In Re the Marriage of Starcevic

HUITINK, Judge.

Kim Starcevic appeals the child support and economic provisions and Beverly Star-cevic cross-appeals the attorney fee provisions of their dissolution decree. We affirm.

Beverly is thirty-eight, and Kim is thirty-seven years of age. They were married sixteen years and have three children: Eric, born October 1979; Amanda, born September 1981; and Gregory, born April 1986.

Beverly is a preschool teacher. Her net monthly income is $1236.95. Kim works full-time for Maytag in Newton and earns net monthly wages in the amount of $2067.84. Kim also has a cattle farm operation on the side. His net monthly income from farming is $186. The district court arrived at this figure by adding back amounts claimed on Schedule F (depreciation allowances) and applying a fifteen-percent tax rate. The court determined his total income for guideline purposes was $2253.99.

Physical custody of the children was awarded to Beverly. The court ordered Kim to pay $789 per month child support while all three children are minors.

Kim was awarded the entire farming operation, including livestock, machinery, .and equipment. Beverly was awarded the marital home, some household items, and a $35,-000 cash adjustment, payable with interest over the next ten years.

Our review in equity actions is de novo. Iowa R.App.P. 4. We give weight to the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(7).

Kim contends the district court erred in determining his income from the farm for child support purposes because it disallowed his depreciation deduction on farm equipment. We disagree.

In In re Marriage of Goer, 476 N.W.2d 324 (Iowa 1991), our supreme court analyzed other jurisdictions’ treatment of the issue of depreciation in calculating child support. The supreme court recognized the inclusion of depreciation deductions in calculation of net disposable income available for child support may give the obligor parent a windfall. Id. at 327. In addition, it recognized the allowance of “paper losses” may result in an unfair child support calculation. Id.

The fair approach, as adopted by the supreme court, is that:

depreciation should not categorically either be deducted as an expense or treated as income, but rather that the extent of its inclusion, if any, should depend on the particular circumstances of each case.

Id. at 328. The circumstances in Goer required a deduction for straight-line depreciation be allowed in order to obtain an equitable result. However, this case is factually distinguishable from Gaer and the line of cases following it which also allow a deduction for straight-line depreciation.

Kim earns a net monthly income of $2067.84 from Maytag and $186 from his cattle farm operation. He does not engage in farming to sustain himself or his family. His farm is, at best, a hobby and, at worst, a tax shelter. If farming served as Kim’s sole source of income, equity would require allowing deductions for depreciation in determining child support.

However, we find it unacceptable as a matter of public policy to allow a person in Kim’s position to generate paper losses which are then deducted from his primary income in order to avoid paying child support as determined by the child support guidelines. We are not required to give any consideration to those “business expenses reasonably necessary” to maintain a farming operation which is neither a business nor an occupation, but is instead a hobby or a tax shelter. See id. at 829.

Under the factual circumstances of this ease, it would be inequitable to allow Kim any deduction for depreciation in calculating his income for child support purposes. We affirm the trial court on this issue.

Kim also contends the property division was inequitable. He argues the assets of the parties should be equally divided. We disagree.

The partners in the marriage are entitled to a just and equitable share of the property accumulated through their joint efforts. In re Marriage of Russell, 473 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa App.1991). Iowa courts do not require an equal division or percentage distribution. Id. The determining factor is what is fair and equitable in each circumstance. Id. The distribution of the property should be made in consideration of the criteria codified in Iowa Code section 598.21(1) (1991). In re Marriage of Estlund, 344 N.W.2d 276, 280 (Iowa App.1983).

Kim was awarded the entire farming operation which will allow him to continue to reap favorable tax benefits in the future. Beverly was awarded a cash adjustment of $35,000 payable over ten years. The record indicates the property division was equitable and meets the needs of both parties. We affirm on this issue.

Beverly cross-appeals, contending the trial court erred when it failed to award her all or part of her attorney fees. We disagree.

Iowa trial courts have considerable discretion in awarding attorney fees. In re Marriage of Giles, 338 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Iowa App.1983). To overturn an award the complaining party must show the trial court abused its discretion. Id. Awards of attorney fees must be for fair and reasonable amounts, In re Marriage of Willcoxson, 250 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Iowa 1977), and based on the parties’ respective abilities to pay. In re Marriage of Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811, 817 (Iowa App.1982).

Beverly argues Kim protracted the proceedings and intentionally caused Beverly to incur unnecessary legal expenses. While the record indicates this was not an amicable dissolution proceeding, it does not show an abuse of process by Kim. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying Beverly an award of attorney fees. We affirm on this issue.

Beverly also requests attorney fees on appeal. An award of attorney fees is not a matter of right, but rests within the court’s discretion and the parties’ financial positions. In re Marriage of Kern, 408 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Iowa App.1987). We are to consider the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the trial court’s decision on appeal. In re Marriage of Castle, 312 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Iowa App.1981). We award Beverly $2000 for appellate attorney fees.

We determine any other issues the parties may have raised are either covered by this opinion or are without merit. Costs are assessed to Kim Starcevic.

AFFIRMED.

DONIELSON, C.J., concurs.

SACKETT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.