State of Iowa v. Phillip Bryant Koromah, Jr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1606
Filed April 26, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PHILLIP BRYANT KOROMAH, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott J. Beattie, Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction for first-degree murder. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Badding, J., and Doyle, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023).
2
BADDING, Judge.
Accidents happen. At least that’s what Phillip Koromah claimed after he
shot his girlfriend in the head and then led the police on a high-speed chase, during
which he tossed the gun out the window and called an ex-girlfriend to tell her that
he was “going to prison for murder.” On appeal from his conviction for first-degree
murder, Koromah challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s
verdict, alleges he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct or
error, and claims the district court erred in overruling his Batson challenge to the
State’s removal of a black juror.1 We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In the early morning hours of July 23, 2020, Koromah and his girlfriend,
Bethany, were headed over to a friend’s house in Koromah’s car when they started
arguing about Bethany’s methamphetamine use that night. Bethany “started
kicking everything in [Koromah’s] car” and “snapped the gear shifter off,” disabling
the car in a quiet neighborhood in Pleasant Hill. So Koromah called his best friend,
Alex, for help. Alex and his girlfriend, Seirria, were drinking at their house about
five blocks away with some other friends.
Seirria drove Alex’s car to where Koromah and Bethany were waiting.
Seirria testified that, when she got there, Koromah was calm and did not seem
upset at Bethany. She started calling different places for a tow truck. Alex arrived
soon after on his motorcycle. He and Koromah got into a “scuffle” because Alex
was drunk and Koromah wanted him to go home. Their argument was loud enough
1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
3
that the police received a noise complaint from a neighbor. Koromah cooperated
with the officers when they arrived, telling them that he was waiting for a tow truck
because his gear shift was broken. The officers told Seirria to take Alex home and,
believing the situation to be handled, left.
But once the officers were gone, Koromah testified that he and Bethany
started arguing again. So Koromah decided that he would have Seirria wait for the
tow truck and walk back to a hotel where he was staying. He gave Seirria his car
key and tried to put a gun from his car into hers so that it wouldn’t be found by the
tow truck company. Koromah testified that Seirria yelled at him, so he stuck the
gun in his waistband and walked back to the corner where Bethany was waiting.
When the tow truck operators arrived, they saw the couple on the corner,
arguing. But when Koromah walked over to them, he was polite and pleasant.
After asking them to tow his car to his hotel, Koromah went back to where Bethany
was waiting at the corner. As the tow truck operators worked to get the car onto
the truck, Seirria saw Koromah punching Bethany. One of the operators heard
Seirria yelling, so he went to get his phone out of the truck to call the police.
The tow truck operator testified that as he was reaching into the truck for
his phone, he heard a gunshot. He bolted upright and looked to where he heard
the shot. He saw Koromah’s outstretched arm, heard two more gunshots, and
then watched Bethany fall to the ground. Although the tow truck operator was able
to tell that Koromah’s arm was straight out, like the “standard way of holding a
pistol,” he did not actually see a gun in Koromah’s hand. He thought that Koromah
and Bethany were about five to ten feet apart when the shots were fired.
4
The tow truck operator ran toward Bethany while dialing 911. On his way
to Bethany, he passed Koromah, who was headed away from the scene. The
operator testified that he saw a gun in the waistband of Koromah’s pants. Koromah
jumped into the car that Seirria had driven there and drove off, running over
Seirria’s foot in the process. The other tow truck operator chased the car as it left
so that he could tell the police where it went. Both then tried to help Bethany, who
was bleeding from her head, until emergency personnel arrived. Bethany was
taken to the hospital, where she died hours later.
As Koromah drove off, he called his ex-girlfriend and told her that he was
“going to prison for murder.” He then led the police on a high-speed chase,
throwing his gun and some drugs out the window along the way. Police eventually
apprehended him after a deputy struck the car causing it to spin out. The gun and
drugs were later recovered by the police.
A few hours after his arrest, Koromah was interviewed by an agent from the
Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation.2 During this interview, he admitted to
having “backhanded” Bethany in the car when they were arguing, busting her lip
open. He also admitted that when they were arguing on the corner, she tried to
walk away, but he dragged her back by her hair because she was being “stubborn
as hell.” And he admitted to punching her, “kicking her ass” while she was on the
ground, and calling her a “goofy-ass bitch.” After that last insult, Koromah said
that Bethany got a gun out of her backpack and aimed it at him. He told the agent
that he was afraid for his life and started wrestling her for the gun, which he said
2 Snippets of the video from Koromah’s interview were played for the jury during
the State’s cross-examination of Koromah at trial.
5
was hers. While they were wrestling, Koromah said the gun went off twice. He
said that he saw Bethany fall, grabbed the gun from her, and ran.
Koromah was charged with murder in the first degree. At his jury trial in
August 2021, the medical examiner testified that Bethany’s cause of death was a
gunshot wound to the head, and the manner of death was homicide. The medical
examiner determined that Bethany was shot from more than two feet away
because she did not have any stippling,3 which he explained only occurs “when
the gun is held in a relatively close proximity.” A firearms expert testified that the
gun Koromah discarded during the chase was the same one that was used to
shoot Bethany and that it would have taken just over five pounds of pressure to
pull the trigger.
After hearing this evidence, Koromah came up with a different story for the
jury. He testified that when he and Bethany were on the corner, he tried to break
up with her. Koromah continued:
She told me she was going to kill me and her, because she
didn’t want to be without me.
Q. What happened next? A. She grabbed the gun from my
waistband without me thinking she would, and tried to shoot me.
Q. Okay. A. And then wrestled the gun. And as I finally got
the gun out of her hand, my left hand was upside down, I stumbled
back—she pushed me, and I stumbled back and it went off twice.
After the gun went off, Koromah testified that Bethany “was still standing
there, and I turned around and ran off to the car.” He denied seeing her fall and
testified that he took off because he “didn’t want her to go to jail for the gun and
3 The medical examiner testified that “stippling” is burnt gunpowder, “which can be
deposited on the body as a black discoloration,” along with gunpowder particles
that “can strike the body and cause an abrasion to occur.”
6
the shots fired.” He also denied backhanding her, kicking her, or dragging her by
her hair back to the corner. And while he had told the agent that the gun belonged
to Bethany, Koromah acknowledged the gun was his at trial. Koromah tried to
explain his different stories away by testifying that during his interview with the
agent, he was tired, intoxicated, and confused from having hit his head when the
deputy rammed his car during the chase.
The jury did not believe any of Koromah’s stories and found him guilty of
first-degree murder. Koromah filed a combined motion for new trial and in arrest
of judgment, which the district court denied. Koromah appeals.
II. Analysis
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The jury was instructed that to find Koromah guilty of first-degree murder,
the State had to prove all of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. On or about July 23, 2020, the defendant shot [Bethany].
2. [Bethany] died as a result of being shot.
3. The defendant acted with malice aforethought.
4. The defendant acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly,
and with a specific intent to kill [Bethany].
Koromah only challenges the final two elements, claiming “the State failed to prove
[he] acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with the specific intent to kill,
and with malice aforethought.”
We review this claim for the correction of errors at law. See State v.
Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Iowa 2022). A verdict will be upheld if substantial
evidence supports it. State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 563 (Iowa 2018).
“Evidence is substantial if, ‘when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it
can convince a rational [factfinder] that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
7
doubt.’” Id. (quoting State v. Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d 884, 890 (Iowa 2017)).
Evidence is not insubstantial just because it might support a different conclusion;
the only question is whether the evidence supports the finding actually made. See
State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021).
Focusing on a jury instruction defining “willful” as “intentional or by fixed
design or purpose and not accidental,” Koromah argues that he “presented
substantial evidence that the shooting was accidental, and the State’s failure to
adequately refute his theory of defense should have led to a directed verdict.” To
support this theory, Koromah zeros in on the testimony of the tow truck operator
who witnessed the shooting. He contends that testimony was contradicted by
other evidence, specifically that while the operator claimed to have heard three
gunshots, the “physical evidence indicated only two shots were fired.” Koromah is
correct that only two casings were recovered from the scene, and only two shots
were heard on a video from a nearby surveillance camera. But it’s for the jury “to
resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to
determine the plausibility of explanations, [and] to weigh the evidence.” State v.
Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted).
The rest of Koromah’s arguments fail under this same standard. See
Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 343 (“While the defendant has an alternative explanation for
the evidence, the jury was not required to accept the defendant’s version of the
events.” (cleaned up)). While Koromah relies on testimony that he was “pleasant
but [Bethany] [w]as yelling and argumentative” to support his claim that he did not
intend to shoot Bethany, Seirria testified that she saw Koromah punch Bethany
just before the shooting. And Koromah himself admitted to the agent investigating
8
the case that he backhanded, punched, and kicked Bethany that night. See State
v. Haskins, 573 N.W.2d 39, 45 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (finding testimony that the
defendant “grabbed his wife’s hair and beat her head against a car previously was
relevant to the issue of intent” and tended “to rebut his accidental shooting
argument”).
Koromah also argues the evidence shows that he “did not intend to have
his gun with him and available when he walked back to” Bethany because he tried
to put it in Seirria’s car. But the jury was instructed that malice aforethought,
deliberation, and premeditation “need not exist for any particular length of time
before the act” and that “[i]f a person has the opportunity to deliberate and uses a
firearm against another resulting in death, you may, but are not required to infer
that the weapon was used with malice, premeditation, and specific intent to kill.”
See State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 2001) (“[T]he use of a deadly
weapon supports an inference of malice, and when accompanied by an opportunity
to deliberate, also supports an inference of deliberation and premeditation.”).
Koromah admitted that he had the gun in his waistband when he walked back up
to Bethany. And the tow truck operator testified that when he looked toward
Koromah and Bethany, he saw Koromah holding his arm straight out in front of him
before hearing two shots and seeing Bethany fall to the ground. See State v.
Chatterson, 259 N.W.2d 766, 769–70 (Iowa 1977) (“[I]ntent is seldom capable of
direct proof, but may be shown by reasonable inferences drawn from the facts
established.”); State v. LuCore, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2023 WL 382968, at *4
(Iowa Ct. App. 2023) (same).
9
The fact that more than one shot was fired is another blow to Koromah’s
claim that the gun went off accidentally. The firearms expert testified that before
the gun could be fired, “You have to load the magazine, you have to load the
magazine in the gun, you have to cycle the slide, get that first round of ammunition
in the gun.” The safety then has to be taken off, and “then you can pull the trigger,
fire the gun.” Koromah admitted that he would have had the safety on since he
was walking around with the gun in his waistband. “Once the gun fires,” according
to the expert, “you have to release the trigger, [and] pull it again for the next round
that’s fired. . . . Pull the trigger, release, pull the trigger, release, for every shot
that’s fired.” The expert testified that the amount of pressure needed to fire
Koromah’s gun in single-action mode was “at 5-and-a-quarter pounds.” This all
weighs against an accidental shooting. See State v. Sudbeck, No. 15-0596, 2016
WL 3003407, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2016) (considering a gun’s safety
system and the pressure required before firing as “militating against this being an
accidental shooting”).
The final blows to Koromah’s claim are his actions after the shooting and
shifting stories about what happened. See State v. Nance, 533 N.W.2d 557, 563
(Iowa 1995) (inferring a shooting was intentional when a defendant’s conduct after
the shooting conflicted with his claim that it was accidental and noting the “use of
a false story could also be treated as an implied admission”). Although he denied
it at trial, Koromah admitted to the agent investigating the shooting that he saw
Bethany fall to the ground before he took off in his friend’s car. He made no effort
to call an ambulance or the police, see id., although he did call his ex-girlfriend to
tell her that he was “going to prison for murder.” And he tried to get rid of the
10
murder weapon while leading the police on a high-speed chase. This is not the
type of “behavior one would expect from a person who sincerely believed that [he]
had just accidentally shot another person.” State v. Williams, No. 02-1338, 2004
WL 1254130, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 9, 2004); accord Sudbeck, 2016
WL 3003407, at *3 (“Sudbeck’s testimony that he spun around, accidentally
discharged his pistol with the effect of killing his girlfriend, and was so unconcerned
that he never bothered to turn around to see whether he hurt anyone is so
implausible that it supports an inference of premeditation.”).
Simply put, we agree with the State that there was “overwhelming evidence
that [Koromah] meant to kill [Bethany] when he shot her in the forehead.” We
accordingly reject Koromah’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his first-degree murder conviction.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct or Error
The overwhelming evidence against Koromah helps us resolve his next
claim—that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct or error4 in its rebuttal
argument at the end of trial “when it disparaged defense counsel for saying the
State had to prove the accidental shooting was not an accident.” We review the
4 The State argues that Koromah only preserved error on a prosecutorial
misconduct claim, not a prosecutorial-error claim. See State v. Schlitter, 881
N.W.2d 380, 394 (Iowa 2016) (distinguishing between the two concepts),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 197 (Iowa
2022). We reject this argument because the analysis is the same for both. See
id. (noting the multifactor test used to evaluate prosecutorial misconduct “easily
translate[s] to an evaluation of prosecutorial error”); see also State v. Veal, 930
N.W.2d 319, 334 (Iowa 2019) (treating a claim framed as prosecutorial misconduct
“as one of prosecutorial misconduct or error” and analyzing the two concepts
simultaneously).
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district court’s decision denying this claim for an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 134 (Iowa 2018).
In closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the final element of the first-
degree murder charge against Koromah, which required the State to prove that he
acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with a specific intent
to kill. That is a mouthful, but the jury instructions break it all down
and define every single one of these terms for us.
The first one is “willful.” “Willful” means intentional or by a
fixed design or purpose and not accidental.
So let’s focus on that one first, because that seems to be the
defendant’s story in this case, that this was an accident.
The prosecutor then went through all the evidence showing “that this was not an
accident.”
Defense counsel also referred to the jury instruction defining “willful” in her
closing argument, asserting: “The State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that this accident was not accidental.” In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued:
The State must prove—and I had to write this down. The
State must prove this accident was not accidental. Those are not my
words, and I’m going to repeat it. She said to you, “The State must
prove this accident was not accidental.” Those were her words.
I assure you, I guarantee you, go through these jury
instructions, you will never see that in there. It doesn’t say the State
must prove this accident was not accidental. That’s not what we are
required to prove.
Do you remember during jury selection when I said the Court
tells you we have to prove three things. Would you ask the State to
prove more than they’re required to prove? The assurances were
“no.” And this is why the State of Iowa asked that question, because
there are going to be lawyers like her that tell you that the State must
prove this accident was not accidental.
That’s not the law. That misstates what the State has to
prove. Don’t fall for it.
(Emphasis added.)
12
After the State finished its rebuttal argument, defense counsel asked for a
sidebar. The court then reminded the jury of the admonition they had received
before closing arguments: “that the statements and arguments of the attorneys are
not the statements of the law, rather the instructions are the statements of the law
that you are to follow.” Once the jury was released to deliberate, the court made
a record with the parties about the sidebar, at which defense counsel argued that
the prosecutor “stated that I purposefully misled the jury on the law. He also stated
‘lawyers like her.’ This is a personal attack accusing me, in front of the jury, that I
misled them about the law. That is extremely prejudicial to our client.” She asked
the court to either bring the jury’s attention to the instruction defining willful to mean
“not accidental” or grant a mistrial.
The court did neither, instead finding “the renewed admonition and the
admonition given prior to closing statements were sufficient in this instance.” In its
ruling on Koromah’s motion for new trial, where Koromah renewed his claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, the court found that “even if the statements were
misconduct, they were not prejudicial.” We agree. See State v. Plain, 898
N.W.2d 801, 818 (Iowa 2017) (“In order to establish a violation of the right to a fair
trial, a defendant must show both (1) error or misconduct and (2) prejudice.”
(emphasis added)).
“In determining whether misconduct is so prejudicial as to warrant a new
trial,” five factors are assessed: “(1) the severity and pervasiveness of misconduct;
(2) the significance of the misconduct to the central issues in the case; (3) the
strength of the State’s evidence; (4) the use of cautionary instructions or other
curative measures; [and] (5) the extent to which the defense invited the
13
misconduct.” Coleman, 907 N.W.2d at 140 (citation omitted). Prejudice is
generally found “where the prosecutor has demonstrated a persistent effort to
present prejudicial information to the jury.” Id. That is not what happened here.
The claimed misconduct or error was limited to the rebuttal argument. In
the initial closing argument, the prosecutor quoted the jury instruction defining
willful as “not accidental” and accurately laid out the State’s burden of proof on that
issue. See id. (“[P]rosecutorial misconduct will not normally rise to the level of a
due process violation when it occurs in isolation.”). While the challenged conduct
did go to a central issue in the case—whether the shooting was intentional or
accidental—the State’s evidence against Koromah was strong as discussed
above. See id. at 141 (“The most important factor in our determination of whether
any prosecutorial misconduct rose to the level of prejudice to demonstrate a due
process violation is the strength of the State’s evidence.”). And after the State’s
rebuttal argument, the court reminded the jury that the attorneys’ arguments were
“not the statements of the law, rather the instructions are the statements of the law
that you are to follow.” This same concept was embodied in the jury instructions,
which directed the jury to base its “verdict only upon the evidence and these
instructions” and instructed them that “[s]tatements, arguments, questions, and
comments by the lawyers” were not evidence. See State v. Hanes, 790
N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2010) (“We presume juries follow the court’s instructions.”).
On the whole, while we do not approve of the prosecutor’s critique of
defense counsel, he “stuck to the evidence, facts, and legal arguments while
presenting the case to the jury.” Coleman, 907 N.W.2d at 141. After assessing all
the factors bearing on the question, we find Koromah failed to show the necessary
14
prejudice to demonstrate that his due process rights were violated. We accordingly
find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision denying him a new trial
on this ground.
C. Batson challenge
This leaves us with Koromah’s Batson challenge, which was made after the
State used a peremptory strike on a potential juror who identified himself as black
on his “panel bio form.” The district court overruled Koromah’s challenge, finding
“that the defense has failed to establish that counsel was using the strike to engage
in purposeful discrimination, even if a prima facie case was made.” We review this
ruling de novo, though “we give ‘a great deal of deference to the district court’s
evaluation of credibility when determining the true motives of the attorney when
making strikes.’” Veal, 930 N.W.2d at 327 (citation omitted).
Under Batson, “[p]urposeful racial discrimination in selection of [a jury]
venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection.” 476 U.S. at 86. “The Equal
Protection Clause ‘forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on
account of their race.’” State v. Williams, No. 21-1772, 2022 WL 16985147, at *1
(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2022) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 86).
A Batson challenge follows three steps. First, the defendant must make a prima-
facie showing that the State used its peremptory challenges to exclude prospective
jurors on the basis of race. State v. Knox, 464 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1990).
Second, the burden shifts to the State to provide “a clear and reasonably specific
and neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge.” Id. And third, the court
must decide whether purposeful discrimination exists based on the reasons
presented by State. Id.15
Koromah contends that he “provided a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination by pointing out the State’s strike of one of only two black jurors on
the panel despite the lack of any disqualifying factors.” The State does not
challenge that point, skipping instead to the second step in arguing that the court
“properly determined that the State offered a race-neutral reason for striking” the
challenged juror. Focusing then on that step, we turn to the record made during
jury selection. See State v. Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 207, 215 (Iowa 2012) (“The prima
facie case requirement . . . becomes moot when the party attempting to strike a
juror offers a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge.”).
The following exchange took place during defense counsel’s voir dire of the
challenged juror:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I know Black Lives Matter, All Lives
Matter, Back the Blue has been, you know—we’ve heard about it for
two years now. It’s been very active in our community. We’ve had
protests, you know, and there’s been a lot of conflict in our
community over it. . . .
Anyone . . . with the issues that we have going on in our
community, feel like you can’t be on a jury for someone who’s been
accused of a crime who is black?
No.
How about you just don’t trust the police force? Anyone in
that camp?
I’ll mark that down.
All right. Mr. [P.], can you give me an answer?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [P.]: Same. I don’t trust the police.
Yeah, I don’t.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Do you think that police
officers—would you be able to—if you were picked—if you were
picked to be on this jury, be able to decide their credibility based on
the testimony?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [P.]: Yeah. I would base it off of their
testimony.
....
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So you feel like you could be fair and
impartial to the police officers who are called?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [P.]: Yeah.
16
After Koromah objected to the State’s strike of this juror, the State argued:
If the Court would remember, I asked a very specific question,
which is, “Is there . . . a question I’m not asking you that you believe
we should know that would not make you a good juror?” He didn’t
respond to that question, obviously, and we concluded.
When we sat down, the defense got up. They addressed . . .
the issue of race again, and then at some point, he said, as clear as
day, “I do not trust police.”
....
We do have quite a few law enforcement officers that are
going to be witnesses in this particular case, and, again, the
gentleman stated he does not trust police. Those are powerful
words, and I know counsel did a very good job of trying to rehabilitate
him, but you have to take in the context that they now know what’s
the right thing to say if you want to still stay on this jury. For that
reason, Your Honor, we believe it’s a race-neutral reason.
The district court agreed, finding “the reasons provided by counsel for the
requested strike were plausible and reasonable and provide a legitimate ground
for counsel to form an opinion that the prospective juror was objectionable.”
Koromah challenges this finding, arguing that “[s]triking potential jurors who
express concern about police conduct—not based on their personal experiences
but based on information they receive through the media and elsewhere—sweeps
too broadly.”
It’s true that the challenged juror denied having any personal life
experiences that would make him biased one way or another. So the State’s
reliance on appellate cases that “have repeatedly noted that a juror’s interactions
with law enforcement and the legal system are a valid, race-neutral reason for a
peremptory challenge” loses some of its force. Mootz, 808 N.W.2d at 219(discussing a potential juror who was struck by the defense because counsel
“didn’t like the way he said that when he was arrested, that he deserved it”); accord
17
Veal, 930 N.W.2d at 334 (finding “a prosecutor’s use of a peremptory strike on a
juror because the same prosecutor had sent her father to prison for the rest of his
life” was a valid, race-neutral reason for rejecting the Batson challenge); State v.
Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370, 376 (Iowa 1997) (affirming district court’s rejection of a
Batson challenge where the State struck two black jurors because they “had
served on previous juries that convicted on lesser-included offenses”).
Koromah also argues that a prosecutor “could use distrust of the police or
support for the Black Lives Matter movement as an acceptable proxy for race.”
Our supreme court acknowledged a similar concern in Veal, 930 N.W.2d at 334,
where it noted “the disproportionate impact when jurors can be removed based on
prior interactions with law enforcement.” Accord State v. Miller, No. 16-0331, 2017
WL 1088104, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017) (“A significantly higher
percentage of people of color have arrest records due to the disproportionate
number of stops, searches, and arrests of people of color.” (quoting Vida B.
Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest Records Violates
Batson, 34 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 387, 389 (Spring 2016)). But the district court,
who had a “ringside seat for jury selection,” did not think that’s what happened
here. Williams, 2022 WL 16985147, at *4. We agree, given the “great deference”
afforded to the court in making these determinations. Knox, 464 N.W.2d at 448.
As was the case in Williams, which involved the strike of a multiracial juror
whose fiancée had a “less-than-positive experience” interning for the county
attorney, our conclusion is bolstered by earlier interactions during jury selection.
2022 WL 16985147, at *4. Consistent with its strike of the challenged juror, the
prosecutor also struck a juror who said that she had been “somewhat involved
18
in . . . social justice issues” and that she knew some police officers and disagreed
“with them on some things.” That juror did not identify herself as black or
multiracial. Cf. Miller, 2017 WL 1088104, at *4 (determining that a “side-by-side
comparison of the response of the stricken black juror with that of the two nonblack
jurors who were eventually empaneled” undermined the reason given by the State
for striking the juror). The State also left the other black potential juror on the panel
seated for Koromah’s trial. Cf. id. at *4 (finding the State’s use of two of its
peremptory strikes to remove the only two black potential jurors was racially
motivated). And the prosecutor spoke at length with the potential jury members
during his voir dire about the need to set aside “some of those societal . . . issues—
race, police, all that stuff” so that Koromah would be judged fairly and impartially.
With all this in mind, we find the reason given by the State for its strike of
the challenged juror was race-neutral and not a pretext to strike a black juror. We
accordingly affirm the district court’s denial of Koromah’s Batson challenge.
III. Conclusion
We affirm Koromah’s conviction for first-degree murder, concluding the
jury’s verdict was supported by substantial evidence, Koromah was not prejudiced
by any alleged prosecutorial misconduct or error, and the district court did not err
in denying his Batson challenge.
AFFIRMED.