Iowa Student Loan Liquidity Corp. v. Eric J. Heaton

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0510
Filed March 18, 2020
IOWA STUDENT LOAN LIQUIDITY CORP.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ERIC J. HEATON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark D. Cleve, Judge.
Eric Heaton appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Iowa
Student Loan Liquidity Corp. AFFIRMED.
Eric J. Heaton, Davenport, self-represented appellant.
Brooke S. Jacobs and Michael Heilman of Brick Gentry, P.C., West Des
Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Ahlers, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.
Eric Heaton failed to pay his student loan debt when it became due. Nearly
ten years after Heaton defaulted, Iowa Student Loan Liquidity Corp. (ISL) filed suit
to recover all amounts owed on the unpaid promissory notes signed by Heaton.
The district court granted ISL summary judgment, and Heaton appeals. Finding
no genuine issue of material fact on any of the claims Heaton preserved for our
review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In 2000, Heaton borrowed $9300.00 from ISL and signed a promissory note
for that amount. In 2002, he borrowed an additional $19,999.00 from ISL, signing
a second promissory note. Although he began making payments on the notes, he
made his last payment on both notes in December 2008. On November 19, 2018,
ISL filed this action seeking to recover damages on both notes due to nonpayment.
ISL moved for summary judgment, which Heaton resisted.1 After an unreported
hearing, the district court granted summary judgment and entered judgment
against Heaton for the total amount owed on both notes of $39,019.91, which
included accrued interest and late fees.
1 The document Heaton filed in response to ISL’s motion for summary judgment
was captioned “Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.” The prayer for relief included a request for denial of ISL’s motion for
summary judgment and entry of dismissal in Heaton’s favor. Although the filing is
captioned as a motion and includes a prayer for dismissal, there is no basis for
dismissal stated in the filing besides conclusory statements with no factual or legal
support. Consequently, we treat Heaton’s filing only as a resistance to ISL’s
motion for summary judgment and it will be referred to as such throughout this
ruling. See Bank of America, N.A. v. Schulte, 843 N.W.2d 876, 879 n.1 (Iowa
2014) (holding that filings are addressed by their content, not their caption).
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II. Standard of Review
We review an order granting summary judgment for correction of
errors at law. The moving party has the burden of showing the
nonexistence of a material fact. The nonmoving party should be
afforded every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced
from the evidence, and if reasonable minds can differ on how the
issue should be resolved, a fact question is generated. Our review
is limited to whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and
whether the district court correctly applied the law.
Hills Bank & Tr. Co. v. Converse, 772 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Iowa 2009) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Error Preservation
Heaton raises numerous issues on appeal. While he referenced many of
these issues in his resistance to ISL’s motion for summary judgment, he had the
obligation to ensure the district court ruled on the issues to preserve error for our
review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a
fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised
and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”). “The
claim or issue raised does not actually need to be used as the basis for the decision
to be preserved, but the record must at least reveal the court was aware of the
claim or issue and litigated it.” Id. at 540.
The district court’s order granting summary judgment to ISL from which
Heaton appeals only states that after considering ISL’s “moving papers and
argument and [Heaton’s] opposition and argument and good cause appearing, the
Court finds that [ISL’s] application for summary judgment should be and is
granted.” This order does not specify which part of Heaton’s “opposition and
argument” the court considered and rejected after the unreported hearing. Heaton
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did not file a post-hearing motion to ensure the court ruled on his outstanding
arguments. See UE Local 893/IUP v. State, 928 N.W.2d 51, 61 (Iowa 2019)
(concluding a party must ask the district court to address an issue not otherwise
addressed on summary judgment in order to preserve the issue for appeal); Bill
Grunder’s Sons Constr., Inc. v. Ganzer, 686 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 2004) (stating
a nonmovant must file a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904 after the
grant of summary judgment to preserve its unaddressed arguments for appeal).
Instead, Heaton sought to create a record of the hearing by filing a statement with
the district court. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.806 (allowing a party to file a statement
“to create a record of a hearing or trial for which a transcript is unavailable,” the
opposing party to file “objections or proposed amendments,” and the district court
to settle and approve the statements). ISL resisted and filed its own statement. In
addressing the parties’ competing statements, the court did not accept either
statement in its entirety, but it found ISL’s statement “more accurately
characterized” the hearing and the hearing “generally followed and [was]
consistent with” ISL’s motion for summary judgment and related filings. Thus, we
find the court decided—and preserved for our review—only those issues discussed
in ISL’s motion for summary judgment and rule 6.806 statement.
ISL’s motion for summary judgment discussed the elements of their breach-
of-contract claim, which Heaton disputed in his resistance. The district court
necessarily agreed ISL satisfied those elements in granting summary judgment.
Therefore, we will consider whether a genuine issue of material fact remains as to
the elements of breach of contract. ISL’s rule 6.806 statement mentions Heaton
asserted ISL’s “claims are ‘time-barred’” as a defense. Therefore, we will also
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consider Heaton’s statute-of-limitations claim. Finding no indication the district
court considered and ruled upon Heaton’s other claims—including, but not limited
to, laches, violations of federal law, breach by the opposing party, and mistake—
those claims are not preserved for our review.
IV. Elements of Breach of Contract
In order to prevail on its breach-of-contract claim, ISL is required to prove:
(1) the existence of a contract; (2) the terms and conditions of the
contract; (3) [the plaintiff] has performed all the terms and conditions
required under the contract; (4) the defendant’s breach of the
contract in some particular way; and (5) that plaintiff has suffered
damages as a result of the breach.
Iowa Mortg. Ctr., L.L.C. v. Baccam, 841 N.W.2d 107, 110–11 (Iowa 2013) (quoting
Molo Oil Co. v. River City Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 222, 224 (Iowa
1998)). To support its claim, ISL submitted the loan applications and promissory
notes showing the amounts Heaton borrowed and agreed to repay to ISL. It also
submitted various financial documentation, including financial activity summaries
showing Heaton’s nonpayment, the accumulation of interest and fees, and the
outstanding balance on both notes. Finally, it submitted an affidavit from its call
center director confirming the various documents. To overcome summary
judgment, Heaton “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial” using affidavits or evidence; he “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials in the pleadings.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5). He submitted
no affidavits or evidence with his filings, and the court in its rule 6.806 statement
verified no one submitted evidence during the hearing. He raises legal arguments
and questions the accuracy of ISL’s evidence in his arguments to us, but his
arguments do not create a genuine issue of material fact. See Hoefer v. Wis. Educ.
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Ass’n Ins. Tr., 470 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Iowa 1991) (“[T]here is no genuine issue of
fact if there is no evidence.”). ISL’s evidence satisfies the elements of its breach-
of-contract claim, and we find no genuine issue of material fact as to these
elements.
V. Statute of Limitations
Heaton claims the three-year limitation period provided for in Iowa Code
section 554.4111 applies to ISL’s claims in this case. See Iowa Code § 554.4111
(2009). This statute of limitations only applies to bank deposits and collections
arising under Iowa Code chapter 554, article 4. See id. ISL’s causes of action
against Heaton are not based on bank deposits or collections, so the limitation
period set forth in Iowa Code section 554.4111 does not apply. Instead, ISL’s
claim are based on breach of written contracts in the form of the promissory notes
signed by Heaton. As such, the ten-year statute of limitations that applies to written
contractual claims applies here. See Iowa Code § 614.1(5) (2009); Legg v. W.
Bank, 873 N.W.2d 763, 774 (Iowa 2016) (“Written contracts are subject to a ten-
year statute of limitations . . . .”). Heaton concedes in his brief to us that ISL’s
action was filed within the ten-year statute of limitations period. Therefore, we find
no genuine issue of material fact that supports Heaton’s defense that ISL’s causes
of action are barred by the statute of limitations.
VI. Conclusion
We find no genuine issue of material fact as to whether ISL satisfied the
elements of their breach-of-contract claims or supporting the contention ISL’s
claims are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Heaton’s other
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claims are not preserved for our review. Therefore, we affirm the grant of summary
judgment in favor of ISL.
AFFIRMED.