State of Iowa v. Gregory M. Hintze

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1030
Filed May 13, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GREGORY M. HINTZE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Nancy S. Tabor,
Judge.
Gregory Hintze appeals the sentence imposed upon his conviction of
extortion. AFFIRMED.
Scott M. Wadding of Sease & Wadding, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mullins and Ahlers, JJ. Tabor, J.,
takes no part.
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MULLINS, Judge.
Gregory Hintze pled guilty to extortion. At his sentencing hearing, the
victim’s mother was allowed to make a statement in support of sending Hintze to
prison. On appeal, we found allowing the victim’s mother to make a statement was
improper, and we vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing before a
different judge. State v. Hintze, No. 18-1418, 2019 WL 1056082, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 6, 2019).
At the resentencing hearing, the State argued for the imposition of a prison
sentence and made statements that went beyond the record made at Hintze’s
guilty plea proceeding and the information contained in the presentence
investigation report (PSI). Defense counsel objected, and the court directed the
State: “I would caution you not to list any facts in this proceeding that were not
specifically agreed to and admitted to in the plea.” The State complied. The court
ultimately sentenced Hintze to prison and denied Hintze’s request for a suspended
sentence. Hintze appeals, arguing the State introduced unproven facts at the
resentencing hearing that raise sufficient questions about their effect on the court’s
sentencing decision to require the sentence be vacated and the matter remanded
for resentencing again.
The court quite specifically directed the State to limit its argument to facts
admitted to in the plea proceeding. Although the district court did not couch its
response as a disavowal of the State’s inappropriate argument, it clearly showed
the court’s recognition of the limits of what it should consider in making a
sentencing decision. In addition, following the parties’ sentencing
recommendations, the court clarified with defense counsel as to what Hintze had
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actually admitted, questioning if Hintze simply admitted to threatening to post
pictures of the victim if she did not pay him. Defense counsel responded in the
affirmative.
A PSI was prepared and available to the court and the parties at the time of
both sentencing hearings. See Iowa Code § 901.3 (2017). Defense counsel did
not object to any of the contents of the report at either hearing. See id. § 901.4
(allowing denial or refutation). The objected-to argument made by the State was
supported generally by statements Hintze made to the preparer and which were
contained in the report. As the court made record of what it was considering in
making its sentencing decision, it specifically asked defense counsel if there was
an objection to a portion of Hintze’s statement to the PSI preparer, and there was
not. The court denied Hintze’s request for a suspended sentence and imposed a
term of imprisonment. In doing so, the court focused on Hintze’s own
characterization of the offense—what he did and why—his lack of resources or
support in the community to deter recidivism, the nature of the offense, and the
need for incarceration in order to protect the community from further offenses. See
id. §§ 901.5, 907.5(1); State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 554–55 (Iowa 2015).
“When a sentence imposed by a district court falls within the statutory
parameters, we presume it is valid and only overturn for an abuse of discretion or
reliance on inappropriate factors.” Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d at 554. Here, we find the
court’s direction that the State not discuss the objected-to information—which
essentially amounted to the court sustaining the defense objection—together with
the court’s clarification as to what Hintze actually admitted to doing, resolves any
suggestion the court considered inappropriate materials. Absent an “affirmative
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showing the sentencing court relied on inappropriate evidence,” we find no abuse
of discretion and affirm. Id. (quoting State v. Washington, 832 N.W.2d 650, 660
(Iowa 2013)).
AFFIRMED.