State of Iowa v. Joshua John Deutsch

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1187
Filed October 19, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSHUA JOHN DEUTSCH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
Brook Jacobsen, District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his guilty plea. APPEAL DISMISSED.
Christopher A. Clausen of Clausen Law Office, Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Joshua Deutsch appeals his convictions for possession of
methamphetamine, first offense, and harassment in the first degree. He contends
his guilty plea was defective on its face, that he did not enter into the plea knowingly
and voluntarily, and that the plea bargain’s recommended sentence and the
sentence the court imposed is not what he agreed to as part of the plea. We find
that Deutsch lacks good cause to challenge his guilty plea and the resulting
sentence. Appeal dismissed.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Deutsch was charged with possession of methamphetamine in February
2021. He was separately charged with first-degree harassment in June 2021. He
filed two written guilty pleas on July 22, 2021, in which he waived his right to be
present at sentencing and waived his right to delay sentencing. The pleas included
joint recommendations for sentencing. For the harassment charge, the plea
recommended a two-year prison sentence, to be suspended, with credit for forty-
five days served. This sentence was to run concurrently to a one-year suspended
sentence for the possession of methamphetamine charge. The plea agreement
also recommended a suspended fine. Finally, both pleas recommended probation.
The court adopted the plea agreement and imposed the recommended sentence
on July 26.
While still represented by trial counsel, Deutsch filed a pro se notice of
appeal on August 25. The pro se document alleged that Deutsch never agreed to
the plea deal and that he signed the waiver of rights while under duress. He
asserted that he had agreed to a sentence of time-served. Our supreme court, on
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its own motion, directed both parties to address in their appellate briefs whether
the court had jurisdiction over this appeal in light of Iowa Code section 814.6A(1)
(2021), which generally prohibits the filing of pro se documents while an appellant
is represented by trial counsel. The jurisdictional issue was transferred to our court
for resolution along with the underlying appeal.
II. Standard of Review
The parties disagree on the applicable standard of review. The State
contends it is for errors at law, while Deutsch contends that because the sentence
was imposed due to ineffective assistance of counsel, our review is de novo. Our
supreme court has consistently held:
Our review of a sentence imposed in a criminal case is for
correction of errors at law. We will not reverse the decision of the
district court absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in the
sentencing procedure. . . . Questions of jurisdiction are also
reviewed for correction of errors at law.
State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002) (internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, “[a]n ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case shall
be determined by filing an application for postconviction relief pursuant to chapter
822 . . . and the claim shall not be decided on direct appeal.” Iowa Code § 814.7.
Thus, to the extent Deutsch alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, we cannot
and do not consider it.
III. Appellate Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear
this appeal. “An appeal from a final judgment of sentence is initiated by ‘filing a
notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court where the order or judgment was
entered.’” State v. Davis, 969 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Iowa R. App.
4
P. 6.102(2)). “This rule is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional,’” meaning “[i]f a party does
not timely file a notice of appeal, the court has no jurisdiction over the appeal and
the matter must be dismissed.” Davis, 969 N.W.2d at 786 (citation omitted).
Deutsch filed a pro se notice of appeal on August 25. Iowa Code
section 814.6A(1) directs, “A defendant who is currently represented by counsel
shall not file any pro se document, including a brief, reply brief, or motion, in any
Iowa court. The court shall not consider . . . such pro se filings.” Our supreme
court has held that a defendant may be granted a delayed appeal following a pro
se notice when they (1) have “expressed a good faith intent to appeal before the
appeal deadline” and (2) their failure to timely perfect the appeal was “due to state
action or circumstances beyond their control.” Id. at 787. Section 814.6A
constitutes state action because it imposes a statutory bar on pursuing a pro se
appeal for those represented by trial counsel. Id. Deutsch timely filed a document
entitled “Motion: For a Notice of Appeal.” Such meets the requirement for a good
faith effort to appeal. See id. (finding that the defendant’s pro se notice of appeal
expressed their good faith intent to appeal).
The State contends this case is distinguishable from Davis and its progeny
because those cases included untimely notice of appeals filed by counsel after the
pro se notices. To be sure, such a notice is lacking in this case. However, we do
not believe that Davis requires a subsequent notice of appeal for us to grant a
delayed appeal.1 The court in that case granted a delayed appeal because
1 We also note our supreme court recently dealt with a factually similar case. In
State v. Crawford, the defendant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal while
represented by trial counsel. 972 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Iowa 2022). However, neither
trial nor appellate counsel subsequently filed a notice of appeal. Id. at 193.
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counsel’s failure to timely appeal was outside of Davis’s control. Id. at 788.
Counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal following Deutsch’s pro se notice is
similarly outside of Deutsch’s control. See State v. Jackson-Douglass, 970 N.W.2d
252, 255 (Iowa 2022) (“[P]lea counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal after the
defendant unequivocally expressed an intent to do so is a circumstance outside
the defendant’s control and serves as grounds for allowing delayed appeal.”). And
we note, “allowing delayed appeal ‘has never been considered a discretionary
action.’” Davis, 969 N.W.2d at 787 (citation omitted). We determine we have
jurisdiction to hear Deutsch’s appeal.
IV. Good Cause
The State contends Deutsch does not have good cause to appeal for his
claims related to the validity of the plea bargain. A defendant bears the burden of
establishing good cause to appeal from a guilty plea. See Iowa Code
§ 814.6(1)(a)(3); State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020). Good cause,
“[b]y definition, [is] a legally sufficient reason . . . that would allow a court to provide
some relief.” State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 2021). Where, as here,
a defendant fails to move in arrest of judgment to challenge their plea, we are
precluded from granting relief. Id.; see also Iowa R. Crim P. 2.24(3)(a) (“A
defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion
in arrest of judgment shall preclude the defendant’s right to assert such challenge
on appeal.”). And while our courts have recognized an exception to this rule when
Despite that, the court granted the defendant a delayed appeal after following the
framework set out in Davis. Id. at 194. Thus, Crawford indicates that a subsequent
notice of appeal is unnecessary to grant this court jurisdiction. See id.6
a district court fails to advise the defendant on the necessity of filing such a motion,
that is not the case here. See State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 153 (Iowa 2021).
Indeed, Deutsch’s written plea deal included the following information:
24. I understand that if I wish to challenge this plea of guilty, I
must do so by filing a Motion in Arrest of Judgment at least five (5)
days prior to the [c]ourt imposing sentence, but no more than 45 days
from today’s date. I understand that by asking the [c]ourt to impose
sentence immediately that I waive my right to challenge the plea of
guilty which I have hereby entered.
25. . . . I understand that if I am sentenced immediately, I lose
my right to challenge any defect in this plea or plea proceeding by
motion in arrest of judgment and appeal to a higher court.
Deutsch was adequately advised of consequences of failing to file a motion in
arrest of judgment and waived his right to file such a motion. His failure to file the
motion precludes appellate relief, meaning he lacks good cause to appeal the
validity of his guilty plea.2
Deutsch similarly lacks good cause to appeal his sentence. Our supreme
court found that a defendant has good cause to appeal a sentence “that was
neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea bargain.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 100.
Deutsch’s conclusory claims notwithstanding, nothing suggests the terms of the
plea bargain were not agreed to.3 In fact, Deutsch initialed next to the agreed-to
2 The State also contends Deutsch failed to preserve error on his claims related to
the validity of the plea agreement. A failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment
has been treated as both a failure to preserve error and a failure to present good
cause. State v. Schulte, No. 20-1092, 2021 WL 4889069, at *1 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Oct. 20, 2021). Because our supreme court recently addressed the issue under
the framework of good cause to appeal, we do the same. See Treptow, 960
N.W.2d at 109. However, the analysis is the same and, as a result, Deutsch has
failed to preserve error for these claims.
3 Deutsch points out that the ink used for the portion of the plea agreement
delineating the suggested sentence is lighter than that used for most of the
document. While true, Deutsch bears the burden of establishing good cause. See
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sentence. Deutsch makes no claim that his sentence was illegal. And the court
sentenced him to the exact terms requested in the plea deal. Deutsch lacks good
cause to appeal his sentence.
Because Deutsch lacks good cause to appeal the validity of the plea deal
and his sentence, we dismiss his appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 104. The faded ink is insufficient to demonstrate the plea
was not what he agreed to.