State of Iowa v. Jessica Noelle Agan

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1703
Filed April 26, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JESSICA NOELLE AGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Brad McCall, Judge.
Jessica Agan appeals her convictions of child endangerment resulting in
serious injury and neglect of a dependent person. AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Kent A. Simmons, Bettendorf, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia Brooks and Zachary Miller,
Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Heard by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
2
BOWER, Chief Judge.
Jessica Agan appeals her convictions of neglect of a dependent person and
child endangerment resulting in serious injury, challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence for each offense and asserting the district court abused its discretion
when ruling on her motion for new trial. We reverse her child-endangerment
conviction, affirm her conviction for neglect of a dependent person, affirm the
district court’s ruling on the motion for new trial, and remand for resentencing.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings.
Jessica and her husband Stormy are the parents of C.A., who was born in
August 2020, and J.A., who was born in the spring of 2019. Stormy worked for his
dad installing windows and siding, often working or traveling twelve to sixteen
hours a day, five days a week. Jessica did most of the housework around their
apartment, attended school online, and returned to work full-time in mid-
November. The children started attending daycare on November 16, 2020.1
In October 2020, Jessica began observing what appeared to be bruises on
C.A. According to Jessica, C.A. did not react when the marks were touched and
the discolorations behaved differently from normal bruises. In addition to the
discolorations, she reported the child was “not wanting to eat and fussy” and was
hard to wake up. She began taking photographs of the marks, which she shared
with Stormy and Stormy’s mother. She also did some online research and took
C.A. to see a pediatrician. The pediatrician noted, “Do not suspect trauma at this
time.” The doctor advised her to be gentle with the child. The doctor ordered blood
1 The children attended daycare on November 16, 18, 19, and 23.
3
tests, checking for an underlying medical reason for the bruising; the test results
did not show a condition that might explain the easy bruising. The doctor ordered
additional testing after more bruises were visible at a November 9 well-child
appointment, but those tests also came back normal. The doctor testified he
observed no concerning behaviors between Jessica and C.A. and would have
reported if there was any indication of trauma. C.A. was free from marks from
November 9 until the 19th, when new marks appeared on his right arm while at
daycare.
On November 24, Jessica brought C.A. to the emergency room, arriving
around 5:30 p.m. The nurse noticed a fresh red spot on the back of C.A.’s left
shoulder, and an x-ray was taken of the shoulder and arm.2 The x-ray showed a
fracture in the middle of the child’s upper left arm. A full-body scan taken later that
evening revealed an older, healing rib fracture.3
Jessica told the attending nurse and doctor the eighteen-month-old sibling
grabbed C.A.’s arm when she was changing his diaper and she heard a pop.
When she tried to feed C.A. later, he was fussy and she noticed the baby’s arm
was limp. She then decided to bring him to the hospital. The medical professionals
determined Jessica’s story was not consistent with the injuries and, as mandatory
reporters, notified the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).
2 No bruising was apparent on the child’s arm that evening or the next day.
3 A healing tibia fracture was also identified two weeks later after another full-body
scan to monitor the child’s condition was performed. The pediatric radiologist
testified the parents could have had a normal routine with the child without
awareness of the rib or tibia fractures or unusual fussiness from the child.
4
A DHHS investigator and police officer interviewed Jessica at the hospital.
She said the arm-pulling incident occurred around 4:30 p.m., after she returned
from an appointment and noticed the limp arm when she started to undress the
child for a bath. She also explained C.A.’s history of bruising. The investigator
and officer went to the Agans’ home, where Stormy relayed a similar story—
Jessica had been updating Stormy via text messages and phone calls while at the
hospital and told him what she told investigators. Stormy also told the officer and
investigator that when Jessica went to her appointment, he held C.A. while
watching television; C.A. wouldn’t eat from the bottle but did fall asleep while held.
Stormy also told the officer and investigator about the testing they had done
concerning the bruising. The officer indicated to Stormy the arm fracture did not
match the story they were telling.
When the officer returned to the hospital, Jessica changed her explanation,
stating, “I’ve already gone through this with one kid, and I’m not making the mistake
with this one.” She then told the officer and the nurse that while she was doing
dishes that morning and Stormy was playing a video game, C.A. started crying.
Stormy went to console the baby, and when he picked him up, he heard a “pop”
and said, “Wow, that was really loud.” Jessica said their older child had loose joints
that would pop in a similar way without harm. The baby didn’t really cry after the
pop but was acting fussy. Late that afternoon, Jessica thought the baby was just
crabby, but when she removed the over-sized sweater the baby had been wearing
all day, she noticed his left arm was limp. She took the baby to the hospital while
Stormy stayed home with the older child.
5
At trial, Jessica and Stormy testified they thought the child’s arm was broken
the day before by daycare workers.
Jessica was charged with one count of neglect of a dependent person and
three counts of child endangerment resulting in serious injury, one count each
specifying a fractured rib, fractured arm, and fractured tibia.4 Following a joint trial
in September 2021, a jury convicted Jessica of neglect of a dependent person and
child endangerment resulting in serious injury—fractured arm. Jessica and Stormy
each filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial, asserting the
verdicts were “contrary to the law and the weight and sufficiency of the evidence
presented.” The court overruled the motions.
Jessica appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support her
convictions and asserting the court abused its discretion in its interpretation of the
evidence when considering her motion for new trial.
II. Standard of Review.
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims are reviewed for correction of errors at
law. State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2021). “[T]he State must prove every
element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Williams, 674
N.W.2d 69, 71 (Iowa 2004). “We consider all evidence, not just the evidence
supporting the conviction, and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State . . . .” Ernst, 954 N.W.2d at 54. “The State’s evidence must ‘raise a fair
inference of guilt and do more than create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture.’”
4Stormy was also charged with the same four offenses and was found guilty of the
same two offenses after the joint jury trial. A panel of this court affirmed his
convictions in State v. Agan, No. 21-1702, 2022 WL 17481838, at *1 (Iowa Ct.
App. Dec. 7, 2022).
6
Williams, 674 N.W.2d at 71 (citation omitted). The finding of guilt must be
supported by substantial evidence, that is, evidence sufficient to “convince a
rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ernst, 954
N.W.2d at 54 (citation omitted).
“We generally review rulings on motions for new trial asserting a verdict is
contrary to the weight of the evidence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Ary,
877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016). “The weight-of-the-evidence standard requires
the district court to consider whether more ‘credible evidence’ supports the verdict
rendered than supports the alternative verdict.” Id. (citation omitted). “The
question for the court is not whether there was sufficient credible evidence to
support the verdict rendered or an alternative verdict, but whether ‘a greater
amount of credible evidence’ suggests the verdict rendered was a miscarriage of
justice.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] district court may invoke its power to grant a
new trial on the ground the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence only
in the extraordinary case in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the
verdict rendered.” Id.III. Analysis.
A. Child endangerment resulting in serious injury. Jessica challenges
several elements supporting her conviction of child endangerment resulting in
serious injury—fractured arm. For this conviction, the jury had to find the State
proved all of the following elements:5
1. On or about November 24, 2020[,] the defendant was the
parent of [C.A.].
5The lesser-included offenses—child endangerment resulting in bodily injury and
child endangerment without injury—were not submitted to the jury.
7
2. [C.A.] was under the age of fourteen years.
3. The defendant acted with knowledge that he or she was
creating a substantial risk to [C.A.]’s physical health or safety.
4. The defendant’s act resulted in serious injury to [C.A.], to
wit: a fractured arm.
If the State has proved all of the elements, the defendant is
guilty of Child Endangerment. If the State has failed to prove any
one of the elements, the defendant is not guilty of Child
Endangerment.
Jessica asserts there is insufficient evidence she acted with knowledge she
was creating a substantial risk to C.A.’s physical health or safety and the child’s
injury does not meet the definition of “serious injury.” The State asserts the jury
could have found Jessica aided and abetted the child-endangerment charge,
effectively conceding substantial evidence does not support her conviction as the
perpetrator of the child’s fractured arm.6 Therefore, we will only examine whether
the State proved Jessica aided and abetted in child endangerment resulting in an
arm fracture.
The jury’s instruction as to the requirements for aiding and abetting stated,
All persons involved in the commission of a crime, whether
they directly commit the crime or knowingly “aid and abet” its
commission, shall be treated in the same way.
“Aid and abet” means to knowingly approve and agree to the
commission of a crime, either by active participation in it or by
knowingly advising or encouraging the act in some way before or
when it is committed. Conduct following the crime may be
considered only as it may tend to prove the defendant’s earlier
participation. Mere nearness to, or presence at, the scene of the
crime, without more evidence, is not “aiding and abetting.” Likewise,
mere knowledge of the crime is not enough to prove “aiding and
abetting.”
6 In closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury to find Jessica “guilty of
causing the rib fracture and the bruising,” and to find Stormy guilty of the arm
fracture. In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor asked the jury to find Jessica guilty of
neglect of a dependent person and child endangerment resulting in serious injury
for the rib and tibia fractures, but he again only mentioned Stormy in relation to the
arm fracture.
8
The guilt of a person who knowingly aids and abets the
commission of a crime must be determined only on the facts which
show the part he or she has in it, and does not depend upon the
degree of another person’s guilt.
If you find the State has proved the defendant directly
committed the crime, or knowingly “aided and abetted” the other
defendant in the commission of the crime, then the defendant is guilty
of the crime charged.
The instruction clearly requires action, either by active participation or by
knowing encouragement before or during the conduct, for a conviction under the
aiding and abetting theory. “[T]he State must prove the accused knew of the crime
at or before its commission.” State v. Lewis, 514 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Iowa 1994). The
State asserts there is evidence Jessica knew of the crime as it was committed and
there is circumstantial evidence of “presence, companionship, and conduct before
and after the offense,” id. (citation omitted), which in combination adequately
support her conviction as an aider and abettor. The State notes Jessica “was
present during the arm fracture; was associated with the perpetrator by marriage
exposing her to his anger issues; and lied to medical personnel, a [DHHS] worker,
and law enforcement about how C.A. broke his arm, only changing her story once
caught in the lie.”
Even viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence here is
not sufficient to support an aiding and abetting conviction for child endangerment
resulting in serious injury. The jury was clearly instructed that mere presence is
not sufficient for a conviction, nor do we consider her marriage to the perpetrator
sufficient for conviction. Jessica’s conduct the State asserts supports her
conviction occurred after the child’s injury—several hours later under the State’s
argument. As the jury was instructed, aiding and abetting requires action by the
9
accused “before or when [the offense] is committed.” See State v. Hustead, 538
N.W.2d 867, 869–70 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (“It is essential that the aider and abettor
have knowledge of the perpetrator’s criminal activity prior to its commission. An
accused may not be convicted as a principal on the theory of aiding and abetting
for conduct that only supports an accessory after the fact.” (internal citation
omitted)). The evidence does not establish Jessica participated in or knowingly
advised or encouraged the conduct resulting in the child’s fractured arm before or
during the act.
Consequently, there is not substantial evidence to support Jessica’s
conviction for aiding and abetting child endangerment resulting in serious injury.
B. Neglect of a dependent person. To find Jessica guilty of neglect of a
dependent person, the jury had to find the State proved all of the following
elements:
1. Between August 26, 2020[,] and November 24, 2020, the
defendant was the parent of [C.A.].
2. [C.A.] was under the age of fourteen years.
3. The defendant knowingly or recklessly exposed [C.A.] to a
hazard or danger against which [C.A.] could not reasonably be
expected to protect himself.
Jessica challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the final element—
she “knowingly or recklessly exposed C.A. to a hazard or danger.” The jury was
instructed,
[A] person is “reckless” or acts “recklessly” when he or she willfully
disregards the safety of persons or property. It is more than a lack
of reasonable care which may cause unintentional injury.
Recklessness is conduct which is consciously done with willful
disregard of the consequences. For recklessness to exist, the act
must be highly dangerous. In addition, the danger must be so
obvious that the actor knows or should reasonably foresee that harm
10
will more likely than not result from the act. Though recklessness is
willful, it is not intentional in the sense that harm is intended to result.
In considering recklessness, “[w]e simply look to whether the actor embarked on
an activity which is known, or should be known, to pose a substantial risk to others.”
State v. Conroy, 604 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Iowa 2000).
The State offers two theories to support Jessica’s conviction here: she
knowingly exposed the child to danger by aiding and abetting the arm fracture, or
she knowingly or recklessly caused or allowed the bruises to C.A. in October and
November 2020. Because we reversed her child-endangerment conviction above,
we now consider this argument in the context of Jessica recklessly exposing the
child to harm.
The arguments here essentially pose a question: did the evidence
presented support a fair inference of knowing or reckless exposure to harm, or was
the conviction based on speculation, suspicion, or conjecture? See Williams, 674
N.W.2d at 71.
It is undisputed Jessica was C.A.’s primary caregiver for the vast majority
of the time when C.A. showed bruising and when the fractures occurred—with
some help from Stormy. Text messages between Jessica and Stormy showed
both parents expressing moments of frustration with the children and each other.
In the months after the children were removed from Stormy and Jessica’s care, the
caretakers did not notice any new bruises developing on C.A., nor were there new
fractures. During her second interview at the hospital, Jessica stated “I’ve already
gone through this with one kid, and I’m not making the mistake with this one,”
before changing her explanation of the cause of the injury. The State also
11
presented text messages showing Jessica’s frustration at times caring for an infant
and toddler. The jury could reasonably infer C.A. was getting bruised from either
Jessica’s or Stormy’s care, Jessica knew the child was at risk of harm, and Jessica
knowingly or recklessly exposed the child to further injury through her treatment of
the child or by failing to protect the child from Stormy’s care.
Jessica emphasizes the evidence showing her confusion concerning how
C.A. was getting bruised. In the month the bruises appeared, she sought help
from her mother-in-law and C.A.’s pediatrician, she had blood testing done, and
she and Stormy handled the child more gently. All of the evidence presented to
the jury regarding the child’s bruises came from Jessica documenting the bruises
in an effort to determine the underlying cause, get the child treatment, and prevent
or mitigate further bruising.
Because we review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges only for
correction of errors of law, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State. See Ernst, 954 N.W.2d at 54. We find the totality of the
circumstances here raises a fair inference Jessica recklessly exposed the child to
danger. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict convicting Jessica of
neglect of a dependent person, and we affirm.
C. Motion for new trial. Jessica asserts the court relied on untenable and
unreasonable interpretations of the evidence when ruling on her motion for new
trial. She points to five separate statements by the court that she claims are based
on suspicion and conjecture rather than legitimate inferences.
The objected-to statements from the court’s analysis are:
12
Significantly, during the first three months of his life C.A.
experienced repeated, unexplained bruising in addition to the three
fractures. . . .
Medical testimony established there was no medical
explanation for the fractures other than abuse. In fact, the medical
testimony established the fracture to C.A.’s tibia, known as a classic
metaphyseal lesion (CML) fracture, is a specific indicator of abuse
and is known to be caused by a shaking mechanism in non-
ambulatory infants.
Photographic evidence, taken both by the Defendants with
their cell phones and by an employee at a day care C.A. was taken
to, establish C.A. did not have a fracture to his humerus before
November 24, 2020. . . .
Both Defendants lied to hospital and law enforcement
authorities as to the mechanism of injury to C.A.’s arm. . . .
Text messages between the Defendants in the months
leading up to November 24, 2020[,] corroborate the jury’s decision.
The messages paint the picture of a young couple expressing
profound frustration in attempting to take care of their two young
sons. In one exchange, shortly before Jessica took C.A. to see a
doctor, Stormy sent a text to Jessica stating “I hope nobody turns us
in. I’m a 21-year-old drop out with anger issues.” Jessica responded
“they don’t know that.”
When considering the motion for new trial, the district court ruled,
Considering the weight of the evidence and the testimony
presented at trial, including a consideration of the credibility of the
witnesses who testified, specifically including each of the
Defendants, the undersigned finds that the jury verdict finding the
Defendants guilty . . . is not contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Of the challenged statements, we agree the third statement has some
logical issues. The fracture was never visible from looking at the child’s arm, and
the child did not have bruising on the arm even the day after the break was
discovered. The State implies the child was content in the photos and upset after
the fracture, yet photos from the afternoon after the State’s suggested time of
fracture have C.A. sleeping peacefully, and in the bodycam video evidence, the
child is sleeping quietly rather than in a state of upset. While this evidence is more
13
conjecture than legitimate inference, our reversal of the child-endangerment
conviction means any error would have been harmless.
Although the evidence supporting the other statements could have been
interpreted in a manner weighing less heavily in favor of conviction, they were
drawn directly from the evidence presented, and the district court did not abuse its
discretion in its reasoning or credibility determinations.
We reverse Jessica’s conviction for child endangerment resulting in serious
injury, affirm her conviction for neglect of a dependent person, affirm the district
court’s ruling on motion for new trial, and remand for resentencing.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING.