Joseph Lewis v. Windsor Windows & Doors and Twin City Fire Insurance Company

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0576
Filed January 23, 2020
JOSEPH LEWIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
WINDSOR WINDOWS & DOORS and TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.
Joseph Lewis appeals the district court’s ruling on judicial review affirming
the decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner. AFFIRMED.
Richard R. Schmidt of Mueller, Berg, & Schmidt, PLLC, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Stephen W. Spencer and Christopher S. Spencer of Peddicord Wharton,
LLP, West Des Moines, for appellees.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Mullins, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2020).
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
Joseph Lewis filed a workers’ compensation petition seeking compensation
for an injury he claimed to have sustained while employed by Windsor Windows &
Doors. Following an evidentiary hearing, a deputy workers’ compensation
commissioner filed an arbitration decision denying the claim. The deputy found
that Lewis lacked credibility and concluded he failed to satisfy his burden of proving
“he sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with
Windsor.” See Iowa Code § 85.3(1) (2018).
On intra-agency appeal, the workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed
the arbitration decision in its entirety. The commissioner made specific reference
to the deputy commissioner’s credibility determinations:
While I performed a de novo review, I give considerable deference
to findings of fact which are impacted by the credibility findings,
expressly or impliedly made, regarding claimant by the deputy
commissioner who presided at the arbitration hearing. I find the
deputy commissioner correctly assessed claimant’s credibility. I find
nothing in the record in this matter which would cause me to reverse
the deputy commissioner’s finding that claimant was not credible.
Lewis sought judicial review. The district court affirmed the final agency
decision.
On appeal, Lewis contends the commissioner’s fact findings are not
supported by substantial evidence. See id. § 17A.19(10)(f) (authorizing review to
determine whether agency action is “[b]ased upon a determination of fact clearly
vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency that is not supported
by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed
as a whole”); (f)(1) (defining “substantial evidence” as “the quantity and quality of
evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable
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person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the
establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance”).
In his view, “the district court on judicial review failed to analyze the . . .
commissioner’s decision as a whole and overlooked inconsistenc[ies] in the
arbitration decision.”
The phrase “[w]hen that record is viewed as a whole” means:
[T]he adequacy of the evidence in the record before the court to
support a particular finding of fact must be judged in light of all the
relevant evidence in the record cited by any party that detracts from
that finding as well as all of the relevant evidence in the record cited
by any party that supports it, including any determinations of veracity
by the presiding officer who personally observed the demeanor of
the witnesses and the agency’s explanation of why the relevant
evidence in the record supports its material findings of fact.
Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(3) (emphasis added). As noted, the deputy
commissioner made detailed credibility findings, which were granted deference by
the commissioner. We, too, defer to those credibility findings. See id.; Broadlawns
Med. Ctr. v. Sanders, 792 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Iowa 2010).
We recognize the commissioner could have found Lewis credible rather
than incredible based on Lewis’ testimony and independent evidence supporting
a key portion of his testimony. That evidence is as follows.
Lewis described the nature of his primary job in the parts fabrication
department and stated he had no problem performing that job. His injury arose
when he was asked to fill in on a newly built paint line. He testified to feeling “stress
in [his] back and neck” when he worked on this line. He told his manager he could
not perform the job. The manager, in turn, advised him to speak to a human
resources manager. According to Lewis, the human resources employee “told me
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specifically, I’m going to talk to your managers and I’ll make sure that you’re not
sent over there again because we don’t want to see you hurt. We don’t want to
get you hurt.” Lewis testified that his manager nonetheless instructed him to
continue his work on the paint line. He fell while working on the line and pain “shot
up [his] arm through [his] shoulder blades” and “down [his] back and up [his] neck.”
The human resources manager came to the site and helped pick him up.
According to Lewis, she “was angry” and “hollering at [his manager], asking him
why did he send me over there when she just told him that she didn’t want [him]
over there working that job.”
The human resources manager essentially corroborated these interactions
with Lewis. In a narrative placed in his personnel file, she stated:
Joseph Lewis was assisting on the Powder Coat Paint Line April 14
—April 22, 2014. After working one week in the area, he came to
HR stating that he has prior back and shoulder issues and should not
be doing this type of work—repetitive lifting of aluminum pieces with
a partner. Joseph never gave any details regarding any back/health
issues nor did he advise the employer of any previous permanent
restrictions for work here at Windsor. I told him the next time he was
asked to assist to refuse and state why and/or come to HR and I
would address it with the manager—thinking staffing would be
sufficient and Joseph would not be asked to help again.
She also confirmed attending to Lewis at the time of the injury.
Although the cited evidence could be found to detract from the deputy
commissioner’s adverse credibility finding, our job is not to weigh the evidence but
to “only determine[] whether substantial evidence supports a finding ‘according to
those witnesses whom the [commissioner] believed.’” Gits Mfg. Co. v. Frank, 855
N.W.2d 195, 198 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Arndt v. City of Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389,
394–95 (Iowa 2007)).
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The witnesses believed by the commissioner provided a wealth of
information about the incident and the injury. Past and present employees testified
to the paint-line job and Lewis’ fall; large numbers of medical records were
admitted; and the commissioner considered a video reenactment of the incident
offered by both sides. No useful purpose would be served by summarizing the
evidence. Suffice it to say the commissioner’s decision was “sufficiently detailed
to show the path . . . taken through conflicting evidence.” Schutjer v. Algona Manor
Care Ctr., 780 N.W.2d 549, 560 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Terwilliger v. Snap-On Tools
Corp., 529 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Iowa 1995)). The record as a whole contained
substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s fact findings and determination
that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of Lewis’ employment.
AFFIRMED.