Blake Haddix v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

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NOT TO BE PUBLISHE D OPINION
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RENDERED : AUGUST 21, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2007-SC-000214-MR
BLAKE HADDIX APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM BREATHITT CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE FRANK A. FLETCHER, JUDGE
NO . 03-CR-000139
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
VACATING AND REMANDING
I. Introduction
A Breathitt County jury convicted Blake Haddix of murder' and of second-degree
assault . 2 In accordance with the jury's recommendation, Haddix was sentenced to
thirty-five (35) years for murder and five (5) years for second-degree assault, to be
served consecutively, for a total of forty (40) years in prison . Appealing to this Court as
a matter of right, Haddix argues the circuit court erred by: (1) failing to conduct a
hearing into the possible impropriety of two jurors; and (2) failing to consider evidence of
non-disclosure by a third juror. Finding the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to
hold a hearing, we vacate the judgment of the court and remand this matter for a
hearing to determine whether Haddix's allegations of juror misconduct are true and, if
so, whether a new trial is warranted.
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 507 .020.
2 KRS 508 .020 .
3 Kentucky Constitution §110(2)(b) .
11 . Factual Background
On the evening of September 5, 2003, Estill Mullins and his father, Woodrow
Mullins, were sitting on Estill's front porch in Breathitt County . Appellant Haddix, who
had known Estill and Woodrow for some time, arrived on a four-wheeler to visit with
them . As they talked, the three men drank beer. After Woodrow came inside, Estill's
wife, Gladys, went to the door and called Estill inside. As Estill was closing the front
door behind him, he was struck by a bullet that came through the window of the front
door. Estill fell to the floor, bleeding from a wound to the head .
Having heard the shot, Gladys headed for the back door so that she could leave
and call the police. As the Mullins's home had no phone, Gladys intended to drive a
short distance to her sister's house. Gladys heard two more shots as she drove away.
As Gladys was leaving, Woodrow grabbed a .410 gauge shotgun and went
outside to confront Haddix . Haddix shot Woodrow twice, with one round traveling from
the chest to the neck and the other round entering the abdomen .
Officers arrived to find Woodrow lying dead on the front porch and Estill lying in
the hallway bleeding from a head wound . Officers also discovered Haddix lying in the
driveway. Haddix appeared to be very intoxicated and had one hand near the grip of a
revolver sticking out of a pocket. Haddix was taken into custody and a .32 caliber
revolver was recovered .
Officers also recovered the .410 gauge shotgun that was found lying near
Woodrow's body. The shotgun had one live round in the chamber . Testimony at the
preliminary hearing indicated no spent shotgun shells were recovered from the scene.
Further, while officers were unable to recover the round that struck Estill, they did
recover both of the rounds that struck Woodrow. Ballistics tests indicated both rounds
that struck Woodrow were fired from the .32 caliber revolver recovered from Haddix.
At trial, Haddix confirmed that he drove to the Mullins's residence on a four-
wheeler, and that the men sat outside drinking beer. However, Haddix claimed that the
men argued over a timber cutting contract . While Haddix denied shooting Estill, he
claimed he shot Woodrow in self defense. Haddix testified that Woodrow came out of
the house with the shotgun and fired it. As Woodrow was reloading, Haddix warned him
not to continue . When Woodrow aimed the shotgun at him, Haddix shot Woodrow.
Haddix's four day trial began on September 26, 2006. While thirteen (13) jurors
were initially seated, one juror was excused on the third day of trial when she advised
the court that she was an acquaintance of James Haddix, a relative of the defendant .
The remaining jurors returned a verdict convicting Haddix and recommending a prison
term of forty (40) years.
111 . Analysis
All claims of error by Haddix relate to juror misconduct . In particular, Haddix has
argued three jurors failed to disclose information during voir dire . In his first post-trial
motion for a new trial, Haddix rated concerns that one juror failed to disclose that he
was a convicted felon and a non-resident of Breathitt County, and that a second juror
failed to disclose that she or a family member had been the victim of a crime . In a
subsequent motion, Haddix alleged that a third juror failed to disclose her relationship to
the victim . Specifically, Haddix alleges the juror's sister was married to the first cousin
of the victim . Haddix contends he did not learn of the information until after trial and,
thus, was denied a fair trial .
Following the first motion, the circuit court agreed to consider the matter and
entered an order directing the Kentucky Bureau of Investigation (KBI) to investigate and
report its findings to the court within sixty (60) days. Apparently, no investigation took
place, nor was a report filed . Nearly three months later, the parties appeared before a
newly elected judge on Haddix's motion to be released on bond . The judge denied the
request for bond, as well as Haddix's pending motions for a new trial based on juror
misconduct, and set a date for final sentencing . Haddix contends this was error.
This Court has recognized that the right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or
jury, is basic to a fair trial . See Paenitz v . Commonwealth, 820 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Ky.
1991) . Further, we have long recognized that:
the right of challenge includes the incidental right that the information elicited
on the voir dire examination shall be true; the right to challenge implies its fair
exercise, and, if a party is misled by erroneous information, the right of rejection
is impaired[ .]
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 182, 223 S.W .2d 741, 743 (1949). Underlying this
rationale is our conclusion that "the question is not whether an improperly established
tribunal acted fairly, but it is whether a proper tribunal was established[ .]" Id .
We agree the circuit court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the allegations
concerning the alleged misconduct of the three jurors. In Smith v. Commonwealth, this
Court recognized the trial court had the option to hold a post-trial hearing to determine
allegations of juror bias . 734 S.W.2d 437, 445 (Ky. 1987) (citation omitted) . In this
case, Haddix brought allegations of juror misconduct. If it is shown that,the first juror
was a convicted felon or a non-resident of Breathitt County at the time of trial in
September of 2006, Haddix would be entitled to a new trial . See Johnson, 223 S .W.2d
4
We do not address the legitimacy of the circuit court's order directing the KBI to investigate . As
we have found the original order to be interlocutory, the KBI issue becomes collateral and irrelevant to our
consideration . Since the first order was interlocutory, it was subject to reconsideration by the court.
Thus, we reject Haddix's claim that collateral estoppel applies to the circumstances present in this case.
4
at 743. In the case of the juror who may have failed to disclose that she or a family
member had been the victim of a crime, the court would have discretion, based on the
circumstances and the juror's knowledge at the time of the verdict, to determine if
Haddix is entitled to a new trial. Likewise, should the third juror be related to the victim
as alleged, the court would have the discretion to determine if Haddix has demonstrated
implied bias based on a relationship by consanguinity or affinity. Pennington v.
Commonwealth , 316 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Ky. 1958) . See also Kentucky Rule of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 9.36. However, Haddix terminates the analysis without considering all
of the requirements.
In Gordon v. Commonwealth, this Court recognized that
In circumstances where no challenge is made to juror qualification prior to or
during trial and the challenge first occurs after rendition of a verdict, a party
seeking relief from the effect of the verdict bears a heavy burden . It is incumbent
upon such a party to allege facts, which if proven to be true, are sufficient to
undermine the integrity of the verdict.
916 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Ky. 1995) . Further, we recognized that "[w]hile we are prepared
to grant relief in a proper case, such will not be lightly undertaken and without a
substantial basis in fact." Id. (internal citation omitted) .
In making a motion for new trial based on juror misconduct, Haddix must show
that the juror was questioned concerning the matter; that the juror failed to disclose the
existence of the relationship; and that he was not aware of the juror's non-disclosure
until after the trial. See Shepherd v. Commonwealth , 269 Ky. 237, 106 S.W.2d 988,
990 (1937) (citation omitted) .
Assuming, without deciding, Haddix's allegations can be supported by evidence,
the burden then shifts to the Commonwealth to prove the juror's knowledge of the
relationship at the time of the verdict. See Pennington, 316 S.W.2d at 224 . See also
Horton v. Commonwealth, 240 S .W.2d 612, 613 (Ky. 1951) . Only after the
Commonwealth has an opportunity to respond can the trial court determine if a new trial
is warranted. In reaching this conclusion, we have recognized that "where the
relationship of a juror to a deceased is remote and unknown to the juror at the time the
verdict was rendered, it does not constitute a valid ground for reversal." Horton , 240
S .W.2d at 613 (citations omitted) .
Further, in the case of the juror with the alleged relationship to the victim, the
circuit court must consider whether the relationship alleged (the juror's sister was
married to a first cousin of the victim) exists and was known to the juror. The court must
then determine whether implied bias based on consanguinity or affinity has been
established . See Davis v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 180, 111 S .W.2d 640 (1937) (juror's
husband was the uncle of the husband to the mother of the deceased - found
relationship not sufficient) ; Cox v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 391, 74 S.W.2d 346 (1934)
(one juror was shown to have the following relationships : (1) the juror was the second
cousin to the wife of the brother of the deceased; and (2) the juror's wife's uncle married
the niece of the deceased - neither relationship was found to be sufficient) . Only if the
circuit court finds that each of the requirements of the analysis is satisfied is a new trial
warranted concerning the allegation that the third juror failed to disclose a relationship to
the victim .
In light of the fact that the court failed to hear evidence concerning Haddix's
allegations of juror misconduct, we reject the Commonwealth's argument that Haddix
failed to meet the heavy burden set out under Gordon , 916 S .W.2d at 179 . Until
evidence has been presented and ruled upon, it is premature to conclude Haddix
cannot meet the required burden .
IV. Conclusion
In light of Haddix's allegations concerning juror misconduct, we conclude the
circuit court abused its discretion by failing to hold a hearing to resolve the claims. For
this reason, we vacate the judgment of the Breathitt Circuit Court and remand this
matter for a hearing to determine whether Haddix's allegations of juror misconduct are
true and, if so, whether a new trial is warranted.
Minton, C.J .; Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, Schroder and Scoff, JJ ., concur .
Venters, J ., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Bruce William Francisky
Michael A. Stidharn
Stidharn & Francisky Law Office
500 Brown Street
P .O. Box 732
Jackson, KY 41339
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204