State of Iowa v. Ezekiel Larson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0148
Filed October 16, 2024
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EZEKIEL LARSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, DeDra Schroeder,
Judge.
A defendant appeals his sentence following a guilty plea. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Buller, J., and Danilson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2024).
2
DANILSON, Senior Judge.
Ezekiel Larson pled guilty to one count of child endangerment resulting in
bodily injury. As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed to jointly
recommend imposition of a suspended five-year prison term accompanied by three
years of probation.1 The subsequent presentence investigation report
recommended Larson be sentenced to prison. At sentencing, the district court
declined to accept the parties’ joint recommendation and instead sentenced
Larson to a five-year term of incarceration. Larson appeals, claiming the district
court abused its discretion when sentencing him to a prison term.2
I. Standard of Review
“Our review of a sentence imposed in a criminal case is for correction of
errors at law.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “We will not
reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some
defect in the sentencing procedure.” Id. “A sentencing court’s decision to impose
a specific sentence that falls within the statutory limits ‘is cloaked with a strong
presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or
the consideration of inappropriate matters.’” State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62, 73
(Iowa 2021) (citation omitted).
1 The plea agreement was not conditioned on the district court’s acceptance of the
joint sentencing recommendation. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(3).
2 Because Larson challenges his discretionary sentence, he has good cause to
appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2023) (requiring defendants who plead
guilty to offenses other than class “A” felonies to establish good cause to appeal);
State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020) (“We hold that the good-cause
requirement is satisfied in this context when the defendant appeals a sentence that
was neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea bargain.”).
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II. Discussion
Larson claims that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by
failing to adequately consider mitigating factors such as his remorse, employment,
family supports, and cooperation with the Iowa Department of Health and Human
Services in a separate juvenile court case. He also argues the district court should
not have considered his criminal history to conclude that he was not an appropriate
candidate for probation.
The purpose of sentencing is “to provide maximum opportunity to
rehabilitate the defendant and to protect the community.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d
at 106. When fashioning an individualized sentence to achieve that purpose, the
sentencing court considers several sentencing factors including: the nature of the
offense; the attending circumstances; the age, character, and propensity of the
defendant; the defendant’s employment status, family circumstances, potential for
reform, and prior record of convictions or deferred judgments; and any other
relevant factors. Id. Additionally, “[a] defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for
the offense, and a sincere demonstration of remorse, are proper considerations in
sentencing.” State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022) (citation
omitted). It is up to the district court to balance these individual factors given the
circumstances of each defendant. See State v. Hightower, 8 N.W.3d 527, 543
(Iowa 2024). And “while the district court ha[s] the obligation to consider relevant
factors, it [is] not required to specifically acknowledge each mitigating factor
claimed by” the defendant. State v. Phillips, 996 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Iowa Ct. App.
2023).
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Following our review of the record, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion when it weighed permissible sentencing factors to reach a
sentencing determination. At the sentencing hearing and within the written
sentencing order, the district court noted Larson’s age, attitude, criminal history,
employment status, and familial support; the nature of the offense; the parties’ joint
recommendation; and the presentence investigation report recommendation as
factors it considered when making its sentencing determination. These are all
permissible factors for the court to consider.
While Larson contends that the court should have placed greater
significance on certain mitigating factors like his remorse, the court had no duty to
specifically discuss each mitigating factor or to weigh them as significantly as
Larson desired. See id. To the extent that Larson argues the district court
improperly considered his criminal history to conclude that he was a poor
candidate for probation, he is incorrect. The district court was free to consider
Larson’s criminal history, which spanned a decade and included multiple instances
of Larson violating probation.3 See id. at 421.
Larson cannot establish that the district court abused its discretion when it
sentenced him to prison. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106 (collecting cases
3 At the sentencing hearing, Larson’s counsel noted that the presentence
investigation report required no additions or corrections and conceded that the
court could rely upon it for sentencing purposes. The report detailed Larson’s
criminal history. It showed that when Larson was previously placed on probation,
he violated probation multiple times.
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recognizing a defendant bears the burden on appeal to “overcome the presumption
in favor of the sentence”). As a result, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.