State of Iowa v. Cassandra Greenway

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1541
Filed August 4, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CASSANDRA GREENWAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Patrice
Eichman, District Associate Judge.
On direct appeal, the defendant claims ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ashley Stewart, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., Greer, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2021).
2
POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.
Cassandra Greenway was convicted of possession of a controlled
substance, second offense, and judgment was entered against her in September
2019. On appeal, Greenway argues trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
by failing to file a motion to suppress evidence based on an unconstitutional search
by police officers.1 But Iowa Code section 814.7 (Supp. 2019) prevents us from
deciding claims of ineffective assistance on direct appeal from the criminal
proceedings.2 And this statute applies to Greenway’s case.3 See State v. Tucker,
959 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Iowa 2021) (“The new legislation applies to this appeal
because judgment and sentence was entered after the effective date of the bill.”).
Recognizing the hurdle created by the amended statute, Greenway argues
section 814.7 is unconstitutional, challenging the statute in a number of ways.
First, she challenges the statute for violating the separation-of-powers doctrine.
1 In the alternative, Greenway asks us to adopt the plain error doctrine. Appellants
have repeatedly asked our court to adopt the doctrine and heretofore, as recently
as a couple of months ago, our supreme court has declined. See State v. Treptow,
960 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 2021) (“[The appellant] argues[] this court should adopt
plain error review. We are disinclined to do so. We have repeatedly rejected plain
error review and will not adopt it now.”). We are not at liberty to overturn supreme
court precedent. State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa 1990).
2 The statute, which took effect July 1, 2019, provides:
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case shall be
determined by filing an application for postconviction relief pursuant
to chapter 822. The claim need not be raised on direct appeal from
the criminal proceedings in order to preserve the claim for
postconviction relief purposes, and the claim shall not be decided on
direct appeal from the criminal proceedings.
Iowa Code § 814.7 (emphasis added).
3 In another appeal before our court, Greenway challenges her conviction for
second-degree theft by raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As in
this case, we are unable to decide her claim on direct appeal. See State v.
Greenway, No. 19-1555, 2021 WL ______, at *_ (Iowa Ct. App. Aug 4, 2021).
3
See id. at 148 (“‘The division of the powers of government into three different
departments—legislative, executive, and judicial—lies at the very foundation of our
constitutional system.’ The ‘historic concept of separation of powers to safeguard
against tyranny’ is memorialized in the Iowa Constitution.’” (citation omitted)); see
also Iowa Const. art. III, Three Separate Departments, § 1. But our supreme court
has already determined “section 814.7 does not violate the separation-of-powers
doctrine,” so this challenge fails. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 151.
Next, Greenway asserts section 814.7 is unconstitutional because it
violates her right to equal protection under the law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1, Iowa Const. art. I, § 6. “The first step in our equal protection analysis is to
determine whether the challenged law makes a distinction between similarly
situated individuals with respect to the purposes of the law.” Treptow, 960 N.W.2d
at 104. Greenway claims the law distinguishes between those defendants who
have been convicted based upon insufficient evidence who were properly
represented and those who were improperly represented. But again, our supreme
court has already considered this argument. It concluded “those asserting claims
other than a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are not similarly situated to
those asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 106. “A claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel is more than an error preservation device; it is
a substantive legal claim with its own elements.” Id. And “[i]t is not unconstitutional
or even unreasonable to treat as similarly situated only those parties whose cases
are ‘factually and legally similar’ and ‘share similar procedural histories.’” Id.
(citation omitted). Because Greenway’s argument is not based on “similarly
situated individuals,” her equal protection argument fails. See State v. Dudley, 766
4
N.W.2d 606, 616 (Iowa 2009) (“If a plaintiff cannot show preliminarily that persons
in the two classes are similarly situated, we have concluded the court need not
determine whether there is a constitutionally adequate basis for the persons’
different treatment.”).
Finally, Greenway agues section 814.7 violates her right to due process.
But “[t]here is no due process right to present claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal.” Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 108. “Due process merely
requires an opportunity to present those claims in some forum.” Id.
Because section 814.7 prevents us from deciding Greenway’s claim of
ineffective assistance on direct appeal and Greenway has not proved section
814.7 is unconstitutional, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.