State of Iowa v. Terran E. Roache

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0931
Filed May 2, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
TERRAN E. ROACHE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, James B. Malloy,
District Associate Judge.
The defendant appeals from the district court order requiring him to pay
restitution. AFFIRMED.
John L. Dirks of Dirks Law Firm, Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Tabor, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, Judge.
Terran Roache appeals from the district court order requiring him to pay
$3557.08 in restitution.
In October 2016, Roache was charged with eleven crimes in two separate
trial informations, stemming from a rash of automobile burglaries reported to the
Ames police on two days earlier that month. Roache reached a plea agreement
with the State, whereby he agreed to enter guilty pleas to one count of second-
degree criminal mischief and one count of third-degree burglary and to pay
restitution on all eleven of the counts. In return, the State agreed to dismiss the
other nine charges.
Later, the State filed a statement of pecuniary damages in the amount of
$4515.80. As part of the damages, the State included $1900 to Jordan Hagedon
for a “Northland CDL Training book” and $958.72 to another victim for the repair
of a vehicle window. The court approved the statement of pecuniary damages and
filed an order requiring Roache to pay the full $4515.80.
Roache objected to the restitution order—specifically the amounts listed
above—as unreasonable. He also claimed the State had not established a causal
connection between his offense and the CDL training book.
At a hearing on the matter, the victim who submitted the $958.72 estimate
did not appear, and the estimate was not received into evidence. Hagedon
appeared and was called to testify. He testified he had paid to take a class through
Northland CDL Training & Licensing; as part of the course work, he had received
a book entitled, “Pre-Trip Inspection Study Guide,” which was a “published,
marked, and copyright booklet” and “the sole property of Northland CDL Training.”
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At the time he received the booklet, he signed an agreement stating he was “fully
aware” he was responsible for returning the study guide and “fully understand[s]”
he would be fined for failing to do so. The State admitted into evidence the signed
agreement, which Hagedon had signed on September 22, 2016. Hagedon further
testified the study guide was in his backpack, which Roache had stolen when he
broke into Hagedon’s vehicle. The study guide was apparently never recovered.
Although the signed agreement did not include the amount of the fine for failing to
return the study guide, the State also admitted into evidence a second form
Hagedon had signed with Northland CDL Training & Licensing—this one on
October 10, a day or two after the guide was taken. The second form stated, in
part, “By losing and not returning the said study guide on my final testing date, I
also fully understand I will be charged a fine 4x the course tuition. The calculated
charge for this course is $1900.” Hagedon had not yet paid Northland, stating,
“They’ve been waiting for what we would hear from restitution,” but testified he had
an outstanding balance with them for the full amount of the fine. On cross-
examination, Hagedon testified the study guide “was a small booklet, soft covered”
and approximately “six-by-eight or ten inches in diameter.” He agreed the value
or cost of the book itself was not $1900. Hagedon was asked by the court if he
had talked to the company about waiving the fine since the book was stolen rather
than lost; Hagedon responded:
I did. All they said was that they reiterated the fact that people
have not returned them in the past, and they do charge the four times
the cost of the class. And I did ask that, and they said that if I did get
money out of the restitution, they’d like to see that, because it’s still
a risk to them, I guess, with their copyrighting or their—they wrote
that book, they publish that book themselves, and they didn’t want
that getting out.
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The court also asked Hagedon if he knew what would happen if he failed to pay
the fine or if it was not ordered as restitution, and he indicated he did not know.
In its written ruling, the district court denied the claim for the windshield
repair but affirmed the rest of the restitution order, requiring Roache to pay
$3557.08 in restitution. In doing so, the court stated:
The “damage” to [Hagedon] for failing to return the study guide came
to $1900. But for [Roache’s] criminal actions, [Hagedon] would not
have been assessed that “fine.” The court would presume that
$1900 far exceeds the actual cost to print the study guide, but the
actual cost of the study guide does not reimburse [Hagedon] for the
loss he sustained as a result of [Roache’s] actions. The amount
claimed for damages is approved in the amount of $1900 for the
study guide.
Roache appeals the district court’s ruling.
“We review restitution orders for correction of errors at law.” State v. Hagen,
840 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 2013). “In reviewing a restitution order ‘we determine
whether the court’s findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or whether the
court has not properly applied the law.’” Id. (quoting State v. Bonstetter, 637
N.W.2d 161, 165 (Iowa 2001)).
While Roache disagrees with the amount of the fine associated with the lost
study guide, nothing in the record suggests the amount of the fine was
exaggerated by Hagedon. Roache presented no contradictory evidence. In fact,
Hagedon testified Northland refused to waive the fine and “reiterated the fact that
people have not returned them in the past, and they do charge the four times the
cost of the class.” Substantial evidence supports the conclusion the fine was
$1900. Next, Roache implies that he should only be responsible for the cost of
reprinting the book or the actual value of the book, but doing so loses sight of the
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purpose of restitution. See Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d at 165 (“The word ‘restitution’
connotes restoring or compensating the victim for loss. Unlike other forms of penal
sanctions, restitution forces the offender to answer directly for the consequences
of his or her actions.”). Here, Hagedon had an outstanding balance of $1900 with
Northland; the outstanding balance would not be satisfied by proffering the value
of the book. See id. at 166 (“A restitution order is not excessive if it bears a
reasonable relationship to the damage caused by the offender’s criminal act.”).
And “[o]nce the causal connection is established by a preponderance of the
evidence, ‘the statute allows recovery of ‘all damages’. . . which the state can show
by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 168 (citations omitted).
Much of Roache’s causation arguments—the idea that it was not his action
of stealing the study guide that resulted in the $1900 outstanding balance—hinge
on his ideas of actions Hagedon could take so as not to pay the outstanding
balance. He claims Northland decided on an unreasonable value for the fine and
that the contract Hagedon signed after the study guide was taken is a contract of
adhesion. But Roache has provided no authority for the proposition that the victim
must do whatever is necessary to reduce the defendant’s restitution obligation. It
is undisputed that at the time of the restitution hearing, Hagedon had an
outstanding balance of $1900 to Northland.
The record reflects that Hagedon was not aware what amount he would be
fined by Northland if the study guide was not returned, but he had signed an
agreement recognizing that he would be fined in such an instance. We agree with
the district court’s reasoning: “But for [Roache’s] criminal actions, [Hagedon] would
not have been assessed” a fine, which—although the amount was unknown at the
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time of the signed agreement—was previously provided for, and even though
$1900 is presumably more than the actual cost of the study guide, “the actual cost
of the study guide does not reimburse [Hagedon] for the loss he sustained.”
Hagedon’s loss was also within the scope of liability of Roache’s action,1 as it was
likely—and presumably Roache’s hope—that the backpack he stole from
Hagedon’s car would contain valuable items. In fact, the bag also contained
prescription eyeglasses, a MacBook Pro computer and charger, and clothing.
Because the $1900 outstanding balance is a damage that is causally related
to Roache’s criminal activities and was properly included in the restitution order,
we affirm. See Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d at 165 (“Any damages that are causally
related to the criminal activities may be included in the restitution order.”).
AFFIRMED.
1
Historically, in criminal cases, issues of causation have been analyzed in much the same
manner as causation in civil cases. See State v. Murray, 512 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Iowa
1994). In the case of Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 836–39 (Iowa 2009), our
supreme court adopted the Restatement (Third) of Torts concept of “scope of liability” in
place of legal or proximate cause in civil cases. Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
“An actor’s liability is limited to those . . . harms that result from the risks that make the
actor’s conduct tortious.” Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 838 (citation omitted); see also In re
J.S., No. 13-0174, 2013 WL 5291959, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2013) (applying the
“scope of liability” in considering causation within a restitution claim).