Rodney Fitzgerald Jackson v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0184
Filed April 26, 2023
RODNEY FITZGERALD JACKSON,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Patrick H. Tott,
Judge.
Rodney Jackson appeals the summary disposition of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Nicholas Einwalter, Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Gamble, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023).
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GAMBLE, Senior Judge.
Rodney Jackson appeals the summary disposition of his application for
postconviction relief (PCR), which alleged he received ineffective assistance of
counsel when he pleaded guilty to assault on a healthcare worker.
We review summary dismissals of PCR applications for legal error. Castro
v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2011). When completing our review of
summary dismissals of PCR actions, we apply our summary judgment standards.
Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Iowa 2018). “We view the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party” and “draw all legitimate inferences from
the record in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. Summary dismissal is only proper
when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id.To establish an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, an applicant “must
demonstrate ‘(1) his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) this
failure resulted in prejudice.’” Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Iowa 2011)
(citation omitted). The applicant must be able to establish both prongs to be
successful. See State v. Haas, 930 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa 2019).
On appeal, Jackson contends the PCR court erred because “there were
several genuine issues of material fact [that] would preclude” granting summary
judgment. Specifically, he complains that his counsel failed to fully explain the
elements of the offense or explore his purported intoxication as a potential
defense. The PCR court agreed, stating,
[T]here does appear to be material issues of fact as to whether or not
the affirmative defense of intoxication was discussed between the
applicant and [counsel] as well as the level of intoxication of the
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applicant at the time of the alleged offense and whether or not
[counsel] explained the elements of the offense.
So both Jackson and the PCR court agree there are questions of material fact with
respect to the first prong of ineffective assistance. But Jackson incorrectly stops
his argument here and does not address the second prong, prejudice.
The PCR court continued its analysis to consider prejudice. It explained,
Jackson “must also show that there are material questions of fact as to whether or
not [he] was prejudiced as a result of the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
provided to him.” This is where Jackson has not established a question of material
fact. An applicant who pleaded guilty to their underlying conviction can only
establish the prejudice prong by establishing a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, they would not have pleaded guilty and instead would have
elected to go to trial. Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 523 (Iowa 2021). This
requirement cannot be satisfied by an applicant’s conclusory after-the-fact
statement that they would have gone to trial but for counsel’s deficient
performance. See Doss v. State, 961 N.W.2d 701, 714 (Iowa 2021); State v.
Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Iowa 2002); see also Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct.
1958, 1967 (2017) (“Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc
assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his
attorney’s deficiencies.”). The PCR court correctly found Jackson did not generate
a fact question as to prejudice because he provided nothing other than a
conclusory and self-serving statement that he would have elected to go to trial.1
1 Jackson’s appellate brief does not expressly challenge the PCR court’s
determination that there is no disputed evidence as to the prejudice prong.
4
Without anything to create a material fact question as to whether Jackson
suffered any prejudice, i.e. whether he would have refused the plea agreement
and instead gone to trial, Jackson could not establish one of the necessary
elements of his ineffective-assistance claim and the PCR court correctly granted
the State’s motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.