Mitchell Jackson v. Hon C. Shea Nickell Judge, Court of Appeals

IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISIO,N IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED: FEBRUARY 2014
NOT TO BE PUB IS D
rc l
Suprnur Gurf of ike
a 11A1
2013-SC-000748-OA 1 -1
3-vb-Au\
MITCHELL JACKSON PETITIONER
V. IN SUPREME COURT
HON. C. SHEA NICKELL (JUDGE, RESPONDENTS
COURT OF APPEALS), ET AL.
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
DISMISSING
Petitioner, Mitchell Jackson, brought forth two claims for relief as an
original action in the Supreme Court of Kentucky. The first claim seeks a
summary reversal of the Jefferson Circuit Court's order of revocation of
Petitioner's probation. Petitioner seeks to invoke this Court's jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 110(2)(a) of the Kentucky Constitution.' Alternatively,
Petitioner's second claim requests a writ of mandamus directing the Court of
Appeals to 1) rule on his motion to expedite, 2) rule on his motion for summary
Section 110(2)(a) states, to wit:
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, except it shall
have the power to issue all writs necessary in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or the complete determination of any cause, or as may be
required to exercise control of the Court of Justice.
reversal, and, if necessary, 3) render a decision on the merits. For the reasons
that follow, we dismiss both claims.
I. BACKGROUND
A Jefferson County Grand Jury returned two separate indictments
charging Petitioner with various offenses. In 2003, Petitioner reached a plea
agreement with the Commonwealth, resulting in two separate judgments.
(
Each judgment sentenced Petitioner to ten years' imprisonment to be served
consecutively for a total of twenty years. However, each sentence was probated
for five years.
In 2005, Petitioner pled guilty to additional unrelated charges. The guilty
plea and resulting judgment indicated that Petitioner agreed to a tolling of the
five-year probationary period imposed by the 2003 judgments. Petitioner was
sentenced to eight years' imprisonment, served two years of his sentence, and
received parole.
After his release on parole, Petitioner was indicted again for additional
offenses. 2 Thereafter, the Jefferson Circuit Court entered an order revoking
Petitioner's probation and imposing two ten-year sentences to be served
consecutively pursuant to the two judgments rendered against him in 2003.
Following his probation revocation, Petitioner filed a matter-of-right
appeal with this Court challenging the circuit court's order. Jackson v.
2 This new indictment included charges of possession of a controlled substance,
tampering with physical evidence, resisting arrest, theft by unlawful taking over
$300.00, use/possession of drug paraphernalia, and criminal trespass. The
indictment included further charges of fleeing or evading the police, possession of a
. controlled substance, and use/possession of drug paraphernalia that were dismissed.
2
Commonwealth, 319 S.W.3d 343 (Ky. 2010). Therein, Petitioner argued that
the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation given that the five-
year probation period established in the two 2003 judgments against him had
lapsed. Id. The Commonwealth moved to dismiss or transfer the appeal,
arguing that a probation revocation order did not constitute a "judgment .. .
imposing a sentence" for purposes of Section 110(2)(b) of the Kentucky
Constitution, 3 and, therefore, Petitioner was not entitled to an appeal as a
matter of right to this Court. Id. at 344-45. Agreeing with the Commonwealth,
we dismissed the appeal and directed the Court of Appeals to accept a belated
appeal if one was filed by Petitioner. Id. at 346-47.
In October 2010, the Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's motion to file
a belated appeal. After the filing of Petitioner's reply brief in June 2011, the
appeal was submitted for a decision. 4 In November 2013, Petitioner filed this
original action seeking to compel the Court of Appeals to act on his appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
Petitioner has filed an original action in this Court requesting summary
reversal of the Jefferson Circuit Court's order' revoking his probation or, in the
alternative, a writ of mandamus compelling the Court of Appeals to rule on his
motions or the merits of his case. Before this Court will reach the merits of
3 Section 110(2)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution provides for direct matter-of-
right appeals to the Supreme Court from any "judgment of the Circuit Court imposing
a sentence of death or life imprisonment or imprisonment for twenty years or
more . . . ."
4 Under CR 76.26, "Appeals will be submitted for consideration on the merits by
the appellate court when all briefs have been filed . . . ."
3
Petitioner's original action, we must first establish whether each claim in the
petition was filed in the proper forum.
A. The Supreme Court's Authority to Exercise Supervisory Control over
the Court of Justice
Petitioner acknowledges that both claims in his original action are
seemingly prohibited by CR 76.36(1), which states, in pertinent part, loiriginal
proceedings in an appellate court may be prosecuted only against a judge or
agency whose decisions may be reviewed as a matter of right by that appellate
court." The Supreme Court is undoubtedly an appellate court. Therefore, by
the plain language of CR 76.36(1), original proceedings may be brought in the
Supreme Court only against a judge whose decisions may be reviewed as a
matter of right by the Supreme Court. Petitioner's case is currently before the
Court of Appeals. The only Court of Appeals decisions reviewable as a matter
of right by the Supreme Court are original actions filed in the Court of Appeals
(i.e., a writ of mandamus/prohibition filed in the Court of Appeals) and -
worker's compensation appeals under CR 76.25. See Vessels v. Brown-
Foreman Distillers Corp., 793 S.W.2d 795 (Ky. 1990). Because Petitioner's case
before the Court of Appeals is not itself an original action or a worker's
compensation decision, his appeal is not reviewable as a matter of right in the
Supreme Court. Id. Consequently, CR 76.36(1) bars Petitioner from filing an
original action in this Court.
Nonetheless, Petitioner argues that, even though his original action is
barred by CR 76.36(1), we should still review his claims because the rule is
unconstitutional. Petitioner asserts that CR 76.36(1) violates Section 115 of
4
the Kentucky Constitution, which requires procedural rules to "provide for
expeditious and inexpensive appeals." In support of his argument, Petitioner
contends that CR 76.36(1) fails to provide for expeditious appeal because the
rule prevents most litigants from remedying inaction on the part of the Court of
Appeals. For example, CR 76.36(1) prevents parties such as Petitioner from
bringing an original action for mandamus in this Court against the Court of
Appeals in order to compel the court to act. Therefore, because of CR 76.36(1),
the Court of Appeals can interminably avoid ruling on Petitioner's appeal.
According to Petitioner, to the extent that CR 76.36(1) deprives litigants of any
recourse against a dilatory ruling by the Court of Appeals, the rule frustrates
Section 115's expeditious appeal mandate.
Furthermore, Petitioner contends that the Supreme Court may address
the claims in his original action under the Court's broad authority to act in the
orderly administration of justice regardless of the dictates of CR 76.36(1). In
support of this argument, Petitioner cites Abernathy v. Nicholson, in which this
Court stated, to wit:
Initially, it should be conceded that this Court possesses the raw
power to entertain any case which fits generally within the rubric
of its constitutional grant of authority. As Section 110(2)(a) of the
Constitution contains a provision which grants the Supreme Court
supervisory control of the Court of Justice, virtually any matter
within that context would be subject to its jurisdiction.
899 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Ky. 1995). As alluded to in Abernathy, Section 110(2)(a) of
the Constitution of Kentucky states, in pertinent part, "[t]he Supreme Court
shall have . . . the power to issue all writs . . . as may be required to exercise
control of the Court of Justice."
5
In Vessels, this Court had occasion to consider a conflict between a civil
rule, CR 76.25(12), and a constitutional provision, Ky. Const. § 115. 793
S.W.2d 795. In that case, we determined that Section 115 afforded appeals to
the Supreme Court as a matter of right from the Court of Appeals in workers'
compensation cases. Id. at 798. However, CR 76.25(12) limited appeals of
Court of Appeals workers' compensation decisions to discretionary review. Id.
at 797. Ultimately, we held that Cr 76.25(12) was unconstitutional because it
conflicted with Section 115. Id. at 798.
Similarly, to the extent CR 76.36(1) conflicts with Section 110(2)(a) of the
Kentucky Constitution, we must declare the rule unconstitutional. Section
110(2)(a) affords the Supreme Court the authority to issue all writs necessary
to "exercise control of the Court of Justice." Therefore, in the event that the
Court of Appeals neglects or refuses to rule on a pending appeal, Section
110(2)(a) provides this Court the authority to compel the Court of Appeals to
act through issuance of a writ of mandamus. CR 76.36(1) cannot override
Section 110(2)(a) and limit this Court's ability to issue writs against the Court
of Appeals. See id. ("Only the people by amendment or by convention have the
power to amend or change the constitution.").
However, we still find it prudent to comply with CR 76.36(1) in those
circumstances in which the rule does not conflict with this Court's ability to
"exercise control over the Court of Justice" under Section 110(2)(a). Ordinarily,
CR 76.36(1) supports judicial economy by encouraging the normal appellate
6
process and preventing petitioners from circumventing the Court of Appeals by
filing original actions in the Supreme Court.
In holding that this Court retains the constitutional power to compel the
Court of Appeals to act through the writ of mandamus, we also remove any
concern that CR 76.36(1) fails to provide for expeditious appeals as required by
Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution. Having determined that CR 76.36(1)
cannot bar this Court from issuing those writs necessary to exercise control
over the Court of Justice, we turn to the first claim in Petitioner's original
action, a request for summary reversal of the trial court's order revoking his
probation. Before reaching the merits of Petitioner's claim, we will consider
whether it is a valid invocation of our authority to exercise supervisory control
over the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, that portion of CR 76.36(1) that does not
conflict with Section 110(2)(a) will bar the claim from being filed in this Court.
B. Petitioner's Request for Summary Reversal of the Circuit Court's
Order
Petitioner requests summary reversal of the Jefferson Circuit Court's
order revoking his probation, arguing that the Court of Appeals will not act and
that summary reversal is his only recourse. However, the summary reversal
requested by Petitioner would do nothing to address the Court of Appeals'
failure to rule on his motions and the merits of his case. Instead, it would
address Petitioner's underlying allegation against the trial court, which forms
the basis of his appeal—that the trial court acted outside its jurisdiction by
revoking his probation after the five-year probationary period had passed.
7
In requesting summary reversal of the trial court's order, Petitioner does
not ask us to exercise supervisory control over the Court of Justice, but rather
to wrest a decision previously made from the trial court. This is not the
authority envisioned for the Supreme Court in Section 110(2)(a). When a trial
court neglects or refuses to act, it is the function of an appellate court to
compel it to do so. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co. v. Peers, 747
S.W.2d 125, 126-27 (Ky. 1988) (citations omitted). However, "lilt is not the
function of an appellate court . . . to direct a trial court on how to exercise its
discretion." Id. at 126.
Because Petitioner's request for summary reversal does not invoke this
Court's authority to exercise supervisory control over the Court of Justice, we
find that Petitioner's request for summary reversal is improperly filed in this
forum in violation of CR 76.36(1). In this instance, CR 76.36(1) properly acts to
preserve the appellate process by rejecting Petitioner's original action for
summary reversal, thereby preventing Petitioner from evading the Court of
Appeals. Accordingly, Petitioner's request for summary reversal is dismissed
without reaching its merits. Furthermore, we caution those who would bring
further actions in this vein that the response going forward will be summary
dismissal under CR 76.36(1). 5
5 Additionally, we note that Petitioner's request for summary reversal is
inappropriate in this Court because Petitioner ignored the accepted protocol for
challenging an order of revocation. When a trial judge issues an order revoking
probation, the aggrieved party may file a petition for writ of prohibition or mandamus
against the circuit court in the Court of Appeals. See Lasley v. Shake, 2013 WL
674837 (Ky. Feb. 21, 2013) (affirming Court of Appeals' denial of a petition for writ of
mandamus to reinstate revoked probation); Conrad v. Evridge, 315 S.W.3d 313 (Ky.
8
C. Petitioner's Request for a Writ of Mandamus
Petitioner's second claim in this original action is a request for a writ of
mandamus directing the Court of Appeals to: 1) rule on his motion to expedite
his appeal, 2) rule on his motion for summary reversal, and, if necessary, 3)
render a decision on the merits of his appeal. Several days prior to Petitioner
filing his original action with this Court, the Court of Appeals issued an order
.
denying Petitioner's motion for summary reversal and abating his appeal.
Thus, Petitioner's first two requests have been rendered moot and we need only
address the question of whether Petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandamus
compelling the Court of Appeals to rule on the merits of his case.
As explained above, we have determined that this Court has the
authority to direct the Court of Appeals to act under Section 110(2)(a) of the
Kentucky Constitution. Therefore, CR 76.36(1) cannot mandate that this Court
must dismiss Petitioner's request for mandamus as an original action
improperly filed in the Supreme Court. However, simply because this Court
has the authority to reach the merits of the mandamus portion of Petitioner's
original action does not mean that it must do so in this instance.
In its response and motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals, citing
Abernathy, concedes that the Supreme Court has inherent authority to rule on
original actions as required to control the Court of Justice. Therefore, if ruling
2010) (affirming Court of Appeals' grant of a writ of prohibition where the trial court
acted outside its jurisdiction in revoking petitioner's probation). Petitioner should
have followed the ordinary procedural approach rather than attempting to subvert the
appellate process by filing an original action in this Court.
9
on Petitioner's request for mandamus is necessary to exercise supervisory
control over the Court of Justice, then this Court has jurisdiction to consider
the writ even though it is an original action. However, the Court of Appeals
argues that the Supreme Court is not per se required to hear such original
actions because the exercise of this jurisdiction is discretionary. Respondents
caution that the Supreme Court's ability to entertain cases as original actions
should be used sparingly and that Petitioner's writ does not constitute a proper
case for invocation of that power.
This Court previously addressed its inherent power to entertain original
actions in Abernathy:
The Constitutional language here under review grants this Court
jurisdiction "as may be required to'exercise control over the Court
of Justice." Such language is of a decidedly discretionary tone.
The Court is not thereby required to do anything under'this
provision, but may exercise control if its discretion so indicates. In
view of the essential nature of appellate courts, only in well defined
or compelling circumstances should an original action be
entertained therein.
899 S.W.2d at 88. Respondents are correct that the Supreme Court is not
obligated to consider Petitioner's writ request and should only do so in
"compelling circumstances." Given the explanations for the delay in ruling
provided by Respondents, we find that Petitioner's request for a writ of
mandamus lacks the "compelling circumstances" necessary for this Court to
address a request for writ of mandamus.
In recent years, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has managed a
demanding caseload. Therefore, although delays that are not fully justified
may occasionally occur, only in the most exceptional circumstances would this
10
Court consider an original action to require the Court of Appeals to render a
decision in a pending case.
Petitioner criticizes the Court of Appeals for failing to rule on the merits
of his appeal, which was submitted for a decision on June 13, 2011. In their
response, the Court of Appeals provides an explanation for their delay in
adjudicating Petitioner's appeal. Shortly after the initial panel assignment of
the case, Judge Thomas Wine recused himself, which necessitated
reassignment of the appeal to a different panel. The new panel issued a notice
of assignment on August 18, 2011.
Thereafter, on September 19, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion to cite
additional authority. Petitioner's motion alleged that the opinion rendered in
Dulin v. Commonwealth, 2011-CA-000602-MR, 2012 WL 4036657 (Ky. App.
Sep. 14, 2012), was dispositive of the issue of whether the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction to revoke his probation. Following the Court of Appeals', decision in
Dulin, the Commonwealth filed a motion for discretionary review of the case
with this Court. Discretionary review of Dulin was later granted by order of this
Court.
The Court of Appeals attributes much of the delay in ruling on
Petitioner's appeal to the pending review of Dulin in this Court. Respondents
assert that an opinion by this Court in Dulin has the potential to dispose of the
issues asserted in Petitioner's appeal. In its order denying Petitioner's motion
for summary reversal and abating appeal until this Court resolves Dulin, the
Court of Appeals admits that it had previously "informally" abated Petitioner's
11
appeal. Respondent's brief cites "prudence and judicial economy" as reasons
for the formal abeyance issued in the order. Respondents also explain that
panels of the Court of Appeals "routinely" abate cases pending resolution of
potentially dispositive cases pending in this Court.
Additionally, Respondents note that in November 2012, Senior Judge
Joseph Lambert, the presiding judge of the new panel, retired, necessitating
another reassignment. We find that the Court of Appeals' explanation of the
various factors contributing to its delay in ruling on Petitioner's appeal is
sufficient to mandate dismissal of Petitioner's requested writ without reaching
its merits. On these facts, the Court of Appeals' decision to delay its ruling on
the merits of the case was sound, for it will enable it to consider potentially
dispositive precedent soon to issue from this Court in the Dulin case.
Moreover, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy at least in part because
of the mutual respect this Court has for its fellow jurists. The Court of Appeals
has offered a satisfactory explanation for its delay in reaching the merits of this
case. In light of the Court of Appeals' abatement of Petitioner's appeal and its
explanation for the delay in reaching a ruling, we find it unnecessary for this
Court to reach the merits of Petitioner's original action seeking mandamus.
For the foregoing reasons, that portion of Petitioner's original action requesting
a writ of mandamus is dismissed.
What is more, we issue this word of caution that nothing in this Opinion
should be construed as an open invitation to petitions for mandamus seeking
to compel the Court of Appeals to act. As explained above, we will not reach
12
the merits of writs directed at the ordinary delays of an appeal. Such writs
seek to subvert the appellate process. Therefore, the response of this Court
will be dismissal.
III. CONCLUSION
We dismiss Petitioner's original action for summary reversal as not
properly filed in this forum. In addition, we decline to employ our discretionary
jurisdiction to exercise control over the Court of Justice for the purpose of
considering Petitioner's original action for writ of mandamus and dismiss the
writ without reaching its merits.
Minton, C.J.; Cunningham, Keller, Noble, Scott, and Venters, JJ.,
concur. Abramson, J., concurs in result only.
13
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER:
Daniel T. Goyette, Louisville Metro Public Defender of Counsel
Bruce P. Hackett, Chief Appellate Defender
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS:
Ann P. Swain, Chief Staff Attorney, Kentucky Court of Appeals
COUNSEL FOR COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST:
Jack Conway, Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs, Assistant Attorney General