Inquiry Commission v. Ronnie Lee Goldy, Jr.

TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2022-SC-0289-KB
INQUIRY COMMISSION MOVANT
V. IN SUPREME COURT
RONNIE LEE GOLDY, JR. RESPONDENT
OPINION AND ORDER
DISSOLVING TEMPORARY SUSPENSION
This matter is before the Court upon Ronnie L. Goldy, Jr.’s motion to
terminate temporary suspension, pursuant to SCR 3.165(4). Goldy was
previously ordered temporarily suspended from the practice of law on
September 16, 2022. The Kentucky Bar Association has responded, arguing
that Goldy has not presented any new information to the Court justifying
termination of the temporary suspension, and that he continues to present a
substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public. For the following
reasons, we dissolve the temporary suspension.
Goldy was the Commonwealth’s Attorney for the 21st Judicial Circuit
beginning January 1, 2013. In 2015 or 2016, he met Misty Helton when she
was incarcerated in the Rowan County Detention Center. Goldy and Helton
began a relationship. Goldy would communicate with Helton directly through
text messages and social media, frequently requesting and receiving nude
images and videos of Helton. In return, Goldy intervened on Helton’s behalf in
several criminal cases throughout his jurisdiction, and attempted to use his
position to influence a criminal case in Clark County. Specifically, Goldy had
multiple bench warrants recalled on Helton’s behalf and agreed to change
hearing dates.
The Special Commissioner made findings of fact that
The evidence establishes probable cause to believe that Ronnie Lee
Goldy, Jr., while serving as the Commonwealth Attorney for the
21st Judicial Circuit, engaged in personal communications with
Misty Helton, a defendant in the 21st Judicial Circuit, regarding
her various criminal cases. He discussed Ms. Helton’s criminal
matters with her directly without her counsel being present and
clearly intervened on her behalf by having court dates moved or
warrants recalled. In return for his actions, Mr. Goldy solicited
nude pictures and videos from Ms. Helton.
The Special Commissioner found that for a “period up to seven years” this
conduct occurred, and that “Mr. Goldy abused his power by using his official
position as Commonwealth’s Attorney to provide Ms. Helton with assistance in
criminal matters for her benefit while he expected and requested actions of a
sexual nature from her for his benefit.”
Based upon the Special Commissioner’s findings and conclusion that
probable cause existed to believe that “Mr. Goldy’s professional misconduct
poses a substantial threat of harm to the public pursuant to SCR 3.165(1)(b),”
we ordered him temporarily suspended from the practice of law during the
pendency of the Inquiry Commission’s investigation.
Since that time, Goldy has been formally charged with one count of
violation of SCR 3.130(4.2). That rule reads,
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has
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the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a
court order.
Additionally, the House of Representatives passed Articles of Impeachment
against Goldy, and the Senate duly impeached him on March 30, 2023. Goldy
is no longer the Commonwealth Attorney for the 21st Judicial Circuit and may
not hold any elected office again. Ky. Const. § 68.
Goldy has argued that his temporary suspension for more than 180 days
is overly punitive when compared to other cases of attorneys who were also
found to have violated SCR 3.130(4.2). For example, he cites Callis v. KBA, 143
S.W.3d 603 (Ky. 2004); Moore v. KBA, 950 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1997); Brachter v.
KBA, 290 S.W.3d 648 (Ky. 2009); and Riley v. KBA, 349 S.W.3d 301 (Ky. 2011).
He also argues that both he and his wife have lost their jobs, and he is unable
to secure employment elsewhere.
None of the cases cited by Goldy involved a Commonwealth’s Attorney, a
fact we think extremely important. Goldy is correct, however, that public
reprimand is the typical sanction when there is only a violation of SCR
3.130(4.2). Moore, 950 S.W.2d at 231; Callis, 143 S.W.3d at 604; Bratcher, 290
S.W.3d at 650; Sipes v. KBA, 290 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Ky. 2009). But all of these
were negotiated sanctions. In the Riley case, although it involved sexual
communications, the rule violated there was SCR 3.130(1.7(b)). 349 S.W.3d at
302. And again, it was a negotiated sanction.
In the case of Stevens v. KBA, we issued a public reprimand for a former
Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney who had a sexual affair with a defendant,
although he was not the prosecuting attorney in her case. 186 S.W.3d 744, 744
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(Ky. 2006). That case is distinguishable, however, because Stevens admitted to
the affair, apologized and expressed regret publicly, was cooperative with the
investigation, “and he made no offers of compromise or any kind of deal to the
Defendant. His behavior did not prejudice the Commonwealth or any party.” Id.
at 745.
SCR 3.165(4), in pertinent part, states “The Respondent may for good
cause request dissolution or amendment of any such temporary order by
petition filed with the Court . . . .” “Good cause” is defined as a “legally
sufficient reason.” Good Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). This
raises the question of what is good cause or a legally sufficient reason to
dissolve or amend an order of temporary suspension. A temporary suspension
may only be ordered upon probable cause to believe one or more of four
circumstances exists: misappropriation of funds; a substantial threat to clients
or the public; a criminal conviction calling into doubt an attorney’s moral
fitness to practice law; or mental disability, mental incapacity, or substance
abuse. SCR 3.165(1)(a)-(d). In this case, the order was predicated on a finding
of probable cause existing to believe Goldy posed a substantial threat to his
clients or the public. That conclusion was inextricably linked to his position as
a Commonwealth’s Attorney. Thus, the precise question before the Court is
whether there is a legally sufficient reason to find that probable cause no
longer exists to believe Goldy poses a substantial threat to his clients or the
public. Generally, a respondent must demonstrate this affirmatively by
showing that the facts which predicated the probable cause finding either were
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incorrect or a change of circumstances has occurred that essentially nullifies
the finding of probable cause. This is necessarily a case-by-case analysis.
In this case, Goldy was the Commonwealth’s Attorney. He had no clients
but was the representative of the public-at-large. He has denied the charge
against him and refused to resign from his office. Goldy’s tenure in office is
now no longer in question. He has been impeached and is removed. Manifestly,
there is no longer probable cause to believe he poses a substantial threat to the
public by abusing the power of an office he no longer holds. But is there
probable cause to believe his practice of law as a private attorney poses a
substantial threat to his clients or the public? There simply are no facts in the
record to support that conclusion. There is no public record of Goldy having
ever been previously disciplined by this Court before our order of temporary
suspension. Moreover, nothing in the Special Commissioner’s report this Court
adopted as its own to support the order of temporary suspension mentioned,
much less relied upon, prior disciplinary history. Nothing in the Special
Commissioner’s report suggests that Goldy’s conduct towards Helton was part
of a general pattern with multiple persons. The pending charge of one count of
violating SCR 3.130(4.2) is predicated on Goldy’s conduct towards Helton. In
short, the facts in this record only support the conclusion that Goldy’s
conduct, while occurring over a seven-year period, was isolated to just one
person; and this conduct was bound up with Goldy’s position as a
Commonwealth’s Attorney.
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We must also be cognizant that a temporary suspension is not punitive
in nature. It rests on a probable cause standard which, in a different context,
we have explained means “a good reason to act, . . . it does not mean certainty,
or even more likely than not . . . .” Goben v. Commonwealth, 503 S.W.3d 890,
913 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Hanson v. Dane Cnty. Wisconsin, 608 F.3d 335, 338
(7th Cir. 2010)). Typically, sanctions may only be issued upon a preponderance
of the evidence standard. SCR 3.330(4).
Therefore, good cause has been shown by a change in circumstances to
conclude there is no longer probable cause to believe Goldy poses a substantial
threat to his clients or the public. We caution, however, that nothing in this
order should be interpreted as pre-judging or anticipating the conclusions of
the Trial Commissioner regarding the pending charge against Goldy, or the
recommendation of the Board of Governors on that charge. We remind the
parties that this Court possesses the authority to impose discipline as it
determines is appropriate, should it ultimately be concluded that Goldy has
violated SCR 3.130(4.2). SCR 3.380; KBA v. Myers, 457 S.W.3d 725, 726 (Ky.
2015) (“[T]he Trial Commissioner's Report is advisory . . . .”).
The temporary suspension of Ronnie L. Goldy, Jr., from the practice of
law is dissolved.
All sitting. Conley, Lambert, Nickell, Thompson, JJ., concur. VanMeter,
C.J., and Bisig, J., dissent without separate opinion.
ENTERED: June 15, 2023.
___________________________
CHIEF JUSTICE
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