In the Interest of T.W., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1363
Filed October 19, 2022
IN THE INTEREST OF T.W.,
Minor Child,
M.L., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Joan M. Black,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.
AFFIRMED.
Sue Kirk of Arnott & Kirk, PLLC, Iowa City, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Robin L. Himes, Cedar Rapids, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
child.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Badding, JJ.
2
BADDING, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, born in
2016, under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (g) (2022). Her entire argument
is as follows: “Termination was not appropriate because the department did not
make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. The prior termination in 2015, had
no connection to the present matter and should not have been a consideration for
the juvenile court.”1
We first address an issue submitted with the appeal as a result of the
mother’s untimely filing of the petition on appeal. As a result of that deficiency, the
supreme court entered an order directing the mother to “file a statement . . .
explaining why the appeal should not be dismissed.” The mother’s counsel
responded, “[t]he delay was purely attorney error,” as she “miscalculated the
deadline by misreading the Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure.” The supreme
court ordered the issue of whether the mother should be granted a delayed appeal
to be submitted with the appeal and transferred the case to this court.
The termination order was entered on August 3, 2022. The mother filed a
timely notice of appeal on August 18.2 Her petition on appeal was thus due on
September 2, a Friday,3 but was not filed until the following Monday, September 5.
1 Later, she passively challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an
element of termination under section 232.116(1)(g), but she never expressly
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting any elements under section
232.116(1)(f).
2 See Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(a) (“A notice of appeal from a final order or
judgment entered in Iowa Code chapter 232 termination-of-parental-rights . . .
proceedings must be filed within 15 days after the filing of the order or judgment.”).
3 See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(b) (“A petition on appeal must be filed with the
clerk of the supreme court within 15 days after the filing of the notice of
appeal . . . . The time for filing a petition on appeal shall not be extended.”);
3
Although the mother missed her deadline, the supreme court has developed
an avenue for a delayed appeal, which is “proper ‘only where the parent clearly
intended to appeal,’ the ‘failure to timely perfect the appeal was outside of the
parent’s control,’ and the delay was ‘no more than negligible.’” In re W.T., 967
N.W.2d 315, 318 (Iowa 2021) (quoting In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 292 (Iowa
2021)); accord In re T.F., 972 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2022). We find the intent is
present and the failure was outside the mother’s control. And while “three days
may be pushing the limit of what can be considered negligible,” “we opt to . . . grant
the delayed appeal.” In re B.W., No. 21-1810, 2022 WL 468945, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. Feb. 16, 2022).
But our choice to do so does not save the mother from other appellate rules
and standards for petitions on appeal in child-welfare cases. Other than providing
conclusory statements without citations to the record, she offers no meaningful
substantive argument to facilitate appellate review, so we affirm without further
opinion, finding the arguments waived. See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(d) (“The
petition on appeal shall substantially comply with form 5 in rule 6.1401.”); .1401–
Form 5 (“[S]tate what findings of fact or conclusions of law the district court made
with which you disagree and why, generally referencing a particular part of the
record, witnesses’ testimony, or exhibits that support your position on appeal. . . .
General conclusions, such as ‘the trial court’s ruling is not supported by law or the
facts’ are not acceptable.”); see also In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000)
.201(3) (“If the petition on appeal is not filed with the clerk of the supreme court
within 15 days after the filing of a notice of appeal . . . , the supreme court shall
dismiss the appeal, and the clerk shall immediately issue procedendo.”); see also
Iowa Code § 4.1(34) (providing rules on time computation).
4
(“A broad, all encompassing argument is insufficient to identify error in cases of de
novo review.”); Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (1996) (“[W]e will not
speculate on the arguments [a party] might have made and then search for legal
authority and comb the record for facts to support such arguments.”); Inghram v.
Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 215 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1974) (“To reach the merits
of this case would require us to assume a partisan role and undertake the
appellant’s research and advocacy. This role is one we refuse to assume.”); cf.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (requiring arguments in briefs to contain reasoning,
citations to authorities, and references to pertinent parts of the record).
Nor does the mother identify what services should have been offered to
constitute reasonable efforts. See In re M.W., No. 22-0963, 2022 WL 4361792, at
*4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2022) (“The mother's failure to . . . identify the alleged
deficiency in services provided by [the department] prior to the termination hearing
waives the issue.”). And the mother’s parenting deficiencies in the past termination
proceedings were unquestionably a proper consideration for the juvenile court.
See In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 315 (Iowa 2021) (noting importance “of the
parent’s past performance” as “indicative of the parent’s future capabilities”
(citation omitted)).
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.