In the Interest of G.T., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0852
Filed September 21, 2022
IN THE INTEREST OF G.T.,
Minor Child,
I.B., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Ida County, Mark C. Cord III,
District Associate Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Harold K. Widdison, Sioux City, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Lesley D. Rynell of Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, attorney and guardian
ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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BADDING, Judge.
An incarcerated father who has never met his seven-year-old child appeals
the termination of his parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b), (e),
and (f) (2021).1 We review his claims de novo. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313
(Iowa 2022).
The father first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each
of the statutory grounds for termination. We choose to focus on
section 232.116(1)(f). See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (“On
appeal, we may affirm the juvenile court’s termination order on any ground that we
find supported by clear and convincing evidence.”). The father does not specify
which element of this ground he is disputing, arguing instead that the State failed
to show reasonable efforts at reunification. This argument implicates the last
element of subparagraph (f)—whether the child could be returned to his custody
at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4); D.W.,
791 N.W.2d at 707. “The State must show reasonable efforts as a part of its
ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.” In re
C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000).
“The services required to be supplied an incarcerated parent, as with any
other parent, are only those that are reasonable under the circumstances.” In re
S.J., 620 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000). The father concentrates on
contact with his child, contending “[r]easonable efforts include a visitation
1The mother, who was also incarcerated, consented to the termination of her
parental rights to this child and his younger sibling by a different father. She does
not appeal.
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arrangement designed to facilitate reunification,” which he was not afforded. But
“[w]hether visitation for an incarcerated parent should be ordered as a reasonable
effort toward reunification when timely raised by the parent” depends on the
circumstances of each case. In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 840 n.9 (Iowa 2017).
The circumstances here fit the contact the Iowa Department of Human Services
eventually facilitated.
When the child was removed in April 2020, he was in the guardianship of
the father of his younger sibling.2 Having never met his biological father, the child
viewed the guardian as his father. See S.J., 620 N.W.2d at 525 (considering the
child’s bond with the incarcerated parent in determining what services are
reasonable). After some initial confusion about the guardian’s status in relation to
the child, the department located the father and served him with notice of the
proceeding while he was in jail in December 2020. From jail, the father went to
prison on a parole revocation with an expected discharge date of October 2022.
See id. (stating the length of the parent’s sentence is a factor in the services to be
provided). The department did not have contact with the father until he appeared
for an April 2021 permanency hearing by telephone.
After that hearing, a caseworker for the department told the father she would
talk to the child’s foster mother about “getting [the child] involved in therapy
services to be of some support and offer additional guidance on how best to begin
your connection.” In the meantime, the caseworker encouraged the father to “write
2 That guardianship came about as the result of an earlier child-in-need-of-
assistance case in a different county. The father was aware of that case and
consented to the guardianship because he was incarcerated, as he has been for
much of the child’s life.
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letters to [the child] to begin the connection process.” The father agreed with that
plan but only mailed the child one letter. See C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 494 (examining
the parent’s response to the services provided). Phone calls started in
February 2022, after the child was in therapy for a few months, and continued
weekly until the termination hearing in March. While the child was initially open to
the calls, he became resistant after the first one, when the father said he loved
him. In an “All About Me” paper filled out by the child, he worried the father would
take him away from his foster mother and younger brother. Given these
circumstances, we find the efforts made by the department were reasonable. See
In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (“[T]he nature and extent of
visitation is always controlled by the best interests of the child.”).
Six more months would not have eliminated the need for removal, as the
father next argues, considering he would not be released from prison until after
that time expired. See Iowa Code §§ 232.117(5), .104(2)(b). Even then, like the
mother candidly testified,
[O]bviously—well, we’re in prison. Even if . . . me or [the child’s
father] was able to get out today, it would still take us—you know, we
would have—it’s a process, you know. We would have to get stable,
get a job, get a place, get him in school, you know what I mean. And
it’s just—yes. It is in his best interest . . . because we’re not there.
We can’t be there, you know, by our choices, being in here.
We agree. See In re M.M., No. 15-0214, 2015 WL 1332330, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 25, 2015) (“Children should not be forced to wait for their parent to be able to
care for them, particularly when we have so little evidence to rely upon to believe
the circumstances will be different in six months.”). This child identifies his family
as his foster mother and younger brother. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b). He is
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thriving in that adoptive placement, where he deserves to stay. See In re C.S., 776
N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (“[A]t some point, the rights and needs of
the children rise above the rights and needs of the parent.”).
The father lastly claims the attorneys appointed to represent him were
ineffective. See In re S.D.B., No. 08-1334, 2008 WL 4725439, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Oct. 29, 2018) (“Because a parent has a statutory right to counsel in a termination
proceeding, the parent is entitled to effective assistance.” (citing In re D.W., 385
N.W.2d 570, 579–80 (Iowa 1986)). But the father has shown no prejudice from
the errors he claims the attorneys made. See In re A.R.S., 480 N.W.2d 888, 891
(Iowa 1992) (“In order to establish an ineffective assistance claim, it must be shown
that (1) counsel’s performance is deficient, and (2) actual prejudice resulted.”); see
also In re T.P., 757 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008) (stating that, to show
prejudice, a parent needs to prove that but for counsel’s alleged failures, “the result
of the termination of parental rights proceedings would likely have been different”).
The father filed the motions that he says his attorneys should have filed, and they
were considered by the juvenile court. What’s more, aside from the reasonable-
efforts argument rejected above, the father did not challenge any of the elements
of section 232.116(1)(f). See T.P., 757 N.W.2d at 275. As a result, we find the
father’s ineffective-assistance claim fails.
Having considered and rejected all of the father’s claims on appeal, we
affirm the termination of his parental rights.
AFFIRMED.