Bobby Jones v. Trey Sturdivant

RENDERED: APRIL 16, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2019-CA-1636-MR
BOBBY JONES APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE THOMAS L. TRAVIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 17-CI-02188
TREY STURDIVANT APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
CALDWELL, JUDGE: Bobby Jones (“Jones”) appeals orders of the Fayette
Circuit Court following entry of a judgment upon a jury verdict in favor of Trey
Sturdivant (“Sturdivant”). As we agree with Jones that the trial court erred in not
declaring a mistrial and in not granting a new trial, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings in conformity with this Opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a collision between vehicles driven by Steve
Gumm (“Gumm”) and Sturdivant. Jones was a passenger in Gumm’s vehicle and
allegedly suffered injuries from the collision. Jones filed a lawsuit against both
Gumm and Sturdivant, alleging that both negligently operated their vehicles
causing the collision and injuries to him.
Jones settled with Gumm on the eve of trial. The case proceeded to a
jury trial only on Jones’ claim against Sturdivant. Disputed issues at trial included
whether Gumm or Sturdivant had a green light when going through the intersection
and whether and to what degree Jones’ physical problems were caused by the
accident rather than pre-existing conditions.
The collision occurred on October 26, 2016 at the intersection of Man
O’War Boulevard and Blazer Parkway in Lexington. Sturdivant was driving
straight toward the intersection in one direction while Gumm approached from the
opposite direction. Their vehicles collided when Gumm turned left at the
intersection. Both Sturdivant and Gumm claimed to have had a green light when
going through the intersection.1
1
Sturdivant asserted on page 1 of his Appellee brief that Jones’ claim against Sturdivant hinged
solely on whether Sturdivant had run a red light, citing to statements in Sturdivant’s trial
memorandum to the same effect. But from our review of Jones’ complaint, Jones did not
directly and specifically allege in his complaint that Sturdivant had run a red light and could only
be held liable for failure to stop at a red light. Instead, the complaint more generally alleged that
Gumm and Sturdivant had both operated their vehicles in a negligent manner causing the
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Jones, Sturdivant, and Gumm testified at the trial. According to
Jones’ trial testimony, he did not remember the actual collision. He could not
remember what color the traffic light was immediately before the collision. Nor
could he remember anything he said immediately after the collision.
Gumm said he remembered stopping at the intersection for several
seconds due to a red traffic light. He testified that the light had just turned from
red to a green arrow when he turned left. He had not seen Sturdivant’s vehicle
before turning, and he admitted that he did not know if Sturdivant swerved since
Sturdivant’s vehicle seemingly came out of nowhere. Gumm also testified that
immediately after the accident, Jones exclaimed the other driver was at fault.
Sturdivant testified to having a green light while he drove through the
intersection and to seeing Gumm’s vehicle “inch up” to the intersection. But he
believed that Gumm’s vehicle would stop at the intersection. When Sturdivant saw
Gumm’s vehicle turning left, Sturdivant applied his brakes and tried to swerve to
avoid a collision according to his trial testimony.
Sturdivant sought to present the testimony of a city traffic engineer at
trial about the sequencing of traffic lights at the intersection on the date of the
collision—for example, about whether a red light would immediately be followed
collision and injuries to Jones. And the trial court instructed the jury about driver’s various other
duties (such as keeping a lookout, maintaining a reasonable speed and control of the vehicle, and
exercising ordinary care to avoid a collision) in addition to the duty to stop at a red light.
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by a green light or whether there would be a flashing yellow light in between. But
due to failure to timely disclose the nature of this testimony, the trial court granted
Jones’ motion to exclude this witness’s testimony although it stated that other
evidence about sequencing (such as videos) could possibly be admitted. Although
Sturdivant presented the engineer’s testimony by avowal when the jury was not
present, no sequencing evidence was presented for the jury’s consideration.
On multiple occasions during the two-day trial, Jones lodged
objections and moved for a mistrial based on defense counsel’s alleged failure to
abide by the trial court’s pretrial orders in limine. The trial court denied all mistrial
motions, sustained most objections and admonished the jury to disregard the
references to the prohibited matters in most instances. This pattern occurred from
voir dire through closing argument and involved issues including seat belt use, tax-
free status of damage awards, and Jones’ prior receipt of Social Security disability
(SSD) benefits.
After the presentation of evidence, the trial court provided its
instructions to the jury. The first question for the jury to answer was whether it
believed that Sturdivant failed to comply with applicable duties of care when
driving and that such failure was a substantial factor in causing the accident. If the
jury were to answer yes, it would then answer other questions in further
instructions such as determining whether the other driver (Gumm) might be
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partially at fault2 and determining what, if any, damages were due to Jones. But if
the jury answered no to the first question and thus determined that Sturdivant was
not liable, the jury would return its verdict in favor of Sturdivant to the trial court
and would not need to go on to other instructions.
The jury answered “no,” determining that Sturdivant was not liable
and returning a verdict in his favor. Jones then filed post-trial motions claiming
various errors and arguing that the trial court should have granted a mistrial.
Additionally, he argued the court should now grant a new trial, and it should
sanction opposing counsel for alleged repeated failures to comply with pretrial
orders.
At a hearing on the post-trial motions, the trial judge stated his belief
that errors had occurred due to defense counsel seemingly not being cognizant of
the trial court’s pretrial rulings on various topics. Defense counsel even explicitly
agreed with the trial judge’s statement that defense counsel had not fully complied
with orders in limine. But noting that objections had been sustained and
admonitions given, the trial court questioned whether the errors rose to the level of
necessitating a mistrial.
2
Jones, as a passenger, was not alleged to have been at fault, and the trial court’s instructions did
not provide the jury with the opportunity to decide if Jones bore any degree of fault.
-5-
Jones’ argued that defense counsel’s actions had undermined his case
and prejudiced the jury against finding in his favor. Defense counsel pointed out
that the problematically addressed issues related to damages rather than
determining Sturdivant’s liability. He argued that the errors did not ultimately
affect the outcome since the jury simply found Sturdivant not liable.
The trial judge orally indicated that sequencing evidence might be
admitted on retrial and would make a finding of Sturdivant’s liability even less
likely. He expressed doubt that a new trial would change the outcome of the case.
Although the trial court did not orally rule on this issue at the conclusion of the
hearing, the trial court later denied Jones’ motion for a new trial in a written order
without further elaboration.
As for Jones’ motion for sanctions against defense counsel,3 the trial
court reserved ruling on this issue pending any appeal in its initial written order.
3
The trial court asked Jones’ counsel at the hearing whether the motion for sanctions was in
conjunction with another post-trial motion or was independent of the resolution of any other
motion. Jones’ counsel affirmed that the motion for sanctions was independent of other motions.
Contained within the same document as other post-trial motions including the motion for a new
trial, Jones’ Motion for Sanctions states:
The Court is well aware that it has inherent authority to award
sanctions, to hold parties in contempt, to award attorneys’ fees, to
strike their pleadings and to award all necessary relief based on the
circumstances before this Court. Due to the number and gravity of
Defendant’s violations of the Court’s Orders, Plaintiff additionally
moves for sanctions against the Defendant and asks the Court to
award attorneys’ fees for Plaintiff’s preparation for the first trial,
participation in the first trial, and preparation and argument of
post-trial motions from the first trial, including all related costs and
-6-
And after Jones filed a motion demanding a ruling on this issue, the trial court
again entered an order reserving its ruling on the issue pending appeal. Jones then
filed a timely appeal of the trial court’s judgment on the jury verdict.
On appeal, Jones asserts that defense counsel frequently accused him
of hiding evidence and asked him about issues precluded by court orders. He
argues that even though the trial court sustained his objections, it just added fuel to
the fire of Sturdivant’s accusations of Jones’ hiding evidence.
From our review of the record, several prospective jurors expressed a
desire to know about insurance and other collateral source payments in voir dire,
although it does not appear that all of their questions were entirely due to defense
counsel’s actions. And there appeared to be some controversy about defense
counsel arguing or inquiring about medical records without expert testimony
discussing them. Generally, we are aware that the trial court permitted defense
counsel to ask Jones about his medical records for purposes of cross-examination
about whether he experienced neck pain before the accident but did not allow such
records to be taken back as exhibits. We are also aware that defense counsel
expenses, to be paid within 10 days of the Court’s Order on this
issue. Lake Village Water Ass’n v. Sorrell, 815 S.W.2d 418 (Ky.
App. 1991) (in addition to their authority under statutes and
remedial rules, courts may invoke inherent power to impose
attorney fees and related expenses on party as sanction for bad-
faith contempt).
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initially discussed a supposedly similar sequencing schedule at a different
intersection during voir dire but that ultimately no sequencing evidence was
presented. Although we are aware of such other controversies, we decline to try to
resolve every controversy arising in this trial but instead focus on only the most
problematic issues which lead to our conclusion that the trial court erred in neither
declaring a mistrial nor granting Jones’ motion for a new trial.
ANALYSIS
We reverse and remand as we conclude that the trial court erred in not
declaring a mistrial or granting a new trial for the reasons stated herein. As the
trial court has not previously ruled upon Jones’ motion for sanctions, we decline to
address this issue further other than to direct the trial court to determine what, if
any, sanctions are appropriate. See Klein v. Flanery, 439 S.W.3d 107, 122 (Ky.
2014) (“As an appellate court, we review judgments; we do not make them.”). We
also decline to address Jones’ contention that the trial court erred in not removing a
particular juror for cause as unnecessary to the resolution of this case since we
reverse on the failure to declare a mistrial and the failure to grant a new trial.
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently discussed standards governing
a trial court’s ruling on mistrial motions and appellate review of such rulings in
Roberts v. Commonwealth, 599 S.W.3d 841 (Ky. 2020). It recognized that
demonstrating “manifest necessity” for the extreme remedy of a mistrial is difficult
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and that a trial court’s ruling on a mistrial motion should not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 851-52.
Despite the somewhat deferential abuse of discretion standard of
review and the difficulty of demonstrating a manifest necessity for a mistrial, the
Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately determined in Roberts that the trial court erred
in denying motions for a mistrial. In large part due to the prosecution’s repeated
references to an inadmissible matter (a prior assault),4 the Supreme Court
determined that the criminal defendant did not receive a fair trial and that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying her mistrial motion. Id. at 853. We
recognize that Roberts is a criminal case in which an appellate court concluded that
the trial court erred in its instructional and evidentiary rulings in addition to
erroneously denying a mistrial motion. See id. at 847-51. Nonetheless, it suggests
that individual errors which might not necessitate mistrial by themselves can
together create a manifest necessity for a mistrial.
4
In Roberts, the trial court ruled that the prosecution could admit evidence of a 2003 assault if it
provided a proper foundation. Id. at 846. The Supreme Court determined that the trial court
erred in this ruling and should not have permitted any evidence of this assault whatsoever. At
trial, the prosecution violated the trial court’s order by introducing evidence of the assault
without a proper foundation. Id. at 848. Despite the trial court’s offering an admonition which
would presumably cure the error from the initial reference to the assault, the Supreme Court
determined that the trial court’s mishandling of other references to the assault (including its
response to juror questions) compounded the effect from individual errors. Id. at 849-53.
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In reversing and remanding based on the erroneous denial of mistrial,
the Kentucky Supreme Court stated: “These multiple errors, one added to the next,
created just the sort of manifest necessity our precedent envisions for the extreme
remedy of a mistrial.” Id. at 853. Similarly, in the instant case, the cumulative
effect of defense counsel’s repeated references to inadmissible, prejudicial matters
precluded by orders in limine5 created a manifest necessity for the extreme remedy
of a mistrial. For the following reasons, we conclude the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Jones’ mistrial motions.
Reference to Issues About Failure to Wear a Seat Belt
In jury selection, defense counsel asked prospective jurors if they
were familiar with Kentucky law requiring passengers to wear seat belts6 and
whether they agreed with holding people responsible for not wearing a seat belt.
But provisions in the pretrial order in limine provided:
5
As the trial judge asked defense counsel in the hearing on post-trial motions: “Just the sheer
cumulative effect of those misstatements and errors or things that seem to be a violation of the
court’s pretrial orders on motions in limine, in particular, why does that not justify his client
[Jones] receiving a new trial, sir?” (Video Record 9/18/2019, 3:27:45-3:28:01.)
6
Jones argues that defense counsel mis-stated the law, citing Tetrick v. Frashure, 119 S.W.3d
89, 92-93 (Ky. App. 2003) (determining that no duty to wear a seat belt is imposed on passengers
by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 189.125(6), which then provided in pertinent part: “No
person shall operate a motor vehicle manufactured after 1965 on the public roadways of this state
unless the driver and all passengers are wearing a properly adjusted and fastened seat belt, unless
the passenger is a child who is secured as required in subsection (3) of this section.”). We note
that the current version of KRS 189.125(6) is substantially the same except that it now refers to
motor vehicles manufactured after 1981 instead of 1965.
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18. The Plaintiff’s [Jones’] motion to preclude
evidence of the Plaintiff’s failure to wear a seatbelt and
that such a failure may have been a statutory violation or
evidence of negligence per se is SUSTAINED by
agreement.
19. The Plaintiff’s motion to preclude comment or
evidence from the Defendants that fault should be
assessed to the Plaintiff for failure to wear a seatbelt or
that such failure caused or enhanced his injuries is
SUSTAINED by agreement.
(Order dated June 13, 2019, attached as Tab G, Appendix to Appellant’s brief, p.
4.) See also KRS 189.125(5), providing: “Failure to use a child passenger
restraint system or a child booster seat shall not be considered as contributory
negligence, nor shall such failure to use a passenger restraint system or booster seat
be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action. Failure of any person to
wear a seat belt shall not constitute negligence per se.”
The trial court sustained Jones’ objection to Sturdivant’s discussion of
seat belt use in voir dire, denied Jones’ mistrial motion, and admonished the jury
that whether anyone had been wearing a seat belt was not an issue in the case.
(Jones’ counsel declined a similar admonition that whether Jones wore a seat belt
was not an issue for their consideration perhaps to avoid the jury focusing on
whether Jones wore a seat belt.) Sturdivant does not dispute Jones’ contention that
the defense failed to come forward with expert proof showing that Jones’ failure to
wear a seat belt caused or contributed to his injuries. Even assuming arguendo that
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the seat belt use issue by itself would not have necessitated a mistrial, the improper
injection of this issue in voir dire together with other factors had a cumulative
effect casting significant doubt on whether Jones received a fair trial.
Tax-Free Status of Awards
Three times during voir dire, defense counsel asked prospective jurors
how they would feel about receiving different sums of money “tax-free.” But the
trial court’s pretrial order precluded the defense “from stating that any damage
award is free of federal or state income tax . . .” upon the parties’ agreement.
Jones moved for a mistrial due to the “tax-free” references which he argues
suggested any damage awards would be tax-free. The trial court denied the
mistrial motion and declined to give an admonition, and Jones did not request an
admonition.
Sturdivant points out that his counsel did not directly state that any
damage awards were tax-free and asserts that technically the order was not violated
because defense counsel did not ask the jury about a tax-free award of the amount
of damages sought by Sturdivant. Nonetheless, defense counsel’s repeatedly
asking prospective jurors how they would like to receive different sums of money
tax-free can be reasonably construed as implicitly suggesting that money awarded
as damages to Jones would be tax-free. And despite denying the mistrial motion
and agreeing with defense counsel that technically its order had not been violated,
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the trial judge expressed being uncomfortable with how defense counsel asked
prospective jurors about their feelings about receiving money tax-free. Even
assuming arguendo that the “tax-free” issue by itself did not necessitate a mistrial,
it was at best an unnecessary and potentially prejudicial distraction from the real
issues to be decided by the jury and together with other problematic factors
contributed to a cumulative effect of casting significant doubt on whether Jones
received a fair trial.
Social Security Disability (SSD) Benefits
At the hearing on motions in limine, the trial court stated that given
issues about whether Jones’ physical problems stemmed from pre-existing
conditions or resulted from the collision, inquiry would be permitted about whether
Jones had applied for disability benefits. But the trial court indicated that the
Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) determination of disability and the
amount of the SSD award were inadmissible. Its written order, however, denied
Jones’ motion in limine “to the extent that it seeks to preclude evidence of the
[Jones’] Social Security disability benefits” although it granted his motion to
otherwise preclude “comment or evidence” about “prior claims, settlement, or
receipt of insurance or other benefits . . . .” To the extent that the trial court’s
written order conflicted with its oral rulings, the written order prevails. See
generally Machniak v. Commonwealth, 351 S.W.3d 648, 652 (Ky. 2011) (“When
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there is a conflict between a court’s oral statements and the written judgment,
the written judgment controls.”). The trial court had also ordered Jones to provide
his SSD application if in his possession, but it declined to order Jones to sign an
authorization so that defense counsel could obtain a copy of Jones’ application.
During voir dire, defense counsel asked prospective jurors whether
any of them had filed for disability or had family members who had filed for
disability. Jones’ counsel asked to approach the bench, and the trial judge asked
why defense counsel was asking the prospective jurors about disability. Defense
counsel explained Jones had filed for disability and was receiving it at the time of
the accident. But given the collateral nature of disability issues, the trial court
permitted no other questions on the topic and told defense counsel to just get the
juror numbers of those who had raised their hands and move on.
As Sturdivant points out, Jones’ counsel asked Jones during direct
examination whether he received Social Security disability benefits and Jones
admitted that he was receiving such benefits at the time of the collision. And from
our review of the record, Sturdivant states correctly in his brief that the defense
never told the jury that Jones’ SSD benefits paid for treatment after the collision,
and defense counsel never referred to the amount of Jones’ SSD benefits. But
Jones claims that defense counsel placed undue emphasis on issues about him
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receiving SSD beginning in voir dire and opening statement and continuing
through proof and closing argument.
Defense counsel cross-examined Jones about his not providing the
defense with a copy of his application for SSD benefits (which he claimed not to
possess) nor signing an authorization for the defense to obtain such a copy. Jones
objected. At the bench, defense counsel explained that Jones had been saying he
was not trying to hide anything and that defense counsel wished to make the point
that Jones could have requested a copy of the application. The trial judge pointed
out that he did not make Jones sign an authorization and sustained the objection
because of the collateral nature of the issue.
During closing argument, defense counsel argued in pertinent part:
This isn’t a small injury or an insignificant condition he
was dealing with before the accident. This is a serious
thing. And then we all heard in 2009, the federal
government termed him to be disabled. He was in so
much pain he couldn’t work. Now, I’m from Eastern
Kentucky, if you all have not figured that out yet. I know
things about people filing disability benefits. You don’t
get it for arthritis in your back. Okay? It’s got to be a
serious problem where somebody can make
determination that you’re in so much pain, you can’t go
to work and the government will pay you to stay home.
Defense counsel also asserted in closing that Jones “claimed over and over again
that he wasn’t trying to hide anything” but Jones did not share his SSD application
with the defense as Jones said he did not have the application. Defense counsel
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contended that Jones could have signed an authorization so that the defense could
see what the application said about why Jones had filed for disability, especially
since Jones asserted he was not hiding anything. Jones again moved for a mistrial,
which the trial court denied while expressing hope that defense counsel would
move on from that particular argument which it found to be very collateral.
Although some defense inquiry about Jones’ seeking disability
benefits was proper due to its relevance to determining whether his injuries arose
from pre-existing conditions rather than the accident, we agree with Jones that
defense counsel’s statements about his receipt of SSD benefits went beyond the
limits permitted by the trial court’s pre-trial order and Kentucky precedent.
Counsel’s assertions in closing that he had personal knowledge about how SSD
benefits worked and for what conditions one could receive them as a person from
Eastern Kentucky is particularly troubling. Triplett v. Napier, 286 S.W.2d 87, 90
(Ky. 1955) (citation omitted) (Despite the great latitude afforded to counsel in
making closing arguments, holding that counsel cannot refer to matters outside the
record but must confine argument “to matters in issue and to facts shown by
competent evidence, with proper inferences to be drawn therefrom. The personal
experience related to the jury by counsel for appellee had no part or place in the
argument on the matters at issue in the present case.”).
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Also problematic was defense counsel’s reference to the SSA’s
determination of Jones’ disability and discussion of how this meant Jones was in
too much pain to do any work. Jones points out in his brief that another
jurisdiction’s courts have held determinations of disability for Social Security
purposes depend on different standards and are not very helpful to assessing prior
physical condition for tort claims. See Evans v. Sisters of Third Order of St.
Francis, 506 N.E.2d 965, 969 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987) (in medical malpractice cases,
SSA’s and state agency’s determinations of total disability were not relevant for
determining plaintiff’s physical condition prior to treatment as “a determination of
total disability by these agencies does not necessarily indicate a total loss of all
bodily movement and control” and so frequent references to the agencies’
disability determinations “deprived the plaintiffs of a fair trial and constituted
reversible error”); Cargnino v. Smith, 308 N.E.2d 853, 856 (Ill. Ct. App. 1973)
(determination of total disability for Social Security and black lung benefits was
not relevant to determining plaintiff’s physical condition prior to accident and
should be excluded under collateral source rule as “plaintiff’s prior physical
condition can be established without any reference to governmental agencies’
standards for disabilities from unrelated causes or any reference to benefits which
such agencies disburse.”).
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Sturdivant asserts that Kentucky courts apply a different rule than
Illinois about admitting evidence of SSD determinations and benefits, citing Peters
v. Wooten, 297 S.W.3d 55 (Ky. App. 2009). And he claims that no Kentucky case
holds that “the admission of a Social Security disability award automatically
violates the collateral source rule and constitutes reversible error.” As Sturdivant
points out, we recognized that the general rule against admitting evidence of
collateral source benefits is subject to exceptions for malingering or to refute
claims of financial hardship in order to prevent parties from misleading the jury.
Wooten, 297 S.W.3d at 63. But though some evidence relating to seeking or
receiving disability benefits may be relevant to addressing disputes about pre-
existing injuries or whether another party’s actions caused financial hardship, we
do not read Wooten to allow for references to the SSA’s total disability
determination such as that which occurred in defense counsel’s closing argument.
Even if other mentions of Social Security disability issues did not by
themselves merit the extraordinary remedy of a mistrial, we conclude that the trial
court erred in denying Jones’ mistrial motion based on defense counsel’s
discussion of Social Security disability issues in closing. The cumulative effect of
other errors, in combination with and culminating in problematic statements about
SSD in closing argument, created a manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial. See
Roberts, 599 S.W.3d at 853. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in denying
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Jones’ mistrial motion lodged during the defense closing argument if not in
denying those mistrial motions lodged earlier in trial.
In addition to its error in denying Jones’ mistrial motions during trial,
we also conclude that the trial court erred in denying Jones’ motion for a new trial.
We recognize that the trial court’s ruling on Jones’ motion for a new trial is subject
to a significantly deferential standard of review, perhaps more deferential than that
applied to a ruling on a mistrial motion. See Jefferson v. Eggemeyer, 516 S.W.3d
325, 337 (Ky. 2017) (a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial is presumed
correct and should only be reversed for clear error, yet: “If, after review, the Court
finds that the evidence and the jury’s verdict are not reasonably related, the Court
may find the trial court’s denial of a party’s motion for a new trial was an abuse of
discretion and clearly erroneous.”).
Despite the deferential standard of review, we conclude that the trial
court erred in denying the motion for a new trial under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case. Specifically, the repeated references to topics
precluded by pretrial orders casts significant doubt on Jones receiving a fair trial.
As discussed by the Kentucky Supreme Court in a case with repeated instances of
failure to comply with the trial court’s directives in closing argument, such conduct
cannot be condoned. See Risen v. Pierce, 807 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Ky. 1991) (In
reversing judgment based on jury verdict in part for counsel’s repeated failure to
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comply with trial court directives during closing argument, stating: “We recognize
the difficult circumstance counsel imposed upon the trial court. Be that as it may,
however, we cannot overlook such behavior as it is antithetical to a fair trial.”).7
Jones moved the trial court for a new trial pursuant to Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.01 “because of irregularities in the proceedings and
errors of law which occurred at trial, resulting in a verdict that was not supported
by sufficient evidence.” He also stated in his written motion that “CR 59.01(b)
provides that a new trial may be granted for misconduct by the prevailing party.”
(Record, p. 871, also p. 4 of Tab C to Appellant’s brief). So, he appeared to invoke
CR 59.01(a)(b) and (f).8 He also discussed case law about improper arguments and
7
We recognize that the judgment in Risen was reversed in part because of an error in jury
instructions in addition to the conclusion that improper comments in closing argument deprived a
litigant of a fair trial. Although the majority opinion does not explicitly discuss whether the
litigant requested declaration of a mistrial during trial or filed a post-trial motion for a new trial
or both, a statement in the dissenting opinion indicates both declaration of a mistrial and grant of
a new trial were sought: “Like the Court of Appeals, I attach great weight to the refusal of the
trial judge to declare a mistrial and, even more importantly, to grant a new trial even after the
jury’s verdict in favor of the defendant became known.” Id. at 950 (Spain, J., dissenting).
8
CR 59.01 provides in pertinent part that a new trial on some or all issues may be granted for:
(a) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or prevailing
party, or an order of the court, or abuse of discretion, by which the
party was prevented from having a fair trial.
(b) Misconduct of the jury, of the prevailing party, or of his
attorney.
....
(f) That the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or is
contrary to law.
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references to excluded or extraneous matters meriting new trials in his written
motion. See generally Risen, 807 S.W.2d 945; Smith v. McMillan, 841 S.W.2d
172 (Ky. 1992).
Jones’ motion for a new trial afforded the trial court the opportunity to
consider, with the benefit of hindsight, whether Jones received a fair trial. From
our review of the recording of the hearing on the new trial motion, the trial judge
expressed some doubts about whether Jones received a fair trial in light of defense
counsel’s repeated failures to comply with court orders. Yet the trial judge
ultimately denied Jones’ motion for a new trial because he believed that a new trial
would not result in a more favorable outcome for Jones, especially if sequencing
evidence were presented.
Like the Kentucky Supreme Court in Risen, we sympathize with the
trial court’s difficulties in dealing with the issues caused by defense counsel’s
repeated reference to matters which it ordered precluded. And we understand the
trial judge’s reluctance to re-try the case especially since the trial judge believed
the outcome was unlikely to change. Nonetheless, we cannot let stand its judgment
on the jury verdict where repeated violations of trial court orders and precedent
resulted in Jones being deprived of a fair trial, regardless of whether any prejudice
could be conclusively shown. See Risen, 807 S.W.2d at 949:
While we cannot say with certainty that the improper
argument affected the result, we cannot say it did not. A
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party aggrieved by egregious argument should not be
required to demonstrate prejudice, ordinarily an
impossible task, for to do so would in most cases render
reviewing courts powerless to correct the error.
Moreover, we take this opportunity to state that such
conduct will not be tolerated.
In ruling on the motion for new trial, the trial court should have
considered only whether the parties received a fair trial without speculating on
what evidence might be presented in the new trial and what the ultimate outcome
might be. After all, the baseline question in ruling on a motion for a new trial is
whether this trial was fundamentally fair, not whether a future trial would likely be
more or less advantageous to the requesting party.9 Furthermore, we cannot
wholeheartedly accept the trial court’s assessment that the ultimate outcome (a jury
verdict in favor of Sturdivant) would not change in a new trial if sequencing
evidence was presented. Perhaps traffic sequencing evidence on retrial might
somehow conclusively show that Sturdivant had a green light and Gumm did not
when traveling through the intersection. Even so, this would not necessarily show
that Sturdivant did not breach other duties defined in the jury instructions such as
his duties to keep a lookout ahead, keep his vehicle under reasonable control, travel
at a reasonable speed, and exercise ordinary care to avoid a collision. From our
9
The listed grounds for filing a motion for a new trial in CR 59.01 all focus on what previously
happened (such as misconduct or irregularities in proceedings) with the exception (not applicable
here) of CR 59.01(g): “Newly discovered evidence, material for the party applying, which he
could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.”
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review of the record, it does not necessarily appear inevitable that a jury would
find no breach of duties substantially contributing to causing the accident on
Sturdivant’s part. Even if it might appear unlikely that Sturdivant be found to bear
the lion’s share of comparative fault if he had a green light, one cannot lightly
assume that a reasonable jury could not find him to have breached any duties at all
which could have substantially contributed to causing the accident.
Given defense counsel’s repeated violations of the trial court’s orders
in limine, we cannot say that the jury’s determination that Sturdivant was not liable
was not affected by irrelevant and prejudicial matters which could likely have
prejudiced the jury against any finding for Jones. These matters, including
suggestions that any damage award he received would be tax-free, suggestions of
Jones being totally incapacitated before the collision based on his receiving SSD
benefits, and seemingly drawing attention to matters excluded by trial court orders
in order to suggest that Jones had something nefarious to hide, ultimately resulted
in a fundamentally unfair trial.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Jones’ motion
for a new trial as well as in denying his mistrial motion despite any apparent lack
of egregious errors by the trial court in handling other matters. We are aware that,
unlike this case, other cases reversing for denial of motions for mistrial or a new
trial often also involved significant other errors by the trial court, see e.g., Risen,
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807 S.W.2d 945; Roberts, 599 S.W.3d 841. Nonetheless, under the unique facts
and circumstances of this case, defense counsel’s admitted repeated failures to
comply with the spirit if not the letter of the trial court’s order in limine resulted in
Jones being deprived of a fair trial. Thus, Jones’ motions for mistrial and for a
new trial were erroneously denied. Other arguments raised by the parties in their
briefs which are not discussed herein are lacking in merit or unnecessary to our
resolution of this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings in conformity with this Opinion. Upon remand, the trial court shall
rule upon Jones’ motion for sanctions as well as affording him the opportunity for
a new trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sandra M. Varellas Brad E. Moore
D. Todd Varellas Kristin M. Lomond
Lexington, Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky
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