Byron Seymour v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
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PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
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CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
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RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 22, 2022
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2021-SC-0339-MR
BYRON SEYMOUR APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE MITCH PERRY, JUDGE
NOS. 19-CR-000314 & 21-CR-000979
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
A circuit court jury convicted Byron Seymour of first-degree rape and
being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Upon recommendation of the
jury, the trial court sentenced Seymour to 20 years in prison. Seymour now
appeals the resulting judgment as a matter of right,1 alleging six errors.
Finding none of Seymour’s arguments meritorious, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
One morning, Seymour visited the home of T.J., an acquaintance of his.
Seymour had previously visited T.J.’s home to visit Heather, T.J.’s daughter.
On this specific visit, T.J., Seymour, Heather, and Will, another friend of
1 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
Heather’s, were present. At some point, Will left T.J.’s home to purchase
drinks for the group. Heather then went into the bathroom to take a shower,
leaving Seymour alone with T.J.
Seymour entered one of the home’s bedrooms and allegedly used a ruse
to convince T.J. to enter the bedroom. Once T.J. entered the room, she claims
Seymour closed the door and drew two knives on her. Seymour threatened her
and told her not to say anything. Seymour unsuccessfully attempted to
sexually assault T.J. at knifepoint. He then commanded T.J. to snort drugs on
a table in the bedroom while he viewed pornography on his cell phone. He then
sexually assaulted T.J. at knifepoint.
During the assault, Heather entered the bedroom and saw Seymour and
T.J. engaged in intercourse. Heather yelled at Seymour to get off of T.J., and
Heather and T.J. fled from the house. Once T.J. and Heather were outside,
Seymour locked the door so they could not re-enter, and he exited the house by
the back door.
While outside the house, T.J., who was partially naked, screamed for
someone to call the police. An unknown neighbor or bystander called 911.
When officers arrived on the scene, they took statements from T.J. and Heather
and then transported T.J. to a hospital to undergo a sexual assault
examination. Nurse Vickie Yazel, a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE),
performed the exam and collected DNA evidence.
Based on the statements provided to the officers by T.J. and Heather,
police obtained a warrant to locate Seymour using his real-time cell site
2
location information (CSLI). Once located, Seymour was taken into custody
and interviewed. Seymour denied raping T.J. or having sex with her.
When the DNA samples collected from T.J. were examined, the DNA
profile from the vaginal swab was consistent with a mixture of T.J.’s DNA and
Seymour’s DNA. Seymour was charged with first-degree rape, first-degree
wanton endangerment, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender.
At trial, a jury convicted Seymour of first-degree rape and being a
second-degree persistent felony offender. The jury recommended a sentence of
20 years in prison, and the trial court sentenced Seymour in accordance with
the jury’s recommendation.
II. ANALYSIS
Seymour brings his appeal making several claims of alleged error. We
address each alleged error in turn, providing additional facts as necessary.
A. The trial court did not err in qualifying Nurse Yazel as an expert
witness.
On appeal, Seymour argues that the trial court erred in qualifying Nurse
Yazel as an expert witness. But this argument is unpreserved. So we review it
only for palpable error, meaning that we will reverse the trial court’s decision
only if “[a] defect is so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it
threatens the integrity of the judicial process.”2 In order to establish that a
palpable error occurred, Seymour must show “the probability of a different
2 Huddleston v. Commonwealth, 542 S.W.3d 237, 245 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Martin
v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006)).
3
result or error so fundamental as to threaten his entitlement to due process of
law.”3
“[A] trial court has wide latitude in deciding how to test an expert's
reliability and in deciding whether or when special briefing or other
proceedings, i.e., at a Daubert hearing, is needed to investigate reliability.”4
However, a Daubert hearing is not always required, so long as the trial court
makes the decision to qualify an expert based on an adequate record.5
In this case, Seymour concedes that he did not make a pretrial motion to
exclude Nurse Yazel as unqualified, nor did he request a Daubert hearing to
challenge her credentials as an expert. Further, Seymour does not identify any
criteria that would make Nurse Yazel unqualified. Thus, we uphold the trial
court’s qualification of Nurse Yazel as an expert so long as that decision was
based on an adequate record.
At trial, Nurse Yazel testified about her qualifications: she earned her
nursing degree in 2009, she completed SANE training in 2013, and she had
eight years of experience as a SANE at University of Louisville Hospital, where
she had seen more than 1,000 patients and was the manager of the SANE
program. We find Nurse Yazel’s provision of her extensive qualifications to the
trial court to be sufficient evidence on which the trial court could premise its
Brooks v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 219, 225 (Ky. 2007) (internal citation
3
omitted).
Dixon v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 426, 430 (Ky. 2004) (citing Kumho Tire
4
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)).
5 Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851, 865 (Ky. 2015).
4
decision to qualify her as an expert. Thus, we find the trial court’s decision to
qualify Nurse Yazel as an expert was not in error, palpable or otherwise.
B. The trial court did not err in permitting Nurse Yazel to testify that,
in her opinion, T.J.’s injuries were caused by forcible intercourse.
Next, Seymour alleges that the trial court’s admission of Nurse Yazel’s
testimony that T.J.’s injuries were caused by forcible penetration was improper
because it was opinion testimony regarding the ultimate issue in the case.
Seymour concedes that this issue is unpreserved, so we review it only for
palpable error.
KRE6 702 provides that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto[,]” so long as the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and those principles and methods have been reliably
applied to the facts of the case.
A witness presents an opinion on the “ultimate issue” in a criminal case
when he or she opines as to the defendant’s guilt with regard to the charged
offenses.7 Historically, such testimony as to the “ultimate issue” in a case has
been prohibited.8 But in Stringer v. Commonwealth, this Court clarified that
6 Kentucky Rule of Evidence.
7 Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883, 889 (Ky. 1997).
8 See Commonwealth, Dep’t of Highways v. Widner, 388 S.W.2d 583, 586–87
(Ky. 1965).
5
admissibility of statements regarding the “ultimate issue” in a case should be
analyzed based on the testimony’s ability to aid the factfinder “in the solution
of the ultimate problem.”9 The Court in Stringer outlined a four-part test for
trial courts to consider in determining the admissibility of expert opinion
testimony: 1) whether “the witness is qualified to render an opinion on the
subject matter,” 2) whether the subject matter of the testimony satisfies
Daubert, 3) whether “the subject matter satisfies the test of relevancy set forth
in KRE 401, subject to the balancing of probativeness against prejudice
required by KRE 403,” and 4) whether “the opinion will assist the trier of fact
per KRE 702.”10
Regarding the first element of the Stringer analysis, we concluded above
in Part A that the trial court based its decision to qualify Nurse Yazel as an
expert witness upon an adequate record detailing her experience and
qualifications. As such, we find element one met.
Element two of the Stringer analysis concerns the sufficiency of an
expert’s testimony under Daubert. Because Seymour made no request for a
Daubert hearing regarding Nurse Yazel’s testimony or methodology, nor does he
provide any argument in his brief alleging Nurse Yazel’s testimony to be
deficient under the Daubert standard, we find the second element of the
Stringer analysis to be met.
9 956 S.W.2d at 891–92.
10 Id.
6
The third element of the Stringer analysis requires the trial court to
consider whether the evidence in question meets the threshold relevancy
requirement outlined in KRE 401: “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” This standard is “powerfully inclusionary and is met
upon a showing of minimal probativeness.”11
In this case, the jury was tasked with weighing the contravening
testimonies of T.J. and Seymour and determining whether Seymour raped T.J.
The fact that T.J.’s examination after the incident revealed injuries consistent
with those a person would sustain from forcible intercourse is highly probative.
The primary difference between T.J.’s and Seymour’s testimonies was whether
T.J. consented to the sexual encounter between them. Evidence that T.J.
sustained injuries in the encounter of the nature usually caused by forcible
intercourse is certainly helpful to the jury in determining which testimony to
believe.
Even applying the KRE 403 balancing test12 and weighing the evidence’s
probativeness against its prejudicial nature, we find that Nurse Yazel’s
conclusions drawn from her examination of T.J. are highly probative and not
11 Roe v. Commonwealth, 493 S.W.3d 814, 820 (Ky. 2015).
12“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.”
7
unfairly prejudicial to Seymour—her observations of T.J.’s injuries and
opinions about the cause of those injuries simply supported T.J.’s narrative of
the incident.
Lastly, the Stringer analysis requires the Court to consider whether the
expert opinion testimony will assist the jury in determining a fact at issue in
the cause. As described above, Nurse Yazel’s opinion about the cause of T.J.’s
injuries supports the narrative of the incident as described by T.J.—that she
did not consent to the sexual encounter with Seymour. As such, Nurse Yazel’s
testimony was certainly useful to the jury in determining the factual question
of the consensual nature of the interaction between Seymour and T.J.
In conclusion, we first clarify that Nurse Yazel’s testimony did not
necessarily go to the ultimate issue in this case—whether Seymour raped T.J.
Instead, Nurse Yazel’s testimony merely described T.J.’s injuries and opined
about a possible cause of those injuries. But even when considered under the
framework provided in Stringer, we find that Nurse Yazel’s statement that T.J.’s
injuries were caused by forcible intercourse was admissible. Any issue
Seymour takes with the contents of Nurse Yazel’s testimony, like other possible
causes of T.J.’s injuries, could have been addressed in cross-examination. As
such, the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to hear such testimony.
C. The trial court did not err in allowing Nurse Yazel to testify about
the statements made to her by T.J.
When T.J. was undergoing a sexual assault examination by Nurse Yazel,
she recounted to Yazel that her assailant had a knife, told her he would stab
her, raped her, and tried to force her to use drugs. Before Nurse Yazel testified
8
at trial, Seymour made a general objection to Yazel’s testimony as inadmissible
hearsay. The trial court ruled that the statements were admissible, and, as a
compromise, the Commonwealth suggested it be permitted to lead the witness.
All parties agreed with this suggestion as Nurse Yazel took the stand.
The Commonwealth contends that, in so agreeing, Seymour waived his
objection to Nurse Yazel’s testimony as inadmissible hearsay, and thus the
issue is not subject to appellate review. But Seymour contends that his
objection to Nurse Yazel’s testimony and the trial court’s ruling of admissibility
were separate and distinct from the Commonwealth’s suggestion that it be
permitted to lead Nurse Yazel’s testimony. So he argues that his objection
regarding admissibility is preserved even though he acquiesced to the
Commonwealth’s leading Nurse Yazel’s testimony.
The relevant exchange among the parties and the trial court went as
follows:
Defense Counsel: I’ll admit, she got a few sentences in, but I don’t see
how this isn’t hearsay. I don’t see how this isn’t an out-of-court
statement used to prove what [T.J.] is saying happened.
Commonwealth: Your Honor, SANE nurses regularly get a medical
history from the victim. She stated it prior to this question. She needs a
history in order to treat and collect evidence. There is a portion of the
statement, if [Defense Counsel] has an objection to the whole thing, there
is a portion of the statement that is directly made for the purpose of
medical treatment, which is an exception to the hearsay rule.
Trial Court: It is, and I’ll allow this to pass. I don’t know of any new case
law that would say you couldn’t do this.
Commonwealth: I’m sorry, I didn’t hear that last part.
Trial Court: I’ve allowed this to pass. I don’t know of any new case law
that would say this is inappropriate.
9
Commonwealth: I don’t either.
Trial Court: It’s the medical history of why she is there. This is pretty
descriptive, are you reading along with her?
Commonwealth: I am.
Trial Court: I mean, how long is it?
Commonwealth: It’s relatively long. There is quite a lengthy paragraph.
Trial Court: My fear would be it gets turned into, effectively, a second
statement of the prosecuting witness. So is there a way to shorten or
summarize it?
Commonwealth: Absolutely, and if the court will allow me to lead her to
where-
Trial Court: Yeah, do that.
Commonwealth: We’ll do that.
An error is deemed waived when the failure to object is reflective of the
party’s “knowing relinquishment” of the right to object.13 We cannot consider
Defense Counsel’s actions a “knowing relinquishment” of the right to object in
this case. First, Defense Counsel objected to the hearsay in Nurse Yazel’s
testimony. He made an objection and the trial court overruled the objection.
Next, Defense Counsel’s approval of the Commonwealth’s leading Nurse Yazel’s
testimony was neither sought nor given. In no way did Defense Counsel waive
or invite the alleged error in this case. Rather, under RCr14 9.22, “when an
appropriate objection is made to a particular line of inquiry, it is sufficient to
13 Tackett v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.3d 20, 28 (Ky. 2014).
14 Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.
10
preserve the issue for review as to that line of inquiry upon the grounds of the
objection previously made.”15 As such, we conclude that Seymour’s objection
to the hearsay in Nurse Yazel’s testimony was properly preserved for our
review.
A trial court’s decision to admit testimony is an evidentiary ruling we
review for abuse of discretion.16 We will conclude a trial court abused its
discretion only if we find its decision to be “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.”17
At trial, the Commonwealth argued that the hearsay portions of Nurse
Yazel’s testimony were admissible under the KRE 803(4) exception to the
hearsay rule for statements made for the purpose of medical treatment or
diagnosis. And this exception provided the grounds on which the trial court
overruled Seymour’s objection. But the Commonwealth abandons this
argument on appeal and instead presents new grounds on which the hearsay
portions of Nurse Yazel’s testimony were admissible. The Commonwealth now
claims that the hearsay portions of Nurse Yazel’s testimony were admissible as
prior consistent statements made by T.J. However, the only preserved
argument is that Nurse Yazel’s testimony was admissible as a statement made
for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis. As such, we decline to
15 Rice v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-SC-1076-MR, 2006 WL 436123 at *8 (Ky.
Feb. 23, 2006) (citing Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 491–92 (Ky. App.
1993)).
16 Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007).
17 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).
11
address the Commonwealth’s arguments regarding the hearsay exception for
prior consistent statements and review only those arguments presented to the
trial court.
The determination of whether statements are excluded from the general
prohibition on hearsay under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception
“is governed by a two-part test: ‘(1) the declarant's motive in making the
statement must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment; and,
(2) the content of the statement must be such as is reasonably relied on by a
physician in treatment or diagnosis.’”18
Upon review of Nurse Yazel’s testimony, led by the Commonwealth, we
find that the hearsay contained therein is admissible as statements made for
the purposes of medical treatment and diagnosis. Although a medical provider
may not testify about all conversations with a patient,19 the provider may
testify about the patient’s statements of the “type reasonably relied on by a
physician in treatment or diagnosis . . . and ar[ising] from the declarant’s
purpose of promoting treatment.”20 The Commonwealth mischaracterizes this
rule, stating that only T.J.’s statements Nurse Yazel actually used in treating
T.J. are admissible. However, KRE 803(4) grants admissibility to those
statements made for the purpose of obtaining treatment, so long as they are
the type of statements that a physician would use for treatment or diagnosis.
18 Colvard v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.3d 239, 245 (Ky. 2010) (quoting
Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 561–62 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted)).
19 Tackett, 445 S.W.3d at 27.
20 Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.3d 309, 315 (Ky. 2014).
12
There is no requirement that the statements were determinative of the
treatment or diagnosis provided, but only that they were pertinent for the
patient to disclose under the circumstances.
We find T.J.’s three primary statements to Nurse Yazel—(1) she had been
raped, (2) the assailant had held her at knifepoint, and (3) that the assailant
had tried to force her to consume drugs—were statements made by T.J. for the
purpose of obtaining medical treatment, and they were the type of information
a medical provider would rely upon in treating a patient. These statements
would alert a medical provider to the patient’s potential consumption of or
exposure to recreational drugs, potential knife wounds, and potential vaginal
trauma—factors which would inform the care provided to the patient. As such,
we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the KRE
803(4) hearsay exception applied to Nurse Yazel’s testimony concerning T.J.’s
statements to her.
D. The trial court did not err in admitting the 911 call into evidence.
Before trial, Seymour objected to the Commonwealth’s intended
introduction of the 911 call into evidence. Seymour alleged that admission of
the call into evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
because he would be unable to examine the caller at trial. At trial, Seymour’s
objection was also based on the assertion that the 911 call was inadmissible
hearsay. The trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible because it was
not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and thus the call was not
13
inadmissible hearsay. The trial court did not make a ruling about the
Confrontation Clause issue.
On appeal, Seymour abandons his argument that the 911 call was
inadmissible hearsay and instead only argues that the call should have been
excluded to preserve his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against
him.
“[T]he Confrontation Clause precludes admission of the statements of a
witness unavailable to testify at trial if the witness' out-of-court statements
were ‘testimonial,’ unless the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
the witness.”21 We review such constitutional errors under a harmless-error
standard, meaning that we will affirm the lower court only if we find that any
error committed is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.22
As a threshold matter to addressing Seymour’s argument, we must first
determine whether the 911 call audio submitted into evidence is testimonial in
nature such that Seymour’s right to confrontation is implicated. This Court
has held that “statements that tell ‘what is happening’ are nontestimonial,
while statements that tell ‘what happened’ are testimonial.”23 And we consider
21 Hartsfield v. Commonwealth, 277 S.W.3d 239, 242 (Ky. 2009) (citing Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004)).
22 Nunn v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.3d 741, 750 (Ky. 2015) (internal citations
omitted).
23 Rankins v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Ky. 2007) (quoting Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
14
the perspective and intent of the speaker, rather than the listener, when
determining whether a statement is testimonial.24
The 911 caller provided the following information to the 911 operator:
“There’s a lady outside naked saying a man broke into her apartment and
raped her and she’s screaming for me to call 911.” Further, the 911 caller
stated that T.J.’s assailant had attacked her with a knife, and he was running
“toward the YMCA behind the apartments.” Lastly, the caller relayed to the
911 operator that T.J. was requesting an ambulance. The caller appeared to be
primarily summoning aid for T.J., who was screaming and locked outside of
her home naked. While the caller did relay some of T.J. and Heather’s
statements about the details of the attack, like the assailant’s use of a knife,
her statements were primarily reports of what appeared to be an ongoing
emergency.
We conclude that the 911 call did not constitute a testimonial statement
and, thus, Seymour’s right to confrontation was not implicated. So we affirm
the decision of the trial court to admit the 911 call into evidence, but we do so
on different grounds.25 As such, the trial court did not err in allowing the 911
call to be admitted into evidence.
24 Fisher v. Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. 2021) (internal citation
omitted).
25Pace v. Commonwealth, 529 S.W.3d 747, 758 (Ky. 2017) (citing Kentucky
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 326 S.W.3d 803, 805 n.3 (Ky.
2010)).
15
E. The trial court did not err in allowing the jury access to a computer
during deliberations.
During deliberations, the jury requested access to a computer so it could
view evidence that was contained on a CD. The trial court obliged and
provided the jury with a computer. The CD in question contained three
exhibits: audio of the 911 call, silent body-camera footage from one of the
officers who responded to the 911 call, and video footage of Seymour’s
interview with police. The jury did not specify which of these exhibits it
intended to review. Seymour did not object to the trial court’s grant of the
jury’s request for a computer on which to view the exhibits.
Seymour now alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to
have a computer because one of the exhibits on the CD was video footage of
Seymour’s interview with police—a testimonial witness statement. Because
this argument is unpreserved, we review it only for palpable error.26 Palpable
error is that which creates “manifest injustice” or which is “shocking or
jurisprudentially intolerable.”27 On review, we consider whether there is a
substantial possibility that the outcome of the case would have been different
but for the alleged error.28
RCr 9.72 provides that, “[u]pon retiring for deliberation the jury may take
all papers and other things received as evidence in the case.” This rule has
been interpreted as granting the trial court discretion in determining those
26 Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26.
27 Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3-4 (Ky. 2006).
28 Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006).
16
items of evidence a jury is permitting to bring into the jury room during
deliberations.29 But several categories of evidence have been designated as
exceptions to this rule: “expert opinion letters or summaries, depositions, [and]
recorded witness statements[.]”30 Although these items may be admitted into
evidence, they are not permitted to be taken into the jury room because “doing
so would be akin to sending a witness back to the jury room.”31
Seymour correctly states that testimonial witness statements are
categorically prohibited from being brought to the jury room for review.32 He
also correctly identifies his recorded interview with police as a testimonial
witness statement.33 At the outset, we reaffirm this Court’s longstanding rule
that testimonial witness statements cannot be taken into the jury room. So the
trial court erred in allowing the jury to take the CD containing the video of
Seymour’s interview with police into the jury room. However, Seymour fails to
provide evidence that the testimonial witness statement was viewed by the jury
in the jury room. In cases where improper evidence was taken into the jury
room but was not actually viewed by the jury during deliberations, this Court
has found that the “mere possibility” of improper evidence being viewed by the
29 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 563, 567 (Ky. 2004).
30 McAtee v. Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 608, 620 (Ky. 2013).
31 Id.32 Id. at 622.
33 Id. at 623.
17
jury during deliberations cannot be said to have affected the substantial rights
of the parties.34
Additionally, Seymour fails to show that, if the jury did view his
testimonial witness statement in the jury room, a substantial probability exists
that viewing this video changed the outcome of the jury’s decision. The video of
his interview with police had already been viewed by the jury as an exhibit
during the trial, so even if the jury re-watched the video while deliberating, it
was presented with no new evidence or testimony. So we find no substantial
probability that the trial court’s error in allowing the CD containing Seymour’s
interview with police to enter the jury room changed the outcome of the jury’s
decision, and we conclude that the trial court’s allowing the CD into the jury
room did not rise to the level of palpable error.
F. The trial court did not err in failing to strike Juror No. 2615470 for
cause.
During voir dire, defense counsel asked prospective jurors if they had a
personal experience or a friend or family member who had an experience with
sexual assault. Juror No. 2615470 responded that his sister was involved in
an unresolved sexual assault 30 years earlier. When asked by defense counsel
whether it would be “hard to hear allegations and stories from witnesses” in
this case, he said, “Somewhat.” Defense counsel moved to strike Juror No.
2615470 for cause, and the trial court denied the motion. As a result, defense
34 See Commonwealth v. Wright, 467 S.W.3d 238, 244 (Ky. 2015).
18
counsel used a peremptory strike to exclude Juror No. 2615470 from the jury
pool.
We review a trial court’s decision whether to strike a juror for cause
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.35 We will conclude a trial court abused
its discretion only if we find its decision to be “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,
or unsupported by sound legal principles.”36
In determining whether to strike a potential juror for cause, the trial
court “must weigh the probability of bias or prejudice based on the entirety of
the juror's responses and demeanor.”37 Under RCr 9.36(1), a judge is required
to excuse a prospective juror when there is reasonable ground to believe he or
she cannot be impartial. Such impartiality may manifest itself as a general
state of mind or through a direct response to questioning.38
Seymour argues that because Juror No. 2615470 said that it would be
“somewhat” difficult for him to hear the testimony and allegations in this case,
he lacked the ability to act as an impartial juror. We disagree. It would, no
doubt, be difficult for anyone to hear testimony about an alleged violent rape.
Juror No. 2615470’s difficulty in hearing about the incident at issue in this
case, without more, is not grounds for striking him for cause. This Court has
35Basham v. Commonwealth, 455 S.W.3d 415, 420–21 (Ky. 2014) (internal
citation omitted).
36 Goodyear, 11 S.W.3d at 581.
37 McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.3d 89, 92 (Ky. 2011) (citing Shane v.
Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 338 (Ky. 2008)).
38 See id. (citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936); Pennington v.
Commonwealth, 316 S.W.2d 221 (Ky. 1958)).
19
held that the mere fact that a juror, or, in this case, a juror’s sister, “has been
the victim of a crime like the crime being tried does not by itself imply a
disqualifying bias. Additional evidence of bias is required.”39 Several factors
bearing on the existence of bias are “the similarity between the crimes, the
length of time since the prospective juror’s experience, and the degree of
trauma the prospective juror suffered.”40
Juror No. 2615470’s statements that his sister was involved in an
unresolved incident 30 years prior and that he was close to his sister are an
insufficient basis from which to conclude that he could not participate as an
impartial juror. Juror No. 2615470 did not say or imply that his prior
experience would prevent him from acting impartially, and Seymour did not
ask Juror No. 2615470 if his experience would affect his ability to act as an
impartial juror. Based on this record, we cannot conclude that Juror No.
2615470 lacked the ability to act as an impartial juror. As such, we conclude
that the trial court did not err in denying Seymour’s motion to strike Juror No.
2615470 for cause.
III. CONCLUSION
Finding none of Seymour’s assertions of error meritorious, we affirm the
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
All sitting. All concur.
Ward v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.3d 312, 328 (Ky. 2019) (citing Brown v.
39
Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 598 (Ky. 2010) (internal citations omitted)).
40 Id.20
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Joshua Michael Reho
Louisville Metro Public Defender’s Office
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
21