State v. Meraz

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
No. 125,387
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
LUIS MERAZ,
Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE C. BROWN, judge. Opinion filed January 6, 2023.
Affirmed.
Submitted by the parties for summary disposition pursuant to K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-6820(g) and
(h).
Before HILL, P.J., BRUNS and WARNER, JJ.
PER CURIAM: Luis Meraz appeals from the district court's decision to revoke his
probation after he violated the terms of his probation for a second time. On appeal, Meraz
contends that the district court should have imposed a second intermediate sanction
instead of ordering him to serve his underlying prison sentence. We granted Meraz'
motion for summary disposition under Kansas Supreme Court Rule 7.014A (2022 Kan.
S. Ct. R. at 48) and deem this appeal submitted for resolution. Based on our review of the
record on appeal, we do not find that the district court erred in revoking Meraz' probation
or in ordering him to serve his underlying sentence. Thus, we affirm.
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FACTS
After Meraz pleaded guilty to aggravated battery and criminal threat for crimes
occurring in October 2019, the district court sentenced him to 30 months in prison.
However, it suspended the sentence and placed Meraz on probation. Unfortunately,
Meraz has had difficulty fulfilling the terms of his probation.
The first time that Meraz stipulated to violating the terms of his probation, the
district court imposed a three-day jail sanction. Subsequently, the State moved to revoke
probation for a second time. At the revocation hearing, the district court found that Meraz
had once again violated the terms of his probation and ordered him to serve his
underlying prison sentence.
Thereafter, Meraz filed a "Pro Se Motion for Violation of Due Process" in the
district court. In his motion, Meraz argued that the district court should have imposed
another intermediate sanction. Finding that it had no jurisdiction to review a presumptive
sentence, the district court denied Meraz' motion and he filed this appeal.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Meraz asserts that the district court erred by failing to impose a second
intermediate sanction before ordering him to serve his underlying prison sentence. Meraz
cites us to K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3716(c). In particular, he points to the fact that the 2014
version of the statute instructed district courts to impose a 2-day or 3-day jail sanction for
a first probation violation and then a 120-day or 180-day prison sanction for a second
probation violation. See K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3716(c). However, because Meraz
committed his crimes of conviction in October 2019, the 2014 version of the statute is not
applicable in this case.
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Effective July 1, 2019, the Kansas Legislature removed the 120-day and 180-day
intermediate sanction requirement. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3716(c). As a result, the
district court had the authority to revoke Meraz' probation in this case because he had
already been ordered to serve a three-day jail sanction for his first violation of the terms
of probation. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3716(c)(1)(C); see also State v. Dominguez, 58
Kan. App. 2d 630, 633, 473 P.3d 932 (2020). Consequently, the district court did not err
as a matter of law, nor do we find an abuse of discretion based on our review of the
record.
In summary, Meraz committed his crimes of conviction in October 2019. As a
result, his reliance on the 2014 version of K.S.A. 22-3716(c) is misplaced. Instead, the
2019 version of the statute is applicable and it allowed the district court to order Meraz to
serve his underlying sentence after he violated the terms of his probation for a second
time. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision.
Affirmed.
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