Valerie Goldston v. Zebediah Goldston

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0697
Filed February 19, 2020
VALERIE GOLDSTON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ZEBEDIAH GOLDSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark D. Cleve, Judge.
Zebediah Goldston appeals a final domestic-abuse protective order.
AFFIRMED.
Robert S. Gallagher of Gallagher, Millage & Gallagher, P.L.C., Bettendorf,
for appellant.
Paul L. Macek of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Davenport, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Ahlers, JJ.
2
BOWER, Chief Judge.
Zebediah Goldston appeals a final domestic-abuse protective order issued
pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 236 (2018). Because we find Valerie Goldston
sufficiently established an incident of domestic abuse assault, we affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Zebediah and Valerie Goldston are a separated couple. The couple married
in 2012 and moved to Iowa in 2017. Zebediah and Valerie have three minor
children born in 2013, 2016, and 2019.1
On the morning of November 8, 2018, Zebediah and Valerie—who was
pregnant—had a confrontation. Valerie testified Zebediah was “in a rage” and
blocked her within their bedroom, then later blocked her in the children’s room, and
told her she was not leaving the home. While Valerie sat with the children on the
floor of their bedroom, she called the police. According to the responding officer’s
report, “Valerie . . . advised no assault had occurred though she stated Zebediah
has anger issues and was out of control.” At the protective-order hearing, Valerie
testified her “understanding of an assault was a physical hit or punch.” Valerie
stated Zebediah’s aggressive behavior—including punching doors and slamming
things in front of her—frightened her and the children. Zebediah framed the
confrontation as a series of arguments between himself and Valerie.
Zebediah left after the police arrived, but returned a short time later to pick
up some personal belongings. The parties came in physical contact with one
another as each reached for Valerie’s rings on the countertop. Valerie later
1 The couple’s third child was born after the protective order was granted.
3
described the contact as “offensive” and “insulting.” Zebediah said Valerie tried to
force his hand open and stated that he did not initiate any physical contact.
Valerie got ready for a doctor appointment, and she and her child got into
her car. As Valerie was backing out of the garage, Zebediah stood by the garage
door yelling at her. The side mirror struck Zebediah as she left. Zebediah then
called the police claiming Valerie tried to run him over and assaulted him by earlier
grabbing his hand.
On November 13, Valerie filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse. The
court granted Valerie a temporary protective order.
On April 17, 2019, the court held a hearing to determine whether to grant
Valerie’s application for a permanent protective order.2 At the hearing, Zebediah
said he is “known to get angry” but denied having anger issues.
On April 18, the court granted Valerie a one-year protective order, finding
by a preponderance of evidence that Zebediah “committed a domestic abuse
assault against” Valerie and he “represents a credible threat to the physical safety”
of Valerie. Zebediah appeals.
II. Standard of Review
Chapter 236 proceedings are heard in equity.3 See Conklin v. Conklin, 586
N.W.2d 703, 705 (Iowa 1998). We review equity cases de novo. Iowa R. App.
2 Zebediah had filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. The permanent protective
order hearing was combined with a hearing on temporary matters in the dissolution
case.
3 The district court ruled on objections during the hearing but expressly noted it
would allow the parties to make a record. The court did not exclude evidence from
the record through its rulings. The trial was thus conducted as an equitable
proceeding. See Smith v. Janssen, No. 16-0018, 2017 WL 1086206, at *1 (Iowa
Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017).
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P. 6.907. Under de novo review, “we rely on the trial court’s assessment of the
witnesses’ credibility.” Conklin, 586 N.W.2d at 706. A plaintiff must prove an
allegation of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Code
§ 236.4(1).
III. Analysis
Zebediah claims Valerie failed to sufficiently prove an incident of domestic
abuse to warrant the protective order and the trial court erred in admitting evidence
from a journal predating the parties’ marriage and private medical records obtained
without his consent.
A. Preponderance of evidence. Zebediah contends “[t]he court did not make
a determination that a specific assault took place in this case.” He further claims
he did not have notice of the allegation of assault from the touch, which occurred
when both parties reached for Valerie’s rings.
“[T]he domestic abuse chapter is meant to be protective rather than punitive
in nature . . . and is given a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect
its purpose rather than one which will defeat it.” Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590,
596 (Iowa 2001) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Domestic
abuse” occurs when (1) the defendant commits an assault as defined in section
708.1 against the plaintiff; and (2) the defendant and plaintiff are in one of the
relationships identified in section 236.2. Iowa Code § 236.2(2); see also id. § 236.5
(providing for disposition “[u]pon a finding that the defendant has engaged in
domestic abuse”). “[A] finding of assault is a prerequisite to any relief afforded
under chapter 236.” Huntley v. Bacon, No. 16-0044, 2016 WL 3271874, at *3
(Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2016).
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A person commits an assault when, without justification, the person
does any of the following:
(a) Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or
which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting
or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute
the act.
(b) Any act which is intended to place another in fear of
immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting,
or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act.
Iowa Code § 708.1(2)(a)–(b).
The evidence presented by both sides reveals they had a volatile
relationship. The district court had the opportunity to consider the testimony of
both Zebediah and Valerie and evaluate their credibility. Sworn affidavits of third-
parties contradicted Zebediah’s claims about Valerie’s temperament. Valerie also
introduced photographs of damage to the Goldstons’ home, which Zebediah
admitted he caused when he was angry. Both parties’ testimony shows they
argued the morning of November 8 and Zebediah exhibits aggressive behaviors
when angry. The district court’s order impliedly found Valerie was the more
credible witness, and her testimony described behaviors which would reasonably
put her in fear of immediate physical contact that would “be painful, injurious,
insulting, or offensive.” See id. We conclude Valerie established a domestic-
abuse assault by a preponderance of evidence.
As to Zebediah’s notice claim, a petition for relief from domestic abuse need
only state “the nature of the alleged abuse” to provide sufficient notice. See Iowa
Code § 236.3(1)(e); see also Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994)
(“Section 236.3[(1)(e)] requires a petitioner to state the nature of the alleged abuse.
The term ‘nature’ is defined as ‘a kind or class usually distinguished by
fundamental or essential characteristics.’” (citation omitted)). If the plaintiff has
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provided notice of the nature of the abuse, it does not offend due process if the
plaintiff’s case is “based, in part, on conduct and events not stated in the pleading.”
Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 596. Valerie described many aggressive behaviors the
morning of November 8; consideration of the ring incident—which Zebediah
reported to the police as Valerie assaulting him—should not have been a surprise.
B. Evidence admission. Zebediah challenges the court’s admission of his
2008 journal from a treatment program and evidence relating to his medication
prescriptions. He requests the evidence and related testimony be stricken from
the record.
When tried in equity, “the court d[oes] not need to rule on objections, but
c[an] hear all evidence subject to objections.” Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 597. Nothing
indicates the district court relied on either the journal or Zebediah’s medication
prescriptions in issuing the protective order. We did not consider the information
in our determination, so “we need not pass judgment on their admissibility.” See
id. at 598. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.