Roy Edward Tucker v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

·RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2017
·TO BE PUBLISHED
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2015-SC-000655-MR
LONNIE CONYERS APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE
NO. 15-CR-00296.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY · APPELLEE
AND
2015-SC-000687-MR
ROY EDWARD TUCKER APPELLANT
QN APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE
NO. 15-CR-00295
·COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE.
AND
20 l 6-SC-000340-MR
JOSEPH HARDY · APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE
NO. 15-CR-00294
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
• OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE HUGHES
AFFIRMING
Following a joint jury trial, Lonnie Conyers, Roy Tucker, and Joseph
Hardy were all found guiltY of two counts of first-degree burglary. Each
defendant was sentenced as a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO) to
concurrent, twenty-year terms of imprisonment, and each has now appealed to
this Co.urt as a matter of right. Because of the large degree of overlap in the
( . .
factual background and· in the legal issues raised, we have consolidated the
appeals for disposition in this single opinion. All thrt:!e defendants contend
that, in light of juror and witness misconduct during the recess following the
trial's first day, the trial court should have declared a mistrial. Each defendant
_also_ insists that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the first-degree
burglary charges and by failing to give a jury instruction on receiving stolen .
property as a lesser, alternative offense to burglary. In addition, Hardy claims
that he was entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of voluntary
intoxicatio_n, while Conyers seeks resentencing·on the ground-that he was
improperly found to be a PFO in the first degree. Convinced that none of the
alleged errors gives the defenqants_, either jointly or singly, a right to relief, we
affirm all three judgments.
RELEVANT FACTS
During the morning of Februar,Y 11, 2015, in Melbourne, Kentucky, two
residences about one-half mile apart were burglarized. The proof at trial,
construed favorably to the Commonwealth, showed the. following.
Brothers Stan and Brian Turpen, the owners/ occupants of one of the
homes, testified that they left for. work early that morning after having locked
the doors. When Stan returned that afternoon, he found one of his gt.litar
cases lying in the driveway and signs of what appeared to be a forced entry.
2
His home was in shambles with drawers and cupboards opened, their contents
strewn over countertops and on floors, mattresses removed
.
from the beds
.
and
closets ransacked. Stan confirmed that photographs introduced by the
Commonwealth accurately showed, the state of his home that afternoon. After
his initial look around, Stan called both his brother and 911.
·Officer Robert Diamond of the Campbell County Police Department
responded to the 911 call. Earlier that day h~ had participated in the arrest of
three persons suspected of another burglary in the area,. and after talking with .
Stan .Turpen and walking through the residence, he thought it likely that the
same persons were responsible for the scene he found there.
The Turpens' missing property list included a wide-screen television, a
Fender guitar, and severai other household items and five handguns, at least
two of which (the two from the brothers' bedside tables) were loaded and ready
to fire. The list also-included two long guns (a Remington shotgun and a
Winchester rifle) and a starter's pistol-a blank gun-that looked like a .22
caliber revolver. Also missing was ammunition for several of the weapons.
Earlier that day,· a 91 l caller had reported what he believed to be a
. I . ' .
burglary in progress. George Crawford testified that at about 10:30 that
morning he wl3.s looking out his kitchen window toward the rear of his
property. His residence borders on a pasture, Crawford testified, across which .
.· he could se~ the garage side of the residence of Joe and Brittany Vance. 1
, I At that time Crawford had not yet spoken to Joe and believed that Brittany's
name was Tiffany..
3
Crawford testified that his attention was attracted to the Vances' driveway by a
dark-colored, sedan-type car he had never seen there before. Three men
appeared to have gotten out of the car, and one of the men had apparently
gone up the steps to the front door. Although Crawford was suspicious; he was
about to dismiss· his suspicions in light of the fact that one of the men could be
Joe Vance. Before he could turn away, however, he saw one of the men walk
toward the "pedestrian" door of the garage and kick· the door open. All three
men then disappeared inside the garage. At that point Crawford called 911.
/'
On the 911 recording, after Crawford. relayed what he had observed, the
dispatcher asked Crawford for a more detailed description of the vehicle. As
Crawford tried to comply with that request, it occurred to him that a Nikon
camera with a 300mm zoom lens that he used for bird-watching was sitting on
his kitchen table. While using the cainera, Crawford exclaimed to the 911
dispatcher that one of the mep had just co"me out of the house and appeared to
have put something in the backseat of the car. At that point, Crawford started
taking pictures:
At trial, the Commonwealth was able to introduce about two dozen
.photographs-authenticated b:y Crawford-of the burglary as it happened, of
the vehicle and of the three men as they came and went carrying things from
the house to the vehicle. After a few minutes, Crawford told the d~spatcher
that all three men had exited the house, one of them putting what looked like a
white pillowcase filled with some~hing into the backseat. In the closing portion
of.the call, Crawford narrated for the· dispatcher the burglars' sport-lived get-
4
awa.y: their entering the car; the car's descent down the sloped driveway to
Kohls Road; the car's right turn in the direction of Ten-Mile Road; and the
almost immediate appearance of a police cruiser right behind the car.
When Crawford's direct examination resumed after the 911 recording, he
reiterated that he saw all three persons enter the Vances' residence and later
come out carrying items which they placed in the .car. During the various
·,
cross-examinations, Crawford admitted that he could not see clearly enough,
either with or without his camera, to identify any of the persons he saw or to
say what items they brought from the house. In particular~ he admitted that
he saw no one with a gun. He also admitted .that while there are photos
showing tw~ of the men (in the enlarged photos introduced by the
Commonwealth tWo persons clearly resembling Hardy and Conyers) carrying
items from the house, the photo of the third man (strongly resembling Tucker)
does· not make it clear that he is carrying any property. During redirect
examination, however; Crawford explained that during the episode he was
juggling the _phone and his camera and was not able. to photograph everything
he saw. Crawford testified emphatically, however, that notwithstanding the
lack of a clear photograph of the third man removing property from the home,
he witnessed all three men do so.
The Commonwealth's case included testimony from the officers who
stopped the suspects' car moments after it left the_ Va,nces' driveway. Tbey
stopped it as it approached the intersection of Kohls Road and Ten-Mile Road
and arrested its three occupants: Hardy the driver, Tucker in the front
5
passenger seat, and Conyers behind him in the backseat. .bn Hardy's person
the arresting officer found eight prescription pills, slightly more ·than $1,200 in
cash, a silver money clip engraved "Vance," a gold chain necklace·; and a silver
pocket knife. From 'f:ucker the arresting officer took a pocket knife, about $570
• I . • '
in cash, a .gold chain necklace, headphones, part of a wall .cell phone charger,
and an ID card. · Conyers was carrying 8; wallet with his ID card ahd a cell
phone. One of the officers expl~ned that th~y did not go directly to the Vances'
house, but waited for the suspects to leave, because it was safer to approach a
.defined set of suspects·· all contained in a car than an. indeterminate set spread
throughout a resi~ence.
The detective who searched the defendants' car the next morning
·pursuant to a warrant testified that he and an assisting officer photographed
the various items .seized during the search. They included a starter's pistol,
later identified by the Turpens as theirs, which was found under the driver's
seat near the back, and a 9mm Ruger handgun, loaded with a live round of
. ammuriition in the chamber and a full clip, which was found under the front
passenger seat. The Vances identifie_d that gun as belonging to Brittany.
Brittany testified that she. kept it in her jewelry case, which was found, among
other item~ later identified by the Vances, in a white .pillowcas~ in _the car's
backseat.
The Vances also testified
. regarding photographs taken by one of t!J.e
.
investigating officers depicting their home in shambles shortly after the
. .
burglary. T~e Turpens and the \lances all testified that items found in the.
6
defendants' possession had been taken from their respective homes. The items
identified included jewelry, the silver "Vance" money clip, a TV, a guitar,
handguns, long glins, ammunition, a jewelry box, a purse,· a hanimer, savings
bonds, an electric drill, and a set of exercise weights:
The Commonwealth's proof i:q.cluded some additional evidence, but the
first-degree burglary charges rested primarily 6n the evidence summarized
above. Notwithstanding the obviously sufficient evidence of burglary; the
defendants all maintain the -trial court erred by including first-degree burglary
charges in the jury instructions. We begin our analysis with this contention.
ANALYSIS
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Refusing to Dismiss the Charge of
Burglary in The First Degree. ·
Burglary; the basic offense, is a crime against real property-an unlawful
intrusion thereon. Because such intrusions pose risks to persons on the
. . . I . . ' I
premises, the basic offense is punished more-or-less severely depending on the
presence or absence of circumstances which increase or decrease t_hose risks.
r
Litton v. Commonwealth, 597 s:W.2d 616 (Ky. 1980) .(discussing the 1978
amendments to the burglary statutes); Colwell v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d
721 (Ky. 2000) (discussing the interrelationship of the burglary and trespass
offenses). Kentucky Revised Statut~ (KRS) 511.040 outlaws the basic offense- _
burglary in the third d~gree-·as follows: "A person is guilty of burglary in the
third degree when, with intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or
remains unlawfully in a building." KRS 511.040(1). A "building," for the
purposes of the burglary statutes, is a_ building in its ordinary sense plus "any
7
structure, vehicle, watercraft or aircraft: (a) Where any person lives, or (b).
Where people assemble for [various] purposes .... " KRS 511.010(1). Third-
degree burglary is a Class D .felony. KRS 511.040(2).
'The risks posed by the intrusion increase if the building involved is a
dwelling-"a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein."
KRS 511.010(2): Accordingly,
.
a person is guilty of burglary In the second .
degree, a Class C felony, "when, with the intent to commit a crime, he
knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling~" KRS 511.030(1).
Burglary in .the first degree, a Class B felony, occurs if, in the course of
the intrusion, the intruder actually injures someone (a non-participant in the
crime), or if, as reievant here, he "[i]s armed with explosives or a deadly
. .
weapon." KRS 511.020(1). "Deadly weapon" means, in pertinent part, "[a]ny.
weapon from which a shot, readily capable of prod.ucing death or other serious
physical injury, may be discharged[.]" KRS 500.080(4)(b).
Finally, as relevant to this case, KRS 502.020, the complicity statute,
provides in pertinent part t,hat: .
A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when,
with the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of
th~ offense, he: ·
(b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in planning or
committing the offense[ .J ·
KRS 502.020(l)(b). The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that the three
deferidants all participated as principals in the burglaries of both residences,.
8
. and were also complicit in the burglaries, with each defendant being guilty, by
complicity, of the offense committed by any of them.
Because the buildipgs involved in this case were clearly dwellings, the
jucy instructions for each defendant included two second-degree burglary
instructions (Vance and Turpen residences), and the defendants raise no
objections to those instructions. Because both sets of victims reported the loss
of at least one firearm and the police found weapons corresponding to those
reports in the' car occupied by the defendants at the time of their arrests, the
instructions for each defendant also included provisions such as the following
for each residence:
You will fi:nd the defendant ... guilty of First Degree Burglary
· under this instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:
A. That in this County, on or about Februacy 11, 2015, and before
the finding of the indictment herein, the Defendant ... either
entered or was in complicity. with [either of the others] to their
entry of the building owned by the Vances [the Turpens] and
without the permission of the [owners] or any other person
authorized to give such permission; AND
B. That in so doing, he knew that they did not have such
permission; AND
C. That it was the Defendant's intention that either the Defendant
or [either: of the others] would commit a crime therein; AND
D. That when effecting entcy or while in the building or in
. immediate flight there from, the Defendant or [either of the others]
was armed .with a deadly weapon.
The defendants all objected at trial and continue to object to the givi_ng of
this instruction on a number of grounds. Each insists that there was ·n.o
evidence that he was armed, that he was armed with a deadly weapon, or that
he knew or intended that either of the other two men was armed .. Implicitly, at
least, the defendants concede that their complaint on all of these points is not
9
really with the trial ·court, which only _applied existing law, but rather with prior .
decisions of this Court. TWo of those decis~ons they ask us expressly to
reconsider.
A. There Was Evidence That the Defendants Were Armed During Both
Burglaries. ·
· We begin, however, with the defendants' invocation of Wilson v. ·
Common.wealth, 438 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014), in support of their contentions
. . . .
that the Commonwealth failed to prove that they_ were "armed," for first-degree
burglary purposes, because it failed to show "access" to any of the stolen
firearins. In Wilson, this Court qualified the general rule that "[a] person may
beGome 'ar.med with a deadly weapon' for the purposes of first-degree burglary
when he enters a building or dwelling unarmed and subsequently steals a
'·
firearm therein."· 438 S~W.3d at 354 (quoting Hayes v. Commonwealth, 698
S.W.2d 827, 830 (Ky. 1985)). See also Riley v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 560,
563 (Ky. 2002) ("[o]ne who steals a deadly weapon during the course.of a
burglary is armed within the meaning of KRS 511.020."). That rule applies, we
held in _Wilson, where the thief has access to the deadly weapon, but not to the
theft of a locked fire safe· containing a handgun, since the thief, in the four or
. .
five minutes it. took to complete the burglary and leave the scene, had no
remotely realistic chance of gaining access to the gun and using it as a weapon.
The defendants
.
would have us apply· Wilson's narrow exception to this
.
case, where the Turpens' guns were ultimately found in. the trunk and Brittany
..
10
Vance's 9mm Ruger was found under the frorit passenger seat.2 Clearly the
exception we noted in Wilson does not apply here, where one or more of the
defendants had the gilns in hand at so~e point inside the.residences or in the
car while leaving the residences, and where the defendan_ts had ready access to
' . .
the car's trunk and to the area beneath the seat.
B. There Was Evidence That the Defendants Were Armed With a ·
Deadly Weapon.
The defendants also contend that because there was insuffici_ent evidence
that any of the guns was operable, none of the guns could reasonably be
deemed a "deadly weapon." They s11ggest that, in addition to proof that the
gun was loaded, the Commonwealth should be required ~o prove ·either that the
~n was actually fired during the burglary or that ballistics evidence
establishes that it could have been fired ...
The defendants .acknowledge that we rejected this contention ·in Wilburn
v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 321 (Ky. 2010), where a plurality of the Court
deemed the statutory definition satisfied if the particular weapon was one of a
. '
· class of weapons from which a shot readily capable of causing death or serious
physical injury could be discharged. Under Wilburn, Brittany Vance's Ruger
and all of the Turpens' guns (excluding the starter's pistol) could reasonably be
deemed "deadly weapons." The defendants acknowledge this and acknowledge
2 We agree with the defendants' assertion that the Turpens' starter's pistol,
which was found under the driver's seat, was not a deadly weapon under KRS
500.080, since a starter's pistol is not a type of weapon from which a shot may be
discharged.
11
( .
further that we appli,ed Wilburn in Johnson v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.~d. 501
(Ky. 2010), but they ask us to revisit this precedent and reconsider
. . . Justice
·.Noble's Wilburn dissent, which construes KRS 500.080(4) i~ a manner similar.
to what they advocate.
In Wilburn, the Court considered the pre-Penal Code understanding of
"deadly weapon"· in the burglary context. and compared that meaning to the
current statutory definition of the term. Two members of the Court read the
· statute as not affecting the prior law, whiCh provided, in effect, that a deadly.
weapon· was anything a l;>urglar passed off as,a deadly \Yeapon, whether an
actual weapon or not. The three-member plurality agreed with Justice Noble to
the extent that it understood the ~~atutory definition as precluding objects,
·~
such as sticks or fingers in pockets, merely passed off as weapons. However,
the plurality rejected the proposition that first-degree burglary ·prosecutions
should. hfnge on. the savviness of burglars, who could easily defeat prosecution
under the dissent's approach merely by discarding the weapon after the crime
(so its operability could never be determined) or by disabling it. ·The Court's
reasoned consideration in Wilbu.rn is not yet·even eight years old, and we will
.not revisit the question here.
c. There Was Sufficient
.
Evidence
. . of the Defendants'
.
Complicity.
. .
We.also decline the defendants' invitation to reconsider our construction
'
of the _coinplicify statute, KRS 502.020. Section (1) of that statute, the section
applicable in this case, provides, with respect to crimes outlawing certain acts,3
. that o:he person may be found guilty "of an offense committed by another
person when, with the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of
the offense, he" in any of various ways lends support or.assistance to the
principal offender. KRS 502'.020(1) (emphasis supplied). The defendants insist
that an alleged complicitor cannot be found guilty of the aggravated offense of
another (e.g., burglary in the first.degree) unless he intended to promote or
facilitate the aggravated offense, i.e., unless he knew that the principal offender
he was aiding was armed with a deadly weapon.
Arguably, the evidence in this case-.a trunk full of guns and a loaded
Ruger handgun in the passenger compartment-could reasonably·be thol:!.ght
to satisfy ·even the defendants' take on the statute, but we· need not make that
assessment because, as the defendants acknowledge and as we noted in Smith
v. Commonwealth, 370 S.W.3d 871 (Ky. 2012), the law in Kentucky has always
. I .
been otherwise. The mens rea for complicity, we have held, is that the
coinplicitor intend the principal's .commission of the basic offense.· If he does
so and in addition aids or encourages the principal's act (as couid certainly be
found in this case with respect to all of the defendants) then he exposes himself
·to liability for whatever degree of the offense the ·principal actually commits.
See Smith, 370 S.W.3d at 877-78 (citing post-Penal Code cases to this effect).
a As opposed to crimes that outlaw certain results-those crimes are addressed
. in section (2) of the complicity statute. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 370 S. W.3d '871
(Ky. 2012) (discussing the distinction).
13
The Commentary to the Perial Code supports that construction by noting
that these provisions of the. Code were not intended to change existing law and
by emphasizing that under section (1) of the complicity statute, the
complicitor's mental ~tate must be the "intent to promote or facilitate the
commiss~on of an offense," not necessarily the particular degree of the offense
actually committed. Kentucky Penal Code, Final Draft, p. 30 (Nov. 1971).
As we observed in Smith, the defendants' contention that imputing to.
them as complicitors an aggravated offense without proof that they knew the
principal was engaged in aggravated conduct somehow' runs afoul of Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (holding that the government must prove all the
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt), is simply wrong. As just
discussed,. the elements of complicity do not simply track the elements of the
principal offense.· We reject~ in short, the defendants~ proposed reconstruction
· ofthe complicity statute.
D. There Was Sufficient Circumstantial Evidence That the Defenda·nts
' .. Participated in the Turpen Burglary.
Finally, we reject the defendants' contentions that the lack of witnesses
and the lack of forensic evidence connecting any of the defendants to the
Turpens' residence precludes a :(inding that any of th,em participated in that
burglary. On the contrary,
The possession of stolen property is .prima facie evidence of guilt of
theft of the property. Where there is a breaking and entering and
property taken from a dwelling and the property is found in
possession of the accused, such showing makes a submissible
case for the jury on a charge of burglary.
14
Riley v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 560, 563 (Ky. 2002) (quoting Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 670 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Ky. 1984))'. See KRS 500.080(14)
(defining "possession," for Penal Code purposes as either actual or constructive
posse~sion); arid see Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1998)
(recognizing the applicability of "constructive possession" to guns as well as
illegal drugs).
The inference that the defendants who possessed the Turpens' property ·
burglarized their residence i.s strengt?ened in this case by the defendants'
commission of very similar crimes at the Vance residence a short time after the
Turpen burglary, as· witnessed by Mr. Crawford. The trial court did. not err for
this or for any of the other reasons discussed above when it instructed the jury
as to first-degree burglary for the Vance and Turpen residences.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Refusing to Instruct on Receiving
Stolen Property. ·
No more availing ~re the defendants' claims that the trial court erred by
denying their requests for jury instnictions on the "lesser" offense of receiving
stolen property as a defense to the charge of first-degree burglary. They insist
the trial .court violated its duty to provide instructions on the whole law of the
case, including requested instructions on any lawful defense.
None of the defendants testified but, through counsel, they· suggested the
possible involvement of someone other than the defendants, apparently hoping
to induce the jury to doubt that all of the defendants were equally involved in
the offenses and therefore perhaps acquit or convict one or more of them of a
less serious offense. To allow for those "fourth man" arguments, the· trial
15
court, in addition to the first-degree burglary by complicity instructions noted
above, also gave instructions for all the defendants with respect to the Turpen
burglary on facilitation to first-degree burglary, on second-degree burglary by .
complicity, and on facilitation to second-degree burglary.
. With respect to the Vance burglary; Tucker, who did not appear in ariy of
CraWford's photographs with property tn his hands;was given the same four
instructions. Cony~rs and Hardy were given first- and second-degree burglary
by complicity instructions, but the court denied their requests for facilitation
instructions since., in the court's view, Crawford's photos of them actually
·carrying property out of the Vances' home precluded a finding that either of ·
them merely facilitated that crime.
Aside from their already-discus~ed qbjections to the first-degree burglary
instructions, the defendants do not complain about the instructions the court
gave. They comp~ain, rather, that the court erred by refusing·to give additional
instructions at least with respect to the Turpen burglary on the "lesser" offense
of receiving stolen property. Whe~e, as .here, such a claim has been properly
preserved, Martin v. Commonwealth, 409 S:W.3d 340 (Ky. 2013), and where the.
trial court's decision is based on its assessment of the evidence, we review that
claim for. an abuse of discretion. Sargent v. Shaffe~, 467 S.W.3d 198, 20.3 (Ky.
2015). In.this cohtext as in oth~rs, however, where the issue is purely a matter
of faw, our standard of review is de novo. Sargent, 467 S.W.3d at 204.
The receiving stolen property statlite, KRS 514.110, provides in its first
section that a person is. guilty of that offense
16
when he receives, retains, or disposes' of movable property of
another knowing that it has been stolen, or having reason to .
believe that it has been stolen, unless the property is received,·
retained, or disposed of with intent to restore it to the owner.
. The basic offense is a Class A misdemeanor, but if the property received·
includes a firearm or is worth more than $500 but less than $10,000, then the
offense is enhanced to a Class D felony. KRS 514.110(2)(3).
The trial court decided against a "receiving stolen property" instruction
with respect to both burglaries not because the evidence did not support it, but
rather because, in th~ court's view, receiving stolen property is not an included
offense of burglary and'so, at least in this case, was ·not an available lesser
offense.· The defendants contend that the trial court thus ~rred. We disagree.
Although not technically a "defense" under the Penal Code, a lesser-
included offen~e is "in fact and principle, a defense against the higher.charge."
Hudson v. Commonwealth, 202 S.W.3d 17, 20 (Ky. 2006). (quoting Slaven v.
Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 845, 856 (Ky. 1997)). In Kentucky, "KRS
505.020(2) establishes whether a charge is a lesser-included offense." Id.
(citing Perry v. Co.mmon_wealth, 839 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1992)). Under that
statute, as pertinent here,
[a] defendant may be convicted of an offense that is included in
any offe.nse with which he is formally charged. An offense is so
included when: .
(a) It is established by.proof of the same or less than all the facts ·
required to establish the ·commission of the offense charged[.]
.As the trial court correctly observed, thus defined, receiving stolen
property is not an "included" offense of burglary. Receiving stolen property
17
requires proof of the retention or disposition of property with the knowledge
that the property has been stolen. ·Burglary requires an unlawful intrusion
. upon real property With an intent to commit a crime. In terms of their
elements, therefore, the two crimes are utterly distinct. To establish burgl8.ry
. .
in thi_s case, moreover, it was not necessary for the Commonwealth to show
that the defendants also received stolenproperty. While their retention -of
. · .
.stolen property was certainly part of the evidence allowing an inference Of
. . . . : . \
criminal intent, to show that the defendants. entered the two residences with
the intent to commit crimes the evidence of theft, the evidence that the
residences were ransacked, or the evidence tpat convicted felons stole guns.
could also have sufficed. As the Court·noted in Hudson, "the fact that the
· evidence would support a guilty verd~ct on a lesser uncharged offense does not
entitle a defendant to an instruction on that offense." 202 S.W.3d at 21. The
trial court correctly so ruled.
Arguing against that ruling Ute defendants refer_ us to H~ll v.
Commonwealth, 337 S~W.3d
. 595 (Ky. 2011), and .to Perry v. Commonwealth,
.
supra. Those cases involved prosecutions for attempted mµ.rder where the
. .
defendant had shot and injured a victim,_ but had not kiiled him. In both, an
fssue developed at trial concei-ning the defendant's ·intent at the time of t~e
shooting-:...to injure or ~o kill-and in both, at the close of proof the
commonwe~th was granted an instruction on assault as a "lesser-included
.·offense" of attempted murder.·
. 18
Notwithstanding the seemingly obvious tension with KRS 505.020, in
\
both cases this Court upheld the "lesser-included" instruction. Doing so in
Hall, we declined to overrule Perry and instead reiterated its view that KRS
505.020(2) does· not require a "strict statutory elements" approach to lesser-
included offenses, but rather allows for "instructions on uncharged offenses .
where the facts alleged in the indictment or the evidence presented at trial
support[] such instructions." 337 S.W.3d at 606.
The defendants contend that the trial court ignored this teaching from
Hall and subjected their requests for a receiving stolen property instruction to .
a "strict statutory elements" test. We disagree. As noted above, the
Commonwealth's proof of burglary in this case did not necessarily entail proof
of receiving stolen property. Without attempting to explicate.the possible
relationship between Hall and Hudson, moreover, we n?te the trial court's
observation that nothing, i.e.,. none of the double jeopardy provisions of KRS
505.020, precluded conviCting the defendants of receiving stolen property as
. well as. burglary. That possibHio/ makes this case more like Hudson, where
conviction of both the charged offense and the proposed ~esser offense was
possible, 202 S.W.3d at 21, than Hall, where conviction of both assault and
attempted murder would run afoul of KRS 505.020(1)(b), which prohibits
conviction of more than one offense when the· separate offenses require
inconsistent finc:lings of fact.· See Kiper v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 736 (Ky.
2012). Ass~ult in the latter situation can, perhaps, like an elements-based
lesser-included offense, be thought a "defense" to a charge of attempted
19
murder, whereas receiving stolen property in this case does not have the same
significance. In sum,
'
Hudson is the more apt analog to this case, and the trial. .
court did not violate Hall.
Finally, it is also worth -~eiterating that the trial court gave the jury
appropriate lesser-offense options-especially with respect to the Turpen ·
burglary-but nevertheless the jury convicted the defendants of first-degree
·burglaries'. The defendants'. suggestion that the trial coures refusal to instruct ·
on receiving stolen property somehow coerced the jury to find them guilty of a
more serious ·crime than it would have done had it been giveri their requested ·
instruction is thus belied by the record.
-III. Juror and Witness Misconduct Did Not Necessitat~ a Mistrial.
A. The Juror "Misconduct" Was Not Prejudicial.
The defendants also contend that the trial court erred by denying their
joint motion for a mistrial. That motion was premised on· a fluny of juror and
witness misconduct that occurred during the evening recess following the first
day of triaL All of that misconduct involved witness George Crawford, t}1e
·neighbor who saw and photographed the break-in at the Vances' ~esidence~
Crawford was the Commonwealth's second witness and the last witness
at the end of the trial's first day, most of which was devoted to jury selection
and opening statements. Very·soon after Crawford's testimony concluded, the
trial court. admonished thejury members not to discuss the case among
themselves or with anyone else and dismissed them for the night. As it
happened, about half of the jury rode down on the courthouse elevator at the
·20
same time Crawford did. Another person on the elevator-a venire member
who had not been selected to hear the case but who had remained in the
courtroom as a spectator-complimented Crawford on his testimony and asked
_,,
him for additional details about the location of the Vances' house and the
· intersection near where the defendants had been stopped. Crawford answered
the question, admitted having been nervous during his examination, and
wondered whether anyone else had found the air jn the courtroom very dry. A
juror who had suffered a nosebleed during the day's proceedings replied that
his nose had, a remark that drew laughs from some of the other jurors. At that
point, the elevator ride ended, and the jurors and Crawford went their separate
ways.
That evening the. Commonwealth learned of Crawford's encounter with
some of the jurors, and the next mor~ing, before the trial resumed, it informed
the court. One-by-one the court examined the jury members to determine
which of them had been on the elevator with Crawford and what; exactly, had
been said. The scenario sketched above emerged from their answers.
Crawford was also recalled and questioned; and even the spectator who asked
Crawford to elaborate on the location of the arrest was identified and called in
to be questioned by the court and examined by the parties.
The court concluded that, while unfortunate, Crawford's elevator
encounter with jury members had been inadvertent, had not borne on any of
the contested issues in. the case, and did not in any other way threaten to taint
the jury's deliberations or decisions. Beyond .an admonishment to the jurors
21
who had ridden on the elevator with Crawford to say nothing about the
encounter to others; the court concluded that the elevator incident did not
entitle the defendants to any relief, and in particular did not necessitate a
mistrial.
The defendants mainta.in that the trial court's ruling .ignores the
important rights at stake: the right to a fair trial, generally, under the Due
Process Clauses of both our state and the federal constitutions, and more
particularly, the constitutional rights to an unbiased jury,_ Remmer v. United
States, 347 U.S. 227 ·(1954), and to a jury whose verdict is based solely on the ·
evidence received in open co.urt. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). A
juror's exposure to either outside influe~ces.-bribes and threats ~e the- classic
examples-or extrinsic information threatens those rights and, upon a proper
showing, obligates the. trial court to inquire and to "ascertain whether the juror
was ot was not tainted~" United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 1393, 1412.(7th Cir.
1994) (discussing the showing that will trigger the trial court's duty to inquire);
Commonwealth v. Abnee, 375 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Ky. 2012) (same, and holding that
"an unauthenticated and unsworn letter from a lone juror, without more, is
insufficient to trigger the process for further.inquiry"); Smith v. Phillips, 455
U.S. 209, 215 (1982) (notingthat, "This Court has long held that the'remedy-
. for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the.
opportunity to prove actual bias.").
_Upon inquiry, "[i]f there is a 'reasonable possibility' that a jury's verdict
has been [or will be] affected by material not properly admitted as evidence, the
22
criminal defendant is entitled to a new trial." Davis, 15 F.3d at 1412 (citation
·omitted). In other words, juror misconduct entitles.a defendant to a new trial
(or a mistrial) only if there is sufficient ·evidence to establish both the
misconduct and resulting prejudice. "Prejudice is shown whenever there is a
reasonable probability or likelihood that the juror misconduct affected the
verdict." Meyer v. State; 80 P.3d 447, 455 (Nev. 2003) (discussing the different
.ap·p~oaches to the "i;>rejudice" question adopted by the federal Courts of
Appeal).
Not every incidence of juror misconduct requires a mistrial. Rather,
"[e]ach case turns on its own facts, and on the degree and pervasiveness of the
pi:ejudicial influence possibly resulting." Meyer, 80 P.3c:l at 453 (quoting. United
States v. Paneras, 222 F.3d 406;411 (7th Cir. 2000)). As the Supreme Court
. stated in Smith, ·
[D ]ue process does not require a new trial every time a juror has
been placed in a potentially compromising·situation. Were that the
rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable. The
safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir dire and protective
instructions from the trial judge, are not infallible; it is virtually
impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that
might theoretically affect their vote. Due process means a jury
capable ·and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence. before
it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial
occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences wh.en
they happen. Such determinations may properly be made at a
hearing like that ordered in Remrrier and held in this case.
455 U.S. at 217 (footnote omitted).
In Kentucky these fundamental rights receive protection under both KRS
29A.310 and Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.70. Among other things, the
23
. statute forbids. witnesses (without leave of court) from "convers[ing] with the
jury or any member thereof upon any subject after they [the jury members] .
have been sworn." KRS 29A.310(2). The statute also provides that .if the jury
is pe.rmitted to separate prior to deliberatio'n, the court sh:all admonish the Jury
[members] that "it.is their duty not to converse with, ~or allow themselves to be
·~addressed by, any other person o.n any subject of the trial[.]" _KRS 29A.310(1)°.
RCr 9. 70 provides for the same admonition; requires the court to give it, or at
. . . . . .
.
least to refer to it, "at each adjournment"; and further requires that the jury
members be admonished to report immediately to the court any attemptS to .
·communicate with theni.
Under these provisions, we have heid,.imprqper conversations between
third parties (induding witnesses) and jurors I?Ust be assessed for their
potential to prejudice the defendant: "The true test is whether the [third~
- . -
- party /juror] misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has
.not received a fair trial." Graham v. Commonwealth, 319 S.W.3d 331, 339 (Ky.
2010) (quoting Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 86 (Ky. 1998)).
At one extreme, in Dalby v. Cook, 434 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. 1968)', our .
· predecessor Court presumed prejudice where, during the trial, a Juror
conversed with an interested third-party (the secretary of one 'side's attorney)
. ' . .
and expressed agreement with that person's views as to what t_he outcome of
.· ~ . . -
the case should be: ,At the other extreme, in Owings v. Webb's Ex'r, ~04 Ky.
748, 202 S.W.2d-410(1947), our predecessor found presumptively non-
prejudicial brief conversations duririg a recess bet:Ween the court clerk and ~o
24
jurors, one of whom wo:r:idered "where in the community a corn. shredder was
then operating," and th.e other "where they (the jury} would eat lunch that day."
"We have several times held," the Court explained, "that no reversible error was
committed when some person innocently conversed with a juror on a matter ·
foreign to the .trial." 202. S.W.2d at 412 (citation omitted). See also Talbott,
supra (deeming harmless similarly "innocent," "non-substantive" conversations
between a sheriff/Witness and three jurors).
In between the extremes it becomes the duty of the trial court to inquire
as to the breach of the statute or the·rule and to determine,_ if it appears that
misconduct occurred, whether there is a reasPhillips, supra (prescribing,
in the due-process context, a hearing for colorable allegations of juror
misconduct and. an opportunity for the complaining party to show prejudice);
. see also Oro-Jimenez v. Commonwealth; 412S.W.3d174, 180-81 (Ky. 2013)
(approving, under KRS 29A.310, this manner of proceeding and upholding the
trial court's dedsion after the hearing to the effect that brief, consolatory
remarks by ajuror to one ofthe victim/witnesses during the recess between
the trial's guilt and penalty phases did not ne<;;essitate a mistrial).
Here, of course, having been presented with the Commonwealth's own
concerns about potentially serious juror/witness misconduct, the trial court
promptly and thor~ughly inquired into what happened ~d determined,
correctly in our view, that the innocuous elevator encounter posed virtually no
risk of prejudicing the defendants' trials. ·The. trial court proceeded exactly as it:
should have done, and its decision not to declare a mistrial amounted to an
appropriate exercise of its discretion.
Arguing to the contrary, the defendants correctly note that Crawford's
elevator· comments about his nervousness while testifying, about the
courtroom's drynes~, and especially about the location of the Vances' house
and where the defendants were stopped, were not completely "innocent," like
the third-party remarks in Owings·and Talbott, in the sense of being completely
unrelated to .the trial. The defendants' conclusion, however, that because. this
case is not at the "innocent" extreme it must be at the opposite, "presumptively
prejudicial" extreme goes too far. As observed in our more recent cases, such
as Graham and Oro:..Jimenez,
. between the presumptive extremes
.
there is a
middle ground where the trial court must inquire and consider. ·That is
precisely where the elevator inciderit in this case lies.
. .
No more persuasive are the defendants' claims of pr.ejudice arising from
that hicident.. Briefly, they contend that the comr:nent by the courtroom
spectator complimenting Crawford's testimony and Crawford's "I was scared,"
and "Did any01;1e else find the courtroom dry?" comments enabled Crawford to.
establish rapport and sympathy with the jurors on the elevator, and thus were
apt to affect those jurors' asse_ssments of Crawford's credibility. Had the facts
been different and Crawford's credibility crucial to the Commonwealth's case,
this claim might merit more comment. As it was, however, the defendants were
essentially caught red-handed, and Crawford's testimony was cumulative,
supported by, among other things, the 911 recording, by ·crawford's
26
' .
photographs, and by the evidence obtained by the police from the defendants'
· car and identified by the victims. In these circumstances, the trial court
correctly determined ~at the risk of prejudice from Crawford's brief and merely
polite elevator remarks was essentially nil.
A final facet of the defendants' prejudice argument focuses .on their so-
.. . . .
called "fourth man" theory.· Through cross-examination of Crawford, the.
defendants established that he could not see through the tinted windows of the
car he observed in the Vances' driveway and therefore could not rule out the
possibility that there was a fourth man in the vehicle. Similarly, there was a
brief interval when Crawford. lost sight of the vehicle, providing opportunity for
a fourth man.to jump out after the car left the Vance residence and before the
police stopped it. There was absolutely no evidence to .support the presence of
. ..
a "fourtl:l. man" and, significantly, the three men depicted in Crawford's phot<;>s
'
look like the three defendants. Nevertheless, they contend that Crawford's
elevator comments, by establishing rapport with certain jurors, may have
somehow undercut their "fourth man" theory. ~hey never articulate how this
occurred and instead insist that the possibility of prejudice entitles them to a
new trial. As noted,
.
the innocuous .conversation here is f~ less serious than
. tpe misconduct in our presumptive prejudice cases _and it was therefore the
defendants' burdyn of showing prejudice, i.e., providing an evidentiary basis for
finding that it was reasonably possible that the elevator incident would affect
the jury's verdict. With no· such evidence in the record, the trial court properly
denied a mistrial.
27
· B. The. Witness Misconduct Was Not· Prejudicial, Either by Itself or in ·
Conjunction With the· Juror "Misconduct." . . .· .
Next,.the defendants contend that evenjf the elevator inddent was not
enough by itself to call into question the fairness of their trial, it was enough
when viewed in conjunction with two other gaffes by Crawford that same
evening. We disagree.
During Crawford's testimony, the defendants invoked Kentucky Rule of
Evidence (KRE) 615; the ExclusiOn of Witnesse~ rule. With a. few exceptions
not applical;>le here, that rule requires the trial court, upon a party's request, to
"order witnesses excluded [from the courtroom] so that they cannot hear the
testimony of other witnesses." As we have explained; the letter of this rule
applies o~ly to what happens in the courtroom, but its spirit "is violated 'when ·
witnesses coordinate their testimony' outside the courtroom." Hall, 337 S.W.3d
at 616 (quoting Woodard v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.3d 723 (Ky. 2007),
abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealt': v. Prater,. 324 S.W.3d 393 (Ky.
2010)). Accordingly, in conjunction with the exclusion of other witnesses from
the courtroom, the prosecutor duly advised Crawford not to discuss his
.
. . . '
. , I
testimony later with other witnesses.
fiowever, after testifying, Crawford accepted a ride home from Stan
... Turpen, one of the brothers whose.home was burglarized. Turpen wasat the
c~urthouse that afternoon because he too was due to testify for the
· Commonwealth. The two men conversed on the drive ho;rne.
Also, in response to a text message asking how the.day had gone,
Crawford telephoned Brittany Vance later that evening, and discussed with her
28
in some detrul the questions. he had· been ~sked and his impressions
. ' .
of the
.
defense. He appears to have noted, in particular, the interest of both sides in
whether he observed any of the defendants with a gun. Brittany was scheduled
as a prosecution witness.
The defendants objected to these apparent breaches-of KRE 615's spirit.
The trial court therefore, along with its inquiry into the elevator incident,
inquired of, and allowed the parties to examine; Crawford, Brittany Vance, her
husband Joe Vance, and Stan Turpen concerning ari.y attempts among them to
coordinate their testimonies.
Crawford denied having discussed his testimony with Stan Turpen,
whom he had met only that ·day. Turpen recalled Crawford recounting that he
had seen the defendants in the Vances' driveway, but mostly he recalled
Crawford's description of a block-watch program in which he had participated
while he was ·a resident of Cincinnati. The trial court, noting that Crawford
and Turpen were witnesses of separate events and that there was virtually no
overlap between what they had observed, ruled that even if Crawford had
mentioned his testimony during the ride home, Cra~ord's testimony was not
apt to have any bearing on Turpen's and thus the rule violation, if any~ arising
from their conversation was harmless.
I .
With one exception, the trial court ruled similarly with respect to the
Vances. The Vances were not home while Crawford was. observing the break-in
at their house, so their variou~ testimonies overlapped very little: Crawford
describing the break-in from the outside as it occurred and the Vances
describing the effects of it from the inside after the fact. Given those
differences, the trial GOUrt concluded that the Vances' testimonies were not apt
to be_ significantly affected by knowledge of Crawford's testimony. '
The exception, in the_ trial court's view, was Crawford's possible "heads
' ' . . -
up" regarding the significance the. parties appeared to place on Brittany's gun.
B!ittany testified during the voir dir~ tp~t only in the last couple of days had
her husband located a doc~ment identifying the gun by its serial number and
. . . . '
herself as its own.er. She intended, she said, to provide that document to· the
prosecutor. She had also, apparently after talking with Crawford, double
checked with her husband to make sure she knew how many bullets the clips
. ..
for her gun held.· The trial court excluded all of this "new" gun evidence as .
possib~y the result of Crawford's tip, but it denied the defendants' request to
. . .. . . .
exclude Brittany's identification of the gun altogether, since she had told the
investigating detective it was hers long before Crawford testified.
The trial court also denied motions for mistrial or the exclusion of \... ·
. . .
witnesses on the ground that the trial's fairness had been u~dermined by the
two vioiatio~s of KRE 615 together with the violatiOns of KRS 29A.310 and the
. . . -
·fact that Crawford'~ testimony appeared tainted by his apparent desire to help·
out the Vances. Rejecting those claims, the trial court reiterated that in its
view the rule and statutory violations, such as they were, -were minor
.
and
.
did
not threaten to prejudice the defendants or to impair the trial's fairness. it also
. .
noted that if they so desired the defen,dants could recall Crawford and via
cross,...examination attempt to impeach him_as_biased.·· The defendants
30
maintain that, regardless of any actUal prejudice, the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to remedy the appearance nf unfairness arising from so
.many witness and juror improprieties. We are convinced, however, that the
' .
trial court's hand,ling of these matters was appropriEl.te.
. Beginning with the asserted violations of KRE 615, ·W'e explained in
Woodard that, although "collusion" among witnesses (whatever their intent)
. '
violates the.·spirit of KRE 615, because it occurs outside the presence of the
court; the court's ability to do anything about it is limited: "[T]he most [the trial
court] could do is question the witnesses in an effort to ensure a fair. trial. The
best course is to allow the testimony subject to·proper impeachment on cross
examination." Woo 219 S.W.3d at 728-29. The trial court fully complied
with that recommendation here.
As it did in.the face of likely juror/witness misconduct, the trial court
responded to the allegations of out-of-court witness "collusion" by promptly
conducting a very thorough inquiry of its own into what happened and by
. '
giving the parties .full opportunities to explore both what happened and how
what happened might affect them. As with the juror. "misconduct," it turns out
that the witness "collusion" was much more smoke than fire. Stan Turpen
learned nothing bearing on his testimony from Crawford. The Vances had
-. nothing they did not already know to learn from each other. And B.rittany
Vance did not have much to learn from Crawford, either. While Crawford
should not have told Brittany _what he was asked during his testimony and how
31
he responded, the fact that he did, in the circumstances of this case·; was
simply_·not likely to.have much impact on Brittany's testimony ..
The possible exception, Crawford's observation that both sides wanted to
. .
know about Brittany's gun, the trial court defused by disa1,lowing Brittany's
testimony in the least bit likely to be responsive to it. Th~t was a remedy well
beyond the cross-examination that Woodard suggests would have sufficed. In
short~ the. trial court applied KRE 615 to an out-of-court "collusion" situatfon ·
precisely as Woodard envisioned: by inquiring so as to identify possible effects
on a fair proceeding, and by responding so as to resolve the problems and keep
the proceeding-fair.
The defendants insist that that was not enough, that at some point,
· flame or no flame, smoke itself requires relief. "This trial could not possibly
have appeared fair," the defendants complain, to anyone who sat, as they did,
"for hours the second day of trial observing a parade of jurors and witnesses
admitting to rule violation after rule violation undermining the fairness in their
case." On the .contrary, what an observer might have seen, and what the
record ·plainly shows, is a trial judge taking pains to determine exactly what
had happened outside the courtroom and its effect, if any, on the ongoing trial.
The tri8.I court did not err or abuse its discretion in ultimately determining that
none of the alleged incidences of juror or witness misconduct, considered
singly or cumulatively, necessitated a mistrial. The well-developed record
allows us to say with confidence that the defendants "received a fundamentally
fair trial with .any errors being so minor that even their cumulative .effect does
. 32
not demand reversal." Hall, 337 S.W.3d at 616-17 (quoting Roach v.
Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 101, 113 (Ky. 2010)).
IV. Defendant Hardy Was Not Entitled to· an Instruction on Voluntary
Intoxication .
. Hardy individually claims that he was entitled to a jury instruction on
the statutory defense of voluntary intoxication. As he correctly notes, a trial
court is required to instruct the jury on affirmative defenses if the evidence·
would permit a juror reasonably to condude that the defense exists. Fredline.
v. Commonwealth, 241 S.W.3d 793 (Ky. 2007); Nichols v. Commonwealth, 142
S.W.3d 683 (Ky. 2004). On the other hand, such an instruction is to be
..
rejected if the evidence does not warrant it. Payne v. Commonwealth, 656
S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1983). The. tdal court made the latter determination in this
case, and we review that decision for an abuse of discretion. Sargent v. Shaffer,
467 S.W.3d at 202-04.
Under KRS 50.1.080(1), voluntary intoxication is a defense to a.criminal
charge only if the intoxication "[n]egatives the existence of an element of the
offense." As Hardy notes, an intrusion into ariother's real property that is
knowingly wrongful, as well as an intent to commit a crime therein are both
'
elements of burglary that could conceivably be "negatived" by intoxication. See
Weaver v. Commonwealth, 298 S.W.. 3d 851, 855 (Ky. 2009) (noting that
intoxication is a potential defense to burglary). We have interpreted K~S ·
501.080(1), however, "to mean that the [voluntary intoxication] defense is
justified only where there is evidence reasonably sufficient to prove that the
33
defendant was so [intoxicated] that he did not know what he was doing."
Fredline, 241 S.W.3d at 797 (quoting Rogers v. Commonw~alth, 86 S.W.3d 29,.
44 (Ky. 2002)). "[M]ere drunkenness," in other words-i.e., the mete.
impairment of judgment and/ or physical control that commonly leads
intoxicated persons to do things they would not ordinarily do-
.. "does not equate
with the Kentucky Penal Code's definition of the 'c:lefense' of voluntary
intoxication." Nichols, .142 ~.W.3d at 688 (quoting Rogers, 86 S.W.3d at 44).
The defense requires proof of something "more" than "mere drunkenness." Id. .
I
Here it js doubtful that the evidence would. have permitted a finding that Hardy
was intoxicated, much.iess that he was so intoxicated that he ceased to be
aware of what.he .was doip.g.
The evidence Hardy relies on was
. .
all introduc.ed in conjunction· with the
~ . .
evidence of his arrest. Officer Champaign, the arresting officer; testified that
the s~arch of Hardy's person incident to the arrest yielded, among other items,
eight prescription pills, later identified as five hydrocodone pills .arid three
Xanax pills. Additionally, the se~ch incident to Hardy's arrest was captured
by the "dash cam" vi~eo camera of one·of the police cars. Hardy's counsel
played that video for the jury, and maintained that it shows Hardy. moving
slowly, as though under fu.e influence of pills at the time of the arrest.
The. officer testified, however, that Hardy was the driver of the
defendants' car and that his driving had not appeared impaired. According to
. the officer, Hardy was the first defendant ordered out of the car, and he exited .
without stm;nbling or showing any other sign of intoxicatio;n. His eyes were not .
34
glassy. The "dash cam" video, as the officer noted, shows Hardy cooperating
with ·the search and, despite. . having his hands. cuffed behind his back, obeying
without any loss. of balance or other difficulty such commands as turning
around and raising each of his feet as the officer remoyed Hardy's shoes and
searched his socks. The officer testified at no point during.Hardy's arrest did
he ·suspect that Hardy might be intoxicated. The "dash cam"· video in no way .
belies that testimony ..
Defense counsel asked the officer if he was aware that while waiting to be
booked into the Campbell County Detention Center Hardy had wet his pants.
Unfortunately, on the trial video the officer's response, yea or nay, is not clear,
but in· any event defense counsel thereafter referred to Hardy's purported
accident as further evidence of intoxication.
Could a reasonable juror infer from the foregoing evidence that at the
time of either crime Hardy was so intoxicated that he was not aware of what he
was doing? The trial court properly conduded "no." Even if the evidence.
perrriitted an inference that Bardy had ingested pills prior to the crimes,' the
, ,I
evidence, much like the evidence of pre-crime cocaine and alcohol use in
Btanford·v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1990), als? showed that
Hardy could drive, walk, and understand what was said to him. Hardy was
apparently aware of his actions and appeared to be functioning normally.
On the other hand, there was no evidence, as there was in Nichols v.
Commonwealth, supra, that Hardy was wild or out of control, nor was there
evidence, as there was in Lloyd v. State, 587 S.E.2d 372 (Ga. App. 2003), the
35
other case upon which Hardy relies, that he was. acting strangely and was so
. .
·intoxicated immediately after the crime as to pass out and urinate on himself.
In sum, none of the evidence suggested that Hardy was so intoxicated that he
was unaware _of what he did.· 'Accordingly, the trial _court did hot abuse its
discretion when "it decided that Hardy was not entitled to an intoxication
instruction.
V. The Trial. Court Did Not Err During the PFO Proceedings by Refusing to
Exclude Evidence of One of Conyers's Prior Felonies. ·
Finally, Conyers contends· that he was improperly sentenced~ The jury
initially sentenced him to serve fifteen years in prison o_n each first-d~gree .
burglary count, with those sentences to be served concurrently. In light of
proof that Conyers had two prior felony convictions, thejury then.found him
. .
subject to sentencing as a PFO in the first degree arid recommended the two
·concurrent sentences be enhanced ,to twenty years; The trial court sentenced
Conyers accordingly.
On appeal, Conyers contends, as he did in the trial court," that due to a
change in the law one of his prior felonies should no longer count for PFO
purposes. He maintains that he is entitled to be resentenced at a· new penalty
p~ase ·from which evidence of the. "lapsed" felony is. excluded.
In 2004 Conyers pled guilty to trafficking in less than eight ounce.s of
. . .
marijuana. At the·time of the offense (and still today), first-offense trafficking
in less than eight ounces of marijuana was a Class A misdemeanor. KRS.
214A.1421 (1992). However, because Conyers did his peddling within 1000
. yards of a school, the offense was enhanced under KRS 2 l 4A. l 411 (1992) to a
36
Class D felony.4 Conyers, only nineteen at the time of his 2004 guilty plea, was
sentenced to five years but that sentence was probated.
Some seven years later, in June 2011, the General Assembly amended
KRS 2 l 4A. l 41 l so as to shrink the enhancement zone around schools. Under
the amended statute, misdemeanor trafficking offenses do not become feloI?-ies
unless they take place within "one thousand (1000) feet," not yards, of a
classroo:rp.. KRS 214A.1411(1) (2011) (emphasis added). Conyers claims (a
point the Commonwealth does not contest for _the purposes of this case) that
hjs 2004 offense did not taj<:e place within 1000 feet of a clas,sroom and so
. . .
·-
would not have been a felony under the 2011 versi9n of the statute.
From that fact, Conyers argues that his 2004 felony conviction should he
deemed~ retroactively, a misdemeanor for PFO purposes in this case. The trial .·
· court rejected that argument, and so do we. KRS 532.080, the PFO sentencing
statute, does not require proof that prior felonies would still be felonies under
current law. As pertinent here, it requires only a prior conviction (or prior
convictions) "of a felony in this state." .KRS 532.080(2) and (3) (defining second
and first-degree PFO status, respectively). In 2004, Conyers pled guilty to "a.
felony in this state," and the resulting conviction remains a felony. conviction
~The statute provided in pertinent part as follows: "Any person who u!llawfully
traffics iri a controlled substance classified in Schedules I, II, III, IV oi V, or a.
controlled substance analogue in any building used primarily for classroom
instruction in a school or on any premises located within one thousand (1,000) yards
. of any school building used primarily for classroom instruction shall be guilty of a ·
Class D felony, unless a more severe penalty is set forth iD; this chapter, in which case
the higher penalty shall apply." Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I controlled
substance .. KRS 218A.050(3).
37
·for PFO putposes notwithstanding the subsequent amendment of KRS
214A.1411.
Against this conclusion Conyers refers us to KRS 446.110, which, ai:nong
other things, addresses "Offenses committed ... prior to repeal of law .." In
pertinent part, the statute provides: "No new law
.
shaU be construed
.
to repeal a ~
former law as to any offense committed against a former law." This, of course,
is contrary to Conyers' contention, which is that the 2011 amendment of KRS
2 l 8A.14 l 1 did repeal the earlier version applicable to Conyers in 2004. This
provision of the statute is consistent with the general rule, as stated in KRS
446.080(3), that "[n]o statute shaU be construed to be retroaQtive, unless
expressly so declared." Unless the General Assembly says so, in other words,
new statutes, such as the 2Q 11 amendment to KRS. 218A. l 41 l, do not apply to
offenses committed prior to their enactment. However, Conyers points us to an
exception to the presumption against retroactivity: "If any pena.lty, forfeiture or
. punishment is mitigated by any provision of.the new law, sue~ provision may,
by the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced
after the new law takes effect." KRS 446.110 (emphasis added). Even 1
assuming that the 201 l amendment to KRS 446.110 addre.ssed the penalty,
and not the substance of the law, see Rodgers V. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d
740, 750 (Ky. 2009) (~iscussing that distinction), the problem with Conyer~'
reliance on this exception is that the judgment to which he wan~s to apply the
new, "penalty-mitigating" version of the statute-his 2004 trafficking
conviction:-was pronounced some seven years before the new law took effect ...
38
..
The KRS 446.110 exception, by its own terms, does not apply in this situation.
Rogers v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.3d 446, 456.(Ky. 2012) (noting that "by the
statute's [KRS 446.110] plain terms the retroactivity is limited to changes that
take effect prior to the 'pronouncement' of judgment.") ..
Conyers' unsupported. constitutional arguments fare no better. He
contends that he was found to be a first-degree PFO upon proof of only one
prior felony, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution.
He also contends that the judicial branch's use of a crime that the legislature
..
has determined should not be a felony to enhance his sentence as a prior
felony offender is· a violation of the separatfon of powers doctrine.
As discussed above, the General Assembly has made crystal clear its
·intent that unless it clearly says otherwise, even.the penalty provisions of new
laws have only a limited retroactive_ reach. The General Assembly did not
except the 2011 amendment from those limits, and Conyers' 2004 conviction·
lies far outside them.· The real due-:process and separation of powers violations
would occur were we to follow the course urged by Conyers and give the 2011
amendment of KRS 21 BA.1411 a retroactive effect far in excess of what the
General Assembly has indicated it should have. In short, the trial CO\lrt did not
err by allowing use of Conyers' 2004 felony marijuana-trafficking conviction in
the PFO portion of this case.
CONCLUSION
For th,e foregoing reasons, we reject the three defendants' shared
appellate arguments, as well as the individual arguments raised by Hardy and
39
Coi:iyers. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the Cam:pbell Circuit Court's
.. . .
judgments convicting and sentendng each· defendant.
All sitting: All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, LONNIE CONYERS:
Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate _/.
Department of Public Advocacy·
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: .
Andy Beshear .
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jeffrey Ray Prather
·.Assistant Attorney General
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, ROY'EDWARD TUCKER:
Susan Jackson Balliet
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky·
Joseph Todd Henning
Assistant Attorney General
40.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, JOSEPH HARDY:
Erin Hoffman Yang
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky
Joseph Todd Henning
Assistant Attorney General
41 .