In re the Marriage of Moreland

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1136
Filed June 3, 2020
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JILL ELLEN MORELAND
AND SCOTT RUSSELL MORELAND
Upon the Petition of
JILL ELLEN MORELAND,
Petitioner-Appellant,
And Concerning
SCOTT RUSSELL MORELAND,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert,
Judge.
The wife in this dissolution of marriage proceeding seeks to vacate the
dissolution decree based on the claim of extrinsic fraud. AFFIRMED.
Robb D. Goedicke of Cooper, Goedicke, Reimer & Sparks, P.C., West Des
Moines, for appellant.
Jaclyn M. Zimmerman of Miller, Zimmerman & Evans, P.L.C., Des Moines,
for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mullins and Ahlers, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.
Jill and Scott Moreland were married in 2000. In December 2013, the
parties engaged in discussions to end the marriage. They mutually agreed to
proceed without the assistance of attorneys. This led to the initiation of a
dissolution of marriage proceeding. The parties signed and filed a stipulation
resolving all issues surrounding the dissolution of their marriage, including property
division, spousal support, child custody, parenting time, and child support. The
property division dramatically favored Scott. The stipulation was approved and
incorporated into a decree of dissolution of marriage filed in July 2014.
In 2019, nearly five years after the decree of dissolution of marriage was
filed, Jill filed an application seeking to set aside the decree of dissolution of
marriage on the basis that it was procured by extrinsic fraud.1 After a contested
hearing, the district court denied Jill’s application to set aside the decree, finding
she failed to prove the existence of extrinsic fraud by clear and convincing
evidence. Jill appeals.
I. Standard of Review & Legal Standards.
The parties agree this is an action under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
1.1012(2). Actions under rule 1.1012 are subject to the one-year time limitation
set forth in rule 1.1013. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1012 (allowing vacation of judgments on
the grounds set forth in the rule “[u]pon timely petition and notice under rule
1.1013”); Iowa R. Civ. P. 1013(1) (“A petition for relief under rule 1.1012 . . . must
1The same application requested the alternative remedy of modifying the custody
and support provisions of the decree. Those issues were set to be resolved by
separate proceedings and are not before our court in this appeal.
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be filed and served . . . within one year after the entry of the judgment or order
involved.”). In spite of the fact this action to set aside the judgment was not filed
within one year after entry of the judgment involved, neither party raises an issue
over the timeliness of Jill’s action. Therefore, we do not address the timeliness
issue and express no opinion on it.
Actions to vacate judgments under rule 1.1012 are law actions and not
equity actions. In re Marriage of Cutler, 588 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Iowa 1999).
Therefore, the district court’s finding that fraud had not been proven is binding if
supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 430. “A negative finding of fact
concerning a party’s failure to prove an element of its case may only be overturned
on appeal if the appellate court determines that this element was shown to exist
as a matter of law.” Id. The party claiming to have been defrauded must prove
several elements by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) misrepresentation or
failure to disclose when under a legal duty to do so, (2) materiality, (3) scienter,
(4) intent to deceive, (5) justifiable reliance, and (6) resulting injury or damage.” Id.
“Fraud is of two types: extrinsic and intrinsic.” In re Adoption of B.J.H., 564
N.W.2d 387, 391 (Iowa 1997). “Extrinsic fraud ‘is some act or conduct of the
prevailing party which has prevented a fair submission of the controversy.’” Id.
(quoting Stearns v. Stearns, 187 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Iowa 1971)). “It ‘includes lulling
a party into a false sense of security or preventing the party from making a
defense.’” Id. (quoting Costello v. McFadden, 553 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Iowa 1996)).
“In contrast, intrinsic fraud inheres in the judgment itself; it includes, for example,
false testimony and fraudulent exhibits.” Id. “Fraud sufficient to vacate a judgment
under rule [1.1012(2)] must be extrinsic to the judgment.” Id. at 392.
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II. Analysis.
Jill’s claim that she was the victim of extrinsic fraud in signing the stipulation
incorporated into the dissolution decree is based primarily on her claims Scott took
advantage of her poor mental health, she was unable to defend herself because
of the “abuse and control” of Jill by Scott, Scott promised “to take care of her” after
the dissolution, and the property value and income information Scott submitted
was not accurate.
Regarding her claims Scott took advantage of her mental-health condition
and she was unable to defend herself, the district court concluded Jill was
emotionally fragile and conflict-averse, but the court noted that her claims of not
being able to comprehend complicated documents or make decisions because of
her mental-health condition are “tempered somewhat by her receipt of a graduate
degree from Drake University during the marriage.” We agree with this observation
by the district court and conclude any difficulties Jill had in negotiating the terms of
the dissolution settlement as a result of her mental-health condition did not
constitute extrinsic fraud by Scott. Additionally, her claims of “abuse and control,”
which were contested by Scott, would not constitute extrinsic fraud, even if proved,
as they do not include any claimed misrepresentation. See Cutler, 588 N.W.2d at
430 (holding the elements of fraud include “misrepresentation or failure to disclose
when under a legal duty to do so”).
As for Jill’s claims Scott committed fraud by breaching his promise “to take
care of her” after the dissolution and submitting inaccurate financial information,
the district court made the following findings:
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While [Jill] claims that [Scott] misrepresented his intent to “take care
of her” after the dissolution, she has not established by clear and
convincing evidence that this was in fact a misrepresentation at all,
let alone one made with fraudulent intent. He has been current on
his agreed-to support payments and in fact made good on his
agreement to provide her with a residence after the dissolution. The
circumstances of [Jill’s] abandonment of the [residence provided
after the dissolution] are murky at best. Unlike the successful party
in [In re Marriage of Anderson, No. 01-1649, 2003 WL 1967121 (Iowa
Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2003)], she has not established that she was lured
into the stipulated agreement that formed the basis for the decree
through any misrepresentation by [Scott]. To the contrary, as in [In
re Marriage of Heneman, 396 N.W.2d 797 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986)], the
admittedly disproportionate property division contained within the
decree was the result of [Jill’s] failure to protect her interests by
retaining counsel or to obtain independent advice on the propriety of
the division. She has failed to establish on the present record that
she was incapable of entering [in]to an agreement or that [Scott] lied
to her in order to procure that agreement. In short, she has failed to
prove the existence of extrinsic fraud by clear and convincing
evidence. While the property division may not have been the one a
court may have fashioned had the matter gone to trial, the fact that
[Jill] made a bad bargain is insufficient grounds for setting it aside
five years later.
These findings are supported by substantial evidence and we agree with them.
We add some additional observations. This was not a case where Jill did
not participate in the proceedings. A hearing was held in the courtroom for entry
of the decree after the parties signed their stipulation. Jill and Scott attended that
hearing, and the judge2 encouraged both parties to get independent counsel. Jill
declined to do so. A party may not claim extrinsic fraud when seeking to set aside
the judgment in a dissolution proceeding “where that party has participated in the
proceeding, knowing that he or she could further protect his or her rights by
2 The judge presiding at the hearing to enter the decree in 2014 was not the same
judge who presided over the proceedings at issue in this appeal.
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securing counsel, but has failed to do so.” 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation
§ 421 (2020) (citing Lin v. Lin, 834 S.W.2d 224 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)).
Additionally, while Jill did not establish the financial information submitted
by Scott was inaccurate, even if she had established that fact, Jill still would not
have met her burden. Such proof would have constituted intrinsic fraud, not
extrinsic fraud:
Extrinsic fraud is fraud which keeps a party from presenting her case
or prevents an adjudication on the merits. Mauer v. Rohde, 257
N.W.2d 489, 496 (Iowa 1977)). “Examples of extrinsic fraud are a
bribed judge, dishonest attorney representing the defrauded client,
or a false promise of compromise.” Id.
In contrast, intrinsic fraud is fraud that “inheres in the judgment
itself; it includes, for example false testimony and fraudulent
exhibits.” B.J.H., 564 N.W.2d at 391. “Intrinsic fraud occurs within
the framework of the actual conduct of the trial and pertains to and
affects the determination of the issue presented therein.” Mauer, 257
N.W.2d at 496 (internal citations omitted). A party cannot obtain
relief from a judgment based on fraud which is based on matters or
issues which actually were or could have been presented and
adjudicated at trial. Gigilos v. Stavropoulos, 204 N.W.2d 619, 621
(Iowa 1973).
In re Marriage of Bacon, No. 11-0368, 2011 WL 4579601, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
Oct. 5, 2011).
The district court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. We
agree with the district court that Jill failed to meet the burden of proving extrinsic
fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s
ruling denying Jill’s application to set aside the dissolution decree.
AFFIRMED.