to allow plaintiffs to present evidence which would tend to show
that defendant’s belief that plaintiff had committed the crime was unreasonable.”
The court also ruled Schroeder would be permitted to present “evidence that
plaintiff was found not guilty in a criminal trial.” Finally, the court granted the
motion to exclude the prior testimony of Allen, who was stipulated to be
unavailable for the trial, finding the hearsay exception in Iowa Rule of Evidence
5.804(b)(1) did not apply. The court concluded the State did not have a similar
motive and interest at the prior deposition and trial to develop Allen’s testimony in
the same way it would seek to develop his testimony for this trial. In ruling on
this particular motion in limine, the court noted Allen’s testimony at the criminal
trial and in his prior deposition established he consumed two large alcoholic
drinks prior to witnessing the damage done to Curran’s vehicle and had smoked
marijuana prior to making his first identification of Schroeder. In addition, Allen
testified that the photo lineup admitted at the criminal trial was different than the
lineup he was shown by Officer Sitzmann.1
The case proceeded to a jury trial on July 30, 2013. During the plaintiff’s
opening statement,2 the attorney for the defendants objected to the plaintiff’s
attorney’s reference to Allen drinking on the night of the offense, and the
defendants asked for a mistrial. The court held a hearing on the record, outside
the presence of the jury, on the objection and motion. Defense counsel
1
Allen did end up testifying at the trial in the plaintiff’s rebuttal. The only issue he
testified to was whether or not the lineup admitted at the criminal trial was the same
lineup he was shown by Officer Sitzmann. Allen testified four of the six photos in the
lineup admitted at the criminal trial were not in the lineup he was originally shown by
Officer Sitzmann.
2
The opening statements were not reported.
6
explained he objected because the fact Allen was drinking before he witnessed
the crime was unknown to Officer Sitzmann at the time of Schroeder’s arrest and
was thus precluded by the motion in limine. Plaintiff’s counsel responded that
the evidence at issue supported their criticism of Officer Sitzmann’s investigation
to show that Sitzmann’s reliance on Allen’s eyewitness identification was not
reasonable. The court ruled Schroeder could ask
why the defendant did not ask further of Maurice Allen where he
was, what he was doing, but where he actually was and what he
was doing is not relevant to this case. That was something that
was found out after, and those items are—are irrelevant for the
determination as to the probable cause at the time of the arrest.
Plaintiff’s counsel was told to move on to other items in his opening statement,
and the court denied the mistrial motion stating it would give the jury “an
admonishment that is what is said by counsel is not evidence and should not be
consider by them as evidence.” When the jury returned, the court provided the
jury the verbal admonition and also provided them a jury instruction at the end of
the case to the same effect.
After hearing the evidence presented over several days, the jury returned
a verdict in favor of the defendants finding Officer Sitzmann did not falsely arrest
Schroeder. Schroeder filed a motion for a new trial challenging again the court’s
ruling preventing her from introducing evidence discovered after her arrest that
she contends supports her position the investigation done by Sitzmann prior to
her arrest was not reasonable. She asserted the ruling prejudiced her case
because it made her burden impossible to prove and left the arresting officer in
complete control of the evidence. She contended she was prevented from
7
showing the arrest was made on evidence that was not trustworthy. She also
claimed she was prejudiced by the court permitting testimony from the
prosecuting attorney regarding things that occurred after the arrest. The
defendants resisted, and the court denied the motion for the reasons stated in its
previous rulings.
Schroeder now appeals.
II. Error Preservation.
As a preliminary matter, the defendants allege Schroeder did not preserve
error on the claims she makes on appeal. First they contend because Schroeder
failed to make an offer of proof at trial of the evidence she claims should have
been admitted by the court, she waived her claim. Second, the defendants claim
Schroeder did not preserve error on her claim the court erred in admitting the
testimony of James Katcher, the prosecutor involved in her criminal trial, because
she did not object at the time the testimony was offered.
With respect to the first error preservation challenge, the defendants claim
without an offer of proof, it is impossible to know what evidence Schroeder
contends should have been admitted and this court would be forced to speculate
what the evidence would show. The defendants note that it was possible the
testimony Allen would give at the civil trial may not have been identical to the
testimony he offered in his deposition and at the criminal trial. In addition, the
defendants claim there is no information at all in the record of the evidence of
Schroeder’s alleged “alibi” or of a witness’s statement provided to her private
investigator months after her arrest. Schroeder claims error was preserved
8
because while no formal offer of proof was made, the evidence she sought to
introduce was readily apparent to the court and the issue had been raised and
rejected by the court.
The general rule is that a ruling on a motion in limine will not preserve
error for appeal on a claim regarding the admissibility of evidence unless a timely
offer of proof or objection is made at trial. Quad City Bank & Trust v. Jim Kircher
& Assocs., P.C., 804 N.W.2d 83, 89 (Iowa 2011). “This is because the error only
occurs, if at all, when the evidence is offered at trial and is either admitted or
refused.” Id. at 90. However, an exception to the rule exists “[w]hen the court’s
ruling on a motion in limine leaves no question that the challenged evidence will
or will not be admitted at trial.” Id. In such a case, “counsel need not renew its
objection to the evidence at trial to preserve error” because “the decision on the
motion has the effect of [an evidentiary] ruling.” Id.In granting part of the defendants’ motions in limine in this case, the court
ruled any evidence obtained following the arrest of Schroeder was not relevant to
any issue, precluding Schroeder from admitting such evidence. Schroeder’s
attorney was admonished during his opening statement for referencing evidence
that was discovered after Schroeder was arrested—Allen’s intoxication and
consumption of marijuana at critical times of identification. We conclude the
court’s ruling left no question that the challenged evidence would not be admitted
at trial, and the court’s rulings on objections made during trial bear this out. We
conclude no offer of proof was necessary in this case to preserve error on
9
Schroeder’s claim on appeal that the court erred in preventing her introducing
this evidence into the trial.
With respect to the second error preservation challenge, the defendants
offered James Katcher as an expert witness to provide evidence as to whether
Officer Sitzmann had probable cause to arrest Schroeder based on the
information he had at the time. At the beginning of Katcher’s testimony,
Schroeder’s attorney lodged a general objection that the information Katcher
acquired about the case was only learned after Schroeder was arrested. Based
on this fact, counsel stated Katcher would not be able to offer any credible
evidence “since we are limited to information that is known only to the time of the
arrest.” The court did not specifically rule on this objection noting it would take
up Schroeder’s objections as they went along.
During his testimony, Katcher was asked generally how a case proceeds
from an arresting officer to the prosecuting attorney and ultimately to trial.
Schroeder’s attorney objected again stating the testimony was irrelevant and
immaterial and goes to no question before the court. The court overruled the
objection stating the testimony went to the process by which paperwork goes
through the system and was therefore relevant. The next objection lodged was
to a question about what standard a judge uses to determine whether to approve
a trial information. Schroeder’s attorney claimed the question went to the
ultimate question in the case and accused the defendants of trying to back into
an opinion of what the judge did or did not do in this case. The court again
denied the objection finding the testimony “relevant.” No further objections were
10
lodged against the admission of Katcher’s testimony—specifically his testimony
that dealt directly with Katcher’s preparation and the court’s approval of the trial
information in Schroeder’s case.
“Generally, failure to make timely objection or motion to strike showing
reason for delayed objection will preclude a party from later claiming error in
admission of testimony.” State v. Binkley, 201 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1972). An
objection, to be timely, must ordinarily be made at the earliest opportunity after
the grounds for the objection become apparent. Id. However, “when a timely
and proper objection has been distinctly made and overruled[,] it need not be
thereafter repeated as to the same class of evidence offered. State v. Miller, 229
N.W.2d 762, 768 (Iowa 1975).
Here, Schroeder’s attorney objected to Katcher’s testimony in its entirety
because it dealt with information obtained by Katcher after Schroeder’s arrest.
The court did not rule on this objection, instead stating it would take up the
objections as the evidence progressed. Because there was no affirmative ruling,
this objection did not preserve error for this appeal. However, Schroeder’s
attorney again objected to the relevance of Katcher’s testimony as he addressed
the general processes by which a criminal case progresses through the system
and the various standards of review that are applied by the various actors
involved. The court overruled this objection finding the information “relevant.”
The broad relevancy objection implicitly included a reference to the ruling on the
motion in limine which had found that evidence obtained following the arrest of
plaintiff was not relevant. We conclude this did preserve error on the claim
11
Schroeder makes on appeal. Any further objection Schroeder could have lodged
when the testimony turned to the specific process by which Schroeder’s criminal
case proceeded through the system would have been useless as the court had
already ruled the evidence in the “same class of [as the] evidence offered” was
relevant and admissible. See id. We thus reject the defendants’ error
preservation challenges and proceed to address the merits of the case.
III. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review the district court’s determination regarding the relevancy of
evidence and its admissibility for abuse of discretion. Mohammed v. Otoadese,
738 N.W.2d 628, 631 (Iowa 2007). “An abuse of discretion exists when ‘the court
exercised [its] discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an
extent clearly unreasonable.’” Id. at 631–32 (alteration in original) (citations
omitted). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.401.
Generally, relevant evidence is admissible, and evidence that is not relevant is
inadmissible. Iowa R. Evid. 5.402. However, even relevant evidence “may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
Iowa R. Evid. 5.403.
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IV. Admissibility of Evidence—False Arrest.
In order to determine whether the evidence Schroeder sought to introduce
at trial was relevant, we must first analyze what Schroeder had to prove in order
to sustain her claim against the defendants for false arrest. “The essential
elements of the tort of false arrest are (1) detention or restraint against one’s will
and (2) unlawfulness of the detention or restraint.” Children v. Burton, 331
N.W.2d 673, 678–79 (Iowa 1983). If the arrest was without a warrant, as in this
case, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show justification for the
arrest. Id. at 679. “A peace officer in Iowa may make a warrantless arrest when
he has reasonable ground for believing that an indictable public offense has been
committed and has reasonable ground for believing that the person arrested has
committed it.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We equate
“reasonable ground” with the traditional “probable cause” standard. Id.“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within [the officers’]
knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to the belief that’
an offense has been or is being committed.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175–76 (1948) (alterations in original) (citation omitted). The probable
cause standard in civil actions for false arrest is “less demanding than the
constitutional probable cause standard in criminal cases.” Children, 331 N.W.2d
at 680. “If the officer acts in good faith and with reasonable belief that a crime
has been committed and the person arrested committed it, his actions are
justified and liability does not attach.” Id.13
“‘In determining probable cause, all the information in the officer’s
possession, fair inferences therefrom, and observations made by him, are
generally pertinent; and facts may be taken into consideration that would not be
admissible on the issue of guilt.’” Children, 331 N.W.2d at 680 (quoting 5 Am.
Jur. 2d Arrest § 48, at 740-41 (1962)). “A false arrest case involving the issue of
probable cause turns on what the officer knew at the time of arrest, not what he
learned later.” Id. at 678. “Facts that occur or come to light subsequent to the
arrest are irrelevant to a determination of whether probable cause existed at the
time of arrest.” Id. at 680.
Here, Schroeder sought to introduce evidence regarding facts and
circumstances that Officer Sitzmann should have investigated prior to arresting
her. Specifically, she wanted to provide to the jury evidence which called into
question the accuracy of Allen’s identification of her—his consumption of alcohol
the night of the incident and his consumption of marijuana before identifying her
picture. She also wanted to introduce evidence of her alibi. She essentially
wanted to introduce evidence that tended to show Officer Sitzmann should have
conducted a more thorough investigation prior to deciding to arrest her.
However, that is not that standard by which her claim for false arrest is judged.
Probable cause is determined by looking at what the officer knew at the
time he effectuated the arrest. See id. at 678. What he learned later, or what he
could have learned had he continued to investigate the crime, are not relevant to
the inquiry. See id. at 680. The case did evolve around the reliability of Allen’s
identification of Schroeder as the woman he saw damage Curran’s vehicle that
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night. “[W]hen a police officer makes a warrantless arrest, for a crime not
committed in his presence, on the strength of a single witness’[s] uncorroborated
statements” we look to see if there were “circumstances known to the officer
which could cause a reasonable person to doubt the veracity or reliability of the
statements.” Kraft v. City of Bettendorf, 359 N.W.2d 466, 470 (Iowa 1984)
(emphasis added). Despite the information that came to light later regarding the
reliability of Allen’s statement, our focus still remains on the circumstances
known to Officer Sitzmann at the time the arrest occurred. The court permitted
Schroeder to ask Sitzmann why he did not ask further questions of Allen such as
where Allen was earlier in the night and what Allen was doing, but the court
concluded the facts of where Allen actually was and what Allen was actually
doing were not relevant because Officer Sitzmann did not know of those facts at
the time the arrest was made. We believe this evidentiary ruling strikes the
correct balance in permitting Schroeder to present her claim that Officer
Sitzmann did not have enough knowledge of the facts and circumstances to
justify a finding of probable cause for arrest while at the same time keeping the
irrelevant, after-acquired information out of the case. See Children, 331 N.W.2d
at 683 (Harris, J., dissenting) (noting the arresting officer was questioned about
what the eye witness told him and what questions he failed to ask of the witness).
We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of
the information acquired after Schroeder’s arrest.
In addition to challenging the court’s failure to admit the evidence of what
Officer Sitzmann did not know when the arrest was effectuated, Schroeder also
15
claims on appeal the court should not have admitted testimony from the
prosecutor, James Katcher, regarding the procedure and process Schroeder’s
case followed in his office after the arrest was made. Specifically, she claims the
court should not have admitted Katcher’s testimony that he applies a heightened
standard—proof beyond a reasonable doubt—when he decides whether or not to
pursue the prosecution. Schroeder also challenges Katcher’s testimony
regarding the standard applied by the district court judge who approves the trial
information filed. Schroeder claims this evidence should have been precluded by
the court’s ruling regarding after-arrest acquired information and also should
have been excluded as highly prejudicial. She claims Katcher’s testimony placed
a prosecutor’s and judge’s stamp of approval on Sitzmann’s conduct in arresting
Schroeder without allowing her to show the facts as to why the arrest was
unreasonable.
We note the defendants offered Katcher as an expert witness in this case.
He testified to his general knowledge of how a criminal case proceeds through
the system and also specifically how Schroeder’s case proceeded. Katcher
described his personal actions in Schroeder's case and his application of a
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt when he evalutates whether to
prosecute a case. He testified that before he filed charges he reviewed the file
from Officer Sitzmann, which included only information obtained by Officer
Sitzmann prior to the arrest. Based on the information contained in the file,
Katcher testified he determined charges should be prepared and presented to
the judge for approval. His ultimate opinion was that the information in the file,
16
which was obtained by Officer Sitzmann prior to Schroeder’s arrest, was
sufficient to constitute probable cause. In reaching his opinion, Katcher did not
consider facts acquired after Schroeder was arrested but considered only the
facts in the file that were acquired by Officer Sitzmann before Schroeder was
arrested. This includes the photo lineup shown to the eyewitness before
Schroeder's arrest.
Schroeder characterizes Katcher’s testimony as after-acquired information
and claims that such information was irrelevant and inadmissible per the ruling
on the motion in limine. That characterization is too broad, and goes beyond the
scope of the ruling. The district court’s ruling does not prohibit “information;” it
says, “evidence obtained following the arrest of the plaintiff by the defendant is
not relevant to any issue herein.” (Emphasis added.) The “evidence” referenced
by the court was evidence tending to support or detract from the decision to
arrest in the criminal case.
In the case before us, Schroeder obtained express rulings from the court
permitting her to introduce evidence “to show that defendants’ belief that plaintiff
had committed the crime was unreasonable.” It follows then that defendants
were permitted to present evidence at this civil trial to attempt to show that
defendants’ belief was reasonable. One of the ways defendants did that was by
Katcher’s testimony. Further, the district court’s motion in limine ruling
specifically allowed Schroeder to present evidence that a jury found her not guilty
of the criminal offense. She apparently does not consider the ultimate conclusion
of the criminal case—not guilty—to be after-acquired information, precluded by
17
the motion in limine ruling, even though the evidence of the verdict was clearly
intended to show that the jury’s evaluation of the evidence did not support a
conviction. In fact, Schroeder was even allowed to testify that the jury returned
the not-guilty verdict in less than fifteen minutes, which would tend to support her
claim the officer’s investigation prior to her arrest was not reasonable. We
cannot see how allowing evidence of the prosecutor’s evaluation of the case and
the initiation of the case in the courts is any less admissible than the jury’s
ultimate not-guilty verdict.3 Further, there is nothing before us which shows that
Schroeder was denied the opportunity to present evidence to rebut Katcher’s
opinion or fact testimony.
The fact that Katcher first learned of the facts of the case after Schroeder
was arrested does not make his opinion on whether there was probable cause to
arrest Schroeder inadmissible based on the court’s motion in limine ruling. In
reaching his opinion, Katcher did not consider facts acquired after Schroeder was
arrested but considered only the facts in the file that were acquired by Officer
Sitzmann before Schroeder was arrested. Likewise, he prepared the trial
information and minutes of testimony for the judge’s approval based only on the
information contained in the file—pre-arrest facts. The fact that Katcher
performed those functions after the arrest and testified to them does not make
those facts evidence that should have been excluded by the court’s ruling on the
3
We render no opinion as to the admissibility of Katcher’s testimony if plaintiff had not
sought to introduce evidence of the not guilty verdict or had in fact not introduced such
evidence.
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motion in limine. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
Schroeder’s challenge to Katcher’s testimony on these grounds.
Because we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s evidentiary rulings
Schroeder challenges on appeal, we affirm the jury’s verdict.
AFFIRMED.