Ron Copley v. Greer Mining, Inc.

RENDERED: JANUARY 28, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0888-MR
RON COPLEY AND RHONDA
COPLEY APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM ELLIOTT CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE REBECCA K. PHILLIPS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-CI-00007
GREER MINING, INC. AND ELMO
GREER & SONS, LLC APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND McNEILL, JUDGES.
McNEILL, JUDGE: Appellants, Ron and Rhonda Copley, sustained damage to
their home on February 10, 2015 as a result of blasting activity conducted as a part
of improvements being made to Route 7 in Sandy Hook, Kentucky, by Appellees,
Greer Mining, Inc., and Elmo Greer & Sons, LLC (hereafter “Greer”). On May
20, 2015, Appellants executed a document (hereafter, the “Release”), releasing
Greer and their insurer from liability in exchange for $105,976.10 in
compensation. More than eight months later, Appellants filed a lawsuit seeking,
inter alia, mental/emotional damages, and punitive damages for trespass to land,
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED). After years of litigation, the trial court granted Greer’s
motion for summary judgment. In so holding, the court determined that Appellants
failed to present evidence supporting their claims for IIED and NIED, and that
emotional damages arising from the tort of trespass were not permitted under
Kentucky law. However, in the final paragraph of its order, the trial court
provided:
[E]ven if such damages were to be deemed otherwise
compensable in a claim for trespass, such “damages”
would appear to be encompassed within the terms of the
release to the extent they are tied to the claim for
trespass.
As to the issue of punitive damages, the court concluded that they were also
waived pursuant to the terms of the Release. In so holding, the court observed that
“[t]he settlement of the property claim is all-inclusive and covers liability for all
damages stemming from the injury to the property as a result of the occurrence.”
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Greer’s
favor. Having considered the record and the law, we disagree.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” CR1 56.03. The Kentucky Supreme Court further explained this summary
judgment standard in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.:
While it has been recognized that summary
judgment is designed to expedite the disposition of cases
and avoid unnecessary trials when no genuine issues of
material fact are raised, . . . this Court has also repeatedly
admonished that the rule is to be cautiously applied. The
record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all
doubts are to be resolved in his favor. Even though a
trial court may believe the party opposing the motion
may not succeed at trial, it should not render a summary
judgment if there is any issue of material fact. The trial
judge must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue
of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists. It clearly is
not the purpose of the summary judgment rule, as we
have often declared, to cut litigants off from their right of
trial if they have issues to try.
807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991) (citations omitted). “Because no factual issues
are involved and only a legal issue is before the court on the motion for summary
judgment, we do not defer to the trial court and our review is de novo.” Univ. of
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Louisville v. Sharp, 416 S.W.3d 313, 315 (Ky. App. 2013) (citation omitted). With
these standards in mind, we turn to the applicable law and the facts of the present
case.
ANALYSIS
The trial court engaged in an exhaustive analysis of Kentucky law and
secondary source material concerning the availability of emotional damages arising
from the tort of trespass. The court also discussed the Release at length. We
believe that the Release is dispositive of all present issues. It provides in relevant
part as follows:
[The Copleys], being of lawful age and being competent
to enter into this Release, for sole consideration of $105,
976.10, to be paid to Ron and Rhonda Copley no later
than 14 business days from the date Claimant executes
this Release, does hereby and for my heirs executors,
administrators, successors and assigns release, acquit and
forever discharge The Travelers Indemnity Company,
Elmo Greer & Sons Inc. and their agents, servants,
employees, successors, heirs, executors, administrators
and all other persons, firms, corporations, associations or
partnerships of and from any and all claims, actions,
causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs,
statutory interest, loss of service, expenses and
compensation whatsoever which the Undersigned now
has or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in
any way growing out of any and all known and unknown,
foreseen and unforeseen, property damage and the
consequences thereof resulting or to result from the
occurrences on or about 02/10/2015 at or near 6824 Hwy
7, Sandy Hook, KY 41171.
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(Emphasis added.) The language employed in the release is all encompassing. See
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ruschell, 834 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Ky. 1992) (citation
omitted) (“the scope of a release is determined primarily by the intent of the parties
as expressed in the release instrument”). In that same vein, the Release is a
contract governed by the basic principles of contract law:
Where a contract is ambiguous or silent on a vital
matter, a court may consider parol and extrinsic evidence
involving the circumstances surrounding execution of the
contract, the subject matter of the contract, the objects to
be accomplished, and the conduct of the parties. Absent
an ambiguity in the contract, the parties’ intentions
must be discerned from the four corners of the
instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence. A
contract is ambiguous if a reasonable person would find
it susceptible to different or inconsistent interpretations.
The fact that one party may have intended different
results, however, is insufficient to construe a contract at
variance with its plain and unambiguous terms.
Generally, the interpretation of a contract, including
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, is a
question of law for the courts and is subject to de
novo review. However, once a court determines that a
contract is ambiguous, areas of dispute concerning the
extrinsic evidence are factual issues and construction of
the contract become subject to resolution by the fact-
finder.
Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Ky. App.
2002) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Having considered Appellants’
arguments, they have not cited to any authority or evidence of record that would
require this Court to look beyond the four corners of the Release in this instance.
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Therefore, summary judgment in Greer’s favor was appropriate and we need not
address the merits of whether damages for emotional or mental distress arising
from the tort of trespass are permitted under Kentucky law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the order of the
Elliott Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William H. Wilhoit James R. Chadward Kessinger
Grayson, Kentucky Sean P. Johnson
Louisville, Kentucky
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