State of Iowa v. Scott Randolph Luke

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1367
Filed August 30, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SCOTT RANDOLPH LUKE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Karen Kaufman
Salic, District Associate Judge.
Scott Luke appeals his sentence for domestic abuse assault, second
offense. AFFIRMED.
Karmen R. Anderson of Anderson & Taylor, PLLC, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Danilson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023).
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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.
Scott Luke was on probation for domestic abuse assault by strangulation
and domestic abuse assault, second offense, when he was again charged with
domestic abuse assault by impeding breathing or circulation of blood causing
bodily injury. He reached a plea agreement with the State. Pursuant to the
agreement, the State amended the new charge to domestic abuse assault, second
offense, as an aggravated misdemeanor, and Luke pleaded guilty to the amended
charge. The agreement permitted each party to argue for any sentence the party
desired. In the meantime, the State sought revocation of Luke’s probation on the
prior charges. The district court combined a hearing in the probation-revocation
proceedings with the sentencing hearing on the new charge. The court revoked
Luke’s probation on the prior charges and ordered him to serve the original
sentences. On the new charge, the court sentenced Luke to a term of incarceration
not to exceed two years and ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to
the sentences on the prior charges. Luke appeals from the sentence imposed on
the new charge. He contends the court abused its discretion by imposing the
maximum term of incarceration and failed to give adequate reasons for imposition
of consecutive sentences.
Because Luke appeals only his sentence rather than his guilty plea, and the
sentence is neither mandatory nor agreed to as part of the plea agreement, Luke
has established good cause to appeal even though he pleaded guilty. See Iowa
Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2022) (requiring a defendant who pleaded guilty to a charge
other than a class “A” felony to establish good cause in order to appeal); State v.
Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020) (finding good cause when the defendant
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challenges a sentence that is neither mandatory nor agreed to as part of the plea
agreement rather than the plea itself). As Luke does not claim the sentence was
outside statutory limits, the sentence “is cloaked with a strong presumption in its
favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of
inappropriate matters.” See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105–06 (quoting State v.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (2002)). It is Luke’s burden to show an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Stanley, 344 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983) (“To
overcome this presumption of regularity requires an affirmative showing of abuse,
and the burden of so showing rests upon the party complaining.”). We do not
second-guess the sentencing decision because the sentencing judge is afforded
a significant amount of latitude due to “the ‘discretionary nature of judging and the
source of respect afforded by the appellate process.’” Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106
(quoting Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725). As a result, we do not vacate a sentence
unless it was imposed “on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or
unreasonable.” Id. (quoting Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725).
As noted, Luke claims the district court abused its discretion in imposing the
maximum term of incarceration and not suspending it. One theme of Luke’s claim
is that Luke was in jail on the new charge for several months prior to entry of his
guilty plea and sentencing, and that stretch in jail was adequate punishment. He
also contends there were mitigating factors, including his mental-health history,
being improperly medicated at the time of the offense, and the trauma he suffered
due to the recent death of his child. He also highlights the fact that at least one of
his children is involved with a child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding, which would
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provide additional restrictions on and oversights of him. Luke contends these are
mitigating factors that warranted probation.
Luke’s arguments do not persuade us that he met his burden to show that
the district court’s decision was based on grounds or reasons that were clearly
untenable or unreasonable. See id. The district court gave these reasons for
imposing the prison sentence:
Okay, Mr. Luke, at the time of sentencing I’m required to
impose a sentence that I feel is appropriate to meet your needs for
rehabilitation and also to do what’s necessary to protect the
community and your specific victim from any further offenses by you
or by others. There’s a number of things that factor into that: your
age; your prior criminal history; your employment, family, and
personal circumstances I’ve been made aware of; the nature of the
offense; the recommendation of parties; and anything else I’ve
learned about you throughout the proceeding. Those considerations
are also taken into account in a probation disposition and also,
obviously, performance on probation, how minimal you’ve been
towards rehabilitation and that sort of thing. I’m going to include
consideration of the victim impact statement . . . .
[Victim impact statement is read.]
. . . Mr. Luke, you know, obviously during the reading of the
victim impact statement, you had difficulty even listening to that and
kind of restraining yourself. I totally get that you don’t agree with
some of the things that she said. I’m unable to attribute any sort of
cause for PTSD on your victim’s part or any of those sorts of things
so, I mean, there’s limited things in that that I can consider, but I
certainly can consider your almost inability to contain yourself
despite your attorney’s efforts. You’ve committed at this point at
least with these two cases I have here two assaults against this
woman and you appear to have no remorse for that.
THE DEFENDANT: I do have remorse.
THE COURT: You appear to minimize your behavior.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: And you keep interrupting me, which isn’t
helpful, okay?
THE DEFENDANT: Sorry ma’am.
THE COURT: At some point you have to interact with people
differently than you do. That may be impacted if you aren’t taking
your medications or whatever is going on, I don’t have any clue on
those things, but, you know, that’s something that’s within your
control whether you take your medications as prescribed or not. You
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obviously need them, they’re beneficial when you take them, and I
don’t know if that factored into the situation or not. You obviously
have a lot of things going on in your family dynamic. The department
is involved; you’ve lost a child, which is heartbreaking for any parent.
You’re obviously without the coping mechanisms to deal with that in
a healthy, law-abiding way. Those circumstances have been in place
for a long time with the department. I think it’s even something that
I was told when we had your sentencing on your other case, which
was I think a year ago tomorrow, and things are not improving. The
idea of continuing to try to handle this where you do something
illegal, you get arrested, you sit in jail for a while, you get out, it’s just
going to keep repeating itself until you make some significant
changes, and I recognize, you know, that you had some positive
things going for a while. You know, you had a job, you apparently
were otherwise compliant with your probation, you know, and all
those other things that [defense counsel] listed, doing the [Iowa
Domestic Abuse Program], but, you know, none of that was sufficient
to keep us from getting back in here and having the same thing all
over again, and, you know, there’s a point at which the scale kind of
tips on whether we believe we can address your issues in the
community or whether you need to be in prison, and, you know,
Mr. Luke, we’re at that point.
So on the sentencing matter for [the new charge], I’m going to
impose the indeterminate prison term not to exceed two years. That
is not suspended for the factors I’ve stated previously.
Luke points to nothing in these statements that he claims amounted to clearly
untenable or unreasonable grounds for the district court’s sentencing decision. His
argument amounts to nothing more than asking us to second-guess the district
court’s decision, which is not our role. See id. (“Our task on appeal is not to
second-guess the sentencing court’s decision.”). We reject Luke’s claim that the
district court abused its discretion in imposing the maximum term of incarceration
and not suspending it.
Luke’s challenge based on the district court’s failure to give reasons for
consecutive sentences is a much closer call. The rule requiring the sentencing
court to state reasons for choosing a particular sentence includes the obligation to
give reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269,
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273 (Iowa 2016). The only thing stated on the record as to consecutive sentences
occurred after the above-quoted statements by the district court, when the court
added: “With respect to the probation revocation matter, the defendant’s probation
on each count is revoked. Those were previously ordered to be served
consecutively, and the court finds they shall continue to be served consecutively
to each other and also to [the new charge].”
We agree with the State’s concession that this explanation standing alone
would be insufficient to permit us to review the district court’s exercise of discretion
in making the decision to run this sentence consecutive to Luke’s sentence in the
probation-revocation case. See id. at 274 (finding reasons for imposing
consecutive sentences insufficient when the record left the supreme court “unsure
whether the stated reasons for the sentence applied to both the decision to reject
Hill’s request for a suspended sentence and the decision to make his sentence
consecutive”). But we also agree with the State that the district court can satisfy
the requirement of giving reasons for imposing consecutive sentences by stating
the reasons on the record or by stating them in the written sentencing order. State
v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Iowa 2014) (“The district court can satisfy
[Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d), requiring reasons for the sentence be
stated on the record] by orally stating the reasons on the record or placing the
reasons in the written sentencing order.”); State v. Hanson, No. 22-1774, 2023 WL
4530261, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 13, 2023) (“The record includes not just the
reasons stated during the sentencing hearing but also the reasons set out in the
written sentencing order.”).
Here, the written sentencing order following the sentencing hearing stated:
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that taking into account
defendant’s age, attitude, criminal history, and employment, financial
and family circumstances, as well as the nature of the offense,
including whether a weapon or force was used in the commission of
the offense, the recommendations of the parties, and other matters
reflected in the court file and record, for the protection of society and
rehabilitation of defendant:
. . . For the reasons set forth above and/or stated on the
record, the sentence shall be served CONSECUTIVELY to the
sentence(s) imposed in [the probation revocation matter].
We find this statement of reasons sufficient—by the slimmest of margins—to
explain the decision to impose consecutive sentences, so we reject Luke’s
challenge on this basis. That said, we echo the supreme court’s statement in Hill
encouraging “sentencing courts to give more detailed reasons for a sentence
specific to the individual defendant” and to “explicitly state the reasons for imposing
a consecutive sentence.” 878 N.W.2d at 275. The spirit of the requirement of
giving reasons for imposing consecutive sentences would be better met by stating
specific reasons on the record rather than in nonspecific language in the written
sentencing order that follows.
Finding no abuse of the district court’s sentencing discretion, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.