State of Iowa v. Danny Dean Doty

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0249
Filed October 15, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DANNY DEAN DOTY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Kim M. Riley,
District Associate Judge.
Danny Doty appeals following his plea of guilty to domestic abuse assault,
second offense. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Heather R. Quick, Assistant Attorney
General, Jennifer Miller, County Attorney, and Sarah Tupper, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, P.J.
Danny Doty appeals following his written plea of guilty to domestic abuse
assault, second offense, contending plea counsel was ineffective in failing to
ensure the district court conducted a colloquy regarding his prior conviction for
domestic abuse assault as described in State v. Kukowski, 704 N.W.2d 687,
691–92 (Iowa 2005). Doty cannot show he was prejudiced by the failure of plea
counsel to insist upon an in-court colloquy regarding his prior conviction.
Accordingly, Doty’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails.
I. Background Facts.
On January 15, 2014, Doty entered a written guilty plea to aggravated
misdemeanor domestic abuse assault, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1,
.2A(1), and .2A(3)(b) (2013). In his written plea, Doty stated he had “a prior
conviction for domestic abuse assault within the last 12 years.” The minutes of
testimony include the following:
The Defendant was convicted of three prior offenses of
Domestic Abuse Assault in the Marshall County District Court within
the last twelve years. The Defendant was convicted of Domestic
Abuse Assault on February 1, 2011. The Defendant was convicted
of Domestic Abuse Assault on March 23, 2012. The Defendant
was convicted of Domestic Abuse Assault, Second Offense, on
October 29, 2012. The witness will lay the foundation for certified
copies of the judgment entries to be entered into evidence at trial
herein.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State dismissed a first-degree harassment
charge. The district court subsequently sentenced Doty to two years
imprisonment.
On appeal, Doty contends plea counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge his admission to a prior domestic-abuse-assault conviction. He argues
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the district court is required to identify the prior conviction to which a defendant is
stipulating for purposes of sentence enhancement.
II. Standard of Review.
While a defendant’s challenge to a guilty plea is generally reviewed for
corrections of errors at law, we review infective-assistance-of-counsel claims de
novo. State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Iowa 2011). We normally preserve
such claims for postconviction relief proceedings, but will consider the merits on
direct appeal where the record is adequate. Id.III. Merits.
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must prove counsel failed to perform an essential duty and prejudice resulted.
State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999). Failure to prove either
prong is fatal to the claim. State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 142 (Iowa
2006).
Doty contends his counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the
enhanced sentence on the domestic-abuse-assault charge. He alleges he did
not properly admit a prior domestic-abuse-assault conviction and therefore did
not voluntarily or intelligently enter into the guilty plea. He argues the district
court was required to follow the procedure explained in Kukowski and his plea
counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the procedure used here.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.19(9) provides, in part,
After conviction of the primary or current offense, but prior to
pronouncement of sentence, if the indictment or information alleges
one or more prior convictions which by the Code subjects the
offender to an increased sentence, the offender shall have the
opportunity in open court to affirm or deny that the offender is the
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person previously convicted, or that the offender was not
represented by counsel and did not waive counsel.
In Kukowski the court explained,
The rule [2.19(9)] gives the defendant an opportunity to affirm or
deny the allegations the State is obligated to prove at the second
trial. The inquiry providing this opportunity must be conducted in
open court. If the defendant denies “being the person previously
convicted,” or asserts that the prior convictions were obtained
without counsel and counsel was not waived, then the case
proceeds to the second trial. On the other hand, if the defendant
affirms the validity of the prior convictions, then the case proceeds
to sentencing. An affirmative response by the defendant under the
rule, however, does not necessarily serve as an admission to
support the imposition of an enhanced penalty as a multiple
offender. The court has a duty to conduct a further inquiry, similar
to the colloquy required under rule 2.8(2), prior to sentencing to
ensure that the affirmation is voluntary and intelligent.
704 N.W.2d at 692.
In State v. Johnson, 770 N.W.2d 814, 825-26 (Iowa 2009), our supreme
court further addressed the procedure described in rule 2.19(9) and Kukowski.
After the guilt phase of the bench trial, the district court had concluded rule
2.19(9) applied only to a jury trial, not a bench trial. Johnson, 770 N.W.2d at 824.
Our supreme court, however, concluded the court erred in failing to hold a
separate trial on the defendant’s habitual offender status. Id. at 826. But we
note the supreme court stated, “in the absence of an agreement of the parties to
proceed otherwise, the bifurcation procedures explained in Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.19(9) and in Kukowski apply in bench trials and jury trials.” Id. at
825. (emphasis added).
We are faced with neither a bench trial nor a jury trial. Rather, this appeal
involves “an agreement of the parties to proceed otherwise.” Id. Doty entered a
written plea of guilty and admitted a prior domestic abuse conviction. See State
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v. McBride, 625 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001) (“When McBride
stipulated to those [prior] convictions, he was not pleading guilty to a criminal
offense. A rule [2.8(2)(b)] colloquy was not required for McBride to stipulate to
the fact of his prior convictions.” (citing State v. Brady, 442 N.W.2d 57, 58 (Iowa
1989) (“An admission by a defendant of prior convictions cannot be said to be a
plea of guilty to an habitual offender ‘charge,’ moreover, habitual offender
statutes do not charge a separate offense.”))); cf. Johnson, 770 N.W.2d at 826
n.14 (“Johnson asserts the State is essentially seeking a new trial on the habitual
offender status determination in violation of the constitutional prohibition on
double jeopardy. However, a consideration of habitual offender status is merely
a determination of whether a sentencing enhancement applies.”).
Doty’s written guilty plea states he understands the nature of the charge
and the mandatory minimum punishment and maximum punishment for the
offense. This discharges the court’s duty to ensure Doty’s stipulation was
voluntary and intelligent. See State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 688 (Iowa 2000)
(holding that where “[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate [the defendant]
failed to understand the nature of an [enhanced sentence], or the significance of
his admission,” the court discharged its duty to inform the defendant as to the
ramifications). An examination of the minutes of testimony establishes the
domestic abuse assault committed by Doty in 2013 was a second offense that
occurred within twelve years of his first conviction—Doty had two domestic abuse
assault convictions in 2011 and another domestic abuse assault conviction in
2012.
Doty does not assert he was misinformed of the consequences of
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affirming his prior conviction. Nor does he deny the validity of the prior
conviction(s) as set forth in the minutes of testimony. Doty cannot show he was
prejudiced by a failure of plea counsel to insist upon a Kukowski procedure.
Accordingly, Doty’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails. See McBride,
625 N.W.2d at 375 (finding any breach of counsel’s duty was without
consequence where even a full rule 2.8(2)(b) colloquy would not have prevented
the defendant from receiving an enhanced sentence). We therefore affirm his
conviction.
AFFIRMED.