State of Iowa v. Fermin Jose Maldonado

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1363
Filed April 12, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FERMIN JOSE MALDONADO,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Porter, Judge.
Fermin Maldonado appeals from his convictions for sexual abuse in the third
degree and burglary in the first degree. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Vogel, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023).
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VOGEL, Senior Judge.
Fermin Maldonado appeals from his convictions for sexual abuse in the third
degree and burglary in the first degree. He argues the evidence is insufficient to
support either of his convictions. Because we find substantial evidence to support
both verdicts, we affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
According to M.’s testimony, she and Maldonado knew each other for six
years and were occasionally romantically involved. Maldonado has a history of
violence during sexual encounters with her, including hitting her, strangling her,
and dragging her by her hair, which led to her obtaining a protective order against
him in October 2020. They saw each other on March 28, 2021, and “[p]ossibly”
had consensual sex that day. He called her twenty-two times over the next three
days. His behavior concerned her so much she developed a safety plan, which
included a code word she could text to her social worker to alert the worker of a
likely assault happening and to call the police.
M. further testified that on March 31, 2021, Maldonado knocked on her
apartment door in Des Moines, but she did not answer. He then walked around
the building and knocked on her apartment window. She opened the window
“about a fourth of the way to talk to him” and told him he could not come inside her
apartment and “was trespassed.” Disregarding her wishes, Maldonado opened
the window wider and entered the apartment, prompting M. to text the emergency
code word to her social worker. After Maldonado used the bathroom and talked to
M., he removed her pants and forced her to have vaginal intercourse depite her
crying, pushing him back, and telling him to stop.
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Officer Daniel Dempsey with the Des Moines Police Department responded
to the social worker’s call and soon arrived at M.’s apartment. He knocked on the
apartment door and, about thirty seconds later, M. opened the door. Officer
Dempsey’s body camera recorded the encounter, showing M. crying and holding
a blanket around her lower half. M. said Maldonado forced her to have sex with
him and then climbed out through her apartment window when he heard the
knocking on her door. Officer Dempsey went outside and, based on a description
M. provided, quickly located Maldonado across the street from the apartment.
Maldonado gave a false name before admitting his true name to the officer. In a
later police interview, Maldonado initially denied having sex with M. on March 31,
but he eventually admitted to the act though he claimed it was consensual.
Maldonado was arrested and charged with sexual abuse in the third degree
and burglary in the first degree. After a jury trial in June 2021, he was convicted
as charged. The district court sentenced him to terms of incarceration not to
exceed ten years for sexual abuse and twenty-five years for burglary, run
concurrently, and ordered restitution. Maldonado appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“We review the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at law.”
State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Buman, 955
N.W.2d 215, 219 (Iowa 2021)). “The jury’s verdict binds this court if the verdict is
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence
sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. “In determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported by
substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
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including all ‘legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and
reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.’” Id. (quoting State v. Tipton,
897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017)).
III. Analysis
A. Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree
Sexual abuse in the third degree occurs when a “person performs a sex
act . . . by force or against the will of the other person.” Iowa Code § 709.4(1)(a)
(2021). M. explicitly testified Maldonado performed a sex act on her against her
will: “He pulled down his pants and pulled my pants off, and I was—told him, no, I
don’t want to have sex, and he did not care, and he kept going, and he stuck his
penis into my vagina.” See State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d 1, 10–11 (Iowa 2021)
(“A sexual abuse victim’s testimony alone may be sufficient evidence for
conviction.”). Moreover, other evidence corroborated M.’s testimony, including her
texting an emergency code word to her social worker as Maldonado entered M.’s
apartment, her distraught manner when Officer Dempsey first encountered M.
immediately after the incident, and Maldonado’s shifting stories to police. On our
review of all the evidence, we find substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict
of sexual abuse in the third degree.
B. Burglary in the First Degree
Burglary occurs when a “person, having the intent to commit a felony,
assault or theft therein, who, having no right, license or privilege to do so, enters
an occupied structure.” Iowa Code § 713.1. Burglary in the first degree occurs
when a person “while perpetrating a burglary . . . performs or participates in a sex
act with any person which would constitute sexual abuse.” Id. § 713.3(1)(d).
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Maldonado specifically challenges the sufficiency of the evidence proving he had
the specific intent to commit an assault at the time of entry. See id. § 713.1. He
asserts that because he went to the bathroom and talked to M. before the sex act,
the evidence could not establish he intended to assault her at the time he entered
the apartment.
“To convict defendant of burglary, the jury had to, and was allowed to, infer
his intent to commit an assault from the circumstances of his entry and his
subsequent acts.” State v. Olson, 373 N.W.2d 135, 136 (Iowa 1985). Viewing the
record in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence is sufficient to establish
Maldonado’s intent at the time of entry. M. obtained a protective order against him
months before due to her claims Maldonado was violent with her. See State v.
Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 242 (Iowa 2001). Moreover, some of Maldonado’s
behaviors toward M. in the days leading up to the assault were so concerning that
she developed a safety plan with her social worker. On March 31, Maldonado
forced his way into M.’s apartment through her window after she told him not to
enter. He then committed a sex act on her despite her physical and verbal
resistance. While the evidence shows he did not immediately assault her upon
entry, the delay for him to go to the bathroom and talk to M. is not so great as to
negate a finding of intent at the time of entry. The evidence is sufficient for the jury
to have concluded Maldonado intended to assault M. at the time he entered her
apartment, and there is substantial evidence for us on review to support the verdict
of the jury.
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IV. Conclusion
Because we find substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict on both
charges, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.