State of Iowa v. Johnnie Lee Boutchee

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1217
Filed July 5, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOHNNIE LEE BOUTCHEE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Shawn R. Showers,
Judge.
A defendant appeals his convictions for attempted murder, two counts of
willful injury causing serious injury, and going armed with intent. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Tabor, JJ.
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TABOR, Judge.
Johnnie Boutchee concedes he assaulted his girlfriend, T.T., and his
housemate, J.R. Those assaults led to jury verdicts finding Boutchee guilty of two
counts of willful injury causing serious injury, as well as one count each of
attempted murder and going armed with intent. On appeal, Boutchee challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence for attempted murder and going armed with intent.
Boutchee also claims his trial attorney should have objected to expert testimony
from J.R.’s treating physician. Finally, Boutchee contests the district court’s order
that he reimburse court costs without consideration of his reasonable ability to pay.
Finding ample evidence to support the jury verdicts and no cause for his counsel
to object to the doctor’s testimony, we affirm Boutchee’s convictions. As for the
restitution issue, we conclude Boutchee’s complaint is premature.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Boutchee called 911 around 5 a.m. on December 5, 2016, telling the
dispatcher his girlfriend was having a medical emergency and “needs some help.”
When paramedics arrived, they discovered two people who needed help. Not only
was Boutchee’s girlfriend, T.T., bleeding from multiple stab wounds in the
bedroom. But in the living room, paramedics found J.R., bloody and barely
conscious, on the floor. J.R. had visible head injuries and a laceration on his wrist.
Safely in the ambulance, J.R. identified Boutchee as his attacker.
Boutchee and his girlfriend had been out partying the night before.
Boutchee was arrested, but returned home early in the morning. T.T. told the jury:
“I was still sleeping, and Johnnie B. opened the door of the bedroom, turned
the light on, took the bedspread and the sheet off of me, because I had my head
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over the bedspread and sheet. He told me to get up.” Then Boutchee moved back
and forth between the bedroom and living room, where J.R. had been sleeping on
the couch. Boutchee took a metal baseball bat from beside the TV stand and
twirled it around. Boutchee told J.R. “how much he hated” him and punched J.R.
in the face with his fists and “started smashing” him with the bat, according to J.R.’s
testimony. J.R. estimated Boutchee hit him more than two dozen times “all over
his head.” J.R. told the jury:
So I was in and out of consciousness a lot. I don’t know how long I
was out, but I—I was woke up to a knife going into my wrist, and Mr.
Boutchee said to me, I know you love Jesus, but I love the devil, and
I’m here to do the devil’s work.
J.R. also recalled Boutchee saying he was going to “do you both” so he
could “go to prison forever” and “I’m killing you. Hurry up and die.” J.R. pretended
to be dead so Boutchee would leave him alone.
Boutchee also showed T.T. a pocket knife with blood on the blade.
Boutchee slashed the knife near T.T’s throat and stabbed her several times in her
neck and head. As she struggled to stay alive, T.T. convinced Boutchee to call
911. The ambulance transported her to the local hospital and then to University
Hospitals in Iowa City. She required several weeks of hospitalization, underwent
physical therapy, and suffered permanent paralysis on her left side from the stab
wounds.
In addition to his head and wrist injuries, J.R. suffered pelvic fractures and
a lacerated spleen, which were not detected by medical personnel until he returned
to the hospital a week after the assault. When Dr. Gregory Casey saw J.R. in the
Ottumwa emergency room on December 11, 2016, he ordered a CAT scan
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revealing the pelvic fractures and “a pretty significant” injury to the patient’s spleen,
which required continuing observation to ensure it did not bleed to the point of
requiring surgery.
For his attack on J.R., the State charged Boutchee with attempt to commit
murder, a class “B” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.11(1) (2016), and
willful injury causing serious injury, a class “C” felony, in violation of Iowa Code
section 708.4(1). For his attack on T.T., the State charged Boutchee with a second
count of willful injury causing serious injury. For his conduct of shuttling between
the two victims—knife in hand—the State charged Boutchee with going armed with
intent, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.8. The State added
habitual-offender enhancements to all the felonies but the attempted murder. A
jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The district court sentenced Boutchee
to a combination of consecutive and concurrent terms of incarceration not to
exceed forty years.
In his appeal, Boutchee questions the sufficiency of the State’s proof for the
elements of going armed with intent and attempted murder. Boutchee’s counsel
preserved error by moving for judgment of acquittal on the going-armed offense
but waived any test of the attempted-murder count. Accordingly, Boutchee
pursues his challenge to the latter conviction by alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel. Boutchee also argues counsel was remiss in not objecting to Dr. Casey’s
opinion that J.R.’s pelvic and spleen injuries were consistent with being assaulted
with a baseball bat. Finally, Boutchee disputes the court’s order that he repay
court costs—without a finding of his reasonable ability to pay.
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II. Scope and Standards of Review
Because Boutchee’s complaints about the competency of his trial counsel
spring from the Sixth Amendment, we review them de novo. See State v. Canal,
773 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Iowa 2009). Often we reserve ineffective-assistance claims
for postconviction-relief proceedings so the parties may develop the record. State
v. Brubaker, 805 N.W.2d 164, 170 (Iowa 2011). But where enough facts appear
in the trial transcript to settle the dispute on direct appeal, we will do so. Id. at 171.
Here, the record is adequate to address counsel’s performance.
Boutchee bears the burden to show his attorney failed to perform an
essential duty and prejudice resulted. See State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 483
(Iowa 2001). If he cannot show both prongs by a preponderance of the evidence,
we will affirm. See id. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for
errors at law, viewing the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdicts. See Button, 622 N.W.2d at 484. We review restitution orders for
correction of errors at law. State v. Jose, 636 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Iowa 2001).
III. Legal Analysis
A. Did the State offer substantial evidence to support the jury’s
verdict for going armed with intent?
To convict Boutchee of going armed with intent, the State had the burden
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1) Boutchee was armed with a knife;
(2) the knife was a dangerous weapon; (3) Boutchee had the specific intent to use
the knife against another person; and (4) while armed with the knife Boutchee
moved from one place to another. See Iowa Code § 708.8. On appeal, Boutchee
contests only the fourth element—his movement. “Going” armed “necessarily
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implicates proof of movement.” State v. Ray, 516 N.W.2d 863, 865 (Iowa 1994).
But that movement need not cover a great distance. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 891
N.W.2d 182, 187 (Iowa 2017) (upholding conviction based on transition from inside
bar to just outside building); State v. Pearson, 804 N.W.2d 260, 265 n.1 (2011)
(finding movement across kitchen generated jury question); State v. Ray, 516
N.W.2d 863, 865 (Iowa 1994) (finding movement from house to front yard
sufficient).
Boutchee argues the State’s evidence of movement was insubstantial
because he was not pursuing a victim when he drifted between the bedroom and
the living room, and the evidence suggested he consistently carried the pocket
knife with him.1 We do not find his arguments convincing. As the State argues,
“[i]t does not matter which victim Boutchee attacked first—either way, the evidence
showed that he formed a specific intent to inflict injury using the knife and then
brought it from one room to the other.” The district court properly overruled the
motion for judgment of acquittal on this count. See State v. Outlaw, No. 06-0063,
2006 WL 3313942, at *3-4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2006) (upholding going-armed
conviction where weapon was “available for immediate use”).
1
Boutchee cites dicta from our unpublished opinion in State v. Smith, No. 26-1201, 2017
WL 2181621, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 17, 2017), for the proposition that a defendant
who possesses a weapon during an entire argument has not committed the offense of
going armed. But in that case, the defendant shot at her boyfriend through a closed door
as he left the apartment. Id. at *3. If she did not retrieve the gun from her closet during
the argument, the guilty-plea record showed no movement to satisfy a factual basis. Id.
Here, Boutchee shuttled between two victims in two different rooms—cutting them both
with the knife. The element of movement was not in doubt.
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B. Was counsel ineffective for not moving for judgment of acquittal
on the attempted-murder count?
Boutchee argues his attorney breached an essential duty by not seeking a
judgment of acquittal on the charge of attempted murder. Boutchee insists he
suffered prejudice by counsel’s omission because the State offered insufficient
evidence of two elements. To convict Boutchee of attempted murder, the State
was required to prove the following elements: (1) Boutchee assaulted J.R.; (2) By
his acts, Boutchee expected to set in motion a force or chain of events which would
cause or result in the death of J.R.; and (3) when Boutchee acted, he specifically
intended to cause the death of J.R. See Iowa Code § 707.11; State v. Young, 686
N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 2004). It is the State’s proof of the second and third
elements that Boutchee now finds wanting. But if the record reveals substantial
evidence, counsel’s failure to raise the issue in a motion for judgment of acquittal
could not be prejudicial. See State v. Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Iowa 2004).
Evidence is substantial if it would convince a rational jury the accused is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt and it must do more than raise suspicion or
speculation. State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Iowa 2005).
Boutchee focuses on J.R.’s recounting of the violent assault, asserting the
victim’s “credibility was called into question.” Boutchee highlights inconsistencies
in the testimony from several witnesses for the State. But any nicks in the veracity
of a witness are left to the inspection of the jury. See State v. Sauls, 356 N.W.2d
516, 522 (Iowa 1984) (“Given the role of the jury in our system of justice, we must
accept the ability of that institution to resolve the difficult issues of credibility which
are presented.”); see also State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 567 (Iowa 2009) (“A
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court must be careful not to usurp the role of a jury by
making credibility determinations that are outside the proper scope of the
judicial role.”).
The jury was entitled to believe J.R.’s recollection of what Boutchee said
during the attack. For instance, Boutchee expressed his hatred of J.R. and
described his own mission as “the devil’s work.” Boutchee welcomed the
possibility of a lengthy prison sentence for his acts and urged J.R. to “hurry up and
die.” Boutchee’s own words exposed his expectation of setting in motion a chain
of events that could lead to J.R.’s death, as well as his specific intent to cause that
death. And the repeated blows to J.R.’s head and the slashing of his wrist—both
locations on the body vulnerable to mortal injuries—qualified as overt acts in
furtherance of Boutchee’s specific intent to kill J.R. The State may establish an
actor’s specific intent by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. See State v.
Crandall, 288 N.W. 85, 88–89 (Iowa 1939) (upholding assault-with-intent
conviction based on threatening statements attributed to defendant, as well as
implying defendant intended the natural consequences of his unlawful acts).
Finding plentiful evidence of Boutchee’s intent to kill J.R. and Boutchee’s multiple
acts in furtherance of that intent, we conclude counsel’s failure to move for
judgment of acquittal on the attempted-murder count did not result in actual
prejudice to his client’s defense.
C. Was counsel ineffective for not objecting to Dr. Casey’s opinion?
Boutchee believes the doctor who diagnosed J.R.’s pelvic and spleen
injuries gave improper expert testimony and contends his trial attorney performed
below expectations by not lodging an objection. The prosecutor asked Dr. Casey
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if J.R.’s injuries were “consistent with having been received in an assault.” The
doctor answered “Yes.” The doctor acknowledged J.R. reported tripping the day
he came to the emergency room but opined the patient’s injuries did not result from
the fall, explaining, “It’s almost impossible to fall from—you know, if I’m standing
up, my center of gravity is about three feet from the ground. It’s hard to fall from
three feet to the ground and develop enough force to cause pelvic fractures. That’s
inconceivable to me.”
Boutchee argues the doctor’s testimony was impermissible because it “was,
in effect, an expert opining that [J.R.] was to be believed.” Boutchee cites to our
supreme court’s trilogy of cases on expert witness vouching. See State v. Brown,
856 N.W.2d 685 (Iowa 2014); State v. Dudley, 856 N.W.2d 668, 676-77 (Iowa
2014); State v. Jaquez, 856 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 2014). But those cases involved
experts commenting—directly or indirectly—on the credibility of accusers in child
sexual abuse prosecutions. See Brown, 856 N.W.2d at 689 (holding expert
impermissibly vouched for witness’s credibility by opining that “investigation [was]
clearly warranted”); Dudley, 856 N.W.2d at 677 (holding psychologist indirectly
vouched for child’s credibility when expert testified child’s symptoms were
consistent with sexual abuse trauma); Jaquez, 856 N.W.2d at 665 (concluding
expert indirectly vouched for witness in stating child’s demeanor was consistent
with being repeatedly traumatized). The problem in all three cases was the
appearance of a scientific “stamp of approval” given to the version of events
offered by the child witness, “even though an expert cannot accurately opine when
a witness is telling the truth.” See Dudley, 856 N.W.2d at 677.
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Here, Dr. Casey did not offer an opinion, directly or indirectly, on the
truthfulness of J.R.’s testimony. J.R. told the jury he only remembered Boutchee
hitting his head with the baseball bat but, because he suffered injuries to his pelvis
and spleen, J.R. believed that while he was unconscious Boutchee struck him “all
over”; he had no personal recollection of an attack to his chest, abdomen, and
pelvis. Dr. Casey noted on December 11 that J.R. had bruising on his body that
was “more than several days old. He had bruising to his chest wall, to his rib cage
over where his spleen was, and bruising to his pelvis, and that bruising was not
acute. That was days old. You can tell that based upon the coloration.” Because
J.R. did not venture an independent recollection of being struck in the chest or
abdomen, Dr. Casey’s opinion that J.R.’s pelvic and spleen injuries were
consistent with an assault corroborated the circumstantial evidence, not the
credibility of J.R.’s testimony. Boutchee’s attorney had no cause to urge a useless
objection to the doctor’s testimony. See Ray, 516 N.W.2d at 866 (“It is axiomatic
that ineffectiveness of counsel may not be predicated on the filing of a meritless
motion.”).
D. Did the district court properly order restitution for court costs?
As his final assignment of error, Boutchee claims the district court erred in
ordering him, under Iowa Code section 910.3, to pay court costs “in an amount
that will be later certified by the Clerk of Court.” He asserts his obligation totals
$4060.75, citing Iowa Courts Online. Boutchee argues we should vacate that
portion of the judgment order because the district court did not determine whether
he had the reasonable ability to pay that amount. See Iowa Code § 910.2(1)
(limiting restitution for court costs to defendant’s reasonable ability to pay).
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The State tags Boutchee’s concerns as premature and asserts the checked
box requiring repayment of court costs was not a “final restitution order” under
State v. Swartz, 601 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1999), and State v. Jackson, 601
N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999). We agree Boutchee’s challenge is governed by
Jackson and Swartz. Here the restitution order was incomplete; the district court
was not required to determine Boutchee’s ability to pay until the plan of restitution
was final. See State v. Alexander, No. 16-0669, 2017 WL 510950, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. Feb. 8, 2017). Moreover, Iowa Code section 910.7 allows an offender who
is dissatisfied with the amount of restitution required by the plan to petition the
district court for a modification. See Jackson, 601 N.W.2d at 357. Boutchee’s
restitution issue is not ready for review.
AFFIRMED.