Scott Patrick Hassel v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1205
Filed August 9, 2023
SCOTT PATRICK HASSEL,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, John M. Sandy,
Judge.
A defendant appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
Nathan A. Mundy of Mundy Law Office, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
2
GREER, Judge.
Contending his plea counsel failed to properly explain the terms of the plea
agreements, specifically that his sentences were to run consecutively, Scott
Hassel applied for postconviction relief (PCR) asserting ineffective assistance of
his trial counsel. The State argues Hassel’s claim that he did not understand the
terms of the plea agreement is not supported by the evidence and, after a hearing
on the PCR application, the district court agreed with the State’s characterization
and dismissed the application. Hassel appeals.
The State charged Hassel with crimes in two separate cases. As the cases
progressed, trial counsel consulted Hassel about entering plea agreements in each
case. Ultimately, Hassel signed two written plea agreements that were filed and
accepted by the district court; Hassel pled guilty to one count of third-degree
burglary, a class “D” felony, in both FECR021717 and FECR021695. Hassel was
sentenced according to the terms of the plea agreements. At sentencing, the
district court explained
[I]n case number [FECR0]21695, it is the judgment and sentence of
this court that the defendant is guilty and is convicted of the crime of
burglary in the third degree, a class D felony, as charged in count I
of the trial information committed on February 5th of 2017. As
punishment for that crime, the defendant is sentenced to a term of
incarceration not to exceed five years. . . . If [the term of
incarceration] needs to be served, that term of incarceration shall run
consecutive with the sentence that will soon be imposed in case
number [FECR0]21717. However, the serving of that term of
incarceration and the payment of the fine are all suspended, and the
defendant is placed on probation under the supervision of the Third
Judicial District Department of Correctional Services for a period of
three years.
3
The sentencing court repeated the sentence in similar fashion related to the
second charge. When Hassel was asked if he had any questions concerning the
sentence, he answered “no.”
In this PCR and in his own words, Hassel described the plea discrepancy
like this:
I was told [the sentences] were running, as I said, together, and [trial
counsel] said yes. As I’m signing papers and he just signs me one
this is just acknowledging the first thing. I sign. I don’t read through
the small print. I just kept signing and they were [to] run consecutive.
I find this out when I got to Oakdale when I got my time comp
sheet[1] . . . .
But Hassel’s trial counsel also testified at the PCR hearing and discussed the
written guilty plea forms signed by Hassel. In doing so, counsel remembered that
he met with Hassel for an hour and discussed the charges against him and what
plea offers were on the table. One consideration was whether a stint in prison
would be urged by the State. Trial counsel proposed a possible plea deal with
concurrent sentences, but the State indicated with that option it would ask for
incarceration rather than suspended sentences. Weighing the various risks, trial
counsel testified he advised Hassel on the best route to avoid prison.
Remembering the full discussion, trial counsel testified that Hassel “elected to
proceed with the consecutive sentencing and a guarantee of probation in lieu of
proceeding with a chance at being sent to prison.” Then, trial counsel further
described the detailed plea proceeding where the district court confirmed the plea
agreement terms. And counsel noted, as was the office practice, Hassel was sent
1 Because both of Hassel’s sentences were suspended, he was placed on
probation. But his probation was eventually revoked, which is when Hassel claims
he realized the sentences would run consecutively rather than concurrently.
4
a letter advising him his “sentence would be served consecutively [if he ever had
to serve it], but that he was placed on probation.” Trial counsel also emphasized,
“He knew the alternative was running two [“D”] felonies concurrently with most
likely he was going to prison because the [presentence investigation report] would
so indicate, or the alternative is he could accept consecutive sentencing with a
guarantee of probation. He knew that.”
Hassel’s PCR claim centers on his trial counsel’s failure to advise him that
the guilty pleas required that the sentences would run consecutively rather than
concurrently. We generally review a denial of PCR for errors at law. See
Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012). “[W]hen the applicant
asserts claims of a constitutional nature, our review is de novo. Thus, we review
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo.” Id. (quoting Ledezma v.
State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001)).
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant
must demonstrate both ineffective assistance and prejudice.” Ledezma, 626
N.W.2d at 142. Proof of both elements must be by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. As for the ineffective-assistance prong, “the applicant must
demonstrate the attorney performed below the standard demanded of a
reasonably competent attorney.” Id. To establish the prejudice prong, “the
applicant must demonstrate ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.’” Id. at 143 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
Here, Hassel failed to prove counsel provided ineffective assistance.
5
But for Hassel’s protestations over his plea understanding, all of the
evidence presented at the PCR hearing supports the dismissal of the application.
Trial counsel demonstrated reasonable skill in negotiating the plea agreement for
Hassel. He offered Hassel two options—one with a joint recommendation for a
suspended sentence and probation and the other with the State recommending
Hassel serve prison time. Over an hour conference with Hassel, trial counsel set
out the plea agreement options. Hassel2 signed two written plea agreements—
one for each case—which clearly set out that the sentences would be served
consecutively if they were ever served. At the plea hearing, the prosecutor
confirmed the agreement as set out in the written plea agreements, the plea court
carefully explained the terms and asked Hassel, “[D]o you want to be sentenced
in accordance with those plea agreements if we get to the sentencing portion of
those proceedings?” Hassel responded, “Yes.” Hassel agreed to proceed to
sentencing after pleading guilty, and the court confirmed with Hassel that the
presentence investigation report recommended imprisonment and that Hassel
understood that his attorney negotiated a plea agreement that would allow Hassel
to avoid prison. The sentencing court again summarized the sentences, noting
again they would run consecutively. Finally, after the plea and sentencing
proceedings, trial counsel sent Hassel the judgment and sentence and confirmed
in writing the specific details of the agreements, including “that the sentence would
be served consecutively, but that he was placed on probation.”
2 At the time he signed the written plea agreements, Hassel was forty-eight years
old, had a college degree, understood the English language, and had extensive
experience in the criminal system. He does not argue he failed to understand the
terms of the agreements and confirmed with the plea judge that he understood.
6
Based on this record, we agree with the district court’s finding that “there
can be little doubt that Hassel’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.” We
also credit the district court’s determination that trial counsel was more credible
than Hassel. See Cox v. State, 554 N.W.2d 712, 714–15 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996)
(deferring to the PCR court’s credibility findings and finding trial counsel to be more
credible). Hassel did not meet his burden of proof to establish his trial counsel
failed to perform an essential duty, thus we do not reach his prejudice claim. We
affirm the dismissal of the PCR application.
AFFIRMED.