In re the Marriage of Wood

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1787
Filed November 30, 2020
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ROBERT DEAN WOOD, JR.
AND SARAH BETH WOOD
Upon the Petition of
ROBERT DEAN WOOD, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
And Concerning
SARAH BETH WOOD,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Michael K. Jacobsen,
Judge.
Robert Wood Jr. appeals the physical care provisions of his dissolution
decree. AFFIRMED.
Cathleen J. Siebrecht of Siebrecht Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Lora L. McCollom of McCollom Law Firm, PLLC, West Des Moines, for
appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., May, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2020).
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MAHAN, Senior Judge.
Robert Wood Jr. appeals from the decree dissolving his marriage to Sarah
Wood, challenging the district court’s decision to place physical care of their
children with Sarah. Robert requests physical care of the children or, in the event
we affirm the court’s physical care decision, additional parenting time. He also
challenges the court’s attorney fee award to Sarah. We find the district court’s
factual determinations are supported by the record and affirm the physical care
decision and attorney fee award. We deny the parties’ requests for appellate
attorney fees.
Robert and Sarah married in 2009 and are the parents of two children, born
in 2013 and 2016. Robert filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in November
2018. Trial took place in August 2019, and the district court entered an amended
decree of dissolution the following month, ordering physical care of the children
with Sarah and visitation to Robert every Wednesday evening and every other
weekend, Friday to Monday. In reaching its decision, the court stated in part:
Robert requests shared physical care of the children. Sarah
requests primary physical care of the children with parenting time to
Robert on every other Friday at 6:00 pm to Monday at 8:00 am or
school start time.
Prior to the issues arising that lead to the filing of the
dissolution, and since the children’s births, Sarah has been the
primary caretaker for them, in that she was the parent to schedule
and attend doctor’s appointments, ensure they were picked up from
daycare on time and handle the majority of the day to day parenting
tasks. Up until approximately six months prior to the parties’
separation, Robert was a “hands’ on” parent, sharing, albeit not
equally, in the parenting responsibilities with Sarah. At this time, the
parties’ oldest child was four and the youngest, one. For the last
year, Sarah has been more engaged with the children than Robert.
Sarah has been solely responsible since prior to separation, for
ensuring the children were dropped off and picked up from daycare
on time. The children have resided more frequently with Sarah.
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They continue to attend daycare and school in the Dallas Center
School District. The parties have had continuous issues with
communication since the separation. Often times Robert will not
even respond to an inquiry or concern from Sarah. Sarah has
attempted to cooperate and work with Robert in adjustments to the
schedule and communication regarding the kids to no avail. Robert
moved to Ankeny, Iowa from Dallas Center. . . . Although his young
children remain in Dallas Center he made the choice to move over
thirty minutes away from them, likely to be closer to his new
significant other.
....
Sarah’s desire for primary care puts the children’s best
interest at the forefront. She is concerned about the commute to and
from Ankeny from Dallas Center, given that Robert has failed under
the temporary order to get them where they need to be on time from
Ankeny and causing these young children to wake much earlier than
necessary to get to daycare or school in Dallas Center. Sarah has
attempted to communicate and resolve issues with Robert regarding
parenting and shared expenses, but has not been successful in
doing so. A shared care arrangement would require the parties to
communicate more frequently than they currently do causing even
more friction between them and resulting in the children likely
suffering in the middle. A shared care arrangement would also
require these young children to be subject to a much longer than
necessary commute to and from school and activities.
....
. . . . [I]t is in the children’s best interest that Sarah is granted
primary physical care of the children.
We review dissolution cases de novo, giving “weight to the trial court’s
factual findings, especially with respect to the credibility of the witnesses.” In re
Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Iowa 2003). Questions of physical care
are based upon the best interest of the children, and “[t]he objective of a physical
care determination is to place the children in the environment most likely to bring
them to health, both physically and mentally, and to social maturity.” In re Marriage
of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695–96 (Iowa 2007).
The district court found the parties “have demonstrated a continuing
difficulty in communicating about the needs of the children” and “[t]he tension and
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conflict between [them] remains high and it is unlikely it will decrease.” The court
also found “Robert’s move to Ankeny, away from his children, was not in keeping
their best interests in mind” and resulted in “[t]he parties now liv[ing] 30 minutes
apart.” The district court was in the best position to see, hear, and evaluate the
parties first-hand. See Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 773. Upon our review of the record,
we are convinced the district court properly considered all factors in making
physical care and visitation decisions in the best interest of the children. We affirm
the court’s determinations without further opinion pursuant to Iowa Court Rule
21.26(1)(a) through (e).
We further find no abuse of discretion in the court’s award of trial attorney
fees to Sarah. See In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006)
(setting forth standard of review). Robert has a history of significantly higher
earnings than Sarah. And although he became unemployed the week before trial,
he testified he anticipated finding employment paying around the same salary.
The parties’ requests for appellate attorney fees are denied. Costs on
appeal shall be equally assessed between the parties.
AFFIRMED.