In the Interest of M.M., J.M., and P.F., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0618
Filed July 13, 2023
IN THE INTEREST OF M.M., J.M., and P.F.,
Minor Children,
M.M., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Joseph L. Tofilon,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Alesha M. Sigmeth Roberts of Sigmeth Roberts Law, PLC, Clarion, for
appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick (until withdrawal) and
Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.
Gregory H. Stoebe, Humboldt, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
children.
Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her three
children. She argues she should receive a second six-month extension for
reunification, termination is not in the best interests of the children, a permissive
exception applies to preclude termination, and the State failed to make reasonable
efforts for reunification. The record details the mother’s ongoing issues with mental
health, substance abuse, and parenting deficits, as well as her persistent refusal
to engage in services. We affirm the termination of parental rights.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This appeal concerns termination of the mother’s parental rights to M.M.
(born 2017), J.M. (born 2019), and P.F. (born 2021). The family came to the
attention of the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in June
2021, when the mother hit the father of one child with her car and that father then
pulled the mother out of the car and physically assaulted her. Throughout the
assaults, the children were in the car and were not strapped in properly. Both
parents were arrested, and the children were removed from the mother’s custody
and adjudicated as children in need of assistance (CINA) in September 2021. The
children have not returned to the mother’s custody since then.
Concerns about domestic violence persisted after removal. In August 2021,
the mother reported to the local hospital’s emergency department with bruising on
her face, but she claimed the injuries were from a bar fight. HHS believed
otherwise and thought the mother was hiding the abuser in her basement, despite
a no-contact order from the previous attack. Later that month, both the mother
and the same father were arrested after law enforcement was called to the home
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on suspicion of domestic abuse; police located one of the fathers in the basement,
as HHS suspected. When HHS and providers tried to discuss the domestic-
violence issues with the mother, she “was generally dismissive of it and did not
understand how it could [a]ffect the children or how it could have an impact on
them.” In other words, “she did not think [domestic violence in the home] was a
concern.” The HHS worker opined that returning the children to the mother’s
custody would have been dangerous, as the mother could not protect herself, let
alone the children. Eventually, the same father abused the mother so severely
that she had to be life-flighted to a Des Moines hospital for multiple days to treat
her injuries. The abuser was arrested and remained incarcerated through the time
of the termination trial.
In addition to concerns about domestic violence, the mother’s substance-
abuse history is significant. The mother tested positive for methamphetamine on
at least six dates between March 2022 and March 2023. She admitted to smoking
marijuana and tested positive for that substance in January 2023. She also tested
positive for amphetamines in March 2022 and January 2023. And she missed
“numerous” drug-testing appointments. Despite this well-documented history of
substance abuse, the mother did not successfully complete any treatment regimen
to the degree that she can stay clean and sober. Multiple substance-abuse
evaluators (including the most recent) recommended inpatient treatment, and the
mother has yet to engage in such a program.
Both related to and independent of her drug use, the mother also has
significant mental-health problems. Her diagnoses include post-traumatic stress
disorder, dissociative identity disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and a mild
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intellectual disability. The mother reports having an alternate “bad personality”
named “Ms. Nitro” who is “aggressive.” Again, despite this well-documented
history, the mother’s attendance at therapy has been inconsistent at best. She
similarly resisted attending the Iowa Domestic Abuse Program (formerly known as
the Batterers Education Program), which was required by terms of her probation.
The mother struggled, up to the time of termination, with basic parenting
tasks. She was unable to handle scheduling or transporting children to
appointments, even after providers “went to extraordinary lengths to help her
organize her life,” such as by creating and writing in a calendar for her. When the
mother had supervised visits with the children, she sometimes failed to engage
with them and needed significant redirection from providers. She repeatedly
attempted to provide the youngest child with cereal that led to severe vomiting,
even though a pediatrician and court proceedings directed her to stop feeding the
cereal. One time, an HHS worker observed one of the preschool-age children with
a “marijuana pipe” in his mouth and access to firecrackers, a lighter, and
“something that either looked like a gun clip or like a novelty knife.” To the extent
the mother made any significant improvement working with providers on parenting
skills during the life of these cases, there was “back-sliding” soon after her
“sporadic” improvements. The mother never progressed beyond supervised visits,
and even those had issues as recently as the month of the termination trial.
The mother also engaged in “triangulation” and “manipulation” with regard
to the HHS caseworkers and their supervisors, ultimately leading to changes in
personnel working the case. A caseworker also described attempts to interfere
with drug-testing, including the mother’s claim that one patch “had fallen off” and
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the mother’s admission that she took off another “because she was upset.” On
another occasion, the mother claimed to be unable to urinate on her testing date.
On still other occasions, she refused to let workers into the house for home
assessments. During the termination trial, the mother declared she was going to
“put [the HHS caseworkers] on blast” for allegedly lying about all manner of things.
In June 2022, all of the parents involved in the case, including the mother,
were granted six-month extensions to work toward reunification. Nearly all of the
issues discussed in this opinion persisted past that extension.
The juvenile court accurately, although bluntly, summarized the record
evidence concerning the mother’s willingness to rehabilitate and work toward
reunification:
It is apparent that the mother only does what she wants to do
and only when she wants to do it. She resists requests from
providers and frequently rebuffs attempts by providers to help her.
She believes that she knows better than everyone else. [The mother]
did not heed multiple recommendations to engage in inpatient
substance abuse treatment, simply because she did not want to.
Earlier in the case, she put cereal in her baby's bottle even after she
was repeatedly told that it caused him to vomit profusely afterwards.
[The mother]’s stubbornness has been the main obstacle to
reunification. The mother spent the vast majority of the case thinking
she was too good and too cool to meaningfully engage in services.
These observations track those of three different HHS workers, who opined that
the mother “feigned ignorance so we would not be able to help her,” “didn’t like to
hear feedback from other people,” “believed she knew how to parent and her way
of parenting was the right way,” and “believes what she believes and I can’t tell her
otherwise.” Those observations are in turn consistent with the mother’s failure to
complete any mental-health, substance-abuse, or parenting-skills programs.
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The mother’s unwillingness to use services also carried over to the children.
The mother told HHS that “she doesn’t believe in therapy and [the children] don’t
need services.” She denied permission for one of the children to receive
necessary speech therapy through an area education agency, as the mother does
not believe the child needs those services despite a completed assessment to the
contrary. And she refused to consent to the school’s recommendation for another
child to be placed on an Individualized Education Plan because she believes “[the
child] don’t need it.”
Both HHS and the children’s guardian ad litem recommended termination
of parental rights. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s rights to all three
children, and this appeal follows.
II. Standard of Review
“We review termination proceedings de novo.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489,
492 (Iowa 2000). “The primary interest in termination proceedings is the best
interests of the child.” Id.III. Discussion
The mother makes four arguments on appeal: (1) she urges she should
have received another six-month extension to work toward permanency; (2) she
challenges whether termination is in the best interests of the children; (3) she
claims the permissive bond exception precludes termination; and (4) she alleges
HHS failed to make reasonable efforts in the services she was provided. We reject
each of these claims for the reasons that follow.
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A. Another Six-Month Extension
“[T]he juvenile court may deny termination and give the parent an additional
six-months for reunification only if the need for removal ‘will no longer exist at the
end of the additional six-month period.’” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa
2021) (emphasis added) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b) (2021)).
As the State correctly points out, the mother received a six-month extension
in the summer of 2022 and did not use that time to meaningfully address her
underlying problems. In looking at the totality of the record, nothing convinces us
the need for removal would no longer exist after another six-month extension.
Before and after receiving the extension, the mother continued to test positive for
controlled substances and, as of termination, she failed to make significant
progress in substance-abuse or mental-health treatment. At the termination trial,
an HHS worker testified that she did not believe it likely the children could return
to the mother’s custody in six months. The mother’s treating therapist offered a
similar view when questioned by HHS. And perhaps most telling, when the record
was left open at the end of the second day of the termination trial for the mother to
submit results from new drug tests, the test came back positive for both
methamphetamine and amphetamine—after the mother testified under oath that
the test would come back clean.
The juvenile court denied the request for more time, reasoning that the
mother was “no closer to reunification than she was on the date of the removal.
Indeed, she may be further away.” We agree.
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B. Best Interests of the Children
“We have long recognized that an unresolved, severe, and chronic drug
addiction can render a parent unfit to raise children.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764,
777 (Iowa 2012). All of those descriptors—unresolved, severe, and chronic—
apply to the mother here. We also give weight to the “numerous” missed drug-
testing appointments. “Under our case law, we presume that the numerous missed
drug tests would have been positive for illegal substances.” In re C.G., No. 22-
1948, 2023 WL 1809988, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2023) (citing In re R.A.,
No. 21-0746, 2021 WL 4891011, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2021) (collecting
cases)). We consider this evidence in light of the children’s safety, the best
placement for their long-term nurturing and growth, and their physical, mental, and
emotional needs. Iowa Code § 232.116(2) (2023).
On our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that termination is
in the best interests of the children. The children are well cared for by their foster
parents in a home that is safe, clean, and loving. The children’s needs cannot be
met by the mother, and they deserve permanency—particularly after being out of
the mother’s custody for some twenty-one months at the time of termination.
C. Permissive Bond Exception
“The court may exercise its discretion in deciding whether to apply the
factors in section 232.116(3) to save the parent-child relationship based on the
unique circumstances of each case and the best interests of the children.” In re
A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). Here, the juvenile court said it
well: “[The children] undoubtedly will be sad if they stop seeing [the mother], but
the long-term benefits of permanency and living in a stable home far outweigh
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those concerns.” A parent resisting termination has the burden to prove this
permissive exception by clear and convincing evidence, and our case law
recognizes that neither a parent’s love nor the mere existence of a bond are
enough to prevent termination. See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169–70 (Iowa
2021); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). Assuming without deciding
that the mother adequately preserved this issue, whatever bond may exist between
the mother and children does not outweigh the need to provide the children with a
permanent, safe, and stable home. The mother’s history convinces us she cannot
provide such a home now or at any time in the immediate future. We, like the
juvenile court, decline to apply this permissive exception.
D. Reasonable Efforts
Last, the mother contests whether HHS made reasonable efforts toward
reunification. “[W]hat constitutes reasonable services varies based upon the
requirements of each individual case.” In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa
2002).
The parent must “object to services early in the process so appropriate
changes can be made.” C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493–94. “In general, if a parent fails
to request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may
not later challenge it at the termination proceeding.” C.H., 652 N.W.2d at 148.
During the CINA phase, the mother requested—and the juvenile court granted—
additional drug testing. Otherwise, the permanency orders show the court
consistently found the State provided reasonable efforts toward reunification and
“[n]o party has requested additional services or assistance.” Because the mother
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did not timely challenge the adequacy of the services offered, she waived any
challenge to those services on appeal. See C.H., 652 N.W.2d at 148.
Nevertheless, the mother briefly challenged the services offered in a filing
after conclusion of the termination trial. Even if this were sufficient to preserve the
issue for appeal, we would again agree with the juvenile court’s blunt but accurate
assessment of the record evidence:
The evidence shows that [HHS] and its social workers bent over
backwards to help accommodate the mother. They met with her
frequently to review the expectations, they combined appointments
to help her accomplish multiple tasks at the same time, they offered
solution focused meetings (which she declined), and they helped her
maintain a calendar with her obligations on it. Even with all of this
assistance and handholding, the mother could not meet
expectations.
The Court believes that [the mother’s] inability to meet
expectations was caused primarily by her stubbornness and not her
lack of intellectual ability. The mother failed to complete her
assignments because she thought they were stupid and a waste of
her time, not because she did not understand them.
The Court also notes that [HHS] did not ask the mother to
build a rocket from scratch or complete another Herculean task. The
social workers simply asked her to go to substance abuse treatment,
attend mental health treatment, and work on becoming a better
mother. Parenting three children is much more complex and
exhausting than anything [HHS] asked her to do.
We also note the record includes examples of efforts by HHS to condense or
combine services, in an attempt to better serve the mother. The mother’s
reasonable-efforts argument provides no basis for relief.
IV. Disposition
Having rejected the mother’s contentions on appeal, we affirm the
termination of parental rights.
AFFIRMED.