Zayer Antonio Adams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

RENDERED: JANUARY 7, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-0062-MR
ZAYER ANTONIO ADAMS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE ANDREW C. SELF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-CR-00379
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2021-CA-0064-MR
ZAYER ANTONIO ADAMS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE ANDREW C. SELF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-CR-00235
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, JONES, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
JONES, JUDGE: Zayer Adams appeals from the Christian Circuit Court’s order
denying his motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to RCr1 11.42. After a
thorough review of the record, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A thorough recitation of the facts of this case may be found in the
Kentucky Supreme Court’s unpublished opinion on Adams’s direct appeal. Adams
v. Commonwealth, No. 2016-SC-000627-MR, 2017 WL 6379489 (Ky. Dec. 14,
2017). Briefly stated, Adams was charged for severely beating his ex-wife,
Stephanie Shakoor, while holding her captive in her apartment on the morning of
February 4, 2016, and attempting to flee from the police after they arrived at the
apartment in response to a neighbor’s call. Id. at *1. Shakoor suffered numerous
injuries, including swelling, bruising, corneal abrasion, and fractures to the
maxillary bones and the bones adjacent to the sinus cavity; these latter injuries
resulted from Adams repeatedly kicking Shakoor in the face. Adams was
thereafter convicted at jury trial for second-degree assault, first-degree fleeing or
evading police, first-degree unlawful imprisonment, and being a first-degree
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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persistent felony offender. Id. The jury recommended a sentence of fifteen years
for the assault conviction, to be served consecutively with a seven-year sentence
for unlawful imprisonment; however, the trial court imposed a concurrent sentence
of twenty years in order to comply with KRS2 532.110(1)(c). Id. The Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed Adams’s judgment and sentence on direct appeal. Id. at
*5.
Adams subsequently filed a pro se motion to vacate his conviction
under RCr 11.42, arguing he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel during his
trial. Adams specifically contended, inter alia, that trial counsel failed to
investigate his mental health issues in order to present mitigating evidence to the
jury during the penalty phase. (Record (R.) at 77.) The trial court appointed post-
conviction counsel to assist Adams and held an evidentiary hearing on July 7,
2020.
During the evidentiary hearing, Adams’s trial counsel testified about
his prior knowledge of Adams’s mental health and about counsel’s preparation for
trial. He testified he was aware Adams had some mental health issues, and he had
investigated the matter by reviewing a recent district court case in which the
district court had found Adams competent following a psychological evaluation.
Trial counsel stated he wanted Adams to get an evaluation from the Kentucky
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC), but Adams did not wish to pursue the
competency issue further. Additionally, trial counsel testified about how difficult
it was for him to investigate and prepare for the penalty phase of the trial because
Adams did not wish to discuss mitigation in general or to reveal information about
his childhood. Even so, trial counsel testified that he tried to contact Adams’s
mother in preparation for trial. The last known address trial counsel was able to
find for Adams’s mother was a homeless shelter, but he was unable to locate her
there.
Next, Adams’s trial counsel testified about his preparation for trial
and the speed at which Adams’s case progressed. Trial counsel admitted that the
case moved very fast and that he would have preferred to have more time to
prepare for trial. He explained that Adams was insistent on moving things along
quickly and that Adams opposed trial counsel’s plans to ask the court for a
continuance.
Adams also testified at the RCr 11.42 evidentiary hearing. He
asserted his mother had “a mental defect” and that he suffered from a similar
condition. He described his upbringing, his mental health medications, how he
was not able to read or write, and how his mother was not at his trial. Adams also
admitted he asked for a fast and speedy trial because he needed medical treatment
for an injury to his hand, though his testimony was unclear regarding how these
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two items were connected. In addition to his testimony, Adams submitted a
collective exhibit to the court containing documents dating from the early 1980s
from Pennyroyal Center, in which Adams was diagnosed as low-functioning and
suffering from attention deficit disorder.3 The trial court ultimately denied
Adams’s RCr 11.42 motion. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A successful petition for relief under RCr 11.42 based on ineffective
assistance of counsel must survive the twin prongs of “performance” and
“prejudice” provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), accord Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky.
1985). The “performance” prong of Strickland requires as follows:
Appellant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. This is done by showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment, or that counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.
Parrish v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.3d 161, 168 (Ky. 2008) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). The “prejudice” prong requires a showing that
“counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
3
The Pennyroyal Center provides mental health and related services to individuals in western
Kentucky.
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whose result is reliable.” Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d 731, 736
(Ky. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064).
Both Strickland prongs must be met before relief pursuant to RCr
11.42 may be granted. “Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said
that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that
renders the result unreliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
This is a very difficult standard to meet. “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is
never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1485, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010). We review counsel’s performance under
Strickland de novo. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d at 736.
For his sole issue on appeal, Adams contends his trial counsel was
ineffective in his failure to investigate and prepare for the penalty phase of
Adams’s trial, particularly in his failure to present evidence to mitigate Adams’s
punishment. Adams argues a competent attorney would have gathered documents
similar to the ones in the collective exhibit and presented them to the jury, and the
failure of trial counsel to do so was deficient performance. Furthermore, Adams
contends he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s performance, pointing to the
fact that his jury recommended a consecutive sentence which exceeded the limits
imposed by statute.
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In its order denying the RCr 11.42 motion, the trial court determined
that, “[o]ther than possibly introducing records from the Pennyroyal Center from
the 1980’s – which may or may not have been admissible – it is unclear what else
Adams believes his trial counsel should have done.” (R. at 148.) The trial court
also found that trial counsel’s “investigation and preparation were sufficient and
reasonable” in light of Adams’s unwillingness to assist with preparations for the
penalty phase. Id. We agree.
“In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance
inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the
circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. However,
[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be
determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s
own statements or actions. Counsel’s actions are usually
based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made
by the defendant and on information supplied by the
defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are
reasonable depends critically on such information.
Id. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. Adams’s trial counsel testified how Adams did not
wish to engage with him on questions regarding his childhood or on mitigation
generally. Trial counsel attempted to locate Adams’s mother as a mitigation
witness, but she could not be found at her last known address. Finally, Adams
opposed any kind of continuance, further hindering what actions counsel could
undertake on his behalf. Trial counsel nonetheless attempted to provide mitigation
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information to the jury through Adams’s testimony in the penalty phase. The
record supports the trial court’s determination that Adams’s trial counsel provided
reasonable investigation and preparation under the circumstances.
“[C]ounsel is constitutionally ineffective only if performance below
professional standards caused the defendant to lose what he otherwise would
probably have won.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Ky. 2008)
(citations omitted). We cannot say trial counsel provided deficient performance
under the first prong of Strickland.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Christian Circuit Court’s
order denying relief under RCr 11.42.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David L. Stewart Daniel Cameron
LaGrange, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Stephanie L. McKeehan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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