Brown-Forman Corporation v. George Miller

RENDERED: SEPTEM~ER·28, 2017
TO BE PUBLISHED
~uprttttt 551 S.W.2d
80 l; 803 (Ky. 1977). "In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the pleadings should .
be liberally_construed in-the light most favorable t_o the plaintiff, all allegations
I •
being taken as true." Morgan v. Bird, 289 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Ky. App. 2009).
"This exacting standard of review eliminates. any need by the trial court to
make findings of fact; 'rather, the question.is purely a matter of_law. Stated
another way, the court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be
proved, would the plaintiff be entitled tO relief?m Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1,
3
7 (Ky. 2010) ( uoting James v. Wilsqn~ 95 S.W.3d 875, 884 (Ky. App. 2002)).
· Appellate cou ts review· questions of law such as this d~ nova, affording no
· deference to t e trial Gourt. Id. at 7.
In. conducting this de nova review, we must decide two separate, but
. ~ .
~elated, .legal questions.
.
First,.
. we must determine whether the Clean Air Act
'
preempts· Miller's state law tort claims seeking damages. Then, we must
determine whether a trial court may issue a.n injunction such as the one :Mmer
sought.
III. ANALYSIS
·A. Clean Air Act
We will first look to the federal act on which this litigation hinges. In
. pa~sing the .Clean Air Act, Congress delegated its implementation and
administration to the federal Environmental-Protection Agency (EPA). However,
Congress also specifically designated a role for states.
Under the Act; each ~tate may adopt a State Implementation Plan setting
·out emission limitations, emission standards, and other requirements to meet
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards established by th~·EPA. 42 U.S.C.
~ 7410. States submh th,eir: individual plans to ~e EPA Administrator for
approval. 42 U.S.C: §.7410(a)(l) .. The Act sets out the contents arid the
authority states must possess. before the Administrator may approve a State
Plan. 42 U.S.C. ~§ 7410(a)(l).:(2) ..
. After significant amendments
. . . to the Clean Air
. Act in 1990, Congress
· allowed the Administrator to_ authorize state ~-d· local governments (called
·permitp.ng authorities) to issue operating perrriits. 42 U.S.C.,§ 76.61. The Act
4
defines ~e requisite legal authority eac.h permitting authority· must possess,
prescribes the process for judicial review of permitting decisions, and allows
·the EPA to promulgate other requirements .. 42 U.S.C. § 766la(b). Once a
permitting authority's plan satisfies those requirements, then the
Administrator may authorize it to issue permits under the Act.
·In Jefferson County, the Administrator specifically authorized the
Louisville Metro Air Pollution Control District (Metro District)· to issue operating
permits. 40 C.F.R. § 70, App. A-Kentucky. The Administrator also approved
Kentucky's State Plan, which includes Metro District's :i;-egulations. 40 C.F.R. §
52. 923. Brown-Forman and Heaven Hill both maintain permits, and Miller
does not allege. either distiller is in violation of its operating permit; therefore,
we proceed under the premise that the companies are in full compliance with
the requ1site permits mandated by the Act.
l. Federal Preemption
"The Supremacy Clause makes the laws of the United States 'the
supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
.State to the Contrary notwithstanding. m, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mlctg., 136 S .
. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016) (quoting U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). The Supremacy
/
Clause binds this Court and requires th8;t we give precedence to lawful federal
enactments over the laws of the Commonwealth. "[T]he states have no power,
;.
by taxation· or otherivise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner c9ntrol,
the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into
execution the. powers vested in the general government." M'Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819) (emphasis.added). "Put simply, federal law
preempts contrary state law." Hughes, 136 s: Ct. at 1297. State law is
5
contrary "to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute." Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). Notably, this occurs "where,
under the circumstances of a particular case, the challenged state law stands
as an obstacle
.
to the accomplishment
~ .
and execution of the full purposes .and
objectives of Congress~" Hughes, 136 S. Ct . .at 1297 (citing Crosby, 530.U,R at
373). Chief Justice John Marshall recognized nearly two centuries ago that "[i]t
. . .
is of the very ~ssence of supremacy, to remove all obstacles to its action within
its own sphere, and .so to modify every power_ vested in. subordinate
governments; as tO exempt its own operations-.from their own influence."
M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 427.
With that in n:iind, we turn back to the federal Clean Air A~t,-which seeks .
. .
to strike a balance between encouraging economic development and protecting
the environment-a task here entrusted to both the Metro District ~d EPA.-
Specifically, in taking a cost-benefit approach, the Act directs.the
Administrator to "consider all of the economic, public health, and .
environmental benefits of efforts to comply withJsuch standard," 42 U.S.C. §
7612(b), as well as "the effects of such standard on employment, -productivity,
cost of. living, economic
• .
growth, and the overall economy," 42 u.s.c. § 7612(c)
.
.
After this careful balancing was taken into ·account, Brown-Forman and
·Heaven Hill were issued separate kinds of permits based on the. amount of air
. pollutants each releases. Brown-Forman operates under a Title V permit,
which is required for. sta:tionary so~rces emltting 100 t~n.s per year or more of
any non-fugitive.air pollutant. See U.S.C. §§ 7661 et seq.; 40 C.F.'R. § 70;
· Metro Dist. Regulation 2.16. Since Heaven Hill emits less than 100 tons of
non-fugitive air pollutants per year, it holds a Federal Enforceable District
6
Origin Operating Permit. See Metro Dist. Regulation 2.-17. Because no party
·argues ~thetwise, we make no distinction in our analysis between the two types
. of permits ..
·2. Saui.ngs Clauses .
. In determining whether the Act preempts any or all of Miller's claims,
we must construe the Act as a whole and give effect to two separate savings
clauses. · These savings clauses allow states to retain power in spite of the Act's
other provisions. In these clauses, Congre&s declared that certain types of
c~nflicts bet~e.en the Act and state law that might othernise be pr~empted
should, instead, be tolerated.
Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 reserves to the states the power to adopt
and ·enforce more stringent staridard.s thah those established by' the Act. That
clause reads:
[N]othing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right .of
any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce
·( 1) any ~tandard ·or limitation respecting emissions of air
pollutants or (2) any requirement .respecting control or·
abatement of air pollution; except that if an emission
. standard or limitation is in effect under an applicable
.
·implementation pl~ or under section 7411 or section 7412
of this title, such State or political subdivision may not adopt ·
or enforce any ~mission standard or limitation which· is less·
. stringentthan the standard or limitation under such plan or
section.
Id.
The second savings clause appears in 42 U.S.C. §7_604 and. grants
· individuals the power to commence citizen s~its ·.to enforce the Act. While we
acknowledge that·Miller did not bring a citfaen suit, §7604 also covers other
actions._ In particular, the subsection titled "Nonrestriction. of other rights" (as
in, rights. other than citizen s1:1its) states: "Nothing in this section shall restpct .-
·7
·any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or
. common law to seek enforcement of any emission standard or lim'.itation or to
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State
agency)." 42 u.s.c. § 7604(e).
B. State Tort Claims
Again, this case is before us on the trial court's ord~r to dismiss ·Miller's.
case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. At the tri8.l
court, Miller sought damages under state tort theories of negligence,. trespass,
and nuisance. In granting Brown-Forman's motion, the trial court determined
all claims were p:r:eempted py the ·clean Air Act. Our holding on this issue is
limited to whether-.as a matter of law-the action can proceed despite Brown-
Forrnan's preemption argument. We pass no judgment on the merits of Miller's
tort actions.
. .
. To ascertain the Act's preemptive effect on Miller's state tort claims, we
find a recent Sixth Circuit case persuas.iv~. In Merrick v. Diageo Americas
Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685, 686 (6th Cir. 2015), the Sixth Circuit concluded
that the Clean Air Act does· not preempt common law claims· brought against
an emitter based on the law of the ~tate in which the em~tter operates. The
same individual, Merrick, brought both the case considered by the SiXth
Circuit and the case underlying the present action (though he has since been
dismissed as a party herein); In the Sixth Circuit case, Merrick brought a
_similar putative class action against Diageo Americas Supply, Inc: Id. at 686.
There, the plaintiffs alleged that in the course of Diageo's distilling and aging
whiskey at its Louisville facility, large amounts of ethanol are emitted. Just as
. .
in the present case, the plaintiffs alleged those emissions waft onto nearby ~eal
.8
and personal propertY where; when combined with condensation, create
whiskey fungus. Id. TJ:ie pla~ntiffs in Merrick alleged this whiskey fungus
.
constituted a substantial annoyanc~ and an unreasonable interfe~ence with the .
.
use and enjoyment·of their property. Id. at 687.
In Merrick, the class action pl8.int1ffs sought compensatory and punitive
damages for negligence, nuisance, and trespass, along with an injl:lnction
requjdng Diageo to abate its ethanol emissions through implementing certain .
control technology at the facilities. Id. at 698. In responding to the suit,
Diageo argued that all of the plaintiffs' claims we·re pree:m,pted by the Clean Air
Act. Id. The district court dismissed the negligence claim, finding the plaintiffs
had not pled sufficient facts to establish they were owed a duty of care that was
breached, but otherwise the lower court allowed the state la~ claims to
proceed.· Id. Subs~quently, Diageo sought interlocutory review by th~ Sixth
Circuit. Id. at 690.
First, the Sixth Circuit conciuded that the states' rights savings clause of
the Clean Air Act expr~ssly preserved the state common law standards .under
which the plaintiffs had sued. Id. The Sixth·Circuit determine_d that "[s]tate
courts are arms of the 'State, m and that the phrase ."any requirement,"
employed in the states' rig?ts savings clause, dearly covered common law
standardi;; ·adopted by those state courts. Id.
Second, beyond the savings clause ofthe Clean Air Act, the Sixth Circuit
observed that permitting states to apply their commId. at 691. further, the Sixth Circuit noted
· that the legislative history of the Clean Air Act made clear that Congress did
9
not in.tend to pr_eempt state common law claims, like those raised by the
Plaintiffs. Id. Specifically, the Report of the Senate Committee on Public
Works reflects that the "citizen suits" provision of the Clean Air Act, "would
specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if
damages could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance .
with standards under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action
for pollution damages.". Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 91-1196 .at 38 (1970)).
Looking beyond the text and history of the Act,. the S!xth Circuit.noted
that Supreme Court precedent regarding the Clean Water Act was persuasive
authority since the Clean Water Act was modeled·ori the Clean Air Act and "the
two acts are often 'in pari materia."' Id. at 692. In Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the nearly identical states'.
rights savings clause in the Clean Water Act specifically preserired common law
claims brought by aggrieved individuals against "sources" _of water pollutio!l in
their own state (as opposed.to out-of-state sources). As the Sixth Circuit
appropriately found, "[t]he Ouellette Court's interpretation of the Clean Water
A.crs states' rights savings clause fo preserve claims .ba.sed on the law of the
source state leads directly to the conclusion that the analogous states' rights
savings Clause .in the Clean Air Act similarly preserves claims based on the law
of the source state." Id. at 692.
The conclusion that the Clean Air Act does not preempt state common
law claims also finds support, as the Sixth Circ~it noted,· jn the Third Circuit's
decision in Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 192-93 (3d ~ir.
2013), and the Supreme· Court of Iowa's decision in Freeman v. Grain
Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 80 (Iowa 2014). Id, In North Carolina ex rel.
10
Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 61SF.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010), the Fou~th
. Circuit Court of Appeals found preemp~ion of state law claims-but under
·markedly different circumstances, i.e., where North Carolina brought claims
under North Carolina law against companies located in Alabama and
Tennessee. Noting that the result in that case was due to issues of federalis~
and the Supreme Court's holding in Ou~llette, the Sixth Circuit noted that the
Cooper resuJt was actually consistent with Bell and Freeman. · Id. Indeeq, the
Sixth Circuit explained that "[a]ll three courts distinguished between claims
. '
based on the common law of the source state-which are not preempted by the · ·
Clean Air Act-and claims based on the common law of a non-source
state-which are preempted by the Clean Air Act." Id. at 69.3.
Finally, the Merrick Court noted there is a ·strong presumption against
federal pr(!!emption of state law, "one that operates with special force in cases in
which Congress has legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied~" Id. at 694 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) .
.Given that states.have traditionally occupied the field of environmental
regulation, the Sixth Circuit. opined that even. witho~t the Clean Air Act's
states' rights savings clause, state common law claims would likely be
preserved under "prin~iples of federalism and respect for states' rights." Id.
In sum, the text of the Clean Air Act and its legislative history, Supreme
Court precedent construing the virtually ide.ntical provisions of the Clean Water
. • I
. .
Act, persuasive opinions from other federal courts and a state court, and the
strong presumption against preemption in the field of environmental
. .
.regulation, all led to the Sixth Circuit's rejection of preemption .arguments by
11
Diageo. We agree and adopt the Sixth Circuit's analysis as to this issue .. Thus,
we affirm the Court of Appeals insofar as it held that the Clean Afr Act did not
preempt Wilson's state tort causes of action.
3. Monetary· Damages
We further hold that the Act does not preempt a trial court from·
awarding monetary damages on state tort causes of action. Awarding damages
for a particular harm tospecifiG property in no way "retard[s], impede[s],
burden[s], or in any manner control[s], the operations" of the .Act. M'Culloch,
17 U.S. at 436. Nor does it "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and .
execution of the fu11 purposes and objectives of Congress." Hughes, 136 S. Ct.
at 1297.
An award of monetary ciamages to an aggrieved party fundamentally
differs from supplanting a permitting decision of an expert agency. This is
primarily s~ because "the [Act] _does not provide damage remedies to han;ned
individuals:" Freeman, 848 N.W.2d at 69. Monetary damages also withstand
~
scrutiny·in part because "'personalized' remedies are not a first priority of the
Act." Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461, 477 (6th Cir. 2004).
To be sure, the Supreme Court in American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticitt, 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011), held that a public nuisance claim was
preempted because the Act displaced federal common law. But in doing so, the
Court made clear that its analysis of federal c~mmon law differed from that of
state law. Specifically, it stated: ·"Legislative displacement of federal common
law does not require the same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest
congressional purpose demanded for preemption of state law." Id. at 423
(quotation J:I!arks and brackets omitted). ·
. 12
. /
Furthermore,· that case rests upon the premise that under the Act, the
duty to prevent and abate public nui_sances is vested in the EPA and permitting
. .
authorities .. The regU.lato:ry regime created by the Act supplants feder~ public
' .
nuisance _claims because the Act incorporates those same types of protections
against generalized harm. 2 However, the
' .
case
.
at. bar differs from American
/3lectric Power. The nuisance at issue here is a private nuisance claim under
state tort law, rather than a public nuisance claim under federal common law.
· . (It is·.a claim
.
from
. damages
.
caused by specific harm.to specific•property
. .- .
rather
·than general harm,) ·Jn Bell, 734 F.3d at 192-93~ the Third Circuit
distinguished private nuisance
. . . .
state tort actions
.
and determined that the Act
did not preempt the plaintiffs p~ivate nuisance and 'tr~spass claims seeking
·.monetary damages:
· The .Act does not provide El. mechanism for awarding monetary
compensatio"n to an injured party suffering from a particul~ed hatm. "Thus,
a property owner seeking full compensation for harm related to the use and
·enjoyment ~f property at a specific location must resort to common law or state
faw theories to obtain a full recovery."· Freeman; 848 N.W.2d at 70.
We agree with the Iowa Supreme Court that "state commo_n. law and
nuisance.actions have_ a different purpose than the regulatory regime
.2. Iii 42 U.S.C. § 7602, Congress declared 1;hat "{a]ll language referring to effects
on welfare includes ... : ·. damage to and deterioration of property." . While· we
ackriowledge.that several proVisions in the Act refer to welfare, and by extension to
damage and deterioration of property, we read this to apply generally to .all property to
·the extent protected by th~ duty imposed under a theory ofpublic nuisance. We do
not read this to protect discrete private property to the same extent as the duty
imposed under a theory of private nuisance because the Act also requires· the
balancing of inter~sts, of which preventing.damage_and deterioration of property is but
one.
. 13
established by the [Act]. The.purpose 9f.state nuisance and common law
actions is to protecLthe use and enjoyment of specific propez:fy, not to achieve
a general regulatory purpose." Id.. at 84. _Like the plaintiffs .iri Freeman, Miller
here "seek[s] damages related ·ta specific properties at specific locations
allegedly caused by a specific source." Id. at 85. The purpose and function of
the Act differs sufficiently from the purpose ~d function of "a private lawsuit
seeking. damages anchored in owner~hip of real p~operty," id., to avoid issues of
conflict preemption.
The Act does not state that Congress intended to prevent injured
property owners suffering particularized harm from recovering monetary
. .
damages un~er state law. Absent such language or a vividly demonstrable
obstacle to the Act's operation, we cannot conclude it preempts state trial
courts from awarding monetary damages in tort actions fo.r negligence, private
nuisance," or trespass.
As no,ted above, the specifics of Miller's state tort claims are not currently
' .
before this Court. Whether· those causes of actio_n ultimately succeed is a
matter .to be determined at.trial. We hold only. that the Act does not preempt
Miller's state law tort claims seeking damages and remand this matter to the
trial court for further proceedings.
C. Injunction
The injunction Miller sought from the trial court would have requfred
Brown-Forman to implement pollution-control technology pot required by its
permit issued under the Clean Air Act. We must first determine if the Act
. preempts this type of injunctive relief.· In doing so, we must construe the Act
as a whole because "[c]ourts have a duty to construe statutes, not isolated .
14
·provisions." Graham.Cty;
.
Soil&
.
Water Conservation
. ..
Dist.
.' v.. United
.
.
States ex
rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 290 (2010} (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted}. This means
. we cannot read a section quarantined
.
from the,
.
Act's
overalJ.context .. We will first turn to th.e second of the Act's savings clauses _(the
citizen-suit clause discussed above) to determine if the Act saved,the powers in
..
question for the states.
In construing the citizen-suit provision. of the Clean Water Act in City of
·Milwaukee v. Rlinois, the Supreme Coutt said:
Subsection 505(e) is virtually identical to subsections in the
citizen-suit provisions of several environment.al statutes. The ·
subsection is common language accompanying citizen-suit .
·Prc;>visions and we think t.hat it means only that the provision of
such suit does not revoke other remedies. It most assuredly
cannot be read to mean that the Act as a whole does not supplant
formerly available federal common-law actions but only that the
particular section authorizing citizen suits does ·not do so.
451 U.S. 304, 328-29 (1981) (footnote omitted). We acknowledge· that, in that
case, the Supreme Court was int~rpreting the citizen-suit provi'sion of the
. ..
Clean Water Act,_not the Cleari AitAct. In doing so, however, the Court
specifically cited the "virtually identical" citizen-suit provision appearing in the
Clean Air Act.
. .
We adopt the Supreme Court's reasoning interpreting the Clean Water'
. Act as applying with equal force to the Clean Air Act.. First, Congress's creation
of the citizep. suit as a statutory remedy.does not lirnit rem~dies otherwis~
available. Nothing in the section authorizing cit~zen suits, 42_ U.S.C. § 7604,
revokes other available remedie~, including injunctive relief linked to state tort
law. In other words, Congress did hot intend cjtizen suits to be an exclusive·
remedy. Therefore, the Clean Air_ Act does not preempt state injunctive relief.
15
Howeve~, ev~n though injunctive re~ief is not preempted by the A~t, it is
still unavailable in this case. The Act and Kentucky regulations provide for
citizen input in the permitting process. The permit is issued only after careful
balancing of the economic and environmental ii:npact. So long as compani':!s ·
operate within the bounds of their permits conGerning air pollutants (which is
.not contested in the case at bar), injunctive relief for an alleged. nuisance is not
an appropriate remedy.3 Here, by seeking an injunction demanding a ·
particular pollution-control technology, Miller asked the trial court to second-
guess the reasonableness of a decision the Act undeniably entrusted to Metro.
District and the
. .
EPA. As. previously noted, the
. Act directs the EPA
Administrator to "consider all of the economic~ public l).ealth, and
environmental benefits of efforts to comply with such standard," 42 U.S.C. §
7612(b), as well as. "the effects of such standard on employment, productivity,
.
cost of living, economic growth, and the overall economy," 42 U.S.C. § 7612(c).
Jn making the decision to issue the permits, dtizens have the opporhinity for
input.. The agency made a specific determination which balanced the risks to ·
the environment with the economic impact of any pollution-control measures.
For th~ trial court to issue the injunction Miller seeks ~ould impose. higher
standards than the Clean Air Act requires~
Furthermore; while the Act's states' rights savings clause, 42 U.S.C. §
7416, specifically reserves to·the states the power to adopt and enforce more
a Our holding is limited to injunctive relief in nuisance cases where the
regulatory authority (in this case, both federal and state) has issued a permit after
·carefully balancing environmental and economic fac.tors. Issuing an injunction to .
a
require different technology to prevent nuisance is markedly different from issuing
a.ii injunction for other purposes, such as when public health or the ertv.i.ronment are
endangered or there is a violation of law. ·
16
stringent standards than those established by the Act, the Kentucky General
. Assembly has restricted the Energy .and Environment Cabinet from exercising·
that saved power. Specifically, ·the Gen,eral Assembly has charged the Energy
and Environment Cabinet with adopting clean air regulations that are "no more.
stringent than federal requirements." KRS 224.10-100(26). Even though the·
Act would allow Kentucky to enact more stringt'.nt standards under this savings
. clause, Kentucky statute~ expressly prohibit the Cabinet. from issuing more
stringent regulations. Id. We find the fact that Kentucky has explicitly chosen
. ' .
not to. allow its regulatory body to utilize more stringent regulations persuasive
as to the Legislature's intent. ·
We hold that the requested injunction, which would require
implementation of a particular type of pollution-control technology not required
under Brown-Forman's and Heaven Hill's permits, conflicts with the Act by
invading EPA and Metro District's "regulatory turf," id., iri a manner tl'lat the
Kentucky General Assembly has spoken against. Therefore, an injunction to
control an alleged nuisance when the state has already specifically balanced
those factors is inappropriate;· To conclude otherwise would produce the
untenable situation· identified in American Electric Power where ·courts act on
limited records on an ad-hoc basis in an arena where they do not possess the
necessary scientific, economic and technological expertise. We cannot have the
circuit courts of this· Commonwealth imposing. pollution control technqlogies on
distillers that might differ from circuit to cfr~uit. The impact on the bourbon
industry would be far too dire.
Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals insofar as it would allow this
type of. injunctive relief. While the trial court's reasoning was incorrect, the
17
result remains the same. The trial court properly dismissed the plea for
injunctive relief as it i.ndeed failed to state a claim. upon which relief could be
granted.
IV. CONCLUSION ·
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court o~ Appeals as to Miller's
state-law damages claims; however,. we reverse the Court ·of Appeals insofar as
it held that Miller's claim for injunctive relief could go forward. Therefore, we
remand this case to Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent
\
with this opinion~
. All sitting. All concur.
. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT BROWN-FORMAN CORPORATION:
Charles J. Cronan, IV
Mark Richard Overstreet .
Bethany A. Breetz -
Marjorie Ann Farris
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT HEAVEN HILL DISTILLERIES,. INC~:
Virginia Hamilton Snell
Donald Joseph Kelly
Lisa Catherine D~Jaco
,.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE GEORGE MILLER:
None /Withdrawn
COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE
· David -!ames Treacy
18