State of Iowa v. Donterius J. Bomar

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0752
Filed August 18, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DONTERIUS J. BOMAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Sarah E. Crane, Judge.
Donterius Bomar appeals the sentence imposed on his conviction of first-
degree robbery. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Carr, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2021).
2
CARR, Senior Judge.
Donterius Bomar pled guilty1 to second-degree murder and first-degree
robbery. Bomar and the State agreed to jointly recommend consecutive prison
sentences of fifty years for the murder conviction, with a seventy percent
mandatory minimum sentence, and twenty-five years for the robbery conviction,
with a fifty percent mandatory minimum sentence.2 The district court adopted most
of the parties’ sentencing recommendation but deviated from it by imposing
concurrent sentences and a seventy percent mandatory minimum sentence on the
robbery conviction.3
On appeal, Bomar challenges the imposition of a seventy percent
mandatory minimum sentence on his robbery conviction. We review a sentence
for correction of errors at law. See State v. Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Iowa
2021). Because the robbery sentence falls within the statutory limits, it “is cloaked
with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of
discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.” State v. Boldon, 954
N.W.2d 62, 73 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). A sentencing court abuses its
discretion when it imposes a sentence for reasons that are not supported by
substantial evidence or misapplies the law. See State v. Moore, 936 N.W.2d 436,
439 (Iowa 2019).
1 Because Bomar challenges his sentence rather than his guilty plea, he satisfies
the “good cause” requirement of Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2020). See
State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020).
2 The recommendation would result in a total term of seventy-five years in prison,
with Bomar serving a minimum of forty-seven and one-half years.
3 The result is a total term of fifty years in prison, with Bomar serving a minimum
of thirty-five years.
3
Iowa Code section 902.12(3) requires a person serving a sentence for first-
degree robbery to serve between fifty and seventy percent of the maximum term.
The sentencing court must determine the length of the mandatory minimum
sentence “based upon all pertinent information including the person’s criminal
record, a validated risk assessment, and the negative impact the offense has had
on the victim or other persons.” Iowa Code § 901.11(3). Bomar argues the
sentencing court abused its discretion “by failing to appropriately consider [those]
factors.”
In imposing sentence, the district court considered the presentence
investigation report, statements made at the plea hearing, and statements made
at the sentencing hearing. The court noted the seriousness of the offenses, which
occurred close in time but involved different victims. After noting Bomar’s mental
health and his age, the court declined to impose consecutive sentences because
Bomar “will still be facing a significant prison sentence and significant mandatory
prison term,” which the court hoped would allow him to consider and atone for his
actions. The court imposed a seventy percent minimum sentence on the robbery
charge instead of the fifty percent minimum the parties recommended, citing the
seriousness of the crime and injury to a second victim. The written sentencing
order further states that the court considered Bomar’s age, criminal record, family
circumstances, mental-health and substance-abuse history, the nature of the
offense, the plea agreement, and the statutory sentencing requirements.
The court’s statements at the sentencing hearing and in the written
sentencing order show that it considered the factors set forth in section 901.11(3)
in imposing a seventy percent mandatory minimum sentence. See State v.
4
Alloway, 707 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Iowa 2006) (noting that the court can satisfy the
requirement to state its reasons for imposing sentence either by orally stating the
reasons for sentencing at a reported hearing or in the written sentencing order),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa
2010), and State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 921 (Iowa 2014). In each, the
court stated it considered the information in Bomar’s presentence investigation
report, which included his criminal record and a risk assessment. Although the
court did not refer specifically to the risk assessment or Bomar’s criminal record in
imposing sentence, it was not required to do so. See State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d
9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he failure to acknowledge a particular sentencing
circumstance does not necessarily mean it was not considered.”). And because
the court ordered concurrent rather than consecutive sentences, the minimum
amount of time Bomar must serve is less than the amount the parties
recommended to the court. We find no abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.