Walter Schmuck v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 22, 2016
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Suprrittr Court d ritfWir
2015-SC-000511-MR LI LI 1
WALTER SCHMUCK
BAT El°1 ► 3N0 W..
APPEtrANT
be
ON APPEAL FROM GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE BRUCE T. BUTLER, JUDGE
NO. 14-CR-00113
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING, VACATING AND REMANDING
A Grayson Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant, Walter Schmuck, of
manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of synthetic drugs, and
possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty
years' imprisonment. Schmuck appeals to this Court as a matter of right,
pursuant to §110(2)(b) of the Constitution of this Commonwealth. On appeal,
Schmuck argues the trial court erred by: 1) denying his motion for a limited
waiver of counsel without conducting the hearing required by Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); 2) denying his motion to suppress evidence; 3)
admitting a photograph into evidence that showed him handcuffed; 4) allowing
evidence of a prior conviction during the penalty phase; and 5) denying his
motion for a mistrial.
I. BACKGROUND
Leitchfield Police received complaints about high traffic volume and
unusual activity at David Hicks's home. A confidential informant told police
David Hicks sold hydrocodone and morphine pills from the home. The
informant also told police David Hicks used methamphetamine and David's
nephew, Rickey Hicks, made methamphetamine "inside of a shed outside of the
residence." Police accessed the pseudoephedrine log (required for all
pharmacies selling the drug, pursuant to KRS 218A.1446) and discovered the
names of five people who used David Hicks's address when purchasing over-
the-counter medication often used in manufacturing methamphetamine.
Schmuck's name did not appear in the pseudoephedrine log when police
queried David Hicks's address. Police then sought a search warrant. The
supporting affidavit—and the search warrant the court subsequently issued—
specifically named the five individuals who purchased pseudoephedrine using
David Hicks's address. Schmuck's name did not appear in the search warrant,
nor its supporting affidavit.
Schmuck stated that he had been staying at David Hicks's home for six
to eight weeks when police executed the search warrant. When police arrived,
they found Schmuck on the carport of the home. In addition to searching the
individuals specifically named in the warrant, police searched Schmuck, his
pockets, the room in which he claimed to be staying, along with dresser
drawers and a zipped nylon bag found in that room. Police then arrested
Schmuck.
2
One month prior to trial, Schmuck filed a pro se motion seeking a limited
waiver of his right to counsel. In it, he asked the trial court to conduct a
Faretta hearing to determine whether he knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily sought the waiver. In the motion, he cited language indicating that
failure to conduct a Faretta hearing results in an automatic reversal of any
convictions. Furthermore, he asked for the hearing in order to specify the
scope of representation of his court-appointed counsel. Ultimately concluding
Schmuck was merely unhappy with his court appointed counsel, the trial court
summarily denied Schmuck's motion without conducting the Faretta hearing.
A jury subsequently convicted Schmuck of manufacturing methamphetamine,
possession of synthetic drugs, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Faretta Hearing
Schmuck first argues that the trial court committed structural error
requiring reversal by denying his timely and unequivocal motion for a limited
waiver of counsel without conducting a Faretta hearing. For the following
reasons, we agree.
The United States Supreme Court set out the requirements for an
accused to represent himself at trial in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. "In order to
represent himself, the accused must 'knowingly and intelligently' forgo those
relinquished benefits . . . . Although a defendant need not himself have the
skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose
self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and
3
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Id. (emphasis
added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution also addresses this issue,
stating: In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to be heard by
himself and counsel . . . ." Our predecessor Court concluded this means "an
accused may make a limited waiver of counsel, specifying the extent of services
he desires, and he then is entitled to counsel whose duty will be confined to
rendering the specified kind of services (within, of course, the normal scope of
counsel services)." Wake v. Barker, 514 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Ky. 1974). "A trial
court error the end result of which is to deny a defendant the right to hybrid
representation amounts to structural error." Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 423
S.W.3d 152, 162 (Ky. 2014). Furthermore, "'structural defects in the
constitution of the trial mechanism' require automatic reversal." Hill v.
Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 229 (Ky. 2004) holding modified on other
grounds by Depp v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.3d 615 (Ky. 2009) (citing Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 280 (1991)).
In order for a criminal defendant to make a full or limited waiver of the
right to counsel, we have said, "the request must be: (1) timely; (2) unequivocal;
and (3) knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." King v. Commonwealth, 374
S.W.3d 281, 290 (Ky. 2012). In short, a defendant must make a timely and
unequivocal request before the trial court can determine, in a Faretta hearing,
whether the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at 291.
4
A request is timely if made prior to the beginning of meaningful trial
proceedings, e.g., before jury selection or before empaneling a jury. Id.
("Although Appellant's request was made the day before trial . . . . we conclude
that Appellant's request was timely.") Here, Schmuck requested a limited
waiver of his right to counsel a full month prior to the start of trial. Therefore,
we hold that Schmuck's request was timely.
Next, a defendant's request must be unequivocal, or "sufficiently clear
and unambiguous that no reasonable person can say that the request was not
made." Commonwealth v. Martin, 410 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Ky. 2013) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). In this case, Schmuck filed a hand-
written motion requesting to make a limited waiver of counsel, citing § 11 of
the Kentucky Constitution. Not only was the motion clear, it was specific.
Schmuck even went so far in his motion to request that the court conduct a
Faretta hearing in order to determine whether his request "is being made
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily." When the trial court orally
questioned him, Schmuck never wavered in his request, and he never withdrew
his motion. Moreover, Schmuck correctly informed the trial court of the
findings required in a Faretta hearing. In fact, Schmuck orally reiterated his
desire to act as co-counsel with his court-appointed attorney, saying that he
wanted the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, if necessary, and to file
motions. Given these facts, we hold that Schmuck unequivocally requested a
limited waiver of his right to counsel.
We have held that a timely and unequivocal request is a condition
precedent to a Faretta hearing—not a requirement demanded at the hearing.
King, 374 S.W.3d at 291. And that the reason a defendant desires to represent
himself is not a material factor in deciding whether to conduct a Faretta
hearing.' King, 374 S.W.3d at 292 ("Appellant's desire to represent himself
may have been derived from frustration with appointed counsel, but that is
irrelevant . . . ."). Having held that Schmuck's request was both timely and
unequivocal, we now address the consequences of the trial court's failure to
conduct a Faretta hearing.
When a defendant timely and unequivocally requests to make a full or
partial waiver of the right to counsel, the trial court must conduct a Faretta
hearing. King, 374 S.W.3d at 291 (internal brackets omitted) ("[A] request to
proceed pro se or with hybrid representation—in other words, to make either a
full or a limited waiver of his right to counsel—under our precedent, a Faretta
hearing is required.") This is because it is within the confines of the Faretta
hearing that the trial court addresses "whether waiving the right to counsel [is]
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Id. Therefore, if a trial court fails to
conduct a Faretta hearing after a timely and unequivocal request, the trial
court commits structural error that requires the reversal of any corresponding
convictions. See Mitchell, 423 S.W.3d at 162; Hill, 125 S.W.3d at 229.
1 This stands true whether the defendant wishes to proceed pro se or with
hybrid counsel.
6
In the case at bar, just as in King, "the trial court asserted its opinion
that Appellant didn't really want to represent himself, but instead that he
wanted to be represented by someone other than appointed counsel." King,
374 S.W.3d at 294. Like the appellant in King, Schmuck's unhappiness with
his appointed counsel may well have formed the basis for his desire to act as
co-counsel. Also like the appellant in King, Schmuck never withdrew his
motion.
Despite Schmuck's timely and unequivocal request for a limited waiver of
his right to counsel, the trial court summarily denied the motion without
conducting a Faretta hearing. The trial court erroneously stated that the
defense could have but one "driver in the car." Therefore, we hold the trial
court committed structural error by denying Schmuck's motion for a limited
waiver of his right to counsel without conducting a Faretta hearing. Mitchell,
423 S.W.3d at 162. Because structural error requires automatic reversal, Hill,
125 S.W.3d at 229, we reverse Schmuck's convictions; vacate the
corresponding sentences of imprisonment, and remand this matter to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Having reversed and remanded on these grounds, we need only address
the remaining issues likely to recur on remand in order to give guidance to the
trial court.
B. Suppression Motion
Schmuck next argues the trial court erred by failing to suppress the
evidence against him. Schmuck asserts suppression was necessary because
police violated his right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The text
of the Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
On remand, the trial court must conduct a three-step analysis in
determining whether to suppress the evidence found on Schmuck's person, in
the dresser drawers, and in the nylon bag. The trial court must determine: 1)
whether Schmuck had a reasonable expectation a of privacy; 2) whether the
scope of the warrant particularly covered Schmuck's person, his room, and his
effects; and 3) whether the supporting affidavit contained sufficient probable
cause, particularized as to Schmuck, for a valid search warrant to issue.
The Commonwealth erroneously argues that Schmuck lacks standing to
assert an expectation of privacy. Nearly forty years ago, the Supreme Court of
the United States rejected using the standing doctrine to analyze whether a
defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy. Minnesota v. Carter, 525
U.S. 83, 87 (1998) ("The Minnesota courts analyzed whether respondents had a
legitimate expectation of privacy under the rubric of 'standing' doctrine, an
analysis that this Court expressly rejected 20 years ago in Rakas [v. Illinois],
439 U.S. [128,] 139-140 [(1978)].") The Supreme Court said that defining
Fourth Amendment rights fell more within the purview of substantive Fourth
Amendment law than under that of standing. Carter, 525 U.S. at 88.
8
Furthermore, the Court reiterated its holding that in order to claim the
protections of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. The United States Supreme Court held,
the "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not
upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who
claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the invaded place." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. When ascertaining the scope of
the Fourth Amendment's protection, "arcane distinctions developed in property
and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to
control." Id. Moreover, the extent "to which the Fourth Amendment protects
people may depend upon where those people are. We have held that capacity
to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether
the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place." 2 Carter, 525 U.S. at 88 (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted.)
The first part of the analysis requires the trial court to determine whether
Schmuck had a_reasonable expectation of privacy in the invaded place. The
United States Supreme Court recognizes that "a person can have a legally
sufficient interest in a place other than his own home so that the Fourth
2 We recognize that while, "property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth
Amendment violations, [one's reasonable expectation of privacy] . . . [does] not snuff
out the previously recognized protection for property." United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 951 (2012) (internal brackets, citations, and quotation marks omitted).
9
Amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that
place." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142. In fact, "an overnight guest in a home may
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present
with the consent of the householder may not." Carter, 525 U.S. at 90. In
determining that the individuals complaining of the search fit into the latter
category, the Court looked to "the purely commercial nature of the transaction
.. , the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of any
previous connection between respondents and the householder. . . ." Carter,
525 U.S. at 91. Without the expectation of privacy of an overnight guest, the
Court held that the search in question did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
With these guidelines in mind, on remand, the trial court must determine
whether Schmuck possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy as an
overnight guest, or whether he was merely on the premises with the permission
of the householder.
Next, if the trial court determines that Schmuck had a reasonable
expectation of privacy as an overnight guest, the court must then determine
whether the scope 3 of the search warrant extends particularly to cover
3 Two opinions of our predecessor Court may prove useful in determining the
validity of the scope of the search warrant. In Nestor v. Commonwealth, the Court
said:
The mere fact that his premises were under the same roof and in the
same building as other premises under the control of [the property
owner] did not bring them within the terms of the warrant, and, there
being no description of any character of appellant's premises or person,
the officers were not authorized under the circumstances to enter or
search his premises." 202 Ky. 748, 261 S.W. 270, 270 - 71 (1924).
Further, in Williams v. Commonwealth, our"predecessor Court stated:
10
Schmuck's person, his room, and his effects—specifically, the nylon bag police
opened and searched. The court must consider whether the nylon bag is
Schmuck's personal effect to the extent contemplated in the Fourth
Amendment. In so doing, the trial court should consider the Supreme Court's
analysis in Ybarra v. Illinois, in which the Court stated, lallthough the search
warrant, issued upon probable cause, gave the officers authority to search the
premises and to search [the individual named in the warrant], it gave them no
authority whatever to invade the constitutional protections possessed
individually by the tavern's customers." 444 U.S. 85, 92 (1979). The Ybarra
Court also acknowledged that "general" or "open-ended warrants" are
constitutionally prohibited. 4 Id. at 109, n.4.
Finally, if the trial court determines that the nylon bag, Schmuck's room,
or Schmuck's person fall within the scope of the search warrant, the final step
[W]e are presented with the question of whether the search warrant in
this case is a defective 'blanket' warrant because of its failure to contain
a reasonably specific description of the objective of search. The law
applicable to this case appears to be properly summarized . . . where it is
said: Where a warrant describes premises in which different persons
occupy different parts, and fails to name the accused or occupant or to
designate a certain part of the premises, it is defective as a blanket
search warrant. 261 S.W.2d 416, 417 (Ky. 1953).
4 However, the Court went on to say:
It follows that a warrant to search a place cannot normally be construed
to authorize a search of each individual in that place. The warrant for
the Aurora Tap Tavern provided no basis for departing from this general
rule. Consequently, we need not consider situations where the warrant
itself authorizes the search of unnamed persons in a place and is
supported by probable cause to believe that persons who will be in the
place at the time of the search will be in possession of illegal drugs.
Id.
11
requires the trial court to determine whether the affidavit contained sufficient
probable cause, particularized as to Schmuck, for a valid search warrant to
issue. In Ybarra, "the police possessed a warrant based on probable cause to
search the tavern in which Ybarra happened to be at the time the warrant was
executed." Id. at 91. In that case, the Supreme Court said, "a person's mere
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not,
without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Where the
standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported
by probable cause particularized with respect to that person." Id. (internal
citations omitted). The Court went on to say, "jt]his requirement cannot be
undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there
exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises
where the person may happen to be." Id. Unless the trial court determines
that the supporting affidavit contains sufficient probable cause, particularized
as to Schmuck, for a valid search warrant to issue, the trial court must
suppress the evidence of which Schmuck complains.
C. Introduction of Judgment from Prior Conviction in Penalty Phase
Schmuck also contends the trial court erred during the penalty phase of
trial by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce a judgment from an Indiana
court relating to a previous conviction for child molestation. Schmuck did not
object to the court entering the judgment as evidence for the jury's
consideration. On appeal; however, he contends the judgment contained
prejudicial information, specifically "aggravating factors" the trial court
12
considered when imposing judgment. Among the aggravating factors the
Indiana court listed was the fact that Schmuck committed that offense while on
probation and had a history of criminal behavior. The Commonwealth
introduced and the trial court admitted evidence this Court specifically rejected
in Mullikan v. Commonwealth. In that decision, we said:
[W]e hold today that the evidence of prior convictions is limited to
conveying to the jury the elements of the crimes previously
committed. We suggest this be done either by a reading of the
instruction of such crime from an acceptable form book or directly
from the Kentucky Revised Statute itself. Said recitation for the
jury's benefit, we feel, is best left to the judge. The description of
the elements of the prior offense may need to be customized to fit
the particulars of the crime, i.e., the burglary was of a building as
opposed to a dwelling. The trial court should avoid identifiers,
such as naming of victims, which might trigger memories of jurors
who may—especially in rural areas—have prior knowledge about
the crimes.
Mullikan v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.3d 99, 109 (Ky. 2011)
As we stated definitively in Mullikan and reiterated in Webb v. Commonwealth,
when introducing evidence of prior convictions during the penalty phase, "the
first and preferred method . . . is for the judge to recite the elements of the
prior crimes to the jury." 387 S.W.3d 319, 330 (Ky. 2012). Trial courts risk
reversal by deviating from these admonitions. Thus, on remand, the trial court
should follow our precedent.
D. Photograph
Finally, Schmuck contends the trial court erred by allowing the
admission of a photograph showing him handcuffed outside David Hicks's
residence. We agree with Schmuck that a generally accepted principle of
Kentucky law forbids the jury from seeing the defendant handcuffed. RCr.
13
8.28(5). We see no meaningful difference between showing a photo of the
defendant in handcuffs and the defendant appearing handcuffed at trial.
Nonetheless, in limited circumstances, we have held that a photograph
showing the defendant in handcuffs was not reversible error. Estep v.
Commonwealth, 663 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Ky. 1983). However, determining an
alleged error does not result in reversible error differs significantly from
whether the trial court in fact erred. On remand, we strongly caution the trial
court against admitting photographs showing Schmuck handcuffed without
utilizing the KRE 403 balancing test.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Schmuck's convictions, vacate his
corresponding sentences, and remand this matter to the Grayson Circuit Court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
All sitting. Hughes, Noble, Venters, and Wright, JJ., concur. Minton,
C.J., Cunningham, and Keller, JJ., concur in result only.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Molly Mattingly, Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Andy Beshear, Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower, Assistant Attorney General