State of Iowa v. Nathan Ray Tesch

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0343
Filed April 13, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NATHAN RAY TESCH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clay County, Charles Borth, Judge.
Nathan Tesch claims he was denied his right to a speedy trial under the
Iowa and federal Constitutions and challenges the relevance and sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his theft conviction. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Tabor, J., and Gamble, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2022).
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
We are asked to decide whether the State violated Nathan Ray Tesch’s
constitutional rights to a speedy trial.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
A safe was stolen from a Spencer clinic. The State charged Tesch with
fourth-degree theft and third-degree burglary, with a trial information filed on
October 16, 2019, and January 22, 2020, respectively. The charges were later
consolidated.
Tesch filed two motions to dismiss “for lack of speedy trial.” In the first, he
alleged Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b)1 required him to be brought to
trial within ninety days of his indictment, it had “been 238 days since the filing of
the original trial information” in the burglary case and he was aware of an Iowa
Supreme Court May 22, 2020 order relating to the impact of COVID-19 on court
services, but that order could not “abrogate[] or preempt[] [his speedy trial rights
under] the United States and Iowa Constitutions.” In his second motion, Tesch
asserted 372 days had elapsed “since the filing of the original trial information
charging burglary,” a trial date was postponed due to the exposure of a witness to
COVID-19, and the State’s failure to bring him to trial violated the federal and Iowa
Constitutions.
1 Rule 2.33(2)(b) states:
If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived the
defendant’s right to a speedy trial the defendant must be brought to
trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must order
the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be
shown.
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The district court held separate hearings on each motion. At the conclusion
of the first hearing, the court found no speedy trial violation under rule 2.33, the
Iowa Constitution, or the United States Constitution. See State v. Smith, 957
N.W.2d 669, 693 (Iowa 2021) (Appel, J., concurring) (“The Sixth Amendment and
article I, section 10, of the Iowa Constitution provide that an accused is entitled to
a speedy trial. These claims are separate from, though related to, claims under
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(a) and subsection (b), which are designed
to implement speedy trial rights.”). The court reasoned that the supreme court’s
supervisory order modified rule 2.33 and the case was “within that [modified]
speedy trial deadline,” it was “unreasonable to conclude that the Iowa Supreme
Court would modify . . . court rules in order to create a constitutional violation under
the Iowa Constitution,” and the factors for assessing a speedy-trial claim under the
federal Constitution supported denial of that claim. The court denied Tesch’s
second motion “for the same reasons,” again noting that the Iowa Supreme Court
“changed the speedy trial deadlines” and the case was “still within that time line.”
The case proceeded to trial on February 2, 2021. A jury found Tesch guilty of both
charges.
On appeal, Tesch argues “[he] was denied his right to a speedy trial even
in light of the COVID-19 crisis.” In his view, “the delay in his trial of over one year
was excessive and a violation of his speedy trial rights under the federal
[C]onstitution and state constitution.” He also challenges the relevancy and
sufficiency of evidence supporting the value of the stolen safe.
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II. Constitutional Claims
A. United States Constitution
The United States Constitution provides, “[T]he accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also U.S. Const.
amend XIV. To determine if the provision was violated, the court applies a four-
factor “balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant are weighed.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). The factors
are: “Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his
right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Id.The district court determined (1) Tesch would “be brought to trial . . . just
over 10 months from the date of his arrest”; (2) “we are in the midst of a worldwide
pandemic which resulted in the court system being closed for jury trials for an
extended period of time”; (3) Tesch asserted his right to a speedy trial, which
“obviously . . . weigh[ed] in [his] favor”; and (4) on the prejudice component, there
was “no record that any evidence or witnesses . . . disappeared” and there was
“really no evidence that the defendant . . . faced unnecessary lengthy incarceration
due to this charge.” The court concluded, “The bottom line is, the need to protect
the public health during this ongoing pandemic outweighs Tesch’s, or any other
individual’s, right to a speedy trial under the US Constitution at this time.”
On the first factor—the length of the delay—the State concedes “the delays
in Tesch’s case trigger[ed] the Barker analysis” and the delays were
“presumptively prejudicial.” See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651
(1992). But the State asserts the “delay of just over one year was short and does
not weigh heavily in the four-part analysis.” We agree. As the district court stated,
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“there are volumes of cases in the federal appellate courts finding much lengthier
delays to not be a violation of a defendant’s speedy trial deadline.” Compare
United States v. Aldaco, 477 F.3d 1008, 1019 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding a three-and-
a-half-year delay was “uncommonly long”), with United States v. Titlbach, 339 F.3d
692, 699–700 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding a thirteen-month delay met the presumptively
prejudicial threshold but was a “relatively short period of delay” that “weigh[ed]
against finding a Sixth Amendment violation”); see also United States v. Brown,
828 F. App’x. 366, 370–71 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding a fourteen-month delay was
presumptively prejudicial but only “slightly favor[ed]” the defendant). The length of
the delay was not dispositive.
We turn to the reason for the delay. The Supreme Court has identified
several types of delays and assigned different weights to each. Barker, 407 U.S.
at 531. Specifically,
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense
should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be
weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since
the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the
government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason,
such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.
Id. Tesch argues the following are “neutral reasons” attributable to the State:
(1) the supreme court’s suspension of jury trials, (2) the State’s failure to bring him
to trial following the quarantining of a witness for exposure to COVID-19, and
(3) the State’s failure to transfer him to Clay County to attend depositions. We
disagree.
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On May 22, 2020, the Iowa Supreme Court filed a supervisory order
extending and restarting the speedy trial deadline in light of the COVD-19
pandemic. The court stated,
[B]ecause significant logistical issues—including a backlog of
cases—are expected even when trials restart, the court finds good
cause to extend the speedy trial deadline in rule 2.33(2)(b) beyond
ninety days. Accordingly, for any case in which an indictment or
information has been or is filed prior to September 14, 2020, the
ninety-day deadline in rule 2.33(2)(b) and rule 2.33(2)(c) shall be
expanded to 120 days, and shall be restarted with September 14,
2020 as Day 1. For any case in which an indictment or information
has been or is filed prior to September 14, 2020, the one-year
deadline in rule 2.33(2)(c) shall commence from June 22, 2020 or
the date of filing, whichever is later.
Iowa Supreme Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Ongoing Preparation for
Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services ¶ 13 (May 22, 2020). The court
again extended “the ninety-day deadline in rule 2.33(2)(b)” restarting the days “with
February 1, 2021 as Day 1.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter
of Ongoing Provisions for Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services ¶ 13
(Nov. 10, 2020). The court extended “the one-year deadline in rule 2.33(2)(c),”
recommencing it “from February 1, 2021.” Id.The Iowa Supreme Court recently addressed its authority to enter these
orders. See State v. Watson, 970 N.W.2d 302, 310 (Iowa 2022). The court
discussed one component of rule 2.33, then mentioned that its opinion did not
affect the speedy-trial portion of the rule. Id. The court stated: “Most courts
confronting [the speedy-trial] issue have suspended speedy trial deadlines when
jury trials are curtailed because of the pandemic.” Id. (citing opinions from other
states). In another opinion, the court addressed its authority to issue supervisory
orders affecting guilty pleas. See State v. Basquin, 970 N.W.2d 643, 654–56
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(Iowa 2022). The court stated, “Our COVID-19 supervisory orders balanced the
rights of defendants and public safety.” Id. at 654. The court concluded it “had the
constitutional authority to issue the supervisory orders that temporarily suspended
our rules of criminal procedure governing guilty pleas.” Id. While these opinions
do not answer the federal constitutional issue presented by Tesch, they inform our
analysis of this reason for the delay.
Other courts also have upheld their authority to act in the face of the
pandemic. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 968 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Minn. Ct. App. 2021)
(“[W]e hold that neither [the defendant] nor the state are responsible for the delay
in commencing the trial when that delay occurred solely because of public-safety
concerns due to the COVID-19 pandemic and when the district court was
prohibited from holding a jury trial by order of the Chief Justice.”); State v. Brown,
964 N.W.2d 682, 693 (Neb. 2021) (finding “delays caused by the [supreme] court’s
sua sponte good cause continuations for reasons related to the COVID-19
pandemic” were a “‘valid reason’ for purposes of the constitutional analysis”);
Commonwealth v. Murphy, No. 0197-21-2, 2021 WL 3501732, at *1, *5 (Va. Ct.
App. Aug. 10, 2021) (finding “the pandemic [and resulting emergency stay in trials]
was a ‘valid reason’ that ‘justified appropriate delay’ under the third [Barker]
category of reasons for delay”). In light of this nationwide authority, we agree with
the district court that the pandemic-related orders were “valid reasons” for the
delays in bringing Tesch to trial and did not weigh against the State.
The delay caused by the quarantine of a witness for exposure to COVID-19
also was a valid reason for the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (“[A] valid
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reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.”).
This delay did not weigh against the State.
Tesch is judicially estopped from raising his final reason for the delay—“the
neglect of the State to bring [him] to Clay County for depositions.” See Godfrey v.
State, 962 N.W.2d 84, 100 (Iowa 2021) (noting “the rule of ‘judicial estoppel’
prevents a party from changing its position after it has successfully urged a
different position to obtain a certain litigation outcome”). When the State sought
to have certain depositions scheduled remotely, Tesch resisted, requesting “the
option of rescheduling depositions at a future time when the COVID-19 pandemic
[was] not causing interruptions in school and businesses.” That is what the district
court ordered. The court stated depositions would “only be conducted
telephonically or by video conference if [Tesch] file[d] a written waiver [of] of his
right to be personally present for those depositions” and, in the event he did not,
“those remaining depositions” would “be canceled, and rescheduled for a date
mutually agreed to by the parties.” Because Tesch received the relief he
requested, he cannot raise a contrary position on appeal.
The third Barker factor—a defendant’s assertion of his right—is clearly
satisfied. That said, Tesch waived his speedy trial rights for the first four months,
reducing the weight of this factor in his favor.
We are left with the prejudice to the defendant. As the district court noted,
Tesch’s pretrial detention was not entirely related to this charge and he failed to
identify missing witnesses. As for his claim of anxiety and concern, the claim
lacked specificity. See United States v. Flores-Lagonas, 993 F.3d 550, 564–65
(8th Cir. 2021) (finding defendant had not made a showing of actual prejudice as
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his assertions that “he was prejudiced because of oppressive pretrial incarceration,
his anxiety, and impairment to his defense . . . lack[ed] specific facts”). In short,
Tesch failed to establish actual prejudice as was concededly required.
On our de novo review of this constitutional issue, we agree with the district
court that the State did not violate the speedy trial provision of the United States
Constitution.
B. State Constitution
The Iowa Constitution states: “In all criminal prosecutions, and in cases
involving the life, or liberty of an individual the accused shall have a right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury . . . .” Art. I, § 10. Tesch argues, “Even
if the Sixth Amendment’s protections did not result in dismissal, the protections of
article I, section 10 [of the Iowa Constitution] would” because it “is more expansive
than . . . the Sixth Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution].” He focuses on the word
“cases” and argues the term encompasses the criminal complaint preceding the
filing of the trial information in the burglary case, which adds two months to the
delay. On our de novo review, we conclude that, even with the additional two
months, the length of the delay was not so onerous as to support a finding of a
State constitutional violation.
III. Value of the Safe
Iowa Code section 714.2(4) (2019) states, “The theft of property exceeding
three hundred dollars in value but not exceeding seven hundred fifty dollars in
value is theft in the fourth degree.” Tesch challenges the relevance and sufficiency
of the State’s evidence relating to value. In his view,
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The evidence regarding the value of a new safe was irrelevant
without evidence of depreciation, original costs, and condition of
stolen safe. [In addition, t]he evidence was insufficient to prove the
replacement value of the sixteen-year-old safe exceeded three
hundred dollars.
“Evidence is relevant when it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable then it would be without the evidence.’” State v. Castaneda, 621
N.W.2d 435, 440 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Iowa R. Evid. 5.401). “We review a district
court’s decision concerning the admission of relevant evidence for an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 29 (Iowa 2004) (citation omitted).
The jury was instructed: “The ‘value’ of the safe means its higher value by
any reasonable standard at the time of the theft. Reasonable standard includes,
but is not limited to, the property’s actual value, its replacement value, or its market
value within the community.” The clinic’s office manager testified the replacement
value of the safe was $619. Under the instruction, the evidence was relevant.
“[W]e will uphold a verdict if substantial record evidence supports it.” State
v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted). “Value testimony
is liberally received, with its weight to be determined by the jury.” State v. Savage,
288 N.W.2d 502, 504 (Iowa 1980) (citations omitted). The office manager’s
testimony amounted to substantial evidence supporting the value element of the
crime. See id. at 505 (stating “other persons having the requisite knowledge might
also be presumed to be competent to establish value, even if not the owner”).
We affirm the jury’s finding of guilt and Tesch’s judgment and sentence.
AFFIRMED.