Al Brueggeman, Dan Breuker, Tom Bremer, Roger Bosma, Mark Dillehay, Randy Rowe, Allen Rowe, and Jarrod Wallace v. Osceola County, Iowa and City of Harris, Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1010
Filed November 4, 2020
AL BRUEGGEMAN, DAN BREUKER, TOM BREMER, ROGER BOSMA, MARK
DILLEHAY, RANDY ROWE, ALLEN ROWE, and JARROD WALLACE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
OSCEOLA COUNTY, IOWA and CITY OF HARRIS, IOWA,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Osceola County, David A. Lester,
Judge.
Taxpayers appeal the district court’s ruling denying their petition for writ of
certiorari that challenged the joint adoption of an urban renewal area by the city
council and the county board of supervisors. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Aaron W. Ahrendsen and John C. Werden of Eich Werden Steger &
Ahrendsen PC, Carroll, for appellants.
Stephen G. Kersten, Fort Dodge, for appellees.
Heard by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Ahlers, JJ.
2
TABOR, Judge.
This case returns to our court for a second time.1 This go-round,
Al Brueggeman and seven other taxpaying residents of Osceola County
(collectively “the taxpayers”) contend a resolution adopted by the City of Harris and
Osceola County violates Iowa’s urban renewal law. See Iowa Code ch. 403
(2015). That resolution anticipated using tax increment financing (TIF)2 to raise
revenue from properties with windmills in the county to cover the costs of the city’s
sewer rehabilitation project. In challenging the resolution, the taxpayers argued
the city and county ran afoul of the urban renewal law in three ways: (1) by not
entering into a valid joint agreement before passing the resolution, in violation of
Iowa Code section 403.17(4); (2) by establishing urban renewal areas that were
not contiguous, in violation of section 403.17(23); and (3) by including wind energy
conversion properties in the TIF, in violation of the ”spirit and purpose” of the urban
renewal law. The district court rejected the taxpayers’ claims.
1 In the first appeal, we addressed two preliminary issues: 1) whether the taxpayers
had standing to contest the resolution establishing the urban renewal area; and
2) whether the taxpayers were untimely in challenging the ordinance authorizing
tax increment financing in the urban renewal area. Brueggeman v. Osceola Cnty.,
No. 16-1552, 2017 WL 2464072, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7, 2017). Although we
agreed with the district court that the taxpayers were untimely in challenging the
TIF ordinance, we allowed the case to proceed based on the resolution. Id. at *5–
7. On timeliness, we stated: “Because the final action in the adoption of the
ordinance took place on November 10, the plaintiff’s November 3 petition
challenging the ordinance was untimely.” Id. at *5 (citing Iowa R. Civ. P.
1.1402(3)). On standing, we reversed the district court’s ruling, finding the
taxpayers could challenge the resolution because it was “sufficiently likely” they
would suffer harm from the creation of the urban renewal area due to the
anticipated use of TIF. Id. at *7.
2 See Iowa Code § 403.19 (authorizing use of TIF “for the benefit of the state, city,
[or] county”); see also Brueggeman, 2017 WL 2464072, at *1 n.1 (quoting
Concerned Citizens of Se. Polk Sch. Dist. v. City of Pleasant Hill, 878 N.W.2d 252,
254 (Iowa 2016) (providing a detailed explanation of the TIF process)).
3
On appeal from that rejection, the taxpayers reprise all three challenges to
the urban renewal area. But their focus is on the first claim. They argue the city
council could not retroactively ratify an alleged joint agreement with the county, as
required by section 403.17(4) to form the urban renewal area. Why not? Because
the council did not pass a resolution, as required by Iowa Code section 364.3(1),
authorizing the mayor to enter into that agreement. The taxpayers argue that
under City of Akron v. Akron-Westfield Community School District, any oral
agreement between the mayor and the county was void (not just voidable) and
thus not subject to later ratification. See 659 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 2003).
We agree City of Akron controls. That case held that “any contract with a
city entered without a formal motion, resolution, amendment or ordinance is void.”
Id. In justifying what seemed like an “unduly harsh” result, the Akron court
reasoned: “The legislature considered it of first importance for city officials to
observe formal requirements before obligating taxpayers to finance the affairs of
city government.” Id. at 225–26. Because Harris did not take formal action to enter
the joint agreement with the county, any later effort at ratification fails. Without a
valid joint agreement, the city and county did not satisfy the requirements of section
403.17(4) for establishing the urban renewal area. Given the importance of
protecting taxpayers from municipal actions executed without observing statutory
requirements, we reverse the ruling and remand to the district court. Finding the
first issue dispositive, we need not address the two other claims on appeal.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Harris is a small city in Osceola County. In fact, at last count, the city had
fewer than two hundred residents. To serve those residents, Harris began
4
operating its own wastewater treatment facility in 2004 under a pollution discharge
permit issued by the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR). For many
years, Harris drained its wastewater into a single “stabilization lagoon.” That
lagoon drew DNR scrutiny from 2008 until 2014 because wastewater often
overflowed into the nearby Ocheyedan River. Finding “the lagoon was not
providing adequate storage time before wastewater was being released to the
receiving stream,” the DNR issued an administrative consent order against the city
for violating its permit and DNR regulations. Under the consent order, Harris had
to “submit a facility plan for the rehabilitation of the collection system” by August
2015 and begin reconstruction by July 2016. All repairs and improvements needed
to be completed by August 2017 to avoid civil and possibly criminal penalties.
In February 2015, the city council and mayor Greg Spaethe met to discuss
the DNR order. Although the city council unanimously agreed to move forward
with the rehabilitation project, the city lacked a sufficient tax base to pay for the
improvements. With estimated costs “ranging from $1.2 million up to $2 million,”
city attorney Daniel DeKoter recommended using TIF, explaining it “was the only
available source” of financing that would allow the city to bring the facility up to
code.3 Because TIF required creating an urban renewal area that would include
certain windmill properties located beyond the city’s boundaries, DeKoter informed
the city council that Harris could not proceed with the project without Osceola
County’s consent.
3DeKoter testified “the borrowing capacity, under [the city’s] general bonding,
would be maybe $400,000 to $500,000 maximum.” But with TIF, the city would
have the capacity to borrow from general tax revenue funds available to Osceola
County to finance the project.
5
Based on DeKoter’s recommendation, the city council unanimously passed
resolution number 02.10.15.02 that stated:
Section 1. That it is hereby determined that it is necessary and
advisable to hire a bond counsel for Tax Increment Financing for the
Lagoon & other projects.
Section 2. By hiring a bond counsel the City of Harris will be
able to obtain the funding necessary for the number of improvements
that the City needs.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, the City Council hereby
delegates the Mayor and City Clerk the duty of hiring a bond counsel
for Tax Increment Financing for the Lagoon and other projects.
(Emphasis added.) Although the resolution delegated “the duty of hiring a bond
counsel,” the city council provided little clarity as to the scope of that duty in the
meeting minutes.4 When asked to provide context, DeKoter explained that “as
long as they were meeting, they should adopt a resolution to hire bond counsel”
so the city could move forward with the TIF and not “keep that
process suspended.”5
DeKoter believed the resolution to hire a bond counsel included
authorization for the mayor to make “agreements with the County to move forward
with TIF.” Mayor Spaethe and city clerk Chrissi Wiersma shared a similar
understanding. They testified that the bond-counsel resolution, in their view,
included implied authorization for them to enter into the actual joint agreement with
Osceola County, as needed for the TIF plan.
4 The scope of the delegation is at issue on appeal because the taxpayers
challenge the conduct of the mayor purporting to act on behalf of the city. Under
Iowa Code section 364.2, the “power of a city is vested in the city council except
as otherwise provided by a state law.”
5 DeKoter testified that either the city or the county could issue the bonds, “[b]ut if
it would happen that the City would turn out to be the preferred initiator of the
bonds, then they would need to be able to hire bond counsel.”
6
Shortly after the city council meeting, Wiersma sent a letter to the county,
asking generally for its assistance with financing the city’s project. The letter
stated, in part:
The City of Harris is asking for help with possibly doing a TIF
on the windmills for infrastructure within the City as well as possibly
repairing and paving road in and around Harris.
A representative from Harris would be more than willing to
come before the Board of Supervisors to discuss the possibility of
entering into an agreement with the County.
According to Wiersma, “[t]he purpose of the letter was to get a conversation going”
between the city and county about how to proceed with the project.
In late March 2015, Wiersma and Mayor Spaethe attended a board meeting
on behalf of the city to discuss the letter. During his deposition, Mayor Spaethe
explained his primary goal was to secure agreement from the board of supervisors6
to undertake the bond obligation because of the city’s limited debt capacity.
Recalling that meeting later in his deposition, board chairperson Merlin
Sandersfeld remembered asking Mayor Spaethe whether he had “full consent”
from the city council to make that request. Sandersfeld also sought a copy of the
city council’s February resolution, but he did not see the resolution at that time.
Relying on the mayor’s assurance, the supervisors voted in favor of helping the
city finance its urban renewal project and beginning the bond process for the TIF.
The minutes of that meeting show the board’s approval of hiring bond counsel for
the project. Although the minutes do not refer to any formal agreement between
6 The board is the governing body for Osceola County under Iowa Code section
311.301(2), which states: “A power of a county is vested in the board, and a duty
of a county shall be performed by or under the direction of the board except as
otherwise provided by law.”
7
the mayor and the board, Mayor Spaethe and two supervisors testified that they
entered into an oral agreement that same day to formalize the board’s consent.
At a meeting later that August, the board unanimously voted to approve the
engagement of Dorsey & Whitney Law Firm and the hiring of a financial consultant
for the urban renewal project. The board met again in September, passing the
county’s first formal resolution. Under that resolution, the board published a notice
of public hearing set for October 20, 2015, inviting Osceola County residents to
voice their opinions about the urban renewal project and the TIF plan. The
resolution also directed the county auditor to present a formal joint agreement to
the city before the public hearing date. Before the board’s September resolution,
the record reveals no mention of a formal joint agreement.
The taxpayers (who now appeal) attended the October 20 hearing and
voiced their objections to the proposed urban renewal plan. Noting their
objections, the board nevertheless passed resolution number 10-15/16,
establishing the urban renewal area. That resolution stated:
Section 1. An economic development and blight area as
defined in Chapter 403 of the Code of Iowa is found to exist on the
Property.[7]
Section 2. The Property is hereby declared to be an urban
renewal area, in conformance with the requirements of Chapter 403
of the Code of Iowa, and is hereby designated the Osceola County
Urban Renewal Area 7.
....
Section 6. The Joint Agreement between the County and the
City as has been presented to the Board is hereby approved, and the
7 Iowa Code section 403.5(1) states:
A municipality shall not approve an urban renewal project for an
urban renewal area unless the governing body has, by resolution,
determined the area to be a slum area, blighted area, economic
development area or a combination of those areas, and designated
the area as appropriate for an urban renewal project.
8
Chairperson and County Auditor are hereby authorized and directed
to execute said agreements on behalf of the County.
Following the resolution’s adoption, the board chairperson and county auditor
signed the joint agreement. That same meeting, the board also gave “its initial
consideration”8 to ordinance number 47—tentatively voting to authorize the TIF
and to give notice of the specific properties included in the plan. The board
approved the ordinance several weeks later.
Although the joint agreement suggested it was “entered into by and between
the City of Harris, Iowa and Osceola County, Iowa as of October 20, 2015,” only
the board signed the agreement on that date. The city council did not vote until a
November 30, 2015 special meeting. Then, a formal motion “unanimously carried
to enter into a written agreement with Osceola County.” The final joint agreement
contained this language:
WHEREAS, in August of 2015, the City and the County
entered into a verbal agreement[9] (the “Joint Agreement”) with
respect to the County’s undertaking of the urban renewal action
hereinafter described . . . .
....
WHEREAS, at the request of the City, the County has
approved this written contract to memorialize the Joint Agreement;
NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed by the County and the City
as follows:
....
Section 2. This Agreement is intended to memorialize the prior
verbal agreement between the parties and to meet the statutory
requirements of paragraph 4 of Section 403.17 of the Code of Iowa
and shall be effective upon execution as of the date first listed above.
8 See Iowa Code § 331.302(6)(a) (“A proposed ordinance or amendment shall be
considered and voted on for passage at two meetings of the board prior to the
meeting at which it is to be finally passed . . . .”).
9 Both parties agree the joint agreement’s recitation is incorrect because the oral
agreement at issue occurred at the March board meeting. Nothing in the record
suggests there was another agreement in August 2015.
9
But before the city council held its formal vote in late November, the
taxpayers petitioned for writ of certiorari and declaratory judgment against the city
and county, challenging the board’s October resolution. The taxpayers moved for
summary judgment, asserting the claims that are now on appeal. In resistance,
Harris and Osceola County claimed the taxpayers lacked standing and were
untimely in filing their petition. Accepting those arguments, the district court
dismissed the taxpayers’ petition. But on appeal, our court reinstated the case,
finding the taxpayers had standing to challenge the resolution. Bruggeman, 2017
WL 2464072, at *7.
On remand, the taxpayers unsuccessfully renewed their motion for
summary judgment. The court ruled 1) the oral agreement between the city and
county was not void, but voidable, and thus could be ratified after the fact; 2) no
statute required that properties within an urban renewal area must be “contiguous”;
and 3) the county did not violate the “intent, purpose, and spirit” of the law by using
TIF on the wind energy conversion properties.
Based on the court’s ruling, the city and county moved for summary
judgment, claiming ratification of the oral agreement was sufficient to satisfy the
consent requirement of section 403.17(4). The court denied the motion while
acknowledging the apparent inconsistency with its previous ruling:
In its October 11, 2017, ruling denying Plaintiffs’ renewed motion for
summary judgment, the Court concluded that when all facts in that
summary judgment record were construed in favor of Defendants, . .
. the verbal agreement between the City’s mayor and the Board was
a voidable contract subject to later ratification by the City’s council
during its meeting held on November 30, 2015. In now construing
those same facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, . . . the Court
finds there is a genuine dispute of material fact whether that verbal
10
agreement was void as a contract . . . and was therefore not subject
to ratification by a later vote of the City’s council.
Before the trial, the parties decided to submit the case on exhibits and
written arguments.10 In its final ruling, the district court clarified that the sole
remaining question was “whether the joint oral agreement entered into by the City’s
mayor and the board was a voidable contract subject to ratification by the
subsequent execution of a written joint agreement or whether it was a void contract
not subject to ratification.”
In answering that question, the court first noted the city “could have
authorized [Mayor] Spaethe to enter into a verbal agreement with the Board by
passing a resolution in accordance with Iowa Code Section 364.3(1).” Despite
finding the city council “clearly failed to properly exercise that authority,” the court
determined the oral agreement was a voidable contract subject to ratification. So
the court held that the joint agreement was valid and enforceable as of March 2015
because neither the city council nor the board ever sought to “avoid” the oral
agreement. The court thus dismissed the petition. The taxpayers appeal.
II. Standard of Review
We review certiorari actions for correction of errors at law. State v. Iowa
Dist. Ct. ex rel. Story Cnty., 843 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Iowa 2014). In doing so, we “may
examine only the jurisdiction of the district court and the legality of its actions.”
State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 633 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Iowa 2001) (quoting
Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998)). A court acts
10At the parties’ request, the district court held a hearing in August 2018. The
court approved the stipulation and admitted the offered exhibits into the record.
11
illegally when its findings are unsupported by substantial evidence or when the
court has not properly applied the law. Id.
III. Validity of the March 2015 Oral Agreement
This appeal poses a binary question: was the March 2015 oral agreement
between the mayor and county supervisors void or voidable? The taxpayers
contend any agreement was void because the mayor did not secure authorization
by a vote of the city council before approaching the supervisors. See Iowa Code
§ 364.3(1) (“A city council shall exercise a power only by the passage of a motion,
a resolution, an amendment, or an ordinance.”). That official action, according to
the taxpayers, did not come until the city council voted to approve the joint
agreement in November 2015. Pointing to that timeline, the taxpayers assert the
district court acted illegally in deciding the oral agreement was a voidable contract
subject to ratification.
To counter, the city and county argue the mayor did have proper authority.
They claim “inherent” in the resolution approving the hiring of bond counsel was
authority for the mayor to move toward a joint agreement for the TIF and urban
renewal project. In other words, they claim the city’s February resolution satisfied
its obligation under section 364.3(1). Under this line of argument, even if the oral
agreement was flawed, it remained valid because it was voidable rather than void.
And neither the city nor the county tried to avoid it.
Our analysis starts at the intersection of chapter 403 and section 364.3(1).
Chapter 403 gives broad authority to cities and counties to create urban renewal
areas. See id. §§ 403.2, .19. At the same time, chapter 403 imposes procedural
12
requirements for cities and counties undertaking joint ventures. Section 403.17(4)
describes one of those requirements:
[I]n that area outside a city’s boundary but within two miles of the
city’s boundary, a joint agreement between the city and the county is
required allowing the county to proceed with the activities authorized
under this chapter. In addition, a county may proceed with activities
authorized under this chapter in an area inside the boundaries of a
city, provided a joint agreement is entered into with respect to such
activities between a city and a county.
(Emphasis added.)
For its part, section 364.3 limits the powers of a city. To exercise its power—
for example, the power to reach a joint agreement with the county—a city must
approve any action by formal vote. See Iowa Code § 364.3(1). “A city’s
compliance with Iowa Code section 364.3(1) is crucial.” City of Akron, 659 N.W.2d
at 225. If a city does not comply with the formal requirements of section 364.3(1),
any contract entered into is void. Id.
To settle the void-versus-voidable dispute, we must decide whether the city
complied with section 364.3(1) before authorizing the mayor to execute a joint
agreement with the county to satisfy the requirement under section 403.17(4).
Under these provisions, if the city’s February resolution did not authorize the
mayor’s representations to the supervisors, the oral agreement was void and could
not be later ratified. See id. But if the resolution did give the mayor the power to
contract, the oral agreement was voidable and any defects could be cured by
ratification. See City of Creston v. Barney, No. 11-1154, 2012 WL 470169, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2012).
The district court flirted with the City of Akron holding in its ruling:
13
[A]t first glance, it appears that the outcome of this case should be
dictated by the legal principles and authorities set forth in the City of
Akron case with this court concluding that the oral agreement
reached between Mayor Spaethe and the Board during the Board’s
March 24, 2015, meeting was made in violation of Iowa Code Section
364.3(1), and thus is void.
But the court ultimately married its decision to City of Creston, where our court held
that government contracts were voidable when the power to contract had “been
clearly vested with a municipality, but it [was] irregularly or defectively exercised.”
2012 WL 470169, at *2 (citations omitted).
To test the district court’s determination, we compare those two cases. In
City of Akron, a school district wanted to start its own wind energy conversion
project but could not proceed without the city’s help. 659 N.W.2d at 225. After
several meetings between the school district and city representatives, the parties
entered into a written contract requiring the city to buy electricity from the school
district’s wind project. Id. Although the city was aware of project discussions, the
city administrator signed the contract without official authorization by the city
council. Id. When a new mayor took office, the city sued the school district to
invalidate the contract, claiming the council never approved the contract by motion,
resolution, amendment, or ordinance. Id.
Although sympathetic to the school district, which relied on the contract for
eighteen months, our supreme court held the contract was void because the city
bypassed the formal requirements of section 364.3(1). Id. Deferring to the
legislature, the court reasoned that a party’s “good faith” intentions did not
overcome the need “to observe formal requirements before obligating taxpayers
to finance the affairs of city government.” Id. at 225–26 (“A contract, unlawful for
14
lack of authority, is not rescued by good faith.”). The court noted that the
“involvement of two contracting governmental entities rather than one would
elevate, not lower, the importance of compliance with the statute.” Id.
In City of Creston, the city council passed a resolution authorizing the mayor
and city clerk to execute a policy that required police officers to reimburse the city
if the officers resigned within three years of training. 2012 WL 470169, at *1.
Barney, a Creston police officer, signed an agreement containing those terms at
the time of hire. Id. But instead of the mayor or city clerk, the chief of police
executed the agreement on behalf of the city. Id. Soon after, the city council
passed another resolution formally approving Barney’s reimbursement agreement.
Id. When Barney resigned one year later, he refused to reimburse the city,
claiming his agreement was invalid because it was “signed by the chief of police,
who did not have contractual authority” under section 364.3(1). Id. Because the
city did not comply with the formal requirements of the statute at the time of
execution, Barney claimed the reimbursement agreement could not be ratified. Id.
Rejecting Barney’s claims, we found that his agreement was a valid contract
because the first resolution specifically authorized the city to enter into
reimbursement agreements, “such as the one signed by Barney.” Id. at *3.
Because the city council passed an authorizing resolution, we determined the
agreement did not violate section 364.3(1) and was thus not void. We reasoned
the procedural error of the chief of police signing the contract rather than the mayor
or city clerk rendered the agreement voidable because “[t]he error occurred in
implementation of the policy, not the adoption of the policy.” Id. We held that the
city council could ratify the voidable agreement by the later resolution. Id. at *5.
15
After comparing Akron and Creston, we find this case falls somewhere in
the middle. On one extreme, the Akron City Council passed no resolution at all
before the city administrator entered into a contract with the school district. City of
Akron, 659 N.W.2d at 225. Here, the city council passed a resolution delegating
at least some authority to the mayor and city clerk. But unlike City of Creston,
where the resolution specifically authorized the city to enter into the type of
agreement at issue, 2012 WL 470169, at *1, here, the resolution did not authorize
the mayor to enter into a joint agreement with Osceola County. Instead, the
resolution only delegated the duty of hiring a bond counsel for TIF financing “for
the lagoon and other projects.”
In its ruling, the district court acknowledged that the only formal resolution
passed by the city council “on February 10, 2015, did not specifically authorize the
mayor to verbally enter into a joint agreement with the County.” To distinguish City
of Akron, the court inferred that the Harris City Council “intended to confer” the
mayor authority to enter into the joint agreement when it passed the February
resolution. Based on that inferred intent, the court determined the city’s power had
been irregularly or defectively exercised. The court gave significant weight to the
testimonies of the city attorney, mayor, and city clerk, showing that they all believed
the mayor had authority to enter the joint agreement. But their subjective beliefs
do not satisfy the formal requirements of section 364.3(1).
The district court wrongly decided the oral agreement was a voidable
contract. Unlike City of Creston, the error here concerns the Harris City Council
adopting a resolution that did not give adequate notice to the taxpayers and the
16
public that the mayor had the go-ahead to enter a joint agreement to launch an
urban renewal project. The court’s own analysis undermines its conclusion:
[T]he court finds that the City’s Council clearly could have authorized
[Mayor] Spaethe to enter into a verbal agreement with the Board by
passing a resolution in accordance with Iowa Code Section 364.3(1).
The City’s Council clearly failed to properly exercise that authority
resulting in them, instead, directing [Mayor] Spaethe to contact and
offer to meet with the Board, and then later ratifying the oral
agreement . . . .
(Emphasis added.) By finding the council “clearly failed” to authorize the mayor to
execute the agreement, the court acknowledged that the February resolution did
not satisfy the requirements of section 364.3(1). Because the error related to the
city council’s failure to delegate its authority rather than implementing the joint
agreement, the court’s reliance on City of Creston was misplaced.
Under Iowa case law, “[c]ontracts with public entities are unenforceable
when executed without proper approval or compliance with statutory
requirements.” Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 199 v. Iowa Bd. of Regents, 928
N.W.2d 69, 77 (Iowa 2019) (citations omitted). We require public votes and formal
approval of government contracts because of the importance of protecting
taxpayers and safeguarding a free and open democracy. Id.
Applying those principles here, we find the oral agreement was void, and
therefore unenforceable. See City of Akron, 659 N.W.2d at 225; see also Madrid
Lumber Co. v. Boone Cnty., 121 N.W.2d 523, 525 (Iowa 1963) (“When the
legislature permits the exercise of power in a given case only in accordance with
imposed restrictions, a contract entered into in violation thereof is not merely
voidable but void.” (citations omitted)). The oral agreement reached at the
supervisors’ meeting in March was void because the mayor did not have authority
17
under section 364.3(1). By establishing the urban renewal area before entering
into a valid joint agreement, the city and county violated section 403.17(4). And
as the taxpayers urged, the void agreement could not be cured by ratification. The
district court erred in dismissing the taxpayers’ petition. Thus we reverse and
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.