DocketNumber： 89,787
Citation Numbers： 71 P.3d 1180, 31 Kan. App. 2d 728
Judges： Rulon, Knudson, Larson
Filed Date： 7/3/2003
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 10/19/2024
In this K.S.A. 60-1507 appeal, Doug L. Wilson asks for retroactive application of our decision of State v. Frazier, 30 Kan. App. 2d 398, 42 P.3d 188, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1115 (2002).
We decline to apply our Frazier decision retroactively in a collateral attack on an unappealed guilty conviction and affirm the trial court.
On October 12, 1999, Wilson pled no contest to possession of ephedrine/pseudoephedrine, contrary to K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 65-7006(a), attempted manufacture of methamphetamine, contrary to K.S.A. 65-4159 and K.S.A. 21-3301, and possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell, contrary to K.S.A. 65-4161. After an extensive plea hearing, Wilson was found guilty on all three charges.
Wilson’s pleas were the result of a favorable plea agreement where, in exchange for the three no contest pleas, the State dismissed nine counts in the three cases where he pled and completely dismissed all charges in two other cases.
On March 14, 2000, Wilson was sentenced to 146 months for possession of ephedrine/pseudoephedrine, a severity level 1 drug
On March 15, 2002, the Kansas Court of Appeals filed its decision in Frazier. The Frazier court found K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 65-7006(a) to be equivalent to the statute prohibiting possession of drug paraphernalia, K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 65-4152(a)(3), a drug severity level 4 felony, and directed the level 1 sentence to be modified to a level 4 sentence.
Wilson subsequently filed a motion, contending he was illegally sentenced and asked that his level 1 sentence be reduced to a level 4 sentence which with his time served would result in his release.
The trial court ruled in October 2002 that Wilson’s K.S.A. 60-1507 motion could not be used to attack a sentence which Wilson failed to appeal. The court held the original sentence was appropriate for Wilson’s criminal history considering the severity level of the crime at the time sentence was imposed and that the Frazier decision was not to be applied retroactively.
From this ruling, Wilson appeals.
The only issue we face is whether our decision in Frazier is to be applied retroactively. If it is, Wilson’s sentence must be reduced to that which is appropriate for a severity level 4 felony. If it is not, the original sentence imposed by the trial court must be served.
Wilson contends the question of whether Frazier is to be applied retroactively is a question of law over which our review is unlimited. State v. Donlay, 253 Kan. 132, 133-34, 853 P.2d 680 (1993). In addition, an illegal sentence may be corrected by an appellate court at any time. State v. Sisk, 266 Kan. 41, 43, 966 P.2d 671 (1998).
The State suggests our standard of review of the denial of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is to determine if there is substantial competent evidence to support its findings and if those findings are sufficient to support its conclusions of law. Edwards v. State, 29 Kan. App. 2d 75, 25 P.3d 142 (2001). The State also cites Donlay for the rule that our review of questions of law is unlimited.
Where two offenses contain identical elements but carry different severity level classifications, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only according to the lesser severity level. State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 229, 768 P.2d 268 (1989).
In Frazier, this court concluded that possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine and possession of drug paraphernalia, as proscribed in K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 65-7006(a) and K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3), respectively, are identical offenses despite their variations in terminology:
“Both offenses prohibit the possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine for use in the manufacture of a controlled substance. Ephedrine or pseudoephedrine fall within the definition of drug paraphernalia because they are materials used to manufacture a controlled substance. See K.S.A. 65-4150(c).
“. . . Although the statutes use different language, they require the same requisite criminal intent and, as such, the elements are identical. As a result, we find that possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine and possession of drug paraphernalia are identical offenses.” 30 Kan. App. 2d at 405.
This court vacated Frazier’s sentence and remanded the case with directions to impose a sentence consistent with the penalties for a drug severity level 4 felony.
As we have previously stated, our case, while factually following the Frazier scenario, differs because Wilson is collaterally attacking his sentence by way of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. He could have raised the precise question decided by Frazier on appeal, but he
The State asks us to rely on the rule of State v. Neer, 247 Kan. 137, Syl. ¶ 3, 795 P.2d 362 (1990), that “[a] new constitutional rule of criminal procedure generally will not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.” There are several very limited exceptions to this rule, but the problem with the State’s argument is that we are not here dealing with a “constitutional rule of criminal procedure” and Neer is simply not applicable to our situation.
Wilson recognizes that Frazier represents new case law but contends the only period for which the concept of retroactiveness must be considered is when the statute (K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 65-7006[a]) is being applied to a defendant prior to its original enactment before July 1, 1999. This argument, like the State’s Neer argument referred to above, has no applicability to our situation because Wilson’s criminal acts took place September 1, 1999. On that date, both L. 1999, ch. 170, sec. 12 (K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 65-7006[a]) and L. 1999, ch. 170, sec. 4 (K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 65-4152[a]) were in full force and effect.
An alternative argument that Wilson can make is that his situation is like that in State v. Williams, 250 Kan. 730, 829 P.2d 892 (1992). In Williams, a lesser penalty resulted from a holding that where there is a single act of forcible sexual intercourse and the defendant is related to the victim, the crime which is committed is aggravated incest, K.S.A. 21-3603(1), a class D felony, and not indecent liberties with a child, K.S.A. 21-3503(1)(b), a class C felony. Aggravated incest was deemed to be the more specific crime because of the relationship of the parties. The Williams opinion stated the legislature appeared to reason it was a less serious offense when the victim was related to the defendant than when there was no family relationship.
Based on the Williams holding, a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was filed in Carmichael v. State, 255 Kan. 10, 872 P.2d 240 (1994), contending the district court lacked jurisdiction to convict Carmichael of rapes of his granddaughter. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the rape convictions. 18 Kan. App. 2d 435, 448, 856
The holding of Carmichael can be argued to compel and justify a retroactive application of Frazier in a collateral attack situation. Unfortunately for Wilson, the general versus specific situation in Carmichael is reversed in his case as the language of K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 65-7006(a) is more specific and K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3) is the more general crime.
In addition, K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 65-7006(a) is the later enacted criminal statute; possession of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine is specifically prohibited with intent to use the product to manufacture a controlled substance and the violation level is raised to a severity level 1 felony, indicating a legislative intent to treat Wilson’s activity more harshly. There remains, however, the argument that the two crimes are identical, and under the reasoning of Carmichael and Nunn, only the sentence for the lesser severity level could be entered.
A case that is more compelling to us is the recent decision in Easterwood v. State, 273 Kan. 361, 383, 44 P.3d 1209 (2002), which held that intervening appellate decisions interpreting the felony-murder statute did not apply retroactively to a defendant’s collateral attack on his felony-murder conviction. Also of interest is the decision in Whisler v. State, 272 Kan. 864, 36 P.3d 290 (2001), holding that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) (and our Kansas case of State v. Gould, 271 Kan. 394, 23 P.3d 801 [2001]), do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.
While language of both cases is instructive, we will focus on Easterwood as it relates to the announcement of a new rule of case law while Whisler involved a constitutional rule of criminal procedure. This difference was pointed out in Easterwood, 273 Kan. at 371, which we will not here repeat.
In Easterwood, the defendant pled guilty to felony murder following the death of a co-felon by a law enforcement officer. There was a favorable plea agreement. Easterwood did not appeal. Sev
On appeal, Easterwood challenged his felony-murder conviction and argued that it should be set aside or his guilty plea withdrawn. Easterwood contended that the Sophophone and Murphy decisions should be applied retroactively to allow him to attack his conviction on collateral review based on the United States Supreme Court decision in Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828, 118 S. Ct. 1604 (1998).
We will not here repeat Easterwood's detailed discussions of Bousley and Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 148 L. Ed. 2d 629, 121 S. Ct. 712 (2001), 273 Kan. at 373-79, which concluded state courts were under no constitutional obligation to apply their criminal decisions retroactively and federal decisions did not compel that Easterwood’s contentions be followed. The Easterwood decision also pointed out that State v. Neer, 247 Kan. 137, involved a constitutional rule of criminal procedure and not a rule of substantive law. 273 Kan. at 380.
Ultimately, Easterwood relied on the fact he had received a favorable plea agreement, he had been told by counsel that felony murder might not fit his situation, and he elected not to gamble on the outcome of a trial and appeal. The court stated: 'We will not now retroactively decide that his plea is void because of a later favorable ruling on the precise issue he voluntarily declined to challenge.” 273 Kan. at 383.
There are significant similarities between the Easterwood decision and Wilson’s case. There is also one significant difference.
Wilson, like Easterwood, received a favorable plea agreement. In exchange for his pleas of no contest, the State dismissed nine counts in the three cases he pled to and completely dismissed two other cases. In addition, the sentences were imposed concurrently.
We decline, under the facts presented to us in this case, to rule that Frazier must be applied retroactively. To do so would give Wilson a double benefit, a favorable plea agreement and then the benefit of an issue he initially failed to raise on appeal. Carmichael, 255 Kan. 10, is not applicable for the reasons previously set forth.
The trial court is affirmed.