James Lang v. Honorable Eric Haner

IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
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UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
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BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
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ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
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ACTION.
RENDERED: AUGUST 18, 2022
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2021-SC-0225-MR
JAMES LANG APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. NO. 2020-CA-1477
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
NO. 12-CR-003625
HONORABLE ERIC HANER, JUDGE, APPELLEE
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals’ decision denying a writ of
prohibition to the Jefferson Circuit Court. James Lang, the Appellant, sought
the writ to require the Jefferson Circuit Court to dismiss his indictment for
receiving stolen property over $500 but under $10,000 and giving a peace
officer a false name or address. Lang’s basis for the writ is the indictment was
issued in 2012 and since that time he has not been brought to trial, i.e., his
right to a speedy trial under the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
Section 11 of Kentucky’s Constitution has been violated. The Court of Appeals
denied the writ first, because the record did not demonstrate Lang had ever
asserted his right to speedy trial to the trial court nor did the record disclose
any reasons which might justify the delay; and second, because violations of a
speedy trial right are remediable by direct appeal. We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural Posture
Lang was arrested on September 15, 2012. He was incarcerated in the
Louisville Metro Department of Corrections. On November 28, 2012, the
Commonwealth in Jefferson Circuit Court obtained an indictment against Lang
for receiving stolen property over $500 and under $10,000, and for giving a
peace officer a false name or address. This indictment was unrelated to his
September arrest. Lang asserts a detainer has been in place against him since
November 28, 2012, on this indictment. The Commonwealth, however, has
noted Lang is currently serving a twenty-year sentence for escape and being a
persistent felony offender in the first degree. See Lang v. Commonwealth, No.
2020-SC-0045-MR, 2022 WL 574453 (Ky. Feb. 24, 2022). On January 5, 2021,
Lang filed for a writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeals based on the
violation of his right to speedy trial.
The Court of Appeals noted the approximately eight-year delay in
bringing Lang to trial is presumptively prejudicial, but concluded
based on the limited record in this matter, there is no information
before this Court with respect to the reasons for the delay or
whether the petitioner has asserted his right to a speedy trial in
the Jefferson Circuit Court. Accordingly, this Court holds that
petitioner has failed to demonstrate a violation of his right to a
speedy trial which necessitates the issuance of a writ of
prohibition.
Further, appellant would have a remedy by appeal if he is
convicted in this matter.
We now address the merits of the appeal.
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II. Standard of Review
There are two classes of writs of prohibition. The first class involves those
matters when a circuit court is alleged to be acting outside or beyond its
jurisdiction. The second class involves issues when a circuit court is alleged to
be acting erroneously within its jurisdiction. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151
S.W.3d 803, 808 (Ky. 2001). In the seminal decision of Hoskins v. Maricle, we
held
A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the
lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its
jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an
intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about
to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there
exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great
injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not
granted.
150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004), as modified on denial of reh'g (Dec. 16, 2004).
“One seeking a writ when the lower court is acting ‘outside of its jurisdiction’
need not establish the lack of an adequate alternative remedy or the suffering
of great injustice and irreparable injury.” Goldstein v. Feeley, 299 S.W.3d 549,
552 (Ky. 2009). On the other hand, we have stringently emphasized that, as to
the second class of writs, lack of an adequate remedy by appeal is “the one
requirement that is set in stone and unavoidable.” Gilbert v. McDonald-
Burkman, 320 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Ky. 2010).
A denial of writ is reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. “That
is, we will not reverse the lower court’s ruling absent a finding that the
determination was arbitrary, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
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Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Commonwealth, 504 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2016)
(internal citation and quotation omitted).
III. Analysis
The Court of Appeals’ secondary holding that Lang did not lack an
adequate remedy by appeal demonstrates the lower court analyzed Lang’s
petition for a writ under the second class of writs. We agree with the lower
court that the paucity of evidence and available remedy on appeal precludes
issuing the writ.
The lower court cited Goncalves v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.3d 180 (Ky.
2013), Tackett v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.3d 20 (Ky. 2014), and Henderson v.
Commonwealth, 563 S.W.3d 651 (Ky. 2018), to demonstrate that speedy trial
violations are considered on direct appeal. There is no need for extrapolation.
Appellate courts may remedy violations of the right to speedy trial on direct
appeal and that remedy precludes a writ of prohibition of the second class.
Gilbert, 320 S.W.3d at 85.
We also cannot say the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in
determining the record was not developed enough to sustain issuance of the
writ. “[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis
of the right in the particular context of the case[.]” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 522 (1972). Having reviewed the record, Lang has not attached anything
which might tend to prove that he has ever asserted his desire for a speedy trial
to the trial court, orally or written; nor is there any record that the trial court
has ever considered such a motion and rejected it. See Smith v. Com., 636
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S.W.3d 421, 445 (Ky. 2021) (noting assertion of speedy trial right both orally
and in writing is a factor to consider in analysis). He has not attached a motion
to dismiss for violations of said right either. There is no attachment from the
trial court record of any kind. “[I]t is an appellant's burden to present a
complete record and to establish that an error is preserved for our review.”
Early v. Commonwealth, 470 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Ky. 2015). The Court of Appeals
did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue the writ based on an
insufficient record.
Finally, we briefly note Lang’s statutory right to a speedy trial under
KRS1 500.110. Lang never cited to this statute in his petition before the Court
of Appeals, and he cites it only once before this Court merely to highlight the
egregiousness of the delay of his trial. But even if we could say the Court of
Appeals should have analyzed the petition under the auspices of KRS 500.110,
we still would affirm for the lack of a record because there is no proof of a
detainer, no proof a request for speedy trial was made to the trial court nor
notice of said request being sent to the Commonwealth. See Spivey v. Jackson,
602 S.W.2d 158 (Ky. 1980); Donahoo v. Dortch, 128 S.W.3d 491 (Ky. 2004).
The Court of Appeals is affirmed.
All sitting. All concur.
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
James Lang, pro se
APPELLEE:
Hon. Eric Haner, Judge
Jefferson Circuit Court
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST:
Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jeanne Anderson
Special Assistant Attorney General
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