State of Iowa v. Vadim Igorevic Shultsev

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1697
Filed August 3, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VADIM IGOREVIC SHULTSEV,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Brendan E. Greiner,
District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his sentence. AFFIRMED.
Patrick W. O’Bryan, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by May, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
2
GREER, Judge.
In March 2020, Vadim Shultsev pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle
while his license was barred as a habitual offender in the summer of 2019, a
violation of Iowa Code sections 321.560 and 321.561 (2019). His sentencing
hearing was continued repeatedly in part because of his health problems, including
a diagnosis of stage IV heart disease, that required ongoing medical observation
and testing; sentencing eventually took place in October 2021. With no plea
agreement before the court, Shultsev requested he be sentenced to sixty days and
given credit for the time he already served. He also asked that the sentence run
concurrent to the sentence of another charge he had pending.1 The district court
sentenced him to two years running concurrent with the other charge. In its
reasoning, the district court explained to Shultsev:
So I want you to understand, Mr. Shultsev, that the sentence
I’m going to impose I believe is the best one for you so that you can
understand the significance of what it is that you have done, but also
provide you with the type of environment where your health issues
will be addressed better than what we’re talking about with a
significant jail sentence.
. . . The reasons I’m not going to go along with [your
recommendation] is because while you’re sitting in the Jasper
County jail, it will be very difficult for you to get medical treatment.
So the sentence will be a prison sentence. My understanding is that
you will then be transported to the Iowa Medical and Classification
Center. There the Department of Corrections will assist you with
your medical treatment. . . .
....
I believe that is the best thing for your rehabilitation and for
protection of the community from further offenses from you in light of
your criminal record and the mitigating factor of your health concerns
here today.
1The sentence on the other charge required Shultsev to serve ninety days in jail.
At the time of the sentencing, he had already spent sixty days in jail.
3
Shultsev appeals2 and argues that the relative medical capacities of the
prison and county jail should not have influenced the court’s decision—he should
have been sentenced to “county jail time” as opposed to a prison sentence. When
a sentence is within the statutory limitations,3 our review is for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2015). “An abuse of
discretion is found only when the sentencing court exercises its discretion on
grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.”
State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996). Our “focus is whether an
improper sentencing factor crept into the proceedings.” State v. Thomas, 520
N.W.2d 311, 314 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). “When a trial court considers an improper
sentencing factor, we require a remand for resentencing.” State v. Carrillo, 597
N.W.2d 497, 501 (Iowa 1999).
Sentencing courts can consider a “host of factors that weigh in on the often-
arduous task of sentencing a criminal offender, including the nature of the offense,
the attending circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender,
and the chances of reform,” in addition to “the societal goals of sentencing criminal
offenders, which focus on rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the
community from further offenses.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724–25
(Iowa 2002). In the court’s colloquy at sentencing, it referred to Shultsev’s health
2 Shultsev pled guilty to a crime other than a class “A” felony, which would typically
extinguish the right to appeal without good cause. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3)
(2019). But “good cause exists to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea
when the defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.”
State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020).
3 Driving while barred as a habitual offender is an aggravated misdemeanor, which
has a “maximum penalty [of] imprisonment not to exceed two years.” Iowa Code
§§ 321.561, 903.1(2).
4
concerns as a mitigating factor amidst a host of other considerations, including his
criminal record, his rehabilitation, and the protection of the community.4 It is not
improper for a sentencing court to consider health as a mitigating factor. State v.
Withan, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998) (“A sentencing court is to consider any
mitigating circumstances relating to a defendant.”); State v. Ritchie, No. 20-1181,
2021 WL 3074495, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 21, 2021) (“The district court weighed
the health risks associated with [COVID]-19 but was not required to specifically
address each mitigating circumstance Ritchie urged.”); State v. Droegmiller, No.
10-0470, 2011 WL 1818418, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2011) (“The court
considered and weighed multiple appropriate factors [including the defendant’s
health] in arriving at a sentence that appear to provide for [the defendant’s]
rehabilitation as well as the protection of the community.”) As no improper factors
were considered and the sentence was not rooted in untenable or unreasonable
grounds, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
4 The written sentencing order also states “the Court . . . considered that such
sentence is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense,
the Defendant’s criminal history, and the rehabilitative needs of the Defendant.”